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ABSTRACT	
	
The	period	from	1910	to	1939	was	one	of	the	most	turbulent	chapters	in	New	South	
Wales	labour	history.	It	was	defined	by	intense	ideological	conflict,	winner-take-all	
factional	warfare,	widespread	 accusations	 of	 corruption	 and	multiple	 Labor	 Party	
splits.	 Intertwined	within	 these	 issues	were	questions	of	democracy	and	oligarchy	
within	 the	 labour	 movement.	 To	 what	 extent	 should	 members	 control	 labour	
institutions?	Democracy	within	 unions	 and	parties	means	 control	 by	 the	ordinary	
members	and,	where	necessary,	their	accountable	representatives.	Oligarchy	sits	at	
the	 opposite	 end	 of	 the	 spectrum	 from	 democracy	 and	 entails	 organisational	
domination	 by	 a	 small	 group	 of	 leaders.	 This	 thesis	 examines	 the	 tensions	 and	
struggles	between	democracy	and	oligarchy	within	three	key	labour	organisations.	
	
Events	inside	one	major	organisation	affected	what	happened	inside	the	others	and	
my	study	is	therefore	relational	and	comparative,	examining	the	Australian	Workers	
Union	(AWU),	the	Miners	Federation	and	the	NSW	Labor	Party.	Both	the	AWU	and	
NSW	 Labor	 Party	 were	 oligarchies	 and	 became	 more	 oligarchical	 over	 time.	
Conversely,	 the	Miners	Federation	was	highly	democratic,	although	 it	 too	became	
less	democratic	over	time.	The	NSW	Labor	Party	was	an	 interconnected	oligarchy,	
both	influencing	and	influenced	by	its	affiliated	trade	unions.	These	influences	were	
complicated	 and	 sometimes	 counterintuitive.	 At	 times	 the	 effects	 were	
straightforward,	with	organisations	and	leaders	transposing	their	own	methods	into	
another	organisation,	but	in	other	instances	the	participation	of	oligarchical	unions	
and	union	leaders	enhanced	democracy	within	the	Labor	Party	and	vice	versa.		
	
Oligarchy	 predominated	 in	 the	 AWU	 and	 NSW	 Labor	 Party	 but	 it	 was	 always	
contested.	Countervailing	tendencies	against	oligarchy	were	continuously	operating	
in	 some	 form,	 even	 when	 the	 organisations	 were	 at	 their	 least	 democratic.	 My	
analytical	 framework	 comes	 from	 the	 sociological	 literature	 on	 trade	 union	 and	
political	party	democracy	and	I	compare	each	organisation’s	community,	rules,	local	
autonomy,	rank-and-file	decision-making,	 internal	opposition,	 free	communication	
and	 equality	 between	 officials	 and	 members.	 The	 key	 factor	 that	 separated	 the	
	8	
democratic	Miners	Federation	from	the	oligarchical	AWU	and	Labor	Party	was	that	
the	miners	worked	and	lived	within	united,	stable	occupational	communities	in	which	
the	 majority	 of	 union	 members	 and	 officials	 believed	 in	 democracy	 and	 worked	
towards	its	realisation.		
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PREFACE	
	
At	the	end	of	my	second	year	of	university,	Kevin	Rudd	led	the	Australian	Labor	Party	
to	victory	in	the	November	2007	federal	election.	John	Howard	was	the	only	Prime	
Minister	 I	 could	 remember.	 We	 have	 since	 observed	 a	 “revolving	 door	 Prime-
Ministership”	as	the	Labor	and	Coalition	party	rooms	deposed	Prime	Ministers	Rudd,	
Julia	Gillard	and	Tony	Abbott.	In	this	context,	I	became	interested	in	factionalism	and	
the	internal	workings	of	political	parties.	
	
Democracy	and	oligarchy	within	political	parties	and	trade	unions	are	topical	issues	
today	in	Australia	and	around	the	world.	I	saw	something	relevant	in	the	media	most	
days	as	I	wrote	this	thesis;	from	self-interested	politicians	of	all	stripes,	to	the	corrupt	
farce	of	the	Health	Services	Union	(HSU),	to	the	voluminous	and	depressing	details	
of	the	Royal	Commission	 into	Trade	Union	Governance	and	Corruption.	One	thing	
that	 these	parties	 and	unions	have	 in	 common	 is	 a	 lack	of	meaningful	 control	 by	
members.	
	
I	also	worked	at	Woolworths	supermarket	while	writing	this	thesis.	Unloading	trucks	
and	stacking	shelves	provided	physical	balance	to	my	sedentary	scholarship.	Labour	
history	shows	us	that	safety,	dignity	and	fairness	at	work	had	to	be	won.	Fortunately,	
unskilled	Australian	workers	today	enjoy	relatively	high	wages	and	conditions	thanks	
to	unions	and	governments	past	and	present.	At	the	same	time,	however,	my	union,	
the	 Shop	Distributive	and	Allied	 Employees	Association	 (SDA),	 leaves	much	 to	 be	
desired.		
	
The	Fair	Work	Commission	recently	found	that	the	SDA	agreements	with	Woolworths	
and	Coles	have	 left	workers	worse	off	 than	 the	Award,	which	 is	meant	 to	be	 the	
minimum	 safety	 net.	 The	 union	 somehow	 spent	 millions	 of	 dollars	 of	 members’	
money	to	negotiate	a	deal	that	left	workers	worse	off.	And	yet	I	expect	the	current	
leaders	will	be	re-elected	because	they	promote	themselves	tirelessly	in	the	union	
publications.	When	I	started	work	the	SDA	gave	me	an	Entertainment	Voucher	Book	
plastered	with	a	large	photo	of	the	current	leader.	I	also	received	a	pen	with	his	name	
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on	it.	These	are	only	slightly-updated	versions	of	the	methods	that	oligarchical	union	
leaders	used	over	a	century	ago	and	which	I	discuss	in	this	thesis.	
	
After	exploring	organisational	democracy	and	oligarchy	for	the	past	four	years	I	am	
not	 surprised	 by	 the	 current	 state	 of	 Australia’s	major	 political	 parties	 and	 trade	
unions.	I	now	believe	that	party	and	union	democracy	is	unusual	and	unlikely,	but	
still	 possible	 in	 some	 circumstances.	 Understanding	 these	 circumstances	 will	
sometimes	enable	us	to	create	democratic	organisations,	but	more	often	it	will	allow	
us	to	understand	that	democracy	in	a	particular	organisation	(like	the	HSU	or	SDA)	is	
unlikely	 and	 that	 leaders	 need	 to	 be	 held	 accountable	 by	 other	 means	 such	 as	
legislation	and	government	scrutiny.	
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INTRODUCTION	
Democracy,	oligarchy	and	labour	organisation	
	
Historians	have	written	extensively	on	the	NSW	labour	movement	 in	the	 interwar	
period.	 Yet	 they	 have	 only	 provided	 a	 fragmentary	 account	 of	 institutional	
democracy	and	oligarchy.	There	has	been	an	absence	of	detailed	explanation	of	how	
and	why	specific	organisations	were	democratic	or	oligarchic,	and	of	relational	and	
comparative	analysis	of	the	ways	in	which	democracy	or	oligarchy	within	one	labour	
organisation	affected	the	others.	There	has	also	been	a	stark	lack	of	engagement	with	
the	extensive	literature	from	the	fields	of	sociology	and	political	science	on	party	and	
union	democracy.	This	thesis	will	address	some	of	these	gaps	in	the	historiography	
through	a	relational,	comparative,	and	theoretically	informed	analysis.	
	
The	 NSW	 labour	 movement	 was	 highly	 interconnected.	 Events	 inside	 one	 major	
organisation	 affected	 what	 happened	 inside	 the	 others.	 My	 study	 is	 therefore	
relational	 and	 comparative,	 focusing	 on	 three	 key	 institutions:	 the	 Australian	
Workers	Union	(AWU),	the	Miners	Federation	and	the	NSW	Labor	Party.	The	AWU	
and	Miners	Federation	were	two	of	the	largest	and	most	influential	trade	unions	in	
the	state.	They	also	provide	for	good	comparison;	the	AWU	was	the	archetypal	trade	
union	 oligarchy,	 while	 the	Miners	 Federation	was	 a	 democratic	 exception	 to	 the	
oligarchic	norm.	Both	unions	were	at	various	times	affiliated	and	not	affiliated	to	the	
NSW	 Labor	 Party,	 which	 was	 the	 dominant	 political	 party	 within	 the	 labour	
movement.1	
	
I	argue	that	the	NSW	Labor	Party	both	influenced,	and	was	influenced	by,	its	affiliated	
trade	unions.	These	 influences	were	complicated	and	sometimes	counterintuitive.	
Usually	the	effects	were	straightforward,	with	organisations	and	leaders	transposing,	
or	 attempting	 to	 transpose,	 their	 own	methods	 into	 another	 organisation.	 But	 in	
other	 instances	 the	 involvement	 of	 oligarchical	 leaders	 from	 one	 organisation	
increased	democracy	in	another	and	vice	versa.	Oligarchy	was	always	contested	and	
																																								 																				
1	Jim	Hagan	and	Ken	Turner,	A	History	of	the	Labor	Party	in	NSW	1891-1991		(Melbourne:	Longman	
Cheshire	1991):	78-94.	
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resisted.	Throughout	this	thesis	I	continually	highlight	the	democratic	impulses	that	
were	operating	against	oligarchy	and	explain	why	they	were	or	were	not	successful	
in	specific	circumstances.	
	
In	this	introduction	I	define	these	terms	-	democracy	and	oligarchy	-	and	explain	how	
I	will	consider	them	in	practice.	I	then	survey	the	organisations	selected	in	this	study,	
the	sources	used,	the	chronology	covered	and	the	existing	historiography.	I	introduce	
my	 thesis	 argument,	 which	 is	 that	 the	 three	 labour	 organisations	 were	 closely	
interconnected,	that	they	had	significant	and	sometimes	counterintuitive	effects	on	
one	another,	and	that	while	there	was	a	strong	inclination	towards	oligarchy	it	was	
constantly	resisted	and	even	overcome	in	some	circumstances.	
	
Democracy:	definitions,	types	and	debates	
Democracy	means	 “rule	by	 the	people”	but	opinion	 varies	widely	 as	 to	what	 this	
popular	 rule	should	entail	and	the	extent	 to	which	the	people	should	 in	 fact	 rule.	
There	 are	 three	 main	 types	 of	 democracy:	 “participatory”,	 “direct”	 and	
“representative”.	In	a	participatory	democracy,	all	members	can	discuss	every	aspect	
of	each	decision	and	agree	on	a	solution	 for	 the	group.	 In	a	direct	democracy,	all	
members	can	vote	for	or	against	a	set	question	while	in	a	representative	democracy	
members	can	elect	other	members	to	make	decisions	on	their	behalf.2	In	practice,	
most	democratic	systems	include	elements	from	more	than	one	type.	
	
A	decision	contains	three	main	components:	“what	is	the	question?”,	“what	are	the	
possible	answers?”	and	“which	answer	will	be	chosen?”	A	system	is	more	democratic	
when	 the	 members	 have	 more	 direct	 control	 over	 these	 components.	 By	 this	
definition,	participatory	democracy	is	the	most	democratic	as	members	can	control	
all	three	components.	Direct	democracy	is	the	second	most	democratic	as	members	
can	have	direct	control	over	which	answer	will	be	chosen.	Representative	democracy	
is	the	least	democratic	as	 it	does	not	give	members	direct	control	over	any	of	the	
																																								 																				
2	Helena	Catt,	Democracy	in	practice		(London:	Routledge,	1999):	1.	
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three	components.	But	members	can	influence	their	representatives	at	each	of	the	
three	stages,	most	obviously	through	the	representatives’	desire	for	re-election.3	
	
Democracy	can	range	from	strictly	majoritarian,	in	which	the	minority	have	no	real	
power	or	 rights,	 to	 systems	which	provide	 varying	degrees	of	minority	 rights	 and	
power	sharing.	The	AWU,	Miners	Federation	and	Labor	Party	all	promoted	strongly	
majoritarian	 views	 of	 democracy.	 The	 Miners	 Federation’s	 1916	 rules	 succinctly	
advised	members:	“have	your	say	during	debate	but	cheerfully	accept	the	will	of	the	
majority”.4	The	three	organisations	ostensibly	retained	some	minority	rights	such	as	
free	speech	but	these	minority	rights	declined	greatly	during	the	interwar	years	in	
the	AWU	and	Labor	Party	and	to	a	lesser	extent	in	the	Miners	Federation.	
Elected	representatives	can	be	thought	of	as	either	“delegates”,	who	act	on	behalf	
of	the	wishes	of	the	voters,	or	“trustees”,	who	make	what	they	believe	is	the	best	
decision,	regardless	of	the	views	of	their	electors.5	Elitists	argue	that	representatives	
have	greater	knowledge	and	expertise	and	should	aim	to	make	the	“correct”	decision	
for	the	good	of	members,	even	if	the	majority	of	members	do	not	agree.	Those	who	
support	popular	rule	counter	that	representative	democracy	only	exists	because	of	
the	 logistical	 impossibility	 of	 large-scale	 participatory	 democracy,	 and	
representatives	should	do	what	the	majority	of	members	want.	In	practice	these	two	
views	often	coexist.	In	present-day	Australian	politics,	for	example,	a	combined	view	
prevails	 in	which	representatives	are	thought	to	strive	to	broadly	represent	public	
views	while	also	being	willing	and	able	to	make	unpopular	“tough	decisions”	when	
necessary.6	
	
As	Robert	Dahl	has	recognised,	democracy	as	“rule	by	the	people”	is	an	“unattainable	
ideal”,	 so	 assessing	 whether	 a	 country	 or	 organisation	 is	 democratic	 involves	
evaluating	whether	 it	 is	near	enough	to	 the	 ideal	 to	be	satisfactory.7	The	size	and	
composition	of	the	group	sets	limits	on	the	type	and	nature	of	a	democratic	system;	
																																								 																				
3	Ibid.,	16.	
4	Miners	Federation	Rules	1916,	E165/1/1,	Noel	Butlin	Archives	Centre	(NBAC),	3.	
5	Catt,	Democracy	in	practice:	77.	
6	Lindsay	Tanner,	"Window	Dressing,"	Monthly	(November	2011).	
7	Robert	A.	Dahl,	On	Democracy		(New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	2000):	15.	
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participatory	democracy	is	not	a	viable	way	to	run	a	society	of	millions	or	even	an	
organisation	 of	 thousands.	 Its	 focus	 on	 discussion	 and	 consensus	 may	 also	 be	
problematic	in	deeply	divided	groups.8	For	democracy	to	work	there	needs	to	be	a	
democratic	culture.	As	Helena	Catt	argues,	“democracy	is	a	way	of	behaving	and	a	
way	of	perceiving,	and	not	just	participation	in	a	set	of	procedures”.9	Democracy	is	a	
difficult	goal	to	attain	and	it	requires	the	majority	of	ordinary	members	and	elected	
representatives	to	be	committed	to	the	system.	
	
In	 a	 “model”	 democratic	 labour	 organisation,	 local	 branches	 would	 form	 the	
foundations	 of	 the	 organisation	 and	 would	 be	 run	 as	 participatory	 democracies.	
Where	 appropriate,	 local	 braches	would	 consist	 of	 smaller	 “shopfloor”	workplace	
units.	At	 the	district	and	national	 level	as	many	decisions	as	practicable	would	be	
made	 by	 direct	 membership	 vote,	 and	 remaining	 decisions	 made	 by	 elected	
representatives	 who	 were	 as	 accountable	 as	 possible	 to	 the	 ordinary	 members	
through	 regular	 elections.	 Term	 limits	 for	 officials	 would	 prevent	 leadership	
entrenchment.	The	organisation	would	be	so	constituted	and	run	as	to	encourage	
maximum	and	equal	membership	participation	in	these	processes.	
	
In	1963	Emanuel	Stein	argued	against	too	much	democracy	within	trade	unions	and	
labour	parties,	claiming	that	it	causes	inefficiency.	This	position	contends	that	labour	
organisations	 require	 efficient	 and	 effective	 leadership	 that	 can	 make	 difficult	
decisions	 quickly	 in	 response	 to	 changing	 circumstances	 and	 with	 superior	
knowledge	and	experience	compared	with	the	average	member.10	In	hindsight,	we	
can	sometimes	see	that	a	democratic	decision	was	not	a	good	decision	and	that	the	
leaders	did	know	better.	In	the	NSW	General	Strike	of	1917,	for	example,	the	Miners	
Federation	leaders	pleaded	with	their	members	not	to	strike	because	the	employers	
and	government	had	huge	stockpiles	of	coal.	The	members	went	on	strike	anyway,	
and	it	was	a	disaster.	
																																								 																				
8	Catt,	Democracy	in	practice:	14.	
9	Ibid.,	152.	
10	Emanuel	Stein,	"The	Dilemma	of	Union	Democracy,"	The	ANNALS	of	the	American	Academy	of	
Political	and	Social	Science	350,	no.	1	(1963).	
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But	 leaders	can	also	make	bad	decisions.	And	 leaders	develop	their	own	 interests	
that	can	be	at	odds	with	the	interests	of	members.	Most	obviously,	the	leaders	want	
to	 maintain	 their	 positions	 and	 power.	 The	 increased	 efficiency	 provided	 by	
undemocratic	organisation	is	of	no	use	to	the	members	if	it	is	not	directed	towards	
their	 interests.11	The	 absence	 of	 democracy	 within	 labour	 organisations	 can	 also	
discourage	potential	members	from	joining	and	enable	businesses	and	governments	
to	justify	anti-labour	attacks.12	
	
A	common	argument	against	democracy	within	political	parties	 is	 that	politicians’	
accountability	to	their	party	compromises	their	accountability	to	their	electors.	This	
position	maintains	 that	party	members	are	usually	only	a	 small,	 unrepresentative	
section	of	the	population	and	that	it	is	therefore	undemocratic	for	them	to	dictate	to	
politicians.13	Members	are	also	generally	more	radical	in	their	views	than	the	average	
voter,	which	could	lead	to	the	members	insisting	on	policies	that	will	make	the	party	
unelectable.	These	problems	can	certainly	arise	but	they	are	largely	self-correcting	
within	a	democratic	electoral	system.	The	electorate	as	a	whole	retains	the	final	say	
over	a	party’s	election	or	re-election,	and,	if	the	party	members	insist	on	policies	that	
are	 too	 radical,	 then	 the	 party	 will	 not	 form	 government	 until	 it	 moderates	 its	
position.		
	
On	the	other	hand,	party	democracy	can	sometimes	enhance	electoral	democracy	by	
holding	 politicians	 accountable	 to	 their	 election	 promises.	 Furthermore,	 party	
memberships	 do	 not	 by	 definition	 need	 to	 be	 small,	 unrepresentative	minorities.	
Enhanced	party	democracy	could	cause	a	large	increase	in	membership.	Even	if	the	
membership	did	 remain	 small	 and	unrepresentative,	 it	 is	 still	 far	 larger	and	more	
																																								 																				
11	Robert	Michels,	Political	Parties:	A	Sociological	Study	of	the	Oligarchical	Tendencies	of	Modern	
Democracy		(Kitchener:	Batoche	Books,	2001	[1911]).	
12	Kim	Voss,	"Democratic	Dilemmas:	Union	Democracy	and	Union	Renewal,"	Transfer:	European	
Review	of	Labor	and	Research	16,	no.	3	(2010):	370.	
13	Andrew	Parkin	and	John	Warhurst,	eds.,	Machine	Politics	in	the	Australian	Labor	Party	(Sydney:	
Allen	&	Unwin,	1983):	20.	
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representative	 than	 the	 politicians	 themselves	 who	 have	 complete	 power	 in	 an	
undemocratic	party.		
	
Voters	in	general	elections	are	forced	to	choose	a	party	based	on	their	full	suite	of	
policies,	although	individual	voters	may	be	influenced	primarily	by	a	small	number	of	
issues	or	even	a	sole	issue.	Party	democracy	allows	voters	to	join	a	party	and	vote	
and	participate	issue	by	issue.	Membership	control	would	also	remove	the	possibility,	
so	often	complained	of	within	socialist,	 social	democratic	and	 labour	parties,	 that	
initially	 reformist	 politicians	 will	 be	 corrupted	 into	 conservatism	 by	 their	 elite	
parliamentary	 lifestyle.	 Fully	 realised,	democratic	political	 parties	 could	 transform	
political	 life	 by	 empowering	 ordinary	 members	 and	 citizens	 to	 participate	 in	
governments	 rather	 than	 simply	 electing	 them.	 Thriving	 participatory	 democracy	
within	trade	unions	could	form	the	basis	for	industrial	democracy	in	which	workers	
help	to	manage	their	workplaces	and	industries.	
	
In	summary,	while	the	effects	of	democracy	on	an	organisation	can	be	complicated,	
as	 a	 general	 rule,	 high	 levels	 of	 democracy	 are	 good	 for	 an	 organisation	 and	 its	
members,	especially	 if	 the	organisation	 is	 to	be	strong	at	 the	grassroots	 level	and	
therefore	resilient	in	the	face	of	change.	This	is	not	to	say	that	undemocratic	labour	
parties	cannot	form	governments	or	that	oligarchical	trade	unions	cannot	increase	
their	membership	and	win	improved	wages	and	conditions.	They	clearly	can,	have	
and	do.	The	ultimate	“cause”	of	the	Australian	labour	movement	has	always	been	
contested,	but	if	labour’s	goal	is	to	create	a	society	in	which	power	and	wealth	are	
more	equally	distributed,	and	in	which	all	people	have	the	opportunity	to	live,	work	
and	participate	with	safety,	dignity	and	fairness,	then	democracy	is	conducive	to	its	
realisation.		
	
Thesis	focus	and	archival	foundations	
This	 thesis	 focuses	 primarily	 on	 the	 period	 from	 1910	 to	 1939.	 Analysing	 the	
movement	over	three	decades	has	allowed	me	to	study	events	in	detail	while	also	
observing	larger	patterns	and	trends.	This	period	includes	some	big	world	events:	the	
First	World	War,	 Russian	 Revolution,	 Great	Depression	 and	 the	 rise	 of	 fascism	 in	
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Europe.	Largely	because	of	these	world	events	,it	was	also	a	turbulent	and	interesting	
time	in	Australia	and	NSW.	I	begin	in	1910	when	Labor	first	formed	government	in	
NSW.	For	the	first	time	the	party	had	the	authority	to	carry	out	its	policies,	but	there	
was	 disagreement	 about	 how	 it	 should	 proceed.	 Tension	 rapidly	 grew	within	 the	
party	and	wider	labour	movement,	leading	to	the	factional	warfare	and	party	splits	
(1916,	1919,	1927,	1931	and	1938)	that	would	define	the	period.	My	thesis	concludes	
in	1939,	the	end	of	an	era	for	NSW	Labor	and	for	the	world.	Just	before	the	beginning	
of	 the	 Second	 World	 War,	 an	 alliance	 of	 trade	 unions	 and	 local	 party	 branches	
deposed	 Jack	Lang	and	his	 “Inner	Group”	of	allies	 from	their	dominance	over	 the	
NSW	Labor	Party.14	
	
My	focus	on	NSW	is	motivated	by	that	state’s	importance	both	to	me	personally	and	
to	the	Australian	labour	movement	in	the	interwar	period.	I	grew	up	in	Sydney	and	
voted	in	my	first	NSW	election	in	March	2007.	In	the	interwar	period	NSW	was	the	
most	 populous	 state	 in	Australia;	 in	 1925	 it	 had	 2.3	million	 out	 of	 Australia’s	 5.9	
million	people.	It	provided	an	even	larger	share	of	Labor	Party	members	as	it	had	the	
greatest	concentration	of	 trade	unionists	 in	 the	country.	This	was	reflected	 in	 the	
ALP’s	dependence	on	NSW	in	federal	elections.	When	it	won	federal	government	in	
1929,	Labor	won	20	seats	in	NSW	and	27	in	the	rest	of	Australia	combined.	Although	
my	focus	is	NSW,	I	also	devote	significant	attention	to	the	federal	AWU	and	Miners	
Federation,	and	to	a	 lesser	extent	 the	 federal	ALP.	This	 is	necessary	because	they	
were	all	national	organisations	and	it	is	not	possible	to	understand	democracy	and	
oligarchy	within	the	NSW	branches	in	isolation.	
	
The	AWU	began	in	1886	as	a	shearers	union	and	then	a	rural	pastoral	workers	union	
and,	by	the	interwar	period,	amalgamations	had	also	made	it	the	chief	construction	
labourers	union	in	NSW.	The	AWU	was	the	largest,	wealthiest	and	most	influential	
union	in	the	Australia	with	over	100,000	members	and	great	power	within	the	Labor	
Party.	The	Miners	Federation	formed	in	1915	when	district	miners’	unions	fused	into	
a	 national	 union.	 It	was	 the	 dominant	miners’	 union	 in	NSW	and	Australia;	most	
																																								 																				
14	Hagan	and	Turner,	A	History	of	the	Labor	Party	in	NSW	1891-1991:	68-94.	
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members	were	coalminers	and	 there	were	also	some	metal	miners.	By	 the	1920s	
around	 80	 per	 cent	 of	 mineworkers	 were	 Miners	 Federation	 members,	 giving	 it	
20,000	members	in	total.15	
	
The	 memberships	 of	 both	 the	 AWU	 and	 Miners	 Federation	 were	 based	 outside	
Sydney	in	rural	and	regional	areas	of	NSW.	It	is	important	to	acknowledge	that	these	
two	unions	do	not	represent	the	large	proportion	of	NSW	trade	unionists	who	lived	
and	worked	 in	 urban	 areas,	 especially	 in	manufacturing.	 However,	 Sydney	 is	 not	
neglected	in	this	story.	Both	unions	had	a	minority	of	their	members	and	their	head	
offices	in	Sydney	and	many	Sydney-based	unions	and	unionists	feature	throughout	
the	thesis.	The	NSW	Labor	Party	was	also	based	in	Sydney	and	was	easily	the	most	
successful	political	party	within	 the	NSW	 labour	movement.	For	 the	entire	period	
from	 1910	 to	 1939	 NSW	 Labor	 was	 either	 the	 government	 or,	 more	 often,	 the	
opposition.	
	
Trade	unions	could	pay	a	fee	and	affiliate	to	the	NSW	Labor	Party.	The	Labor	Party	
annual	conference	had	unlimited	power	within	the	party	and	the	central	executive	
had	 unlimited	 power	 between	 conferences.	 Until	 1927	 electorate	 councils	 and	
affiliated	unions	elected	or	appointed	delegates	to	annual	conference	according	to	
their	membership	and	annual	conference	delegates	elected	the	central	executive.16	
From	1928	until	1939	the	party	elected	annual	conference	delegates	and	the	central	
executive	 in	 a	 complicated	 group	 system	which	 I	 will	 assess	 in	 chapter	 seven.	 In	
theory,	the	annual	conference	and	central	executive	controlled	the	politicians,	but	in	
practice	they	proved	hard	to	control.	
	
The	three	central	research	questions	in	this	study	are	as	follows:	
1. Where	did	each	organisation	sit	on	 the	spectrum	between	democracy	and	
oligarchy?	How	and	why?	
																																								 																				
15	“The	ballots,”	Common	Cause	(CC)	27	January	1922,	4;	“Industrial	matters,”	Newcastle	Herald	6	
April	1922,	5.	
16	Bede	Nairn,	Civilising	Capitalism:	The	Beginnings	of	the	Australian	Labor	Party		(Carlton:	
Melbourne	University	Press,	1989	[1973]):	52,	92,	111,	137.	
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2. How	did	the	three	organisations	influence	one	another?	
3. What	effects	did	each	organisation’s	internal	governance	have	on	its	external	
behaviour?	
The	thesis	is	in	three	parts:	part	one	on	the	AWU,	part	two	on	the	Miners	Federation	
and	part	three	on	the	NSW	Labor	Party.	There	are	two	substantive	chapters	and	one	
case	study	chapter	for	each	union	and	three	substantive	chapters	and	one	case	study	
chapter	for	the	NSW	Labor	Party.	In	the	substantive	chapters	I	focus	on	how	and	why	
the	organisation	was	democratic,	or	not,	and	how	it	affected,	and	was	affected	by,	
the	other	two	organisations	(research	questions	1	and	2).	Then	in	the	case	studies	I	
look	 at	 how	 each	 organisation’s	 internal	 governance	 influenced	 its	 external	
behaviour	(research	question	3).	
	
My	key	primary	sources	are	institutional	archives,	labour	and	non-labour	newspapers	
and	 personal	 papers	 and	 memoirs.	 In	 the	 institutional	 archives	 rule	 books,	
conference	reports,	election	results	and	internal	inquiries	have	provided	the	basis	for	
exploring	 issues	 of	 democracy	 and	 oligarchy	 within	 the	 movement.	 I	 have	 then	
further	 investigated	 specific	 issues	 and	 events	 in	 other	 sources	 such	 as	 meeting	
minutes,	branch	journals	and	newspapers.	These	latter	sources	also	provide	crucial	
details	of	organisational	culture	and	democratic	values,	or	lack	thereof.	
	
I	have	made	extensive	use	of	the	voluminous	institutional	archives	of	the	AWU	and	
Miners	 Federation	 housed	 at	 the	 Noel	 Butlin	 Archives	 Centre	 at	 the	 Australian	
National	 University	 in	 Canberra.	 Unfortunately,	 there	 are	 few	 surviving	 official	
records	for	the	NSW	Labor	Party	in	my	period.	When	Lang	and	his	Inner	Group	lost	
control	 of	 the	 party	 in	 1939	 they	 stole	 the	 party	 records	 and	 they	 were	 never	
recovered.17	Fortunately,	however,	there	are	newspapers,	especially	the	Labor	Daily,	
Australian	Worker	and	Sydney	Morning	Herald,	which	provide	extensive	coverage	of	
the	 party	 from	 a	 range	 of	 factional	 and	 ideological	 perspectives,	 as	 do	 the	many	
relevant	personal	papers	housed	at	 the	State	 Library	of	NSW	and	elsewhere.	The	
																																								 																				
17	Geoff	Robinson,	When	the	Labor	Party	Dreams		(North	Melbourne:	Australian	Scholarly	Publishing,	
2008).	
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Australian	Worker	and	Sydney	Morning	Herald	are	digitised	which	allowed	for	word	
searches	 and	 enabled	me	 to	 find	 useful	 information	 that	 I	would	 otherwise	 have	
missed.	 The	 text	 recognition	 software	 is	 far	 from	 perfect,	 however,	 so	 extensive	
manual	searching	was	also	necessary.	
	
The	theoretical	foundation	of	my	historical	analysis	is	the	extensive	literature	from	
the	fields	of	sociology	and	political	science	on	party	and	union	democracy.	Gender,	
and	especially	competing	masculinities,	is	also	crucial,	as	is	the	literature	on	nations	
as	“imagined	communities”	and	on	localism.	I	outline	these	bodies	of	theory	in	the	
following	 sections.	 Finally,	 biography	 and	 details	 of	 what	 it	 was	 like	 to	 work	 in	
particular	 industries	 humanise	 my	 story,	 enrich	 my	 analysis	 and	 allow	 me	 to	
contextualise	primary	sources.	They	are	also	crucial	to	my	explanation	of	differences	
in	organisational	culture	and	governance,	especially	in	my	comparison	of	the	AWU	
and	Miners	Federation.		
	
The	tendency	towards	oligarchy	within	trade	unions	and	political	parties	
The	fields	of	trade	union	and	political	party	governance	have	centred	on	arguments	
for	and	against	Robert	Michels’	“iron	law	of	oligarchy”.18	In	1911	Michels	argued	that	
all	 supposedly	 democratic	 voluntary	 organisations	 would	 inevitably	 become	
oligarchies	controlled	by	and	for	a	small	group	of	leaders.	He	reasoned	that	leaders	
will	govern	an	organisation	not	to	benefit	their	members	but	to	advance	their	own	
interests	 and	 entrench	 their	 positions.	 This	 stems	 from	 the	members’	 inability	 to	
control	their	officials.	Few	members	have	the	time,	interest,	or	capacity	to	participate	
meaningfully,	and	since	most	have	“an	immense	need	for	direction	and	guidance”,	
the	leaders’	fulfilment	of	this	need	earns	them	gratitude	and	“a	genuine	cult	for	the	
leaders”.	As	leaders	have	better	organisation,	superior	knowledge	and	political	skills,	
and	 control	 of	 sanctions,	 rewards,	 the	 official	 institutional	 apparatus,	 and	 formal	
																																								 																				
18	Margaret	Levi	et	al.,	"Union	Democracy	Reexamined	"	Politics	&	Society	37(2009):	205;	Voss,	
"Democratic	Dilemmas:	Union	Democracy	and	Union	Renewal,"	372.	
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communication	with	members,	 they	 can	dominate	 the	organisation	and	entrench	
their	positions.19	He	mischievously	labelled	this	cycle	the	“iron	law	of	oligarchy”.	
	
Critics	 of	 Michels	 have	 acknowledged	 the	 propensity	 towards	 oligarchy	 that	 he	
identified	but	have	argued	that	it	can	be	overcome.	Michels’	position	does	not	vary	
dramatically	from	that	of	the	earlier	writing	of	Fabians	Sidney	and	Beatrice	Webb	in	
the	 identification	of	the	disparity	of	outlooks	between	union	 leaders	and	ordinary	
members.	More	optimistically,	 however,	 the	Webbs	believed	 that	 it	was	 possible	
under	 some	 circumstances	 for	 ordinary	members	 to	 control	 officials,	 leaders	 and	
policy.20	More	recent	scholars	have	expanded	on	this	argument.	Richard	Hyman,	for	
example,	 argued	 from	a	Marxist	 perspective	 that	 “countervailing	 tendencies”	 can	
offset	 the	 propensity	 towards	 oligarchy.	 These	 countervailing	 tendencies	 include	
membership	 pressure	 on	 the	 leaders	 “from	 below”	 and	 ideological	 support	 for	
democracy	 amongst	 the	 leaders	 themselves.21 	Hyman’s	 analysis	 was	 couched	 in	
terms	of	the	different	class	interests	of	workers	compared	with	those	of	trade	union	
officials,	and	by	extension	 labour	party	 leaders,	who	occupy	distinct	places	 in	 the	
relations	of	production.	Alvin	Gouldner	argued	 that	 the	 iron	 law	of	oligarchy	only	
describes	 one	 half	 of	 a	 perpetual	 struggle	 between	 democracy	 and	 oligarchy,	
observing	that	if	“oligarchical	waves	repeatedly	wash	away	the	bridges	of	democracy,	
this	eternal	recurrence	can	happen	only	because	men	doggedly	rebuild	them	after	
each	 inundation”	and	 labelled	this	the	“iron	 law	of	democracy”.22	Throughout	this	
thesis	the	strong	tendency	to	oligarchy	is	on	constant	display.	However,	my	findings	
support	critics	of	Michels	who	argued	that	this	propensity	is	not	an	“iron	law”	and	
that	it	can	sometimes	be	overcome.	Even	when	the	AWU	and	NSW	Labor	Party	were	
at	their	most	oligarchical	in	the	late	1930s,	oligarchy	was	resisted	and	contested.	
	
																																								 																				
19	Michels,	Political	Parties:	A	Sociological	Study	of	the	Oligarchical	Tendencies	of	Modern	
Democracy:	38,	42.	
20	Anne-marie	Greene,	John	Hogan,	and	Margaret	Grieco,	"E-collectivism	and	distributed	discourse:	
new	opportunities	for	trade	union	democracy,"	Industrial	Relations	Journal	34,	no.	4	(2003):	283.	
21	Richard	Hyman,	Marxism	and	the	Sociology	of	Trade	Unionism		(Pluto	Press,	1971):	29-32.	
22	Alvin	Gouldner,	"Metaphysical	Pathos	and	the	Theory	of	Bureacracy,"	American	Political	Science	
Review	49,	no.	2	(1955):	506.	
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My	 position	 aligns	 with	 the	 present-day	 consensus	 in	 the	 field	 of	 trade	 union	
governance;	that	there	is	a	strong	inclination	towards	oligarchy	within	trade	unions	
but	that	it	can	be	resisted	and	even	overcome	in	some	circumstances.	Key	works	have	
focussed	on	one	atypical	union	that	is	a	democratic	exception	to	the	oligarchic	norm	
in	order	to	explain	how	that	union	has	resisted	the	tendency	towards	oligarchy,	and	
thereby	extrapolate	the	conditions	required	in	all	unions	to	enhance	democracy.	The	
classic	study	is	Trade	Union	Democracy	by	Seymour	Martin	Lipset,	Martin	Trow	and	
James	Coleman,	a	study	of	the	International	Typographical	Union	(ITU)	in	the	United	
States	from	1850	to	1952.	Most	recently,	Margaret	Levi,	David	Olson,	Jon	Agnone	
and	Devin	Kelly	conducted	a	similar	examination	of	the	US	International	Longshore	
and	Warehouse	Union	(ILWU)	from	its	formation	in	1902	to	the	2000s.23	
	
While	different	scholars	stress	different	factors,	there	is	a	consensus	in	the	literature	
around	seven	key	requirements	for	union	democracy.	
1. The	union	rules	must	be	formally	democratic.		
2. The	members	must	 form	a	 close-knit	 “occupational	 community”	with	high	
levels	of	interaction	and	a	history	of	collective	action	which	creates	a	culture	
of	interest	and	participation	in	union	affairs.24		
3. Toleration	of	internal	opposition	organisation	(factions	or	parties)	facilitates	
electoral	 competition,	 keeps	 members	 informed	 and	 interested,	 fosters	
leadership	 and	 political	 skills	 outside	 the	 leadership	 group,	 and	 makes	
officials	more	accountable.25		
4. Decentralisation	through	local	autonomy	allows	for	the	development	of	local	
powerbases	and	potential	opposition	to	the	national	leadership	and	“creates	
a	 forum	for	encouraging	and	educating	members	to	take	advantage	of	the	
procedures	of	democracy”.26		
																																								 																				
23	Seymour	Martin	Lipset,	Martin	A.	Trow,	and	James	S.	Coleman,	Union	Democracy:	The	Internal	
Politics	of	the	International	Typographical	Union		(New	York:	Free	Press,	1956);	Levi	et	al.,	"Union	
Democracy	Reexamined".	
24	Lipset,	Trow,	and	Coleman,	Union	Democracy:	The	Internal	Politics	of	the	International	
Typographical	Union:	207,	09.		
25	Ibid.,	416;	J.	David	Edelstein	and	Malcolm	Warner,	Comparative	Union	Democracy:	Organisation	
and	Opposition	in	British	and	American	Unions		(London:	Allen	&	Unwin,	1975):188.	
26	Lipset,	Trow,	and	Coleman,	Union	Democracy:	The	Internal	Politics	of	the	International	
Typographical	Union:	414;	Edelstein	and	Warner,	Comparative	Union	Democracy:	Organisation	and	
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5. High	 levels	 of	 direct	 rank-and-file	 decision-making	 facilitates	 membership	
control	over	important	decisions.	
6. Equality	of	salary,	status,	skill	and	education	between	officials	and	members	
minimises	the	gap	in	political	skills	and	causes	leaders	to	feel	less	pressure	to	
maintain	their	positions	through	undemocratic	means.27		
7. Free	communication	and	the	existence	of	communication	channels	that	are	
not	controlled	by	the	leadership	allows	for	informed	participation,	criticism	
of	 sitting	 officials	 and	 enables	 opposition	 groups	 to	 communicate	 with	
members.28		
I	 use	 these	 seven	 requirements	 as	 my	 framework	 to	 analyse	 each	 of	 the	 three	
organisations,	with	slight	modifications	for	the	Labor	Party,	as	 I	explain	 in	chapter	
seven.	
	
As	with	trade	unions,	scholars	have	long	recognised	a	tendency	for	power	to	become	
centralised	within	political	parties.	 In	addition	 to	Michels’	 “iron	 law	of	oligarchy”,	
Moisey	 Ostrogorski	 and	 Max	 Weber	 described	 a	 “caesaristic-plebiscitarian	
dictatorship”,	Maurice	Duverger	an	oligarchic	“inner	circle”,	and	Angelo	Panebianco	
a	“dominant	coalition”.29	From	the	mid-twentieth	century,	political	party	scholarship	
shifted	 away	 from	 the	 study	of	 political	 parties	 as	 organisations	 and	 towards	 the	
study	 of	 party	 systems	 and	 electoral	 politics.	 As	 Panebianco	 observed	 in	Political	
Parties:	Organisation	and	Power,	itself	now	more	than	a	quarter	of	a	century	old,	this	
shift	 in	 focus	 has	meant	 that	 the	 organisational	 theory	 of	 parties	 has	 “remained	
ostensibly	unchanged	since	the	works	of	Michels	and	Duverger”.30	
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Panebianco	contended	that	the	positions	for	and	against	the	“iron	law	of	oligarchy”	
are	implicitly	based	upon	different	conceptions	of	power	within	parties.	He	argued	
that	Michels	and	his	supporters	conceptualised	power	as	a	possession	that	can	be	
held	and	used	by	some	people	over	others,	while	opponents	regarded	power	as	a	
“relation	of	 influence”,	with	at	 least	some	degree	of	 reciprocity.	Both	Panebianco	
and	 I	 subscribe	 to	 the	 latter	 view	 and	 see	 power	 as	 an	 unequal	 relationship	 of	
exchange	in	which	“one	can	exercise	power	over	others	only	by	satisfying	their	needs	
and	expectations”.	Leaders	get	“more	than	the	followers”	from	the	interaction	“but	
must	nonetheless	give	something	in	return”.	The	relationship	between	the	leaders	
and	ordinary	members	within	a	party	exists	at	a	point	along	a	continuum	between	
domination	at	one	extreme	and	reciprocity	at	the	other.31	
	
Where	 a	 party	 sits	 on	 this	 continuum	 depends	 on	 what	 Panebianco	 called	 the	
“substitutability”	 of	 “organisational	 incentives”,	 which	 are	 the	 inducements	 that	
motivate	people	to	become	party	members.	In	other	words,	the	extent	to	which	the	
leaders	can	“unbalance	 in	 their	own	favour	 the	exchanges	with	 the	rank	and	 file”	
depends	 on	 how	 readily	 ordinary	 members	 can	 abandon	 the	 party	 and	 obtain	
elsewhere	the	organisational	 incentives	that	they	receive	from	party	membership.	
Organisational	incentives	can	be	either	“collective	incentives”	of	solidarity	with	party	
ideology,	or	“selective	 incentives”	of	material	gain	or	status.	 	Ostrogorski’s	“spoils	
systems”,	 in	which	politicians	reward	their	supporters	with	government	jobs	upon	
election,	is	an	extreme	example	of	selective	incentives.	Panebianco	held	that	leaders’	
legitimacy	in	the	eyes	of	ordinary	members	depends	on	their	ability	to	control	and	
distribute	 organisational	 incentives. 32 	I	 will	 argue	 that	 the	 substitutability	 of	
organisational	 incentives	 is	 one	 useful	 consideration	 in	 explaining	 internal	
governance	of	parties	and	unions	but	 that	 it	 is	often	overwhelmed,	either	by	 the	
tendencies	 towards	 oligarchy	 identified	 by	 Michels,	 or	 by	 the	 countervailing	
tendencies	towards	democracy	identified	by	Hyman	and	others.	
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If	a	governing	political	party	is	internally	democratic	then	its	members	will	influence	
government	policy,	albeit	within	the	confines	created	by	the	existing	economic	and	
political	systems.	This	makes	party	democracy	a	potentially	crucial	aspect	of	political	
governance.	But	some	scholars	argue	that	control	of	governments	by	political	parties	
is	impossible.	In	Australia,	Vere	Gordon	Childe	argued	that	because	Labor	ministers	
were	“surrounded	by	the	middle-class	atmosphere	of	Parliament”	they	became	more	
concerned	with	“keeping	[their]	seat	and	scoring	political	points	than	of	carrying	out	
the	 ideal	 that	 [they	 were]	 sent	 in	 to	 give	 effect	 to”. 33 	Furthermore,	 Labor	
governments	can	usually	argue	that	any	action	is	consistent	with	party	policy	as	that	
policy	 is	 “occasionally	 contradictory,	 frequently	 vague,	 rarely	 put	 in	 any	 order	 of	
priority	 and	 almost	 never	 tied	 to	 any	 specific	 timetable”.34	Childe	 concluded	 that	
although	 the	 extra-parliamentary	 wing	 of	 the	 ALP	 was	 theoretically	 supreme,	
concerted	attempts	to	force	the	parliamentarians	to	act	would	be	unsuccessful	as	
they	would	cause	party	splits	and	loss	of	office.35	
	
Parties	 can	 certainly	 face	 difficulties	 in	 controlling	 their	 politicians	 and	 these	
difficulties	were	fully	expressed	within	the	ALP	in	Childe’s	period,	as	I	discuss	below.	
But	 as	 Lewis	Minkin	 observed,	 there	 is	 danger	 in	 “ascribing	 either	 inevitability	 or	
immutability	to	the	various	relationships	which	emerge	[within	labour	parties]	in	any	
given	period”.36	Labor	politicians	will	usually	be	just	as	eager	to	avoid	party	splits	and	
loss	of	office	as	members	of	the	extra-parliamentary	party.	The	latter	also	have	the	
ability	 to	 embarrass	 and	 even	 expel	 uncooperative	 parliamentarians	 which,	
depending	on	the	circumstances,	will	often	be	a	powerful	sanction.	Through	party	
factions,	 extra-parliamentary	 groupings	 can	 exercise	 significant	 control	 over	 pre-
selections	 and	 the	 choice	 of	 parliamentary	 leader	 and	 cabinet	 ministers.	
Furthermore,	 some	 politicians	 genuinely	 believe	 in	 the	 supremacy	 of	 the	 extra-
parliamentary	party	and	govern	accordingly.37	We	will	see	that	the	NSW	Labor	Party	
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from	1926	 to	 the	mid-1930s	 demonstrates	 that,	 in	 favourable	 circumstances	 and	
with	the	right	internal	processes,	it	is	possible	for	parties	to	control	their	politicians.	
	
There	is	then	the	issue	of	whether	extra-parliamentary	control	can	be	exercised	by	
the	 ordinary	 members.	 Robert	 McKenzie	 studied	 the	 British	 Labour	 Party	 in	 the	
period	from	1900	until	1964	and	maintained,	 in	 line	with	Michels,	 that	despite	 its	
democratic	constitution	the	party	was	in	fact	an	oligarchy.	For	McKenzie,	ordinary	
members	were	 of	 “little	 importance”	 in	 “an	 analysis	 of	 the	 distribution	 of	 power	
within	the	party”	which	was	controlled	by	the	parliamentary	leaders	in	coalition	with	
some	 of	 the	 trade	 union	 leaders.38 	Samuel	 Beer	 countered	 that	 what	 McKenzie	
interpreted	 as	 oligarchy	 in	 the	 period	 1918-48	was	 in	 fact	 the	 result	 of	 “a	 broad	
consensus	 in	 the	 party	 on	 ideology,	 program	 and	 strategy”	 in	 which	 “all	 major	
elements	…	were	so	much	in	agreement”	that	“serious	questions	of	power	were	not	
raised”.39	Minkin	also	opposed	McKenzie,	arguing	that	while	“there	is	much	which	
could	 be	 used	 to	 support	 this	 perspective”	 it	 remained	 “a	 partial	 and	 in	 certain	
respects	a	misleading	view”.	He	cited	Gouldner’s	“iron	law	of	democracy”	and	argued	
that	in	the	early	1970s	membership	dissatisfaction	created	“a	powerful	set	of	upward	
pressures”	that	resulted	in	significant	reforms	which	promoted	party	democracy.40	
The	findings	of	this	thesis	support	Minkin’s	position	and	suggest	that	membership	
opinion	retained	at	 least	some	 influence	 in	all	 three	organisations	throughout	the	
period.	
	
Labour	parties	are	distinguished	from	other	social	democratic	parties	by	the	formal	
affiliation	of	 trade	unions.41	Unions	pay	dues	 in	exchange	 for	authority	within	 the	
party	 in	 the	 form	of	 representatives	and	delegates	on	party	bodies.	This	power	 is	
exercised	 by	 union	 leaderships	 who	 in	 theory	 represent	 their	 members	 but	 in	
practice	are	usually	unaccountable	oligarchies.	Union	affiliation	can	thereby	seriously	
weaken	party	democracy	by	giving	disproportionate	power	to	small	groups	of	trade	
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union	 leaders. 42 	I	 argue,	 in	 line	 with	 most	 of	 the	 historiography,	 that	 the	
disproportionate	power	wielded	by	union	leaders	was	a	primary	cause	of	oligarchy	
within	the	interwar	NSW	Labor	Party,	but	unlike	the	historiography	I	argue	that	union	
affiliation	to	the	Labor	Party	also	had	some	positive	effects	for	party	democracy.	For	
example,	 unions	 formed	 the	 basis	 for	 factions	 which	 provided	 opposition	 to	 the	
sitting	 officials.	 Some	 unions	 such	 as	 the	 Miners	 Federation	 also	 imported	 their	
democratic	practices	into	the	party.	
	
Issues	 of	 identity	 and	 community:	 men	 and	 women,	 competing	 masculinities,	
localism	and	imagined	communities	
Issues	 of	 identity	 and	 community	 amongst	 union	 and	 party	members	 influenced	
oligarchy	 and	democracy	within	 all	 three	organisations.	While	 the	AWU	excluded	
women	from	almost	all	areas	of	union	life,	the	Miners	Federation	gradually	increased	
the	 role	of	women,	particularly	 through	 the	Women’s	Auxiliaries	 in	 the	1930s.	 In	
chapter	 five	 I	 argue	 that	 the	Women’s	 Auxiliaries	 were	 a	 key	 component	 in	 the	
creation	of	a	national	mining	community	and	that	the	increase	in	class-consciousness	
in	mining	communities	in	the	1930s	was	facilitated	by	the	miners	bringing	women	
into	their	union	communities.	In	the	NSW	Labor	Party	women	took	a	large	role	in	the	
party	 early	 on.	 In	 chapter	 seven	we	will	 see	 that,	 unlike	 in	 the	AWU	and	Miners	
Federation,	 women	 successfully	 won	 a	 public	 role	 within	 the	 party	 in	 the	 early	
twentieth	century	and	helped	to	shape	it	from	the	local	branch	communities	up	to	
the	state	level.	Women	represented	the	party	at	Annual	Conference,	on	the	Central	
Executive	 and	 in	 the	 NSW	 Legislative	 Council	 and	 the	 party	 rules	 contained	
affirmative	action	provisions	for	women.	
	
Another	 relevant	 gender	 consideration	 is	 that	 the	 cultures	 of	 both	 the	AWU	and	
Miners	 Federation	 were	 influenced	 by	 competition	 between	 rival	 masculinities.	
Marilyn	 Lake	 argued	 that	 there	 was	 tension	 in	 late	 nineteenth	 century	 Australia	
between	 the	 rival	 masculinities	 of	 the	 “responsible	 domestic	 man”	 versus	 the	
“independent	man”	free	to	enjoy	mateship,	drinking,	smoking,	gambling	and	sex	with	
																																								 																				
42	Parkin	and	Warhurst,	Machine	Politics	in	the	Australian	Labor	Party,	22.	
	 31	
women.	Bohemian	city	intellectuals	held	up	the	bushman	as	their	ideal	independent	
man,	mobile	and	free	of	marriage	and	children.43	They	presented	women	as	killjoys	
who	 trapped	 men	 into	 marriage,	 ignoring	 the	 fact	 that	 marriage	 trapped	
economically	dependent	women	more	than	it	did	men.44	
	
By	the	1920s,	according	to	Lake,	the	responsible	domestic	man	had	triumphed	and	
“responsible	breadwinning”	was	the	dominant	Australian	view	of	masculinity.	It	was	
promoted	 by	 employers,	 governments,	 union	 leaders,	 arbitration	 courts	 and	
women’s	groups,	all	of	whom	desired	responsible,	efficient,	disciplined	workers	and	
husbands	to	provide	for	their	women	and	children.45	Most	unionists	also	wanted	to	
keep	women	out	of	the	workplace	because	they	would	increase	the	labour	supply	
and	 drive	 down	 wages	 and	 conditions.	 Yet	 the	 celebration	 of	 independent	
masculinity	 lived	on	amongst	many	working	men	and	sometimes	created	tensions	
between	union	members	and	officials.		
	
In	chapter	one	I	discuss	the	similarities	and	differences	between	AWU	masculinity	
and	 the	masculinity	of	Russel	Ward’s	mythical	 “typical	Australian”.	A	competitive,	
independent	 masculinity	 pervaded	 the	 pastoral	 station	 and	 shearing	 shed	 and	
created	a	culture	of	hierarchy	amongst	pastoral	workers	which	was	well-suited	to	
oligarchical	 AWU	 union	 leadership.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 however,	 AWU	 leaders	
presented	 themselves	 in	 the	 model	 of	 wealthy,	 responsible	 breadwinners,	
deliberately	distinguishing	themselves	from	the	ordinary	members	and	demanding	
obedience	 from	 them.	 Competing	 masculinities	 also	 influenced	 the	 miners.	 In	
chapter	 four	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 Miners	 Federation	 encouraged	 the	 responsible	
breadwinning	 view	 of	masculinity	 as	 a	 way	 to	 unite	 the	 union	 and	 prevent	 local	
stoppages.	
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Localism	is	an	ideology	that	privileges	location	over	other	forms	of	identity	with	the	
effect	of	promoting	unity	between	classes	and	concealing	class	interests.46	We	will	
see	that	localism	was	a	significant	obstacle	for	union	and	class	unity	and	solidarity,	
especially	within	the	Miners	Federation.	The	Miners	Federation	overcame	localism	
by	creating	a	national	community	of	miners.	This	was	a	different	kind	of	community	
from	the	miners’	 longstanding	 local	occupational	 communities	because	a	national	
mining	community	was	one	in	which	the	members	could	not	know	or	interact	with	
one	another;	it	was	what	Benedict	Anderson	called	an	“imagined	community”.47	Just	
as	Anderson	argued	that	daily	newspapers	printed	in	the	common	tongue	were	the	
key	 to	 the	 formation	 of	 national	 imagined	 communities,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	miners’	
national	newspaper,	Common	Cause,	was	one	of	the	key	facilitators	of	the	national	
mining	 community.	 Additional	 factors	 were	 shared	 entertainment	 and	 sport	
between	 regions,	 the	 national	 organisation	 of	 the	Women’s	 Auxiliaries	 and	 rising	
class	 consciousness	 in	 the	 1930s.	 State-wide	 “imagined	 communities”	 were	 also	
important	within	 the	AWU	and	NSW	Labor	Party	and	were	 similarly	 facilitated	by	
those	 organisations’	 newspapers,	 the	 Australian	 Worker	 and	 Labor	 Daily	
respectively,	and	by	additional	factors	which	I	will	discuss	in	parts	one	and	three	of	
the	thesis.	
	
A	brief	history	of	the	NSW	labour	movement	from	1910	to	1939	
I	will	now	provide	a	brief	history	of	the	NSW	labour	movement	from	1910	to	1939	so	
as	to	avoid	repetition	and	minimise	descriptive	history	in	each	chapter.	Labor	first	
formed	government	 in	NSW	 in	1910.	 Excitement	quickly	 turned	 to	 frustration	 for	
party	 members	 as	 the	 government	 failed	 to	 implement	 party	 policy.	 This	
dissatisfaction	intensified	under	wartime	austerity	from	1914,	and	culminated	in	a	
party	split	over	conscription	in	1916	which	caused	Labor	to	lose	office.	In	an	attempt	
to	control	the	defiant	politicians,	a	trade	union	coalition	called	the	Industrial	Section	
had	led	the	party’s	1916	Annual	Conference	to	change	conference	representation	to	
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the	 unions’	 advantage,	 effectively	 transferring	 control	 of	 the	 party	 from	 the	
politicians	and	local	branch	members	to	the	leaders	of	the	affiliated	trade	unions.48	
Labor	also	became	more	militant	and	more	Catholic	in	this	period,	as	those	who	split	
from	the	party	were	more	likely	to	be	conservative	and	Protestant.49		
	
The	key	organisational	 incentive	that	motivated	membership	of	the	Labor	Party	in	
this	period	was	the	collective	incentive	of	agreement	with	the	party’s	ideology	and	
working-class	identity.	In	terms	of	selective	incentives	of	material	gain,	there	were	
no	 significant	 spoils,	 but	 members	 did	 expect	 to	 gain	 materially	 in	 the	 form	 of	
improved	wages	and	employment	conditions	implemented	by	Labor	governments.	
The	 labour	movement	 was	 split	 ideologically	 between	 what	 subsequent	 scholars	
have	 called	 “labourism”	 on	 one	 side,	 and	 various	 forms	 of	 socialism	 and	 anti-
capitalism	on	the	other.	Labourism	was	a	reformist	ideology	which	held	that	strong	
trade	 unions	 and	 Labor	 governments	 could	 modify	 capitalism	 so	 that	 it	 would	
advantage	workers	as	well	as	employers.	To	this	end,	the	key	planks	of	 labourism	
were	compulsory	arbitration,	tariff	protection	and	White	Australia.50		
	
Tariffs	 would	 protect	 Australia’s	 manufacturing	 industry,	 thereby	 protecting	 its	
employees’	 jobs,	wages	 and	 conditions.	 A	 “White	Australia”	would	 prevent	Asian	
workers,	who	often	accepted	poor	pay	and	conditions,	from	driving	down	wages	and	
conditions	 for	 white	 Australians.	 More	 conservative	 labourists	 advocated	 reform	
through	 political	 action	 and	 arbitration,	 while	 more	 militant	 labourists	 also	
advocated	 strikes.	 Conversely,	 socialists	 and	 other	 anti-capitalists	 argued	 that	
capitalism	would	never	benefit	workers	and	that	it	must	be	replaced	with	a	system	
of	collective	ownership.51	
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Arbitration	was	a	system	of	mediation	 in	which	 industrial	courts	decided	disputes	
between	 employers	 and	 employees	 (and	 their	 unions).	 It	 had	 solidified	 craft	
unionism	by	allowing	for	the	survival	of	small	and/or	weak	unions.	Arbitration	judges	
also	deliberately	favoured	some	unions	(usually	the	less	militant)	at	the	expense	of	
others.	For	example,	NSW	industrial	Judge	Charles	Heydon	transferred	jurisdiction	
for	Water	Board	 rockchoppers	 and	 sewer	miners	 from	 the	militant	Rockchoppers	
Union	to	the	compliant	Water	Board	house	union.	Officials	from	unions	favoured	by	
the	arbitration	system	therefore	opposed	anti-arbitration	militants.52		
	
The	first	serious	ideological	threat	to	labourism	had	come	in	1907,	when	the	United	
States-based	 Industrial	 Workers	 of	 the	 World	 (IWW)	 began	 to	 organise	 within	
Australian	unions.	The	anti-capitalist	IWW	argued	that	the	interests	of	workers	and	
employers	were	irreconcilable.	It	advocated	the	formation	of	One	Big	Union	(OBU)	
for	 all	 workers,	 controlled	 by	 the	 rank	 and	 file.	 Once	 organised,	 the	 OBU	would	
overthrow	 capitalism	 through	 a	 general	 strike.53	In	 December	 1916,	 twelve	 IWW	
members	were	 jailed	 for	 seditious	conspiracy.	Many	within	 the	 labour	movement	
believed	 that	 the	 state	 was	 persecuting	 the	 “IWW	 Twelve”	 for	 their	 high-profile	
opposition	to	the	First	World	War	and	conscription.	The	case	highlighted	the	growing	
division	between	the	more	conservative	side	of	the	labour	movement,	that	remained	
committed	to	labourism,	and	the	increasingly	radical	side,	that	wished	to	overthrow	
capitalism.		
	
Conservative	labourists,	including	most	of	the	parliamentarians	and	the	AWU,	called	
for	a	new	trial	for	the	twelve.	As	well	as	pacifying	the	radicals’	call	for	unconditional	
release,	the	conservatives	were	justifying	their	commitment	to	labourist	reform.	An	
injustice	had	occurred,	but	it	could	be	righted	within	the	existing	system.	The	radicals	
countered	that	a	new	trial	was	pointless	within	a	legal	system	that	was	a	tool	of	the	
capitalist	class.	Only	industrial	agitation	could	force	the	government	to	release	the	
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twelve.54	The	newly-elected	NSW	Labor	government	released	the	twelve	in	1920	and	
1921.	 Its	 judicial	 inquiry	 into	 the	 case	 had	 found	 multiple	 problems	 with	 the	
convictions.	On	 its	 face,	 this	was	a	victory	 for	 the	conservative	 labourists,	but	 the	
grassroots	release	campaign	had	pressured	the	politicians	to	act.55	
	
In	August	1917	increasing	working-class	militancy	had	also	culminated	in	a	General	
Strike	 in	NSW.	Tens	of	 thousands	of	workers,	and	many	conservative	and	militant	
unions,	joined	the	strike.	The	AWU	did	not	participate.	While	large	and	widespread,	
the	strike	was	poorly	organised	and	ended	in	total	defeat	for	the	strikers.56	For	many	
unionists,	 the	 failed	 strike	 demonstrated	 the	 need	 for	 greater	 trade	 union	
organisation	and	direction	from	above.	For	example,	Albert	Willis,	Secretary	of	the	
Miners	Federation,	had	known	that	 the	miners’	position	was	weak,	and	had	 tried	
unsuccessfully	 to	 prevent	 their	 involvement	 in	 the	 General	 Strike.	 These	 more	
militant	unionists	began	organising	for	the	creation	of	OBU.	Their	OBU	would	break	
down	 traditional	 craft	 unionism	by	organising	workers	by	 industry	 rather	 than	by	
trade.	This	would	prevent	employers	from	pitting	one	trade	against	another	within	
an	 industry.	Willis	and	 Jock	Garden,	NSW	Labor	Council	Secretary	and	 leader	of	a	
group	 of	 radical	 union	 leaders	 known	 as	 the	 “Trades	 Hall	 Reds”,	 led	 this	 OBU	
movement.	Unlike	the	radical	 IWW	which	had	conceptualised	the	OBU,	Willis	and	
Garden	did	not	reject	political	action	or	compulsory	arbitration.	They	also	favoured	
hierarchical	 control	 of	 the	 OBU	 in	 place	 of	 the	 IWW’s	 emphasis	 on	 rank-and-file	
control.57	
	
Meanwhile	the	AWU	leaders	were	also	interested	in	the	OBU	concept.	They	wanted	
their	union	to	become	the	OBU	through	the	amalgamation	of	all	other	unions	into	
the	AWU.	When	it	became	clear	that	the	OBU	would	not	take	this	form,	the	AWU	
withdrew	its	support.	Most	AWU	officials	feared	that	they	would	lose	much	of	their	
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power	and	autonomy	if	the	AWU	merged	into	the	OBU.	They	also	believed	that	the	
OBU’s	revolutionary	politics	would	 jeopardise	Labor’s	electoral	prospects,	and	the	
arbitration	system	that	the	AWU	relied	upon.58	
	
The	OBU	issue	dominated	the	1919	NSW	Labor	Party	Annual	Conference.	Led	by	the	
AWU,	 the	 more	 conservative,	 anti-OBU	 forces	 won	 a	 narrow	 victory.	 The	
parliamentarians	and	most	of	the	local	branches	had	flocked	to	the	AWU	faction	as	
they	believed	that	the	OBU	was	electoral	poison.	Like	the	AWU,	most	conservative	
labourist	mass	union	leaders	opposed	the	OBU’s	radical	anti-capitalism,	and	feared	
that	the	OBU	would	reduce	their	power	and	autonomy.	Finally,	many	craft	unions	
allied	themselves	with	the	AWU	faction	and	fought	for	their	lives	against	the	OBU,	
which	would	have	obliterated	them.	All	of	these	unions	were	competitors	with	the	
AWU,	and/or	with	one	another,	 in	 the	workplace	 recruiting	members,	before	 the	
Arbitration	Court,	and	for	power	within	the	Labor	Party.	Yet	the	threat	of	the	OBU	
united	them.59	
	
Throughout	the	1920s	the	AWU	led	the	resistance	to	attempts	to	create	a	national	
trade	 union	 organisation	 and	 in	 1928	 refused	 to	 affiliate	 with	 the	 newly-formed	
Australasian	 Council	 of	 Trade	 Unions	 (ACTU).60	AWU	 leaders	 were	 jealous	 of	 the	
ACTU’s	position	as	 the	nation’s	 largest	union	organisation	and	did	not	want	to	be	
supplanted	by	a	 rival	national	union	body.	Furthermore,	 the	OBU	and	ACTU	were	
organised	 by	 the	 AWU	 leaders’	 factional	 enemies	 and	 the	 bodies	 had	 ties	 to	
radicalism,	 Communism	 and	 Asian	 labour	 organisations,	 all	 of	 which	 the	 AWU	
opposed.61	
	
Following	their	defeat	in	1919,	many	of	the	more	militant	OBU	supporters,	including	
the	Trades	Hall	Reds	and	Willis	and	his	Miners	Federation	allies,	left	the	Labor	Party	
to	form	a	new	party.	With	a	strong	tradition	of	militancy,	and	widespread	sympathy	
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for	 revolutionary	 ideas	 amongst	 its	members	 and	officials,	 the	Miners	 Federation	
took	 a	 leading	 role	 in	 this	 increasingly	militant	 section	 of	 the	 labour	movement.	
When	 the	 new	party	 proved	 ineffective,	 in	November	 1920	 the	 Trades	Hall	 Reds	
helped	 to	 establish	 the	 Communist	 Party	 of	 Australia	 (CPA).	 The	 AWU	 faction	
coalition	of	conservative	labourist	unions,	leagues	and	parliamentarians	went	on	to	
dominate	the	1920,	1921	and	1922	NSW	Labor	Party	Annual	Conferences.	The	Labor	
Party	formed	NSW	governments	from	1920	to	1922	under	Premiers	John	Storey	and	
James	Dooley.62	
	
A	more	militant	faction	took	control	of	the	NSW	Labor	Party	from	the	AWU	leaders	
in	 1923.	 The	 AWU	 faction	 had	 alienated	 many	 of	 its	 former	 allies	 through	 its	
authoritarianism	and	abuse	of	executive	power.	One	of	the	organisers	of	the	militant	
faction	was	Labor’s	new	parliamentary	leader	Jack	Lang.	Other	leading	forces	in	this	
militant	faction	were	Willis	and	the	Miners	Federation	and	Garden	and	the	Trades	
Hall	Reds,	who	had	recently	re-entered	the	party.	Labor	held	government	from	1925	
to	1927	and	during	the	tumultuous	peak	of	the	Great	Depression	from	1930	to	1932.	
Unlike	previous	Labor	leaders,	Lang	delivered	on	industrial	 legislation,	making	him	
increasingly	popular	with	trade	unionists.63	
	
Lang	was	born	in	1876	in	Sydney,	the	son	of	a	Scottish	watchmaker	and	his	Irish	wife.	
He	worked	 as	 an	 accountant’s	 clerk	 and	 then	 as	 a	 real	 estate	 agent	 and	became	
independently	wealthy.	Lang	was	active	in	the	Labor	Party	from	the	early	twentieth	
century	and	entered	politics	when	he	won	the	state	seat	of	Granville	 for	Labor	 in	
1913.	 He	 had	 no	 real	 experience	 or	 connection	 with	 trade	 unions	 or	 the	 labour	
movement.	 Serious,	 ruthless	 and	 ambitious,	 Lang	 rarely	 smiled	 and	 had	 no	 close	
friends.	 Yet	 he	 attracted	 a	 political	 following	 with	 his	 imposing	 appearance	 and	
engaging,	populist	speeches.	Nicknamed	“the	Big	Fella”,	he	was	a	tall,	solid	man	(193	
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cm)	with	a	trademark	black	moustache	and	receding	hairline.	Bede	Nairn	argued	that	
his	auctioneering	had	produced	“a	crude	but	effective	public	speaking	style:	rasping	
voice,	 snarling	 mouth,	 flailing	 hands,	 sentences	 and	 phrases	 punctuated	 by	 long	
pauses”.64	
	
Figure	1	John	Thomas	(Jack)	Lang	speaking	to	a	crowd	on	8	Septmeber	1934.65	
	
By	1926,	the	factional	situation	within	the	NSW	Labor	Party	had	returned	more	or	
less	to	its	1919	position.	There	was	a	conservative	faction	led	in	Caucus	by	deputy	
parliamentary	 leader	Peter	Loughlin	and	 in	the	extra-parliamentary	party	by	AWU	
leader	Jack	Bailey.	A	more	militant	faction	was	led	in	Caucus	by	Premier	Lang,	and	in	
the	extra-parliamentary	party	by	Willis	and	the	Miners	Federation	and	Garden	and	
the	Trades	Hall	Reds,	although	both	Bailey	and	Garden	were	expelled	from	the	Labor	
Party	at	this	stage.	Garden	and	most	of	the	Trades	Hall	Reds	had	left	the	CPA	by	this	
time	 and	were	 firmly	 allied	with	 Lang	 and	 Labor.	 Each	 faction	 controlled	 its	 own	
labour	newspaper:	the	conservative	faction	had	the	Australian	Worker,	the	militants	
the	Labor	Daily.		
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In	contrast	with	his	popularity	amongst	members	and	voters,	Lang	was	unpopular	
amongst	his	Caucus	whom	he	treated	with	contempt	and	did	not	consult.	In	1924	he	
survived	a	leadership	challenge	by	one	vote	and	from	1926	relied	on	the	support	of	
Annual	 Conference	 rather	 than	 Caucus	 to	 maintain	 his	 leadership.66	In	 1926	 the	
militant	 faction	 controlled	 a	 Special	 Conference	 and	 confirmed	 Lang	 as	 the	
parliamentary	 leader	 for	 the	 life	 of	 the	 current	 parliament.	 This	 radical	 change	
removed	the	politicians’	right	to	choose	their	leader,	and	began	what	his	opponents	
called	 the	 “Lang	dictatorship”.	 The	party	 split	 in	1927,	 this	 time	over	 the	militant	
faction’s	 proposed	 1927	 Rules	 which	 introduced	 a	 group	 system	 of	 party	
organisation.	Opponents	within	and	outside	the	party	labelled	them	the	“Red	Rules”,	
falsely	claiming	that	 they	would	allow	Communists	 to	 infiltrate	 the	party.67	In	 July	
that	year,	a	Unity	Conference	approved	the	1927	Rules	by	an	overwhelming	majority.	
The	AWU	disaffiliated	from	the	party	in	protest.68	
	
An	uncontested	aspect	of	labour’s	ideology	throughout	the	interwar	period	was	that	
it	 was	 an	 egalitarian	 and	 internally	 democratic	 movement.	 Control	 by	 ordinary	
members,	usually	termed	“rank-and-file	control”,	was	central	to	its	stated	ideology.69	
All	 leading	 figures	within	 the	movement	 claimed	 to	 support	 the	position	 that	 the	
ordinary	 members	 should	 have	 as	 much	 control	 of	 labour	 institutions	 as	 was	
practically	possible.	The	extent	to	which	the	leaders	actually	believed	in	membership	
control	 varied,	 and	 was	 generally	 less	 than	 they	 claimed.	 As	 we	 will	 see,	 the	
authoritarian	and	oligarchic	behaviour	of	the	AWU	leaders	within	their	own	union	
and	within	the	Labor	Party	reveals	a	weak	commitment	to	internal	democracy.	The	
ideologies	 of	 the	more	militant	 leaders,	who	mostly	 supported	 various	 strains	 of	
socialism,	suggest	that	they	should	have	been	more	inclined	towards	rank-and-file	
control.	Willis,	for	example,	adhered	to	the	guild	socialism	of	English	political	theorist	
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G.D.H.	Cole	who	advocated	a	socialism	of	decentralised	association	and	participatory	
rank-and-file	democracy.70	
	
By	1930,	Lang	and	an	“Inner	Group”	of	his	allies	dominated	the	party.	Lang	was	by	
this	time	extremely	popular	with	ordinary	party	and	trade	union	members.	This	was	
based	largely	on	his	political	success	and	legislative	record,	although	his	popularity	
was	in	part	that	of	a	demagogue	in	a	time	of	crisis	during	the	Great	Depression.71	
Lang’s	alliance	with	key	trade	union	leaders	was	also	crucial	to	his	supremacy,	and	
the	 Trade	 Union	 Secretaries	 Association	 (TUSA)	 was	 a	 key	 site	 of	 pro-Lang	
organising.72	Lang’s	prestige	was	so	great	that	he	was	able	to	defy	expulsion	by	the	
Federal	ALP	 in	1931	and	continue	as	 leader	of	 “Lang	 Labor”,	which	 remained	 the	
dominant	labour	party	in	NSW.	There	had	been	long-running	hostility	between	the	
federal	 and	 NSW	 ALP	 but	 the	 immediate	 cause	 of	 the	 split	 was	 disagreement	
between	the	Federal	ALP	government’s	conservative,	deflationary	response	to	the	
Great	 Depression	 and	 NSW’s	 “Lang	 Plan”	 which	 most	 famously	 included	 the	
suspension	of	interest	payments	to	overseas	bondholders.	Lang’s	populist	attack	on	
the	“elites”	had	made	him	an	archetypal	example	of	Michels’	“cult	for	the	leaders”;	
he	was	immortalised	in	busts	and	praised	with	the	slogan	“Lang	is	right!”73	
	
Yet	in	1930	a	new	and	unexpected	challenge	to	Inner	Group	dominance	had	emerged	
in	 the	 form	 of	 the	 Socialisation	 Units.	 That	 year	 the	 NSW	 Labor	 Metropolitan	
Conference	had	voted	to	form	a	committee	to	promote	the	party	objective	of	the	
socialisation	of	industry.	The	Socialisation	Committee	then	formed	Socialisation	Units	
based	initially	on	the	local	party	branches.	Soon	there	were	180	Socialisation	Units,	
mostly	in	metropolitan	Sydney,	and	members	quickly	joined	“in	a	surge	of	political	
involvement	 unparalleled	 in	 the	 party’s	 history”.74	The	 units	 were	 a	 reflection	 of	
growing	 radicalism	 in	 the	Depression	 context	 and	 they	 essentially	 became	 a	well	
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organised,	 radical	 faction	within	 the	 party	which	 controlled	 the	 election	 of	many	
branch	officers	and	Annual	Conference	delegates.75	Many	in	the	ruling	Inner	Group	
coalition	 were	 former	 or	 current	 militants	 and	 radicals	 themselves	 and	 initially	
welcomed	the	Socialisation	movement,	not	yet	realising	the	threat	it	posed	to	Inner	
Group	rule.76	In	1931	the	Socialisation	Units	attempted	to	form	within	trade	unions	
but	were	largely	unsuccessful	and	the	following	year	the	units	narrowly	failed	in	their	
attempt	to	capture	the	NSW	Labor	executive	from	the	Inner	Group.	The	Inner	Group	
suppressed	 the	 units	 and	 at	 the	 1933	Annual	 Conference	won	 a	 vote	 to	 dissolve	
them.77	
	
By	the	mid-1930s	the	threat	from	the	Socialisation	Units	was	over	but	a	new	threat	
to	Lang	was	emerging	from	the	unions.	By	this	time	he	had	made	enemies	of	most	
union	leaders	including	Garden,	Willis	and	TUSA	Secretary	Oscar	(Ossie)	Schreiber.	
Communists	won	leadership	of	the	Miners	Federation	and	ARU	in	1934	and	1935	and	
the	leaders	began	agitating	against	Lang	who	was	increasingly	anti-communist	and	
isolationist.78	Lang	further	alienated	the	unions	by	attempting	to	take	control	of	the	
Labor	Council’s	radio	station	2KY,	as	he	had	done	with	the	Labor	Daily.	Led	by	Garden,	
the	 unions	 blocked	 Lang’s	 takeover.79 	The	 Inner	 Group	 now	 consisted	 of	 Lang’s	
personal	 allies,	 most	 prominently:	 Paddy	 Keller,	 Party	 President;	 Jim	 Graves,	
Organising	Secretary;	“Plugger”	Martin,	Organiser;	Harry	O’Regan,	Returning	Officer;	
and	Harold	and	Norman	McCauley,	former	members	of	the	Premier’s	Department.80	
As	Lang	increasingly	cut	out	the	unions	and	it	became	clear	that	he	could	not	win	a	
general	election,	his	hold	on	power	began	to	slip.	An	opposition	coalition	of	trade	
unions	and	local	branches	finally	deposed	Lang	and	the	Inner	Group	in	1939.81	
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Originality	and	arguments	
There	is	a	historical	consensus	that	in	the	interwar	period	the	AWU	and	NSW	Labor	
Party	were	oligarchies	while	the	Miners	Federation	was	democratic.	This	has	been	
much	 noted	 but	 little	 analysed	 by	 historians.	 This	 thesis	 is	 the	 first	 book-length	
analysis	of	democracy	and	oligarchy	within	the	NSW	labour	movement	in	this	period	
and	 the	 first	 chapter-length	 analysis	 for	 each	 organisation.	 There	 has	 been	 little	
historiographical	 focus	 on	 how	 or	 why	 each	 organisation	 was	 democratic	 or	
oligarchic,	what	effects	this	had	or	how	the	organisations	influenced	one	another.	I	
am	also	the	first	person	to	situate	these	organisations	within	the	international	body	
of	 theory	on	trade	union	and	political	party	democracy.	 I	will	now	provide	a	brief	
outline	of	the	historiography	(which	is	expanded	in	relevant	chapters)	and	my	main	
arguments	and	conclusions.	
	
Historians	 agree	 that	 trade	 union	 leaders	 were	 the	 most	 powerful	 extra-
parliamentary	 actors	 within	 the	 NSW	 Labor	 Party. 82 	Furthermore,	 historians	
recognise	 that	 union	 leaders’	 power	 within	 the	 party	 came	 as	 a	 result	 of	 their	
positions	of	dominance	within	their	unions.83	In	the	1960s	Irwin	Young	and	Miriam	
Dixson	analysed	 the	 inter-war	NSW	Labor	Party	 in	 terms	of	union	power	bases.84	
These	union	power	bases	were	also	an	important	component	of	Geoffrey	Robinson’s	
more	recent	analysis	of	the	second	Lang	government.85		I	too	focus	on	union	power	
bases	but	I	take	the	analysis	one	step	further	and	look	at	what	was	happening	within	
two	of	the	key	unions.	Vere	Gordon	Childe’s	contemporary	1923	account	is	closer	to	
my	 approach.	 He	 focused	 on	 union	 participation	within	 the	 Labor	 Party	 and	 also	
highlighted	 some	of	 the	 related	 internal	 conflict	within	 the	unions,	 especially	 the	
AWU.86	
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I	am	concerned	with	what	was	happening	inside	each	of	these	three	organisations	
and	how	it	affected	what	was	happening	inside	the	other	two.	Historians	have	only	
briefly	analysed	these	links.	Bede	Nairn	noted	that	from	1917	to	1923,	“the	AWU	had	
developed	its	own	brand	of	internal	control	and	sought	to	transfer	it	to	the	[Labor]	
Party	Executive”.87	Raymond	Markey	argued	that	upon	its	 foundation	 in	1891,	the	
NSW	 Labor	 Party	 based	 its	 party	 and	 local	 branch	 structure	 on	 “the	 urban	 craft	
unions,	 or	 maritime,	 coal	 mining	 and	 other	 unskilled	 unions”	 which	 all	 shared	 a	
“localised,	 participatory	 mode	 of	 organisation”.	 From	 1895,	 however,	 with	 the	
unions	greatly	weakened	by	the	failed	1890s	strikes,	the	AWU	and	professional	Labor	
politicians	 imposed	their	“more	centralised,	bureaucratic	 form	of	government”	on	
the	party	and	on	the	re-emerging	unions.88	My	thesis	develops	this	line	of	enquiry	
and	analysis.	
	
Historians	 of	 this	 period	 of	 NSW	 labour	 history	 have	 engaged	 little	 with	 theory.	
Marxist	theory	underlies	much	of	the	historiography,	but	it	is	not	explicitly	set	out	or	
analysed.	Michels	is	barely	mentioned,	despite	the	glaring	relevance	of	his	iron	law	
of	oligarchy.	Ian	Turner	provided	the	most	explicit	engagement	with	theory,	yet	even	
he	did	so	only	briefly.	In	the	introduction	to	Industrial	Labour	and	Politics	(1965),	he	
discussed	Vilfredo	Pareto’s	elite	theory	and	the	argument	that	“the	leaders	of	the	
labour	movement	are	nothing	but	a	new	elite”.	Turner	challenged	this	elite	theory	
from	his	Marxist	position	that	“the	limits	of	the	actions	of	labour	leaders	are	set	by	
the	masses	of	the	labour	movement”.	Unfortunately,	Turner	simply	mentioned	in	the	
introduction	that	this	proposition	“is	one	of	the	arguments	of	this	work”	but	did	not	
return	to	it	or	examine	it	explicitly.89		
	
Markey	 noted	 that	 the	 history	 of	 the	 AWU	 between	 1880	 and	 1900	 “confirms	
Michels’	thesis”90	and,	in	her	review	of	Mark	Hearn	and	Harry	Knowles’	history	of	the	
AWU,	Verity	Burgmann	observed	 that	 the	AWU	“became	a	union	 that	 seemed	 to	
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confirm	the	clearly	 iron-like	nature	of	the	law	of	oligarchy”.91	These	brief	allusions	
are	 the	 historiography’s	 only	 engagement	 with	 the	 extensive	 international	
sociological	 and	 political	 science	 literature	 on	 trade	 union	 and	 political	 party	
governance.	Conversely,	my	analysis	is	grounded	in	this	international	theory	which	
provides	much	of	the	framework	for	each	of	the	three	parts	of	the	thesis.	
	
Part	one:	AWU	
The	first	three	chapters	focus	on	the	AWU,	assessing	how	and	why	it	was	an	oligarchy	
and	investigating	oligarchical	continuity	and	change.	I	demonstrate	that	over	the	first	
50	 years	 of	 its	 history	 the	 AWU	 changed	 from	 a	 federal	 oligarchy	 to	 a	 collegial	
oligarchy	 to	 a	 simple	 official	 hierarchy.	 The	 union	 possessed	 none	 of	 the	 seven	
requirements	 for	 trade	 union	 democracy.	 In	 chapter	 one	 I	 argue	 that	most	 AWU	
members	 did	 not	 form	 strong	 occupational	 communities,	 the	 union’s	 rules	 were	
undemocratic	and	 there	was	a	 large	gap	 in	status	and	skills	between	officials	and	
ordinary	members.	 In	 chapter	 two	 I	 show	 that	 the	 union	 had	 low	 levels	 of	 local	
autonomy	 and	 membership	 decision-making	 and	 how	 the	 officials	 stifled	 and	
suppressed	internal	organised	opposition	and	free	communication.	
	
In	chapter	two	we	will	see	that	countervailing	tendencies	operated	against	oligarchy	
within	the	union,	mainly	through	pressure	from	ordinary	members	and	support	for	
democracy	amongst	a	minority	of	leaders,	but	they	were	not	enough	to	overcome	
oligarchy.	I	argue	that	four	foundational	elements	allowed	for	the	persistence	and	
development	of	AWU	oligarchy	throughout	the	first	half	of	the	twentieth	century:	
1. The	 pastoral	 industry’s	 scattered	 and	 itinerant	 rural	workers	 did	 not	 form	
lasting	communities	and	were	overly	reliant	on	official	union	communication.	
2. The	 aspirational,	 competitive	 and	 hierarchical	 elements	 of	 the	 AWU’s	
workplace	culture	made	it	well-suited	to	authoritarian	leadership.	
3. The	union’s	centralised	constitution	concentrated	power	 into	 the	hands	of	
the	top	officials	and	undermined	grassroots	participation.	
																																								 																				
91	Verity	Burgmann,	"Review:	One	Big	Union.	A	History	of	the	Australian	Workers	Union	1886-1994,"	
Labor	History	39,	no.	2	(1998):	233.	
	 45	
4. The	AWU’s	commitment	to	industrial	arbitration	meant	that	members	had	no	
real	role	to	play	within	the	union	other	than	paying	their	membership	fees	
and	voting	in	annual	elections.	
AWU	 affiliation	 with	 the	 Labor	 Party	 had	 mixed	 effects	 on	 the	 union’s	 internal	
governance.	 On	 the	 democratic	 side,	 factional	 opponents	 within	 the	 Labor	 Party	
publicised	the	AWU	leaders’	undemocratic	behaviour.	On	the	anti-democratic	side,	
however,	affiliation	gave	AWU	officials	power	and	prestige	within	the	Labor	Party	
which	 further	 exacerbated	 the	 status	 gap	 between	 members	 and	 officials.	
Furthermore,	 the	 Labor	Party’s	 requirement	 that	 all	 party	members	must	 also	be	
members	of	their	trade	union	reduced	members’	ability	to	leave	the	AWU	in	protest.	
	
Chapter	three	is	a	case	study	which	examines	the	AWU’s	role	in	the	1916	Australian	
conscription	 plebiscite.	 The	 AWU	 and	 its	 Worker	 newspapers	 strongly	 opposed	
conscription	 and	 historians	 argue	 that	 if	 not	 for	 the	 AWU’s	 “no”	 campaign,	
conscription	would	probably	have	been	introduced.92	I	argue	that	we	do	not	know	
how	most	AWU	members	felt	about	conscription	and	that	the	members	had	 little	
influence	over	the	union’s	stance.	Furthermore,	if	the	AWU	had	been	a	different	kind	
of	oligarchy,	such	as	a	simple	official	hierarchy	where	President	William	Spence	had	
absolute	power,	it	may	have	supported	conscription.	So	from	the	“no”	conscription	
campaign’s	perspective,	it	was	fortunate	that	the	AWU	was	a	collegial	oligarchy.	
	
Part	two:	Miners	Federation	
Chapters	 four,	 five	 and	 six	 focus	 on	 the	 Miners	 Federation.	 In	 chapter	 four	 I	
investigate	why	 the	Miners	 Federation	was	 democratic	 by	 comparing	 it	 with	 the	
AWU.	 The	 Miners	 Federation	 possessed	 six	 out	 of	 the	 seven	 requirements	 for	
democracy;	it	had	a	strong	occupational	community,	democratic	rules,	high	levels	of	
local	autonomy	and	membership	decision-making,	internal	organised	opposition	and	
free	 communication.	 The	 only	 democratic	 requirement	 that	 the	 union	 did	 not	
																																								 																				
92	Hearn	and	Knowles,	One	Big	Union:	A	History	of	the	Australian	Workers'	Union	1886-1994:	118;	
Clyde	Cameron,	"Henry	Ernest	Boote:	It's	Wrong	to	be	Right,"	Labour	History	80(2001).	
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possess	 was	 equality	 between	members	 and	 officials.	 Miners	 Federation	 leaders	
enjoyed	high	pay	and	celebrity	status	within	mining	communities.	
	
I	 argue	 that	 in	 the	 cultures	 of	 both	 the	 AWU	 and	Miners	 Federation	 there	were	
tensions	between	solidarity	and	egalitarianism	on	the	one	hand	and	aspirationalism,	
competitiveness	 and	 hierarchy	 on	 the	 other.	 In	 the	 AWU	 aspirationalism,	
competitiveness	 and	 hierarchy	 prevailed	 and	 led	 the	 union	 down	 the	 path	 to	
oligarchy.	 In	 the	 Miners	 Federation	 solidarity	 and	 egalitarianism	 prevailed	 and	
facilitated	democracy.	The	most	important	contextual	difference	between	the	AWU	
and	Miners	Federation	was	that	miners	and	their	families	lived	and	worked	together	
within	permanent	communities.	The	fact	that	mining	was	dangerous	also	meant	that	
miners	relied	on	each	other	for	safety	and	potential	rescue	which	further	discouraged	
individualism.93	The	arbitration	 system	undermined	Miners	 Federation	democracy	
but	 less	 than	 it	 had	 in	 the	 AWU	 because	 the	 miners	 had	 a	 more	 contested	
relationship	with	arbitration	and	continued	to	strike.	
	
The	effects	of	Labor	Party	affiliation	were	mixed	for	Miners	Federation	democracy.	
On	the	anti-democratic	side,	when	Miners	Federation	officials	became	powerful	and	
famous	within	the	Labor	Party	this	increased	the	status	gap	between	members	and	
officials.	Furthermore,	when	these	Miners	Federation	leaders	allied	with	Lang	in	the	
mid-1920s,	 and	 privileged	 political	 action	 over	 industrial	 action,	 this	 encouraged	
membership	 passivity.	 The	 absorption	of	 the	Miners	 Federation’s	Common	Cause	
newspaper	 into	 the	 Labor	Party’s	Labor	Daily	 also	 reduced	 the	utility	of	Common	
Cause	 as	 a	 forum	 for	 free	 union	 communication.	 On	 the	 democratic	 side,	 the	
unsuccessful	attempt	of	Lang’s	Labor	Party	faction	to	defeat	the	Miners	Federation	
leadership	in	union	elections	in	the	mid-1930s	increased	membership	interest	and	
debate	within	the	union	and	provided	for	electoral	opposition.	
	
Chapter	 four	 focuses	 in	 depth	 on	 the	Miners	 Federation’s	 crucial	 shift	 from	 local	
democratic	communities	to	a	national	democratic	community	in	the	decades	after	
																																								 																				
93	“The	price	the	miner	pays,”	CC	16	February	1923,	6.	
	 47	
1915.	 To	 build	 a	 national	 miners’	 community,	 the	 Miners	 Federation	 needed	 to	
overcome	 localism	 and	 it	 did	 so	 by	 creating	 an	 imagined	 community	 of	 miners	
through	 the	 national	 newspaper	 Common	 Cause,	 class	 consciousness,	 shared	
entertainment	 and	 sport	 between	 regions	 and	 the	 national	 organisation	 of	 the	
Miners	Federation	Women’s	Auxiliaries.	The	Miners	Federation	case	study	in	chapter	
six	examines	the	union’s	five	month	campaign	against	mechanisation	in	the	Lambton	
B	coal	mine	near	Newcastle	from	1935	to	1936.	The	Miners	Federation	members	had	
elected	a	CPA	leadership	in	1934	and	the	anti-mechanisation	campaign	was	an	early	
test	of	that	leadership,	with	the	local	members	refusing	the	leaders’	instructions	to	
strike.	 We	 will	 see	 the	 complexities	 of	 Miners	 Federation	 democracy	 in	 action.	
Central	leadership,	a	national	mining	community	and	working-class	solidarity	chafe	
against	 local	 community,	 local	 autonomy,	 membership	 decision-making	 and	
pragmatic	 concerns	 for	 jobs,	wages	 and	 conditions	 in	ways	 that	 demonstrate	 the	
union’s	high	levels	of	democracy.	
	
Part	three:	NSW	Labor	Party	
The	final	four	chapters	examine	the	NSW	Labor	Party.	I	agree	with	the	historiography	
that	the	party	was	an	oligarchy	and	that	the	chief	cause	of	that	oligarchy	was	that	
trade	union	leaders	enjoyed	disproportionate	power	within	the	party.	The	problem	
was	not	that	trade	unions	or	trade	unionists	had	significant	power:	it	was,	after	all,	a	
labour	party.	The	problem	was	that	trade	union	leaders	exercised	power	as	if	they	
were	 delegates	 faithfully	 representing	 the	 views	 of	 their	 thousands	 of	members,	
when	in	reality	the	union	members	were	often	uninformed	and	uninterested	and	had	
no	real	way	of	influencing	their	leaders.	Nevertheless,	the	historiography	presents	an	
overly	pessimistic	view	as	 it	fails	to	recognise	adequately	the	democratic	 impulses	
that	 were	 operating	 within	 the	 party.	 This	 in	 turn	 has	 caused	 historians	 to	
misinterpret	important	events.	For	example,	I	demonstrate	that	both	the	so-called	
“Lang	dictatorship”	and	the	1927	Rules	actually	enhanced	democracy.	
	
In	chapter	seven	I	focus	on	the	NSW	Labor	Party’s	community	and	rules.	I	argue	that	
while	 some	 local	branches	possessed	strong	communities,	most	did	not,	and	 that	
while	the	party	rules	became	more	democratic	in	1927,	they	continued	to	give	too	
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much	power	to	union	leaders.	In	chapter	eight	I	argue	that	the	party’s	toleration	of	
internal	opposition	(factions)	and	defence	of	NSW	local	autonomy	against	the	federal	
ALP	 enhanced	 democracy.	 Unions	 provided	 the	 foundations	 for	 the	 factions	 and	
must	therefore	receive	much	of	the	credit	for	the	democracy-enhancing	effects	of	
factionalism.	But	each	union	also	came	into	the	party	as	an	individual	“quasi-faction”	
of	its	own,	and	this	sometimes	enabled	them	to	exercise	undemocratic	influence	on	
the	party.		
	
Within	 the	 NSW	 Labor	 Party,	 local	 branch	 autonomy	 and	 membership	 decision-
making	declined	and	only	a	minority	of	branches	had	strong	enough	communities	to	
resist.	 In	 chapter	 nine	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 so-called	 “Lang	 dictatorship”	 enhanced	
democracy	by	establishing	effective	extra-parliamentary	control	over	the	politicians	
for	the	first	time	in	the	party’s	history.	By	the	mid-1930s,	however,	the	increasing	
power	 of	 Lang	 and	 his	 Inner	 Group	 of	 personal	 allies	 had	 made	 this	 extra-
parliamentary	control	illusory.	The	Inner	Group	eroded	free	speech	and	increasingly	
used	corruption	and	violence	to	maintain	power.	
	
Overall,	union	affiliation	had	mixed	effects	on	NSW	Labor	Party	democracy.	Union	
leaders’	 immense	power	was	the	primary	source	of	party	oligarchy	but	the	unions	
also	provided	an	effective	check	on	Inner	Group	oligarchy	in	the	late	1930s.	Turning	
to	the	AWU	and	Miners	Federation	specifically,	usually	the	effects	of	their	affiliation	
were	straightforward	as	they	transposed,	or	attempted	to	transpose,	their	own	rules,	
methods	and	cultures	 into	 the	party.	But	sometimes	 the	oligarchical	AWU	and	 its	
Australian	Worker	newspaper	actually	enhanced	Labor	Party	democracy	by	providing	
opposition	 to	 the	 ruling	 faction,	 holding	 the	 leaders	 to	 account	 and	 stimulating	
member	interest	and	debate.	On	the	other	hand,	the	democratic	Miners	Federation	
sometimes	undermined	Labor	Party	democracy	by,	for	example,	using	its	money	to	
take	control	over	the	party	newspapers.	
	
In	the	NSW	Labor	Party	case	study	in	chapter	ten	I	examine	the	effects	of	the	party’s	
internal	governance	on	its	general	election	prospects.	I	argue	that	the	Labor	Party’s	
internal	oligarchy	was	a	primary	cause	of	Labor’s	defeat	at	the	1938	NSW	election.	
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Lang	and	his	Inner	Group	had	become	so	undemocratic	that	a	large	section	of	the	
party	had	broken	away	to	form	a	rival	Industrialist	Labour	Party	which	campaigned	
under	the	slogan	“Labor	without	Lang”.	The	majority	of	voters	refused	to	vote	for	
Lang	who	was	increasingly	criticised	as	a	tyrant	even	by	those	within	his	own	party.	
	
Conclusion	
This	thesis	examines	democracy	and	oligarchy	within	the	AWU,	Miners	Federation	
and	NSW	Labor	Party	from	1910	to	1939.	It	is	the	first	detailed	examination	of	this	
topic	within	each	organisation	and	the	first	to	conduct	a	relational	and	comparative	
analysis	within	the	three.	 	Unlike	previous	histories,	my	analysis	 is	enriched	by	an	
extensive	engagement	with	 the	 relevant	 theoretical	 literature	on	party	and	union	
governance	as	well	as	gender,	localism	and	imagined	communities.	I	argue	that	the	
NSW	Labor	Party	both	influenced	and	was	influenced	by	its	affiliated	unions.	These	
effects	were	complicated	and	mixed.	Within	all	three	organisations	the	pro	and	anti-
democratic	effects	of	trade	union	affiliation	with	the	Labor	Party	were	approximately	
equal.	
	
The	AWU	and	NSW	Labor	Party	were	both	oligarchies	from	1910	to	1939	and	both	
became	 more	 oligarchical	 as	 the	 interwar	 period	 progressed.	 Even	 the	 Miners	
Federation’s	 democracy	 declined	 somewhat,	 especially	 under	 the	 Communist	
leadership	 from	1934.	This	 thesis	could	 therefore	be	 interpreted	as	evidence	 that	
democracy	within	political	parties	and	trade	unions	is	a	hopeless	cause.	Michels,	a	
democratic	socialist	when	he	first	formulated	the	iron	law	of	oligarchy,	stared	too	
long	into	this	pessimistic	void	and	converted	to	fascism.	I	will	demonstrate,	however,	
that	 oligarchy	 was	 always	 contested	 and	 that	 these	 organisations	 all	 provide	
examples	of	how	oligarchy	can	be	successfully	resisted.	There	is	a	strong	tendency	
towards	oligarchy	within	parties	and	unions,	but	oligarchy	is	not	always	inevitable.	
The	first	step	in	counteracting	oligarchy	is	to	understand	it.	
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CHAPTER	I	
Foundations	of	oligarchy:	the	AWU	
	
The	 Australian	Workers	 Union	 (AWU)	 was	 the	 largest	 and	most	 influential	 trade	
union	in	Australia	throughout	the	first	half	of	the	twentieth	century.1	It	was	also	the	
archetypal	trade	union	oligarchy.2	Both	this	chapter	and	that	which	follows	analyse	
the	circumstances	that	allowed	for	the	creation,	persistence	and	development	of	that	
oligarchy	from	the	union’s	formation	in	1886	through	to	1939.	Like	union	democracy,	
union	oligarchy	requires	certain	conditions	to	thrive,	and	this	chapter	explores	the	
contextual	 factors	 that	 allowed	 the	 AWU	 to	 become	 and	 remain	 an	 oligarchical	
union.	
	
The	 sociological	 literature	 identifies	 seven	 key	 requirements	 for	 trade	 union	
democracy:	 democratic	 rules,	 a	 close-knit	 occupational	 community,	 internal	
organised	 opposition,	 local	 autonomy,	 membership	 decision-making,	 equality	
between	 officials	 and	 members	 and	 free	 communication.	 These	 requirements	
provide	a	useful	framework	for	analysing	democracy	and	oligarchy	within	the	AWU,	
which	 did	 not	 possess	 any	 of	 the	 seven.	 This	 chapter	 focuses	 on	 the	 AWU’s	
occupational	community,	 rules	and	equality	between	officials	and	members	while	
the	 following	 chapter	 examines	 local	 autonomy,	 membership	 decision-making,	
internal	organised	opposition	and	free	communication.	
	
AWU	oligarchy	was	not	static;	it	changed	and	adapted	to	new	circumstances.	But	four	
contextual	 elements	 continued	 to	 allow	 for	 its	 persistence	 and	 development	
throughout	the	first	half	of	the	twentieth	century.	Time	and	again	we	will	see	how	
the	aspirational	and	hierarchical	elements	of	the	AWU’s	founding	ethos,	the	pastoral	
industry’s	 scattered	 and	 itinerant	 rural	 membership,	 the	 union’s	 centralised	
constitution	and	its	dedication	to	compulsory	arbitration	enabled	the	union’s	leaders	
to	entrench	their	rule.	We	will	also	see	that	affiliation	with	the	Australian	Labor	Party	
																																								 																				
1	John	Merritt,	The	Making	of	the	A.W.U.		(Melbourne:	Oxford	University	Press,	1986).	1.	
2	Mark	Hearn	and	Harry	Knowles,	One	Big	Union:	A	History	of	the	Australian	Workers'	Union	1886-
1994		(Melbourne	Cambridge	University	Press,	1996):	136.	
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(ALP)	 had	 mixed	 effects,	 at	 certain	 times	 facilitating	 oligarchy,	 and	 at	 others	
promoting	democracy.	
	
A	short	history	of	the	AWU	from	1886	to	1939	
Shearers	 in	 the	 south-eastern	 state	of	Victoria	 founded	 the	Australasian	 Shearers	
Union	 (ASU)	 in	 1886	 and	 it	 quickly	 amalgamated	with	 similar	 unions	 and	 spread	
throughout	Australia.3	In	1890	the	ASU	leaders	created	the	General	Labourers	Union	
(GLU)	to	unionise	shedhands	and	in	1894	the	ASU	and	GLU	amalgamated	to	form	the	
AWU.	It	was	structured	federally	with	regional	branches	controlled	by	the	national	
annual	 convention	 and	 executive	 council.	 By	 the	 twentieth	 century	 the	 AWU	
published	the	Australian	Worker	newspaper	 in	Sydney,	the	NSW	state	capital,	 the	
Worker	 in	 Queensland	 and	 the	 Westralian	 Worker	 in	 Western	 Australia.	 These	
newspapers	were	widely	read	by	AWU	members	and	the	general	public.4	
	
By	1910	 there	were	 two	AWU	branches	 in	NSW.	Both	primarily	 enrolled	pastoral	
workers	 with	 the	 Bourke	 Branch	 covering	 western	 NSW	 and	 the	 Central	 Branch	
covering	 the	rest	of	 the	state.5	In	1913	the	annual	convention	retitled	 the	Bourke	
Branch	as	 the	Western	Branch,	extended	 its	boundaries	 to	 include	Northern	NSW	
and	moved	its	headquarters	to	Armidale	in	the	state’s	New	England	district	(figure	
2).6	In	1916,	the	NSW	AWU	doubled	its	membership	when	the	state’s	largest	union,	
the	18,000-member	Railway	Workers	and	General	Labourers	Association	(RWGLA),	
amalgamated	with	the	AWU	to	form	the	Railway	Workers	Industry	Branch	(RWIB).	
Attracted	by	the	enhanced	career	opportunities	within	the	AWU,	RWGLA	organiser	
George	Bodkin	led	the	push	for	amalgamation	within	his	union.	The	following	year,	
the	Rockchoppers	and	Sewer	Miners	Union	(RSMU)	fused	into	the	RWIB.	The	AWU	
was	 henceforth	 the	 principal	 construction	 labourers’	 union	 in	 NSW.7	The	 Central	
Branch	(12,000	members)	absorbed	the	Western	Branch	(6,500	members)	in	1920,	
																																								 																				
3	Merritt,	The	Making	of	the	A.W.U.:	98.	
4	Hearn	and	Knowles,	One	Big	Union:	A	History	of	the	Australian	Workers'	Union	1886-1994:	11.	
5	AWU	Annual	Convention	Report,	Worker	(Brisbane),	19	January	1910,	1.	
6	AWU	Annual	Convention	Report,	Australian	Worker,	26	February	1913,	3.	
7	Peter	Sheldon,	"System	and	Strategy:	The	Changing	Shape	of	Unionism	Among	NSW	Construction	
Labourers,"	Labour	History	65(1993):	123.	
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in	an	effort	to	suppress	Western	Branch	radicalism,	and	there	were	once	again	two	
NSW	AWU	branches.	The	Central	Branch	had	approximately	18,500	members	and	
the	RWIB	had	6,000	(figure	3).8	
																																								 																				
8	Hearn	and	Knowles,	One	Big	Union:	A	History	of	the	Australian	Workers'	Union	1886-1994:	131.	
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Figure	2	AWU	branches	in	NSW	from	1913	to	1920.9
	
Figure	3	AWU	branches	in	NSW	from	1920	to	1933.10	
																																								 																				
9	Central	Branch	Annual	Report,	31	May	1914.	
10	AWU	Constitution	and	General	Rules	1923-1924,	AWU,	E154/25,	NBAC.	
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For	most	of	the	period	from	1910	to	1939	Jack	Bailey	was	the	state’s	most	powerful	
and	prominent	AWU	leader.	Born	and	raised	in	rural	NSW,	he	left	school	at	a	young	
age	to	work	as	a	shearing	shed	tar	boy,	and	was	later	employed	as	a	farm	labourer,	
shearer	(and	bare-knuckle	boxer)	and	then	AWU	organiser.	He	was	president	of	the	
Central	Branch	from	1915	to	1933,	and	used	this	position	to	gain	election	to	the	NSW	
Legislative	Assembly	from	1918	to	1925.	A	tough	man	of	stern	expression,	muscular	
build	and	violent	temper,	Bailey	possessed	a	rugged	personal	magnetism.11	He	did	
not	drink,	smoke	or	gamble,	and	rarely	gave	speeches	or	sought	publicity,	preferring	
to	utilise	his	impressive	political	organising	skills	discretely	(figure	4).12	Bailey’s	chief	
lieutenants	 were	 Central	 Branch	 Secretaries	William	 Lambert	 from	 1915	 to	 1921	
(figure	5)	and	George	Buckland	from	1921	to	1933	(figure	6).		
	
	
Figure	4	John	(Jack)	Bailey	c.	1917.13	
																																								 																				
11	Martha	Rutledge,	Bailey,	John	(Jack)	(1871–1947).	Australian	Dictionary	of	Biography	7,	1979.	
12	John	Brown,	“Labor’s	new	bosses.	Mr	J	Bailey	strategist	of	the	board,”	Smith’s	Weekly,	8	March	
1919,	7;	“Death	of	John	Bailey,”	Australian	Worker,	27	October	1947,	3;	Scott	Stephenson,	Bailey,	
John	(Jack)	(1871–1947),	http://labouraustralia.anu.edu.au/biography/bailey-john-jack-5096,	
accessed	19	March	2015.	
13	“Labor’s	candidates,”	Australian	Worker,	12	April	1917,	7.	
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Figure	5	William	(Bill)	Lambert	c.	1917.14	
	
Figure	6	Jack	Bailey,	Tom	Bartle	and	George	Buckland	in	1924.15	
	
From	the	late	1910s	to	the	early	1930s	Bailey	and	his	Central	Branch	allies	joined	with	
fellow	conservative	reformist	branch	leaders	from	Victoria,	Queensland	and	South	
Australia	to	form	a	collegial	oligarchy	and	control	the	AWU	at	the	federal	level.	Ernest	
Henry	Lane,	a	rebel	Queensland	Annual	Convention	delegate	who	opposed	the	ruling	
																																								 																				
14	“Labor’s	candidates,”	Australian	Worker,	14	June	1917,	15.	
15	Central	Branch	Annual	Report,	31	May	1924,	15.	
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group,	recalled	that	there	was	not	a	single	convention	resolution	in	the	period	from	
1918	 to	 1926	 in	 which	 this	 “old	 guard”	 and	 “their	 henchmen”	 did	 not	 “score	 a	
victory”. 16 	The	 key	 members	 of	 this	 controlling	 group	 were	 national	 General	
Secretary	and	 former	Secretary	of	 the	Victoria-Riverina	Branch	Edward	Grayndler,	
national	President	and	former	Secretary	of	the	Victoria-Riverina	Branch	Jack	Barnes,	
NSW	Central	Branch	President	Bailey,	NSW	Central	Branch	Secretaries	Lambert	and	
Buckland,	 Queensland	 Branch	 Secretary	 William	 Dunstan,	 Queensland	 Branch	
President	William	Riordan	and	Adelaide	Branch	Secretary	Frank	Lundie.17	
	
Ideologically,	most	AWU	officials	in	NSW	and	nationwide	were	conservative	labourist	
reformists	 who	 advocated	 modifications	 of	 the	 existing	 political	 and	 economic	
systems	 to	 win	 greater	 wages	 and	 safety	 for	 workers.	 Shearers’	 unions	 had	
participated	in	a	series	of	massive	but	unsuccessful	strikes	in	the	1890s	and,	defeated	
by	the	combined	power	of	employers	and	the	state,	most	AWU	leaders	had	become	
convinced	that	 future	success	would	be	achieved	through	arbitration	and	political	
action	rather	than	strikes.18	In	1927	Bailey	still	maintained	that	“in	tracing	the	history	
of	 the	 AWU	 back	 to	 the	 [1890s]	 the	 argument	 [is]	 a	 long	 way	 in	 favour	 of	
arbitration”.19	Membership	voting	suggests	that	the	majority	of	members	shared	this	
view,	but	a	significant	minority	did	not.	In	1920	members	voted	16,138	to	10,157	to	
maintain	AWU	support	for	arbitration	over	direct	action.20	
	
There	 was	 always	 a	 radical	 minority	 of	 officials	 and	 members	 who	 opposed	
arbitration.	Within	 the	 AWU	 and	 the	wider	 labour	movement	militant	 reformists	
promoted	strikes	and	radicals	worked	to	overthrow	capitalism.21	Militant	members	
formed	 internal	 dissident	 groups	 within	 the	 NSW	 AWU,	 most	 notably	 the	
																																								 																				
16	Ernest	Henry	Lane,	Dawn	to	dusk:	reminiscences	of	a	rebel	(Brisbane:	William	Brooks,	1939):	243-
44;	Jeff	Rickertt,	The	Conscientious	Communist:	Ernie	Lane	and	the	rise	of	Australian	socialism		
(Melbourne:	Australian	Scholarly	Publishing,	2016).	
17	Lane,	Dawn	to	dusk:	reminiscences	of	a	rebel	158,	243-44.;	Hearn	and	Knowles,	One	Big	Union:	A	
History	of	the	Australian	Workers'	Union	1886-1994:	101,	114,	158.	
18	Harry	Knowles,	"Comparative	Labour	Biography:	An	Historical	Study	of	Leadership	in	the	
Australian	Workers’	Union"	(University	of	Sydney,	2003),	112.	
19	AWU	Annual	Convention	Report,	Australian	Worker,	26	January	1927,	18.	
20	Hearn	and	Knowles,	One	Big	Union:	A	History	of	the	Australian	Workers'	Union	1886-1994:	136.	
21	Jim	Hagan,	The	History	of	the	ACTU		(Melbourne:	Longman	Cheshire,	1981):	6-10.	
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Bushworkers	Propaganda	Group	(BPG)	in	1922,	before	breaking	away	in	the	1930s	to	
form	a	rival	Pastoral	Workers	Industrial	Union	(PWIU)	which	had	strong	links	to	the	
Communist	Party.22	
	
Taking	advantage	of	the	split	in	the	NSW	Labor	Party	over	conscription	in	1916,	Bailey	
and	the	AWU	leadership	in	NSW	led	a	coalition	of	conservative	labourist	trade	union	
and	local	branch	delegates	to	take	control	of	the	party.	This	“AWU	faction”	or	“Bailey	
faction”	 exercised	 a	 conservative	 influence	 on	 the	 NSW	 Labor	 Party	 and	 labour	
movement,	refusing	to	participate	in	the	huge	but	disastrous	1917	General	Strike	and	
blocking	attempts	to	form	the	One	Big	Union	(OBU).23		
	
From	1919	to	1923	the	AWU-controlled	NSW	Labor	Party	Central	Executive	engaged	
in	 increasingly	 authoritarian	 abuse	 of	 its	 power	 in	 which	 it	 expelled	 the	 NSW	
parliamentary	Labor	leader,	appointed	a	new	leader	over	the	heads	of	caucus,	barred	
members	and	local	branches	from	discussing	the	issue	and	then,	when	they	refused	
to	comply	with	the	gag	order,	expelling	scores	of	branches	from	the	party.	A	more	
militant	faction	deposed	the	conservative	faction	in	1923	and	the	AWU	leadership	
remained	politically	ostracised	in	NSW	for	the	remainder	of	the	interwar	period.	The	
loss	was	especially	damaging	 for	Bailey	personally	as,	despite	a	 lack	of	 conclusive	
evidence,	the	militant	faction	found	him	guilty	of	conspiring	to	build	ballot	boxes	with	
secret	sliding	panels	in	order	to	corrupt	internal	party	elections.	They	expelled	him	
from	the	party	and	he	did	not	contest	his	Legislative	Assembly	seat	at	the	next	state	
election.24	When	the	militant	 faction	 instituted	new	party	 rules	 in	1927,	 the	AWU	
labelled	them	the	“Red	Rules”,	falsely	claiming	that	they	would	allow	for	the	entry	of	
Communists,	and	disaffiliated	from	the	party	in	protest.	The	AWU	re-affiliated	the	
following	year	but	in	1931	the	federal	Australian	Labor	Party	(ALP)	expelled	Lang	and	
																																								 																				
22	Harry	Knowles,	"Arthur	Rae:	A	‘Napoleon’	in	Exile,"	Labour	History	87(2004):	112-15;	Andrew	
Moore,	"The	Pastoral	Workers’	Industrial	Union	1930-37,"	Labour	History	49(1985):	62.	
23	Irwin	Young,	"Changes	Within	the	NSW	Branch	of	the	Australian	Workers'	Union	1919-1924	"	
Journal	of	Industrial	Relations	6,	no.	1	(1964):	52-59.	
24	Scott	Stephenson,	""Ballot-Faking	Crooks	and	a	Tyrannical	Executive":	The	Australian	Workers	
Union	Faction	and	the	1923	New	South	Wales	Labor	Party	Annual	Conference,"	Labour	History	
105(2013).	
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his	supporters	and	established	a	new	official	NSW	Branch	of	 the	 federal	ALP	with	
which	the	AWU	quickly	affiliated.	
	
By	the	mid-1930s	the	Queensland	Branch	of	the	AWU	had	more	members	than	the	
rest	 of	 the	 branches	 combined.	 Its	 Secretary	 Clarrie	 Fallon	 used	 this	 massive	
membership	to	govern	the	union	 in	an	unofficial	dictatorship.	By	1932	NSW	AWU	
membership	 had	 collapsed	 from	 35,000	 to	 5,000,	 primarily	 due	 to	 the	 Great	
Depression.25	Fallon	blamed	Bailey	and	the	other	NSW	leaders	for	the	severity	of	the	
membership	decline,	the	union’s	political	isolation	from	Lang	Labor	and	the	growing	
anti-AWU	 militancy	 within	 the	 pastoral	 industry.	 In	 1933	 the	 federal	 executive	
council	removed	the	NSW	leaders	by	combining	the	Central	Branch	and	RWIB	into	
one	“NSW	Branch”	and	appointing	new	officials.		
	
At	 the	1938	NSW	Branch	election	Bailey	made	a	 surprise	 comeback	and	won	 the	
presidency.	 This	 reflected	 the	 members’	 growing	 anti-Lang	 sentiment	 and	
resentment	of	federal	AWU	domination,	and	perhaps	some	nostalgia	for	the	1910s	
and	 1920s	 when	 Bailey	 reigned	 supreme	 in	 the	 NSW	 AWU.	Many	 of	 his	 former	
enemies	 and	 critics	 inside	 and	 outside	 the	 labour	movement	 praised	 Bailey	 as	 a	
returning	anti-Lang	hero.	The	SMH	editorialised	that	“Mr	Bailey's	battle	against	the	
Langist	challenge	and	the	Communist	 influence	…	was	Homeric”.26	But	the	federal	
executive	 council	 voided	 Bailey’s	 victory	 for	 supposed	 “ballot	 irregularities”.	 The	
executive	council	governed	the	NSW	Branch	for	most	of	the	period	from	1933	until	
Fallon	died	in	office	in	1950.27	
	
Oligarchy	within	the	AWU:	much	noted	but	little	analysed	
There	is	a	historical	consensus	that	the	interwar	AWU	was	the	archetypal	trade	union	
oligarchy.28	Yet	it	is	only	possible	to	piece	together	a	partial	account	of	this	oligarchy	
from	the	AWU’s	extensive	historiography.	Vere	Gordon	Childe	began	the	scholarly	
																																								 																				
25	Hearn	and	Knowles,	One	Big	Union:	A	History	of	the	Australian	Workers'	Union	1886-1994:	167.	
26	“The	return	of	Mr	Bailey,”	Sydney	Morning	Herald	(SMH)	19	January	1938,	16.	
27	Hearn	and	Knowles,	One	Big	Union:	A	History	of	the	Australian	Workers'	Union	1886-1994:	179.	
28	Ibid.,	136.	
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organisational	 study	 of	 the	 AWU	 in	 his	 1923	 classic	 How	 Labour	 Governs,	 and	
historians	since	have	generally	followed	his	analysis.29	For	Childe,	oligarchy	was	the	
“natural	outcome	of	the	AWU	structure”.	The	union’s	supreme	governing	body	was	
the	annual	convention	at	which	branches	were	represented	by	delegates	elected	by	
a	vote	open	to	all	members	of	the	branch.	However,	“owing	to	the	vast	area	of	these	
branches”,	 power	 was	 by	 necessity	 centralised	 and	 the	 branch	 officers	 had	 “an	
incalculable	advantage	over	the	ordinary	working	members	who	can	only	be	known	
as	 a	 rule	 to	 their	 actual	workmates	 in	 a	 limited	 area”.	 Thus	 “the	majority	 of	 the	
delegates	to	the	annual	convention	are	organisers	or	other	employees	even	more	
directly	 under	 the	 control	 of	 the	 [Branch]	 executive”	 and	 “the	 official	 junta	 can	
control	a	large	bloc	vote	at	that	gathering”.30	
	
Raymond	Markey	examined	(lack	of)	democracy	within	the	AWU	and	its	forerunners	
from	1886	to	1900.	 In	addition	 to	Childe’s	observations,	Markey	also	situated	the	
AWU’s	centralism	in	terms	of	two	broader	trends	within	Australian	trade	unionism.	
First,	 the	 increasing	 tendency	 towards	 “larger	 unions	 spread	 over	 a	 number	 of	
localities”	 which	 meant	 that	 “the	 opportunity	 for	 old	 craft-style	 participatory	
democracy	based	on	small	localised	union	membership	was	receding”.	Second,	the	
arbitration	 system’s	 “court-room	method	 of	 operation”	 discouraged	membership	
involvement	as	it	was	performed	by	experienced	union	officials	and	did	not	require	
the	participation	of	ordinary	members.31	
	
I	 follow	 Childe	 and	 Markey	 and	 highlight	 the	 AWU’s	 scattered	 membership,	
centralised	constitution	and	devotion	to	arbitration	as	explanations	of	the	union’s	
oligarchy.	 I	 expand	 on	 their	 analysis,	 in	 particular	 demonstrating	 additional	 anti-
democratic	 effects	 of	 arbitration,	 while	 also	 analysing	 the	 influence	 of	 the	
aspirational	and	hierarchical	aspects	of	the	AWU’s	founding	ethos	and	the	union’s	
strong	connection	to	the	ALP.	Where	Markey	studied	the	AWU	to	1900	and	Childe	
																																								 																				
29	Ibid.	
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studied	it	to	1923,	I	continue	the	analysis	to	1939,	and,	unlike	the	previous	historians,	
I	assess	oligarchical	continuity	and	change	over	time.	
	
Historians	have	 focussed	 little	on	 the	ways	 in	which	oligarchy	changed	within	 the	
AWU.	Harry	Knowles	noted	that	because	from	the	mid-1930s	the	Queensland	Branch	
had	more	members	than	the	rest	of	the	branches	combined,	it	naturally	“dominated	
the	politics	and	direction	of	the	national	union”.	Due	to	his	position	as	Queensland	
Branch	Secretary	and	his	personal	leadership	qualities,	Fallon	became	“undoubtedly	
the	powerhouse”	of	the	AWU.	In	line	with	Michels,	but	without	engaging	with	him,	
Knowles	 also	 observed	 that	 over	 time	 the	 AWU	 leadership	 was	 able	 to	 “take	
advantage	of	a	substantially	quiescent	rank	and	file	to	extend	its	authority	as	well	as	
its	tenure”.32	
	
Occupational	communities	within	the	AWU	
Union	 democracy	 requires	 a	 strong	 “occupational	 community”	 which	 creates	 a	
culture	of	membership	interest,	involvement	and	empowerment.	By	the	1920s	the	
AWU	was	a	massive	union	of	100,000	members	covering	a	multitude	of	jobs	across	a	
vast	continent.	Members	clearly	did	not	form	a	single	occupational	community.	The	
majority	 were	 either	 rural	 “bushworkers”	 such	 as	 shearers,	 farm-hands,	 rabbit-
trappers,	sugarcane	cutters	and	fruit	pickers	or	“navvies”,	short	for	navigators,	who	
performed	manual	 labour	 for	 civil	 engineering	projects	 like	 railways	 and	 roads.	A	
minority	of	AWU	members	also	worked	in	mining,	metals,	factories,	cooking,	baking,	
hotels,	clubs,	restaurants	and	more.33		
	
Shearers	enjoyed	a	robust	culture	of	mateship.	The	AWU	shearers	were	as	much	an	
imagined	 community	 as	 a	 community	built	 on	 face-to-face	 interactions.	When	he	
arrived	at	a	shed	a	shearer	would	show	the	others	his	cardboard	AWU	membership	
card	(“ticket”)	and	they	would	get	to	work.	AWU	shearers	were	diverse	but,	at	least	
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according	to	the	stereotype	promoted	by	the	union,	they	worked	hard,	played	hard,	
stuck	together	loyally	and	did	not	believe	anything	unless	they	read	it	in	the	Worker.	
This	stereotype	both	reflected	and	shaped	the	imagined	community.	
	
The	shearers	worked	together	all	day	 in	 the	burning	hot	sheds,	shouting	over	 the	
screaming	 of	 the	 shearing	machines	 and	 the	 bleating	 of	 scared	 sheep.	 Originally	
shearers	used	blade	shears	similar	to	 large	scissors	but	 from	the	1880s	they	were	
replaced	by	machine	 shears.	 Each	handpiece	 (similar	 to	human	hair	 clippers)	was	
powered	by	an	overhead	gear.	Jim	Casteen	recalled	shearing	in	Northern	NSW	in	the	
1930s:	
You’re	bent	double	all	day	while	struggling	with	hundreds	of	hot	sheep,	often	
with	fleeces	matted	with	wiregrass	seed	and	galvanised	burr	thorns.	When	
the	 seed	 is	 bad,	 your	 arms	 and	 underarms	 and	 all	 down	 the	 left	 side	 get	
rubbed	raw	by	millions	of	needle-sharp	barbs.	In	the	stifling	hot	conditions	of	
a	woolshed,	you’re	perpetually	dripping	with	salty	sweat	that’s	rubbed	into	
all	the	raw	places	by	wool	abrasion	and	bur.	It	felt	like	being	scrubbed	down	
with	sandpaper	and	coarse	salt.	At	the	end	of	each	day	you’re	so	sore	and	
your	 back	 is	 so	 stiff	 it	 takes	 a	 good	 while	 and	 a	 lot	 of	 determination	 to	
straighten	up	to	a	normal	position.	Most	shearers	end	up	with	crook	backs.34	
Adding	 to	 the	 heat	 was	 the	 steam	 engine	 which	 powered	 the	 machine	 shears.	
Occasionally	 shearers	 and	 shedhands	 were	 killed	 or	 maimed	 when	 an	 engine	
exploded	and	sprayed	the	shed	with	fiery	shrapnel.35	
	
Controlling	the	frightened	sheep	was	difficult	work	and	it	took	skill	and	strength	to	
avoid	being	bitten	or	kicked.	The	shearing	combs	would	become	so	hot	 that	 they	
smoked	and	burnt	the	sheep’s	skin	on	contact.	George	Smith,	an	Englishman	who	
wrote	a	memoir	recalling	his	time	as	a	jackeroo	in	Australia	in	the	1920s,	recalled	that	
if	a	shearer	cut	a	sheep	he	would	further	scare	it	by	yelling	“keep	still	ya	silly	bitch	or	
I’ll	 shove	 it	 up	 ya	 bloody	 snatch!”36	Things	were	 even	worse	when	 sheep	 had	 fly	
strike.	Casteen	reported	that	“the	sticky	putrid	mess	where	the	maggots	are	working	
creates	an	unbearable	itch	that	the	sheep	keeps	biting	at	for	relief.	As	the	machine	
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works	through	the	nest	of	maggots,	accentuating	the	itch,	the	minced	up	bits	fly	up	
into	your	face,	over	your	lips	and	in	your	nostrils”.37	
	
At	sundown	the	shearers	ate,	spoke	and	sang	together	around	the	fire	and	then	slept	
side	by	side	in	the	rough	and	ready	shearers’	quarters.	Bonds	were	forged	in	hardship	
as	the	work	was	tough,	the	conditions	were	basic	and	the	sleeping	quarters	often	
housed	animals	for	most	of	the	year.	Bailey	recalled	that	
at	Gobaralong,	owned	by	Mr	Quiltie,	in	the	Gundagai	district	[southern	NSW],	
a	stable	was	given	to	the	men,	and	they	had	to	hunt	pigs	out	of	the	place	and	
frequently	found	them	in	possession	when	they	returned	from	work.	Surely	
it	was	never	intended	that	men	should	have	to	sleep	and	have	their	meals	in	
the	same	quarters	as	where	pigs	disputed	proprietorship	with	them?38	
Friendships	formed	quickly	but	even	at	the	largest	stations	shearing	lasted	for	less	
than	two	months.	Some	shearers	would	travel	together	in	groups	and	others	would	
work	with	the	same	shearers	multiple	times	along	a	“run”	of	sheds.	But	in	general	
the	seasonal	and	itinerant	nature	of	the	work	was	not	conducive	to	the	formation	of	
strong,	 stable	 occupational	 communities. 39 	The	 roving	 nature	 of	 shearing	 was,	
however,	conducive	to	the	spread	of	unionism	and	helps	to	explain	how	the	shearers’	
unions	 grew	 so	 quickly	 in	 the	 late	 nineteenth	 century.	 Unlike	 shearers,	 other	
bushworkers	 rarely	 worked	 together	 in	 significant	 numbers.	 Scattered	 across	
thousands	 of	 pastoral	 stations,	 most	 were	 too	 isolated	 to	 form	 occupational	
communities.	
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Figure	7	Australian	shearers	c.	1920.40	
	
Navvies	were	similar	to	the	shearers	in	that	they	lived	together	in	camps	and	enjoyed	
a	strong	culture	of	mateship	and	loyalty,	working	hard	and	playing	hard,	but	their	
work	 too	was	 short-term	 and	 itinerant	which	 prevented	 the	 formation	 of	 lasting	
occupational	communities.41	William	Morrow	was	an	AWU	navvy	on	the	Queensland	
railways	 in	the	early	 twentieth	century.	He	recalled	that	 the	navvy	was	“the	most	
loyal	of	men”.42	They	worked	hard	 clearing	 land,	digging	 roads	and	 laying	 railway	
tracks	for	48	hours	per	week.	The	work	was	all	manual	with	pick,	shovel,	hammer	
and	drill;	the	best	assistance	a	navvy	could	hope	for	was	explosives	and	a	horse	and	
dray.43 	In	 1912	 the	 Wagga	 Wagga	Worker	 published	 a	 song	 by	 A.E.	 Yarra	 titled	
“Australian	Navvies	on	the	Line”:	
Dig,	dig,	lift	and	throw!	
Into	the	dray	we	make	it	go;	
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Boulders	and	sand	and	roots	and	stones,	
We	swing	with	the	knack	that	the	navvy	owns;		
We	loaf	in	wet	and	work	in	fine,	
Australian	navvies	"on	the	line."44	
Morrow	began	work	at	10	years	old	as	a	“nipper”	delivering	water	to	the	rail	lifting	
team	and	by	the	time	he	was	16	he	was	digging	and	carting	with	the	men.	He	
recalled	“very	primitive”	conditions:	
every	fortnight	we'd	shift	our	camps.	Our	camps	consisted	of	tents,	no	
boarding	houses.	We	had	to	cook	all	our	own	meals,	and	I,	at	ten,	used	to	
cook	mine.	Our	main	diet	was	corn	beef,	bread	and	golden	syrup,	potatoes	
and	tea	and	sugar.	We	had	no	cooling	system	then.	We'd	hang	our	food	up	
in	a	bag	under	the	tent.45	
Navvies	were	fully	exposed	to	the	elements	from	heat	to	cold,	weeks	of	rain	to	dust	
storms.	Morrow	recalled	“very,	very	bad”	working	conditions.	Eye	disease	from	the	
dust	and	flies	was	a	regular	discomfort	and	was	known	as	“bung	eye”	or	“sandy	
blight”.	Serious	injury	and	death	was	common,	mostly	from	being	crushed	by	
equipment	or	rock.46	Such	intense	and	sustained	physical	labour	took	a	heavy	toll	
on	the	men’s	bodies	and	many	of	those	who	lived	to	see	retirement	must	have	
suffered	horribly	from	arthritis,	bad	backs	and	other	overuse	injuries.	Facing	these	
hardships	together,	in	the	face	of	uncaring	managers	and	employers,	fostered	
solidarity	and	militancy	which	led	to	high	rates	of	unionism.	Morrow	recalled	“if	
anything	bad	goes	on	long	enough,	people	will	revolt	against	it.	The	result	of	that	
revolt	[amongst	navvies]	was	trade	unionism”.47		
	
While	most	AWU	members	 did	 not	work	 in	 lasting	 occupational	 communities,	 its	
members	shared	an	imagined	community	based	around	the	AWU	ticket,	the	Worker	
newspapers	and	a	“bushworker	ethos”.	This	ethos	is	at	the	core	of	Mark	Hearn	and	
Harry	Knowles’	history	of	 the	AWU	and	they	argue	that	 it	was	created	during	the	
1890s	 shearers’	 strikes	and	continued	 to	define	 the	union	 into	 the	mid-twentieth	
century	and	beyond.48	The	ideological	heart	of	the	ethos	both	reflected	and	helped	
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to	shape	the	wider	national	consensus	of	the	“Australian	Settlement”,	chiefly	White	
Australia,	compulsory	arbitration	and	tariff	protection.	The	mateship	of	white,	male	
unionists	 and	 solidarity	 in	 defeat	 during	 the	 1890s	 strikes	 long	 remained	 the	
mythological	glue	that	united	the	union.	49		
	
Fierce	 racism,	 especially	 against	 Asians	 and	 Pacific	 Islanders,	 also	 formed	 a	 key	
component	of	the	ethos.	The	AWU	feared	cheap	“coloured”	labour	would	drive	down	
wages	and	conditions	for	whites,	but	there	were	also	concerns	about	the	influence	
of	foreign	cultures.	For	the	AWU,	Western	culture	was	the	moral	light	in	a	dark	world.	
In	1908	Mary	Gilmore,	writer	of	the	Australian	Worker	Women’s	Page,	wrote	of	the	
White	Australia	Policy:	“once	we	let	that	break	down,	and	the	white	man’s	civilisation	
will	pass	from	the	black	as	the	white	light	of	day	passes	from	the	sky,	to	be	followed	
by	blackness	and	night”.50	
	
The	AWU	ethos	was	mythologised	by	poets	such	as	Henry	Lawson,	promoted	by	the	
union’s	Worker	 newspapers	 and	 employed	 towards	 a	 large	 variety	 of	 causes	 by	
generations	of	AWU	officials.	Even	by	the	1940s,	the	majority	of	officials	continued	
to	come	from	a	shearing	background,	despite	the	fact	that	shearers	were	by	this	time	
less	than	five	per	cent	of	members.51	The	existing	leaders	promoted	fellow	shearers	
and	clearly	believed	shearers	best	embodied	the	ethos	of	the	union.		
	
The	 AWU’s	 masculinity	 was	 based	 on	 the	 “gun”	 shearer	 who,	 with	 his	 physical	
strength	 and	 skill,	 demanded	 high	 wages	 for	 hard	 work	 and	 maintained	 his	
independence	and	autonomy.	This	was	in	keeping	with	some	aspects	of	what	Russell	
Ward	famously	described	as	the	“Australian	Legend”;	the	qualities	of	the	mythical	
“typical	 Australian”	 in	 the	 late	 nineteenth	 century.	 He	 was	 “quick	 to	 decry	 any	
appearance	of	affectation	in	others”,	“a	great	'knocker'	of	eminent	people”	unless	
they	 were	 sports	 stars	 and	 “a	 fiercely	 independent	 person”.	 AWU	 cartoonists	
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regularly	depicted	the	AWU	as	a	muscular	rural	man	with	a	gun	or	other	practical	
tool	(figure	8).	
	
Figure	8	The	practical	AWU	man	“guarding”	the	labour	movement	“camp”	from	
“treachery”,	“slander”	and	a	“bogus	party”	(the	break-away	militant	faction).52	
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Bravery	 and	 physical	 and	 mental	 strength	 were	 also	 key	 components	 of	 AWU	
masculinity.	 Joan	Austin	 Palmer	 recalled	men	 shearing	 at	 her	 father’s	 farm	when	
suddenly	the	steam	engine	began	to	shake	violently.	The	shearers	and	shed-hands	
quickly	evacuated	the	shed;	they	had	all	heard	stories	of	exploding	engines.	Palmer’s	
father	was	the	only	one	who	remained	in	the	shed	and	fortunately	for	him	the	engine	
did	not	explode.	Later	the	men	were	full	of	respect:	“my	word	your	father’s	game.	
He	never	budged”.	But	Joan’s	friend	Frank	later	told	her:	“I	don’t	really	think	he	knew	
what	 danger	 he	 was	 in.	 The	 shearers	 and	 shedhands	 fled	 because	 they	 knew	
better”.53	This	respect	for	bravery	(or	stupidity)	in	the	face	of	danger	exemplifies	the	
more	 macho	 elements	 of	 AWU	 masculinity.	 This	 was	 further	 displayed	 by	 the	
prevalence	of	bare	knuckle	boxing	in	the	shearing	sheds	as	both	entertainment	and	
to	settle	disputes.	
	
Ward’s	 “Australian	 legend”	 thesis	 has	 generated	 a	 large	historiographical	 debate.	
Coral	Lansbury,	for	example,	went	to	the	opposite	extreme	and	argued	that	signs	of	
mateship	and	solidarity	“were	singularly	absent	among	the	bushworkers”	who,	she	
argued,	were	competitive	and	distrusting	of	one	another;	“nomads	who	slept	with	
their	 moneybelts	 strapped	 under	 their	 shirts”.54	The	 AWU	 ethos	 sat	 somewhere	
between	 these	 two	extremes.	Where	 it	diverged	 from	Ward’s	“typical	Australian”	
was	 in	 the	 prevailing	 attitude	 to	 work.	 While	 capable	 of	 great	 exertion	 in	 an	
emergency,	Ward	says,	 the	“typical	Australian”	generally	 felt	“no	 impulse	to	work	
hard	without	good	cause”.	Conversely,	the	AWU	ethos	celebrated	hard	work	as	the	
source	of	a	man’s	independence.	This	was	best	demonstrated	by	the	union’s	strong	
support	for	piecework	rates	where	men	were	paid	for	their	results	(such	as	per	sheep	
shorn)	rather	than	hourly	wages.55	Another	divergence	was	that	in	the	AWU	ethos	
egalitarianism	and	anti-authoritarianism	were	more	contested	than	in	the	Australian	
Legend,	and	the	union	was	closer	to	the	competitiveness	described	by	Lansbury.		
Within	 the	 AWU	 ethos	 there	 were	 contradictory	 impulses	 towards	 egalitarian	
mateship	 on	 one	 side	 and	 aspirationalism,	 competitiveness	 and	 hierarchy	 on	 the	
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other	side.	AWU	culture	was	based	on	exclusivity	and	hierarchy:	unionists	over	non-
unionists,	 men	 over	 women,	 whites	 over	 non-whites. 56 	As	 the	 bushworkers	 felt	
increasingly	 marginalised	 following	 the	 strike	 defeats	 of	 the	 1890s,	 they	 were	
desperate	to	distinguish	themselves	from	other	marginalised	non-white	workers	and	
women	and	maintain	their	position	in	the	hierarchy	above	these	“inferior”	groups.57	
There	 was	 also	 a	 clear	 hierarchy	 on	 the	 pastoral	 stations.	 Workers	 accepted	
pragmatic	workplace	discipline	and	authority	from	the	pastoralist	and	his	jackaroos	
where	it	was	necessary.58	This	also	reflected	the	bushworkers’	aspirational	culture.	
The	majority	of	shearers	up	to	the	early	twentieth	century	were	smallholders	and	
their	sons	who	went	shearing	part-time	for	a	few	months	a	year.	These	smallholders	
identified	as	much	with	the	boss	as	with	their	fellow	workers;	they	wanted	to	be	the	
boss	themselves	someday,	perhaps	shearing	to	make	extra	money	towards	that	end.	
Many	station	hands	and	shedhands	were	equally	aspirational	and	hoped	to	climb	the	
ladder	themselves	by	becoming	a	shearer	and/or	landholder.59	Many,	perhaps	most,	
AWU	members	were	drawn	into	the	union	less	by	class	solidarity	and	more	because	
they	thought	it	was	to	their	advantage	or	because	they	were	afraid	of	recrimination	
as	a	“scab”.60	
	
Sheep	 occupied	 a	 paradoxical	 position	 on	 the	 station.	 They	 were	 completely	
powerless	 and	 at	 the	 bottom	 of	 the	 hierarchy	 but	 they	 also	 symbolised	 the	
pastoralist’s	authority.	If	shearers	were	unhappy	with	the	owner	they	could	take	it	
out	on	his	sheep.	Smith	recalled	an	owner	warning	him:	“take	your	eye	off	a	shearer	
and	he’ll	have	his	knee	 in	the	groin	of	a	wether	 just	 for	the	pleasure	of	hearing	 it	
grunt.	He’ll	half	break	its	bloody	neck	just	because	its	mine	and	I	am	what	I	am	see?”61	
Sheep	were	treated	as	property	but	there	was	also	the	acknowledgement,	at	least	
tacitly,	 that	 they	were	sentient.	Minimising	or	at	 least	managing	the	sheeps’	 fear,	
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pain	and	discomfort	were	part	of	the	skillset	of	a	good	shearer	while	maximising	the	
sheeps’	unhappiness	could	be	a	means	of	revenge	against	the	boss	or	simply	a	source	
of	sadistic	humour.	
	
In	 addition	 to	 the	 hierarchy	 of	 the	 pastoral	 station,	 there	 was	 also	 an	 accepted	
hierarchy	 amongst	 the	 unionists	 themselves.	 The	 well-paid	 shearers	 considered	
themselves	“bushworker	aristocrats”	and	lived	and	ate	in	their	own	accommodation	
with	their	own	cook.	Below	them	were	the	station	hands	and	shedhands	who	were	
fed	 and	 housed	 separately	 and	 at	 the	 bottom	 were	 Aboriginal	 workers,	 a	 small	
number	of	whom	were	AWU	members.62	Shearers	looked	down	on	shedhands	and	
often	 treated	 them	 badly.	 Shedhand	 Phil	 Mowbray	 complained	 that	 shearers	
employed	double	 standards,	 condemning	 shedhands	who	worked	with	non-union	
shearers	 as	 “scabs”	 but	 then	 working	 with	 non-union	 shedhands	 themselves. 63	
Shedhands	 simultaneously	 disliked	 and	 admired	 the	 arrogant	 shearers	 and	many	
shedhands	hoped	to	better	themselves	by	learning	to	shear.64		
	
The	divide	between	shearers	and	shedhands	was	demonstrated	most	clearly	by	the	
ASU’s	formation	of	the	GLU	in	1890.	The	ASU	had	wanted	the	shedhands	unionised	
so	they	would	not	act	as	strikebreakers,	but	they	would	not	accept	these	“inferior”	
unskilled	workers	into	their	own	union.	Eventually	the	two	unions	combined	in	1894	
but	this	was	a	defensive	act	by	the	shearers	designed	to	contain	shedhand	militancy	
which	was	threatening	the	ASU’s	agreement	with	the	pastoralists.65	Throughout	the	
1890s	the	shedhands	remained	second-class	members	of	the	AWU	and	only	shearers	
could	be	annual	convention	delegates.66	
	
A	 clear	 pecking	 order	 existed	 amongst	 the	 shearers	 themselves,	 from	 the	 “gun”	
shearers	 down	 to	 the	 beginners.	 Shearers	 were	 paid	 piecework	 rates	 per	 sheep	
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shorn,	 14s	 per	 100	 in	 1889,	which	 facilitated	 sports-like	 competition.67	Each	man	
strived	 to	be	 the	 first	 to	100	 sheep	 in	 a	day	or,	 for	 the	best	 shearers	 in	 the	best	
conditions,	 the	 first	 to	200	sheep.	Record	tallies	became	 legendary.	Decades	 later	
Palmer	still	recalled	that	the	best	tally	she	ever	saw	on	her	farm	was	204	sheep	in	a	
day	set	by	Albert	Hurst	of	Wagga	Wagga	in	1896.68		
	
In	relation	to	nineteenth-century	Australian	bushworkers,	Linzie	Murrie	argued	that	
“men	 continually	 need	 to	 seek	 approval	 of	 their	 masculinity	 from	 other	 men”,	
directing	 their	 behaviour	 at	 “the	 authorising	 male	 gaze”. 69 	Competition	 in	 the	
shearing	shed	was	centred	on	this	authorising	male	gaze.	Shearing	quickly	and	well	
was	about	earning	respect	and	maintaining	or	improving	your	ranking	as	much	as	it	
was	about	making	money.	Shearers	worked	side	by	side	in	the	shed	and	the	shearers	
and	 shedhands	were	 all	 aware	 of	 each	 shearer’s	 speed	 and	 skill,	 or	 lack	 thereof	
(figure	9).	Each	shearer	knew	where	he	had	placed	in	the	daily	tally,	who	was	at	the	
top	and	who	was	at	the	bottom,	or	“on	the	chain”.70	Smith	described	when	a	shearer	
finished	shearing	a	sheep:	he	“gives	a	quick	look	at	his	‘enemy’	(his	neighbours	right	
and	left)	staggers	back	to	the	board	with	his	aching	back,	selects	the	next	victim	and	
drags	it	out	onto	the	board”.71	Hierarchy	was	also	based	on	a	man’s	ability	to	fight	
and	a	below-average	shearer	could	regain	some	respect	with	a	strong	bare-knuckle	
boxing	display.	The	shearers’	competitive	hierarchy	was	compounded	by	a	further,	
more	contested	hierarchy	which	existed	between	smallholder	and	roving	shearers.	
Smallholders	looked	down	on	rovers	as	aimless	wanderers	while	rovers	considered	
smallholders	stingy	and	stupid	and	trapped	on	their	meagre	properties.72	
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Figure	9	An	unknown	Australian	shearing	shed	c.1900.73	
	
The	aspirational,	hierarchical	culture	of	the	shearing	shed	and	pastoral	station	was	
perfectly	 suited	 to	 top-down	 oligarchical	 union	 leadership.	 Leaders	 took	 their	
position	at	the	top	of	the	pile	with	political	and	legal	power	to	rival	the	pastoralist.	
The	 fact	 that	 many	 AWU	 leaders	 became	 Labor	 parliamentarians	 and	 Cabinet	
Ministers	was	inspirational	to	bushworkers.	AWU	leaders	had	begun	as	shearers	and	
had	bettered	themselves	to	become	part	of	the	ruling	elite.	The	process	by	which	
shearers	 became	 AWU	 officials	 also	 made	 them	 well-suited	 to	 become	 union	
oligarchs.	Officials	began	as	union	organisers	and	for	a	man	to	do	this	work	effectively	
he	needed	to	be	tough	with	both	words	and	fists.	Most	early	organisers	travelled	the	
vast	 distances	 between	 pastoral	 stations	 alone	 on	 foot	 or	 bicycle.	 The	 organiser	
would	turn	up	at	a	pastoral	station	and,	assuming	he	could	talk	or	force	his	way	past	
the	 pastoralist	 and	 his	 jackaroos,	 would	 begin	 the	 process	 of	 signing	 up	 new	
members	and	chasing	up	existing	members	for	their	union	dues.	This	work	required	
a	combination	of	charisma	and	 intimidation.	When	these	organisers	 later	became	
union	 officials	 they	 brought	 with	 them	 this	 authoritarian	 attitude	 towards	 the	
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members.	Bailey	is	the	archetypal	example	with	his	history	as	a	tar	boy,	shedhand,	
shearer,	legendary	bare-knuckle	boxer,	union	organiser	and	then	oligarchical	union	
official.	
	
Smith	recalled	working	at	a	farm	near	Dirranbandi	in	south	west	Queensland	when	
an	AWU	organiser	visited	his	farm’s	shearing	shed.	The	men	seemed	to	dislike	the	
organiser	but	were	also	scared	of	him.	Smith	wrote	that	the	shearers	greeted	the	
organiser	“with	civility	but	without	enthusiasm	…	no	one	wanted	any	truck	with	this	
man	 but	 they	 had	 no	 choice…	 he	went	 from	man	 to	man	 like	 an	 aging	 butterfly	
lolloping	from	bloom	to	bloom.	It	was	all	so	false”.74	The	organiser	said	he	was	there	
to	ensure	working	conditions	were	safe	and	legal	but	he	was	there	primarily	to	collect	
union	dues.75	
	
The	 AWU	 newspapers,	 always	 more	 radical	 than	 most	 members	 and	 officials,	
encouraged	the	elements	of	egalitarianism	and	solidarity	 in	the	union’s	ethos	and	
criticised	 the	more	hierarchical	 and	aspirational	 sentiments.	 In	1890	 the	Brisbane	
Worker	satirised	the	“respectable	member”	as	“an	individual	who	declaims	in	and	
out	of	season	that	he	belongs	to	what	he	is	pleased	to	refer	to	seriously	as	the	artisan	
class,	but	which	in	his	jocular	moments	he	mentions	as	the	‘aristocracy	of	labour’”.76	
Yet	in	other	ways	the	newspapers	reinforced	the	aspirational	and	hierarchical	aspects	
of	 the	 ethos	 by,	 for	 example,	 idolising	 the	 “gun”	 shearer.	 A	 fictional	 story	 in	 the	
Wagga	Wagga	Worker	in	1900	began:	“Our	hero	was	a	big	gun	in	the	manipulation	
of	the	blades;	for	a	century	and	a	half	and	well	into	the	third	quarter	was	an	ordinary	
tally	for	him”	(over	150	sheep	in	a	day).77	There	were	no	equivalent	heroes	for	the	
shedhands.	 The	AWU	newspapers	 also	 acknowledged	 that	many	members	 either	
were	or	aspired	 to	be	 smallholders,	 and	highlighted	 the	 common	 interests	of	 the	
workers	and	smallholders	against	the	large	landholders.78	
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Most	AWU	bushworkers	were	scattered,	itinerant	and	dependent	on	the	Worker	for	
union	 information	 and	 therefore	 in	 a	 weak	 position	 to	 resist	 the	 oligarchy.	
Furthermore,	voting	numbers	suggest	the	majority	of	members	were	uninterested,	
as	Michels	would	predict.	Even	with	postal	voting	and	ballot	papers	printed	in	the	
Worker	 newspapers,	 overall	 participation	 in	 both	 the	 Central	 Branch	 and	 RWIB	
elections	 only	 peaked	 at	 around	 25	 per	 cent. 79 	In	 1925	 an	 AWU	 workplace	
representative	wrote	 to	 the	 Labor	 Daily	 blaming	 the	 “apathy	 and	 indifference	 of	
many	members”	 for	 oligarchy	 in	 the	 union.80	John	Merritt	 argues	 that	 for	 many	
members,	and	especially	part-timers	who	were	also	smallholders,	acquiring	a	union	
ticket	was	 little	more	than	a	business	 transaction.81	Perhaps	some	members	were	
also	satisfied	with	the	union	and	were	happy	to	defer	to	the	expertise	of	the	current	
leadership.		
	
Those	AWU	members	who	did	resist	the	oligarchy	tended	to	be	from	the	minority	of	
members	who	worked	and	 lived	 in	 strong	occupational	 communities.	 These	were	
most	likely	to	develop	where	a	significant	number	of	members	settled	in	the	same	
place	for	an	extended	period.	AWU	members	at	Port	Kembla	in	Wollongong	provide	
a	useful	 case	 study.	 	The	 local	press	 referred	 to	 the	Pork	Kembla	“branch”	of	 the	
AWU,	but	it	was	actually	a	section	of	the	Central	Branch.	The	Port	Kembla	members	
mostly	 worked	 in	 smelting,	 metal	 work	 and	 fertiliser	 manufacture,	 lived	 in	 the	
surrounding	area	and	regularly	attended	mass	AWU	meetings	 in	their	hundreds.82	
They	were	highly	organised	and	by	their	own	initiative	had	elected	a	local	president	
and	secretary	and	a	representative	in	each	of	the	major	enterprises	that	employed	
AWU	members.83	The	Port	Kembla	members	would	often	strike,	and	even	sympathy	
strike,	 in	 defiance	 of	 the	 union’s	 arbitration	 policy	 and	 without	 Central	 Branch	
permission.84	
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For	 the	 Central	 Branch	 officials	 the	 Port	 Kembla	members	 were	 an	 inconvenient	
source	of	militancy	and	democratic	practice	which	they	sought	to	placate	as	far	as	
possible.	But	the	Pork	Kembla	members	still	resisted	the	officials	at	times.	In	the	fight	
over	the	1927	NSW	Labor	Party	“Red	Rules”,	for	example,	the	Pork	Kembla	members	
sided	overwhelmingly	against	the	AWU	leadership.	A	meeting	of	over	700	members	
booed	a	speech	by	Buckland	and	passed	a	motion	supporting	the	new	rules.85	In	1929	
local	 Port	 Kembla	 leader	 John	 Mathews	 stood	 against	 Bailey	 for	 Central	 Branch	
President	but	his	local	popularity	was	not	enough	to	win	the	state-wide	ballot.86	In	
addition	 to	 the	 Port	 Kembla	 members,	 four	 groups	 of	 railway	 workers,	 AWU	
timberworkers	 and	 AWU	 Nepean	 Dam	members	 declared	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 1927	
Rules.87	These	were	all	groups	of	members	who	worked	and	lived	with	one	another	
for	 extended	 periods.	 Fortunately	 for	 the	 AWU	 oligarchs,	 such	 occupational	
communities	were	rare	within	the	union.	
	
AWU	Rules	
At	 first	 glance	 the	 AWU	 appeared	 to	 be	 a	 representative	 democracy.	 Members	
directly	 elected	 their	 branch	 executive,	 annual	 convention	 delegates	 and	 federal	
executive	 council	 members	 in	 an	 annual	 postal	 ballot.	 This	 appearance	 was	
deceptive,	however,	as	a	series	of	undemocratic	rules	undermined	the	legitimacy	of	
elections.	As	part	of	 the	 registration	process,	arbitration	courts	had	 the	power	 to	
disallow	union	 rules	 that	were	 tyrannical	or	oppressive	or	 contrary	 to	 law	and	 to	
order	the	union	to	obey	its	own	rules.88	This	was	very	limited	legislative	protection	
for	 democracy	within	 trade	unions,	 as	 is	 demonstrated	by	 the	 failed	 attempts	by	
several	AWU	members	to	have	the	union’s	anti-democratic	rules	disallowed.89	The	
ALP	imposed	no	democratic	requirements	on	affiliated	unions.	
	
Each	 AWU	 branch	 was	 governed	 by	 a	 branch	 executive	 headed	 by	 a	 secretary,	
president	and	two	vice-presidents	and,	from	1914	to	1920,	one	representative	from	
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each	 of	 15	 local	 committees. 90 	Because	 of	 the	 AWU’s	 scattered,	 itinerant	
membership,	many	local	committees	failed	to	elect	a	representative	and	the	branch	
Executive	appointed	one	instead.91	The	power	of	office	allowed	the	sitting	officials	to	
further	 manipulate	 these	 appointments	 to	 their	 advantage	 by	 altering	 local	
committee	 boundaries,	 changing	 their	 own	 places	 of	 residence	 and	 packing	 local	
committee	meetings.92	The	Branch	Executive	also	appointed	replacements	 for	any	
officials	who	 left	 office	mid-term	 and	 appointed	 all	 non-elected	 branch	 staff	 in	 a	
patronage	system.93		
	
Officials	stacked	the	union	with	their	 friends	and	family	who	they	knew	would	be	
personally	 loyal.	Several	of	Bodkin’s	sons	became	RWIB	officials.94	Bailey	hired	his	
teenage	 son	 to	work	 in	 the	 Central	 Branch	 office,	made	 his	 brother-in-law	Harry	
Elphick	an	organiser	and	representative	on	the	branch	executive	and	then	drafted	
Elphick’s	brother-in-law	onto	the	branch	executive.95	The	leadership	also	found	jobs	
for	loyal	political	allies.	In	1921	the	Central	Branch	leaders	employed	their	friend	Tom	
Holloway,	 a	Victorian	AWU	convention	delegate,	 in	 the	Central	Branch	office	and	
then	 as	 an	 organiser.	 Opponents	 claimed	 this	 employment	was	 “in	 exchange	 for	
voting	to	close	the	[dissident]	Western	Branch”	in	1920.96	
	
Where	 officials	 were	 elected	 these	 ballots	 were	 undermined	 by	 a	 series	 of	
undemocratic	rules	that	made	it	very	difficult	for	outsiders	to	defeat	the	incumbents.	
An	individual	needed	to	be	a	financial	member	of	the	AWU	for	at	least	the	past	two	
years	 (three	years	 from	1937)	before	nominating	for	any	position.97	This	debarred	
many	working	members	 from	 running	 for	 office	 as	 periodic	 unemployment	 often	
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caused	a	break	in	membership.	It	was	also	common	for	the	sitting	officials	to	refuse	
rival	candidates	on	technicalities	such	as	failing	to	renew	their	membership	before	a	
certain	date	or	neglecting	to	pay	a	voluntary	levy.98		
	
The	rules	required	both	the	branch	executive	and	the	federal	executive	council	to	
approve	all	electoral	candidates	on	their	“ability”	and	“good	behaviour”.99	Pleading	
fear	of	libel	lawsuits,	the	officials	did	not	provide	reasons	for	rejecting	candidates.100	
The	current	leaders	were	able	to	decide	who	was	allowed	to	run	against	them,	and	
bar	 any	who	posed	 a	 genuine	 threat,	without	 providing	 any	 justification.	 In	 1924	
leading	BPG	member	John	Bowen	nominated	for	Central	Branch	president,	but	his	
name	 never	 appeared	 on	 the	 ballot	 paper	which	 stated	 that	 Bailey	 had	 been	 re-
elected	“unopposed”.	Buckland	eventually	informed	Bowen	that	in	the	opinion	of	the	
Branch	 Executive	 he	 did	 not	 “possess	 the	 necessary	 qualifications	 to	 fill	 the	
position”.101	
	
The	 AWU’s	 simple	 first-past-the-post	 voting	 system	 further	 favoured	 the	
incumbents.	The	candidate/s	with	the	highest	number	of	votes	were	elected	with	no	
preferences	 and	 no	 proportional	 representation.	 This	meant	 that	 the	well-known	
sitting	officials	did	not	need	majority	support	but	simply	more	votes	than	any	other	
individual	candidate.	The	officials	exacerbated	this	problem	by	having	their	allies	run	
as	 “dummy”	 candidates,	 further	 splitting	 the	 vote. 102 	For	 example,	 in	 the	 1923	
election	 for	 the	NSW	representative	on	the	executive	council,	Holloway	won	with	
only	22	per	cent	of	the	vote	(1504	out	of	6849)	because	the	opposition	vote	was	split	
evenly	between	six	other	candidates.103		
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Opponents	 at	 the	 time,	 and	 historians	 since,	 have	 argued	 that	 the	 ruling	 group	
officials	corrupted	the	union	elections	to	ensure	their	continual	re-election.104	The	
AWU’s	key	accuser	was	the	BPG.	A	1924	BPG	leaflet	claimed	that,	for	the	previous	
five	years,	postal	votes	for	Bailey	and	his	allies	had	come	from	non-existent	shearing	
sheds.	In	1922	AWU	organiser	and	BPG	member,	A.B.	Berry,	wrote	that	in	the	1919-
20	 Central	 Branch	 ballot,	 33	 out	 of	 34	 postal	 votes	 from	 “Elburn	 Wheat	 Yard”	
recorded	 votes	 for	 Bailey.	 Berry	 claimed	 that	 his	 extensive	 research	 had	 “proved	
beyond	doubt”	that	no	such	place	ever	existed.	In	1924,	Group	member	John	Bowen	
took	the	Central	Branch	to	the	NSW	Equity	Court	for	ballot	corruption.	He	claimed	
that	AWU	membership	voting	slips	had	been	removed	from	a	bundle	of	votes	at	“Til	
Til”	shearing	shed	and	attached	to	fraudulent	votes	from	a	non-existent	shed	called	
“Bongo”.	Chief	Justice	Street	found	that	“for	the	purposes	of	the	demurrer,	the	facts	
alleged	 …	 must	 be	 assumed	 to	 be	 true”.	 However,	 as	 the	 alleged	 number	 of	
fraudulent	votes	were	not	enough	to	change	the	result	of	the	ballot,	it	was	not	clear	
who	had	committed	the	fraud,	and	the	AWU	had	mechanisms	in	place	for	dealing	
with	the	matter	internally,	Street	found	in	favour	of	the	Central	Branch.105	There	was	
never	any	conclusive	evidence	against	any	individual	officer,	although	most	fingers	
pointed	at	Bailey	and	his	allies.	
	
In	1924	AWU	member	“Old	Mac”	complained	to	the	Labor	Daily:	“if	it	were	possible	
for	a	straight	out	vote	to	be	taken	without	any	monkeying	I	feel	sure	there	would	be	
a	new	set	of	officers”.106	An	AWU	member	from	Orange	recalled	that	“on	one	job	I	
recorded	my	vote	the	‘ballot	box’	consisted	of	an	open	kerosene	tin,	with	a	movable	
covering	board,	which	suggests	peculiar	possibilities”.107	There	was	certainly	some	
ballot	corruption	within	the	AWU,	to	which	postal	voting	was	especially	conducive,	
but	it	was	not	the	primary	cause	of	oligarchy.	In	general,	the	officials	did	not	need	to	
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rig	the	ballots	to	win	re-election.	The	union’s	rules	made	it	almost	impossible	for	an	
outsider	to	depose	the	incumbents.	As	Childe	recognised,	the	massive	areas	covered	
by	AWU	branches	made	it	difficult	for	non-officials	to	become	known	throughout	a	
branch.	 The	 union	 rules	 exacerbated	 this	 problem	 by	 outlawing	 electoral	
campaigning	and	canvassing.108	The	justification	for	this	was	that	election	campaigns	
would	be	divisive	and	would	give	an	unfair	advantage	to	candidates	with	superior	
organisation	 and	 funds.	 But	 the	ban	on	 campaigning	 gave	 the	 serving	officials	 an	
almost	insurmountable	advantage	as	they	were	well-known	to	the	membership	and,	
as	Michels	would	anticipate,	used	their	positions	to	promote	themselves	and	their	
views	in	the	union’s	newspapers	and	other	communications,	while	opponents	had	
no	way	to	make	themselves	known.109		
	
The	cult	of	the	AWU	official	
Equality	 of	 salary,	 status,	 skill	 and	 education	 between	members	 and	 officials	 is	 a	
further	requirement	of	union	democracy.	There	is	a	historical	consensus	that	that	the	
AWU	 officials	 were	 “exceedingly	 well-paid”.	 110 	Some	 members	 at	 the	 time	 also	
complained	of	the	leaders’	high	salaries.111	This	was	in	stark	contrast	to	the	opinion	
of	 the	 officials	 themselves	 who	 often	 complained	 that	 they	 were	 poorly	 paid	
considering	 their	 hours	 and	 expenses. 112 	Some	 leading	 officials	 such	 as	 branch	
presidents	were	not	paid	at	all.	The	secretary	was	the	best	paid	position	in	a	branch	
and	 in	1911	 the	Central	Branch	 secretary	 received	£237	per	 annum	or	£4/12	per	
week	(double	the	minimum	wage)	while	an	average	shearer	who	sheared	90	sheep	
per	day	 for	a	6	day	week	 received	considerably	higher	pay	of	£6/10.	By	1939	 the	
Central	Branch	secretary	earned	£647	or	£12/9	per	week	(triple	the	minimum	wage)	
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and	an	average	shearer	earned	significantly	less	at	£9/12	per	week.113	The	NSW	AWU	
officials	 received	 good	 salaries	 but	 they	 were	 not	 as	 extravagant	 as	 the	
historiography	 suggests	 or	 as	 high	 as	 present-day	 Australian	 union	 officials.	
Nevertheless	there	was	a	significant	pay	gap	between	the	officials	and	most	of	the	
members	and	the	fact	that	the	gap	increased	as	oligarchy	became	further	entrenched	
accords	with	the	expectations	of	the	theoretical	literature.	
	
More	important	was	the	large	gap	in	status	between	AWU	members	and	officials.	
The	 AWU	 oligarchs	 played	 on	 the	 aspirational	 and	 hierarchical	 elements	 of	 the	
union’s	 culture	 and	 deliberately	 distinguished	 themselves	 from	 the	 ordinary	
members.	Here	the	body	of	theory	on	the	relationship	between	the	working	class	
and	the	“professional-managerial	class”	is	useful.	Barbara	and	John	Ehrenreich	sum	
up	this	relationship	as	“a	complex	mixture	of	hostility	and	deference	on	the	part	of	
working-class	 people,	 contempt	 and	 paternalism	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 professional-
managerial	class”.114	Officials	presented	themselves	tacitly	as	part	of	the	professional	
managerial	 class.	 Photographs	 in	 union	 publications	 featured	 the	 leaders	 in	
expensive	 suits	 and	 hats	 with	 hair	 combed	 and	 moustaches	 waxed	 and	 often	
fraternising	with	elites	such	as	politicians	and	barristers	(figures	10	and	11).	
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Figure	10	Dr	H.V.	Evatt,	A.C.	Roberts	and	Jack	Bailey	in	1928.115	
	
Figure	11	A	well-dressed	labour	delegation	in	1930.	George	Buckland	is	fourth	from	
left	and	Jack	Bailey	is	furthest	right.116	 	
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They	argued	that	 it	was	 the	duty	of	members	 to	 follow	their	 leaders’	 instructions	
unquestioningly.	There	was	a	pseudo-militaristic	element	to	this	discipline	and	at	the	
1926	Annual	Convention,	President	Barnes	stressed	the	need	for	drilling:	
each	member	of	our	organisation	must	respond	to	discipline,	and	if	necessary	
he	will	have	to	drill	himself	as	every	man	of	you	had	to	drill	yourself	when	you	
came	into	the	AWU	…	they	will	have	to	realise	that	when	AWU	decisions	are	
made	there	 is	no	questioning	them,	there	 is	no	falling	back	from	anything.	
The	AWU	has	to	stand	for	what	is	said	here	at	your	convention.117	
The	 officials	 expressed	 these	 elitist	 views	 openly	 and	 clearly	 believed	 that	 the	
members	 were	 sympathetic	 to	 such	 hierarchical	 organisation.	 A	 1930	 Australian	
Worker	cartoon	reminded	members	to	“act	only	as	your	accredited	officials	advise”	
and	depicted	a	member	militaristically	saluting	the	union	flag	(figure	12).	
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Figure	12	Obedience	was	an	AWU	virtue.118	
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Ideas	 of	 masculinity	 within	 the	 AWU	 are	 also	 important	 here.	 As	 we	 saw	 in	 the	
introduction,	 Marilyn	 Lake	 argued	 that	 there	 was	 a	 tension	 in	 late	 nineteenth-
century	Australia	between	the	rival	masculinities	of	the	“responsible	domestic	man”	
and	 the	 larrikin,	 hedonistic	 “independent	 man”.	 By	 the	 1920s,	 the	 responsible	
domestic	 man	 had	 triumphed	 and	 responsible	 breadwinning	 was	 the	 dominant	
Australian	view	of	masculinity,	but	the	celebration	of	independent	masculinity	lived	
on	 amongst	 many	 workers.	 The	 AWU	 leaders	 in	 their	 suits	 fraternising	 with	
university-educated	 professionals	 were	 on	 the	 side	 of	 respectable,	 responsible	
breadwinning.	 They	were	 certainly	 no	hedonists	 and	Bailey,	 for	 example,	 proudly	
advocated	 teetotalism.119	This	 “respectability”	was	unacceptable	 to	 some	militant	
members	who	saw	it	as	proof	the	officials	had	“duchessed”	(sold	out)	to	the	ruling	
class. 120 	But	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 officials	 continually	 publicised	 photographs	 of	
themselves	in	suits	suggests	that	they	believed	respect	and/or	deference	was	a	more	
common	response	than	hostility	amongst	the	members	and	that	it	fit	well	with	the	
aspirational	 aspects	 of	 the	 AWU	 ethos.	 Perhaps	 it	 was	 only	 acceptable	 to	 the	
members,	however,	because	the	officials	had	previously	been	practical	men	who	had	
served	their	apprenticeships	as	shearers	and	organisers,	who	could	shear	a	sheep	in	
under	three	minutes	and	hold	their	own	in	a	bare-knuckle	boxing	match.	If	they	had	
been	upper-class	“toffs”	who	had	gone	straight	from	school	to	university	to	union	
officialdom	it	seems	unlikely	that	the	members	would	have	accepted	them	so	readily.	
	
AWU	officials	built	a	pseudo-religious	cult	of	leadership.	The	dissident	Ernest	Lane	
referred	disparagingly	to	the	ruling	group	as	“the	AWU	high	priests”.121	The	leaders	
made	pilgrimages	to	the	graves	of	former	leaders	and	the	hotel	in	Ballarat	where	the	
union	 was	 founded. 122 	When	 a	 leading	 official	 died	 it	 was	 common	 to	 call	 for	
donations	to	build	a	memorial	monument	in	his	honour.	AWU	buildings	were	also	
named	 for	 late	 former	 leaders;	 after	General	 Secretary	Donald	Macdonell	 died	 in	
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1911,	the	union	erected	a	ten	tonne	granite	memorial	in	his	honour	in	Stuart	Mill,	
Victoria,	and	named	its	Sydney	headquarters	Macdonell	House	(figure	13).	
	
Figure	13	Macdonell	House	in	Sydney	in	1924.123	
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The	leaders’	self-aggrandisement	infuriated	militant	members	who	perceived	it	as	a	
break	with	the	union’s	glorious	past.	Lawson’s	1920	poem	“The	Delegates”	compared	
the	heroic	AWU	leadership	of	the	1890s	with	the	self-serving	leadership	of	1920.	He	
recalled	that	in	the	1890s:	
We	had	no	grand	head-office,		
Where	staffs	are	mild	and	meek,		
And	bosses	fight	for	freedom		
On	fifteen	pounds	a	week;		
Where	pen-cranks	blur	the	lessons		
We'd	learned	in	'Ninety-Three,		
And	well-dressed	Union	bullies		
Bludge	on	Democracy.124	
If	the	union’s	founding	culture	had	been	solely	one	of	egalitarian	mateship	then	the	
leaders’	actions	would	constitute	a	clear	break	with	the	past,	as	Lawson	and	others	
claimed.	 However,	 the	 leaders’	 behaviour	 fits	 neatly	 within	 the	 aspirational	 and	
hierarchical	elements	of	the	AWU	ethos.	Barnes	exemplified	this	aspect	at	the	1911	
Annual	Convention	where	he	gave	an	impassioned	defence	of	delegates	riding	first-
class	to	convention.	He	said	that	the	union	was	aiming	for	“all	the	benefits	it	could	
get”	for	members	and	officials.		“Workers	made	first	class	carriages”	so	why	should	
the	union	only	“let	the	fat	fellows	ride	in	them?”	He	said	that	the	members	of	his	
Victoria-Riverina	branch	“believed	in	first	class	fares”	for	officials	“and	recognised	the	
principle	it	involved”.	The	implication	being	that	ordinary	members	were	asserting	
their	own	dignity	and	status	in	providing	for	their	leaders	in	this	manner.	Delegates	
frequently	 made	 similar	 arguments	 regarding	 raising	 or	 maintaining	 officials’	
salaries.125	Officials	were	the	elite	at	 the	top	of	 the	AWU	hierarchy	and	should	be	
treated	accordingly.	
	
Affiliation	with	 the	 ALP	 further	 exacerbated	 the	 status	 gap	 between	 officials	 and	
members	and	encouraged	union	officials	to	behave	oligarchically.	AWU	officials	often	
became	Labor	Party	officials	and/or	politicians,	even	Premiers	and	Prime	Ministers,	
which	 greatly	 increased	 their	 status.	 The	 AWU	 leaders’	 union	 positions	were	 the	
source	of	their	power	within	the	party	as	it	allowed	them	to	control	union	delegates	
																																								 																				
124	Henry	Lawson,	“The	Delegate,”	1920.	
125	AWU	Annual	Convention	Report,	AW	15	February	1911,	4.	
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and	representatives	on	the	party’s	governing	bodies.	This	made	AWU	officials	more	
desperate	to	keep	their	union	positions	even	if	it	meant	resorting	to	undemocratic	
means.	Careerist	involvement	in	the	Labor	Party	also	meant	that	AWU	officialdom	
was	a	means	to	an	end	rather	than	an	end	in	itself.	Many	officials	were	less	concerned	
with	winning	improved	wages	and	conditions	for	their	members	and	more	concerned	
with	maintaining	their	dominance	of	a	stable	union	with	a	large	membership	as	their	
power	base	within	the	Labor	Party.126	
	
Both	 officials	 and	 members	 had	 minimal	 formal	 education.	 But	 the	 officials	
developed	skills	and	informal	education	on	the	job	that	created	a	significant	skill	and	
education	 gap	 between	 themselves	 and	 ordinary	 members.	 This	 was	 especially	
facilitated	by	the	arbitration	system.	AWU	official	Tom	Dougherty	argued	that	it	took	
three	years	for	an	ordinary	member	to	become	a	“competent	organiser”	because	of	
the	“many	and	varied	[arbitration]	awards	and	matters	affecting	members”.127	This	
was	especially	the	case	for	branch	secretaries	“who	had	to	prepare	and	present	cases	
to	 the	 [arbitration]	 court”	 and	 developed	 skills	 similar	 to	 those	 of	 a	 lawyer. 128	
Members’	lack	of	understanding	of	the	complicated	arbitration	system	made	them	
dependent	 on	 the	 officials	 and	 removed	 them	 from	 the	 bargaining	 process,	 thus	
creating	a	passive	and	uninvolved	membership.	
	
Conclusion	
Most	 AWU	members	 did	 not	 form	 strong	 occupational	 communities,	 the	 union’s	
rules	were	 undemocratic	 and	 there	was	 a	 large	 gap	 in	 status	 and	 skills	 between	
officials	and	ordinary	members.	These	three	observations	take	us	some	way	towards	
demonstrating	how	the	AWU	was	an	oligarchy,	and	I	will	complete	my	argument	in	
the	following	chapter.	Four	contextual	factors,	all	founded	in	the	1890s,	facilitated	
and	 reinforced	 the	 oligarchy.	 Most	 of	 the	 scattered,	 itinerant	 membership	 was	
unable	to	form	occupational	communities,	participate	in	the	short-lived	local	branch	
																																								 																				
126	Peter	Sheldon,	"Maintaining	Control:	A	History	of	Unionism	among	Employees	of	the	Sydney	
Water	Board"	(PhD	thesis,	University	of	Wollongong,	1989),	126.	
127	AWU	Annual	Convention	Report,	Australian	Worker,	23	March	1938,	17.	
128	AWU	Annual	Convention	Report,	Australian	Worker,	16	March	1938,	18.	
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committees	or	generally	participate	in	the	union	in	any	way	beyond	postal	voting.	
The	aspirational	and	hierarchical	elements	of	the	AWU	ethos	enabled	the	leaders	to	
deliberately	 extend	 the	 status	 and	 skills	 gap	 between	 themselves	 and	 the	
membership.	The	union’s	 founding	constitution	either	contained	or	 facilitated	the	
development	 of	 a	 series	 of	 undemocratic	 rules	 and	 the	 arbitration	 system	made	
members	dependent	on	officials	and	further	undermined	participation	and	interest	
as	most	members	did	not	understand	the	complicated	arbitration	system	and	had	no	
role	within	 it.	 This	 chapter	 has	 also	 demonstrated	 some	 undemocratic	 effects	 of	
affiliation	with	the	ALP	as	it	further	exacerbated	the	status	gap	between	members	
and	officials	and	encouraged	the	officials	to	behave	oligarchically	in	order	to	maintain	
the	union	as	their	power	base	within	the	ALP.	
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CHAPTER	II	
The	infamous	iron	hand:	resisting	oligarchy	within	the	AWU	
“The	infamous	iron	hand”;	an	appropriate	metaphor	for	the	oligarchy	that	gripped	
the	AWU	from	the	1890s	to	1939	and	beyond.	The	description	was	first	used	by	the	
dissident	AWU	Bushworkers	Propaganda	Group	(BPG)	in	the	1920s	as	part	of	their	
campaign	 against	 the	 AWU	 leadership.	 One	 focus	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 internal	
opposition	within	the	AWU	from	individuals	and	groups	like	the	BPG.	We	see	that	
countervailing	 tendencies	 were	 constantly	 operating	 against	 oligarchy,	 chiefly	
through	 pressure	 from	 ordinary	members	 and	 support	 for	 democracy	 amongst	 a	
minority	of	leaders	such	as	Jack	Cullinan	and	Arthur	Rae.	We	also	see,	however,	that	
these	 tendencies	 towards	 democracy	 were	 not	 strong	 enough	 to	 overcome	 the	
foundations	of	AWU	oligarchy.	
	
This	 chapter	 analyses	 local	 autonomy,	 membership	 decision-making,	 internal	
organised	opposition	and	free	communication	within	the	AWU.	The	analysis	of	local	
branch	 autonomy	means	 that	 a	 key	 focus	 in	 this	 chapter	 is	 how	 and	 why	 AWU	
oligarchy	changed	over	time	through	three	oligarchical	types;	from	an	organisation	
of	significant	branch	autonomy	to	one	of	centralised	national	control.	I	continue	my	
argument	 from	 the	 previous	 chapter	 and	 show	 how	 the	 AWU’s	 oligarchy	 was	
supported	 by	 its	 scattered	 and	 itinerant	 membership,	 the	 hierarchical	 and	
aspirational	aspects	of	the	AWU	ethos,	its	centralised	constitution	and	its	dedication	
to	compulsory	arbitration.	I	also	demonstrate	that	affiliation	with	the	Labor	Party	had	
democratic	as	well	as	oligarchic	effects	on	the	AWU.	
	
Variations	of	trade	union	oligarchy	
Most	 trade	 unions	 are	 oligarchies,	 but	 the	 nature	 of	 these	 oligarchies	 differs	
enormously	and	can	change	over	time.	It	is	therefore	surprising	that	little	work	exists	
on	different	 kinds	of	oligarchy	within	 labour	organisations	or	 transitions	between	
kinds.	In	their	classic	study	Union	Democracy,	Seymour	Martin	Lipset,	Martin	Trow	
and	James	Coleman	briefly	stated	that	“almost	all”	union	oligarchies	were	“one-party	
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oligarchies”.1	This	 claim	 implied	 that	 there	were	 other	 types	 of	 oligarchy	 but	 the	
authors	did	not	explore	this	possibility.	David	Edelstein	and	Malcolm	Warner	were	
the	first	to	 identify	and	distinguish	various	forms	of	oligarchy	within	trade	unions.	
This	was	a	crucial	first	step	but	unfortunately	no	subsequent	scholars	have	engaged	
with	their	models.	
	
They	define	seven	models	based	on	who	exercises	power	and	how	they	do	so:	federal	
oligarchy,	collegial	oligarchy,	simple	official	hierarchy,	summit	oligarchy,	one-party	
system,	 externally	 appointed	 oligarchy	 and	 neo-classical	 oligarchy.	 I	 will	 focus	
primarily	on	federal	oligarchy,	collegial	oligarchy	and	simple	official	hierarchy	as	the	
AWU	moved	through	these	three	models	from	1886	to	1939.	A	federal	oligarchy	is	
one	 in	 which	 power	 is	 dispersed	 amongst	 autonomous	 regional	 branches,	 each	
controlled	 by	 independent	 rulers.	 In	 a	 collegial	 oligarchy	 power	 is	 shared	 equally	
amongst	a	central	group	of	leaders,	while	a	simple	official	hierarchy	is	dominated	by	
a	 single	 dictatorial	 leader.2	While	 acknowledging	 that	 “in	 practice	 there	must	 be	
considerable	variability	even	amongst	unions	approximating	one	model	fairly	well”,	
Edelstein	and	Warner	contend	 that	 the	simple	official	hierarchy	has	 the	“greatest	
potential	for	the	arbitrary	exercise	of	political	power	against	internal	dissidents”	and	
that	 federal	 oligarchy	 and	 collegial	 oligarchy	 along	 with	 summit	 oligarchy	 are	
“probably	less	oppressive	and	exploitative	than	the	remaining	models”.3	
	
The	decline	of	AWU	branch	autonomy	
The	autonomy	enjoyed	by	each	AWU	branch	decreased	over	time.	This	undermined	
democracy	 as	 it	 concentrated	 power	 into	 an	 ever-smaller	 group	 of	 top	 officials,	
further	and	further	removed	from	the	ordinary	members.	It	meant	that	the	officials	
of	an	increasing	number	of	branches	had	no	real	say	in	running	their	own	branch,	
which	in	turn	meant	that	the	members	of	that	branch	who	elected	their	officials	had	
no	real	say	in	who	ran	their	branch	or	how	they	did	so.	Union	decisions	were	made	
																																								 																				
1	Seymour	Martin	Lipset,	Martin	A.	Trow,	and	James	S.	Coleman,	Union	Democracy:	The	Internal	
Politics	of	the	International	Typographical	Union		(New	York:	Free	Press,	1956):	3.	
2	J.	David	Edelstein	and	Malcolm	Warner,	Comparative	Union	Democracy:	Organisation	and	
Opposition	in	British	and	American	Unions		(London:	Allen	&	Unwin,	1975):	36-37.	
3	Ibid.,	52.	
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at	the	federal	level,	far	removed	from	the	local	workplace	units	of	the	union	which	
often	operated	as	participatory	democracies	around	the	campfire	but	had	no	real	
power.	
	
In	its	early	years	the	AWU	sat	somewhere	between	a	collegial	oligarchy	and	a	federal	
oligarchy.	 The	 key	distinction	between	 the	 two	 is	 that	 in	 a	 collegial	 oligarchy	 the	
central	 authority	 controls	 the	 entire	 organisation	 while	 in	 a	 federal	 oligarchy	
branches	are	autonomous.	According	to	the	AWU	constitution,	AWU	branches	had	
no	 local	 autonomy	 and	 were	 completely	 subservient	 to	 the	 federal	 annual	
convention	and	executive	 council.	 This	 centralisation	was	 legally	 cemented	 in	 the	
1890s	 and	 remained	 unchanged	 in	 its	 essentials	well	 into	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	
twentieth	century.	The	annual	convention	was	the	highest	authority	in	the	union	and	
had	unlimited	power.	Only	convention	could	make,	change	or	remove	union	rules,	
and	members	had	the	right	to	challenge	the	decisions	of	branch	officials	at	the	annual	
convention.	Branches	with	1	to	500	members	sent	one	delegate	to	convention,	500	
to	 1000	 members	 two	 delegates	 and	 over	 1000	 members	 three	 delegates.	
Convention	delegates	also	elected	the	president,	two	vice-presidents,	treasurer	and	
secretary	and	set	the	salaries	of	all	federal	and	branch	officials.	The	executive	council	
was	 the	union’s	 highest	 authority	 between	 conventions	 and	 consisted	of	 the	 five	
officials	elected	at	convention	plus	one	representative	from	each	branch.4	
	
Despite	 the	 appearance	 of	 the	 AWU	 constitution,	 however,	 the	 union	 initially	
retained	 some	 of	 the	 features	 of	 a	 federal	 oligarchy.	 Paradoxically,	 the	 rules	
concentrated	 complete	 power	 in	 the	 federal	 annual	 convention	 and	 executive	
council	but	also	appeared	 to	give	branches	 significant	autonomy.	The	union	 rules	
gave	each	branch	“control	of	affairs	in	its	own	district”	with	which	other	branches	
could	“not	interfere	in	any	way”.	The	branches	also	managed	their	own	finances,	only	
forwarding	 funds	“over	and	above	the	amount	 required	 for	working	expenses”	 to	
head	office.	Branch	members	elected	their	own	branch	officials	and	the	rules	were	
																																								 																				
4	Rule	6,	36,	by-law	39,	rule	29,	3,	General	Rules	and	By-laws	of	the	Amalgamated	Shearers	Union	of	
Australasia	(ASU)	1890,	24430423,	National	Library	of	Australia	(NLA).	
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ambiguous	as	to	whether	the	central	authorities	had	the	power	to	close	a	branch.5	
The	AWU’s	early	convention	decisions	further	supported	branch	autonomy.	At	the	
1890	Annual	Convention	the	delegates	voted	that	each	branch	could	adopt	its	own	
employment	agreements	and	shearing	shed	rules	suitable	to	its	region	and	decide	
whether	union	rules	should	be	displayed	at	sheds	within	branch	boundaries.6	
	
But	in	the	early	1890s	the	AWU	became	increasingly	centralised,	shifting	away	from	
federal	 oligarchy	 and	 closer	 to	 collegial	 oligarchy.	 This	 centralising	 process	 began	
before	the	commencement	of	compulsory	arbitration	in	NSW	in	1901	and	federally	
in	1904.	In	1891	the	Wagga	Wagga	branch	had	started	a	radical	newspaper	called	the	
Hummer.	Most	 officials	 from	 other	 branches	 worried	 that	 the	 radicalism	 of	 the	
Wagga	 officials	 and	 their	 newspaper	would	 alienate	 potential	 AWU	 allies.	 At	 the	
annual	 convention	 in	 February	 1892	 the	 neighbouring	 Goulburn	 Branch	 officials	
challenged	 their	 rival	Wagga	 counterparts	 over	 their	 use	 of	 union	money	 on	 the	
Hummer.7	This	 was	 the	 issue	 that	 would	 resolve	 the	 contradictions	 in	 the	 union	
constitution	with	regard	to	branch	autonomy.		
	
The	Wagga	 officials	 claimed	 that	 they	 had	 the	 authority	 to	 spend	 their	 branch’s	
money	in	any	way	they	chose,	but	only	the	Bourke	Branch	agreed.	Convention	passed	
a	motion	by	16	votes	to	6	that	effectively	prevented	such	expenditure	in	future.	The	
Bourke	and	Wagga	delegates	temporarily	withdrew	from	the	convention	in	protest	
over	the	removal	of	their	“branch	rights”.	While	the	conflict	had	been	primarily	over	
ideology	and	personal	 rivalries,	 the	 result	was	 to	expose	 the	 real	 limits	of	branch	
autonomy.8	
	
In	 the	 early	 twentieth	 century	 a	 conflict	 with	 a	 rival	 union	 within	 the	 newly-
established	 arbitration	 system	 caused	 power	within	 the	 AWU	 to	 become	 further	
centralised.	 The	 employer-friendly	Machine	 Shearers	 and	 Shed	 Employees	 Union	
																																								 																				
5	By-law	50,	rule	31,	by-law	12	and	41	ASU	Rules	1890.	
6	John	Merritt,	The	Making	of	the	A.W.U.		(Melbourne:	Oxford	University	Press,	1986):	141.	
7	Ibid.,	205.	
8	Mark	Hearn	and	Harry	Knowles,	One	Big	Union:	A	History	of	the	Australian	Workers'	Union	1886-
1994		(Melbourne	Cambridge	University	Press,	1996):	59-60.	
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(MSU)	formed	in	1902.	The	AWU	applied	to	the	newly-established	NSW	Arbitration	
Court	for	deregistration	of	the	MSU	on	the	grounds	that	the	AWU	already	covered	
these	occupations.	The	Arbitration	Court	refused	to	deregister	the	MSU,	and	thereby	
force	its	members	to	join	the	AWU,	because	the	MSU	members	said	they	found	some	
of	the	AWU’s	rules	objectionable.	The	AWU	executive	council	promptly	deleted	the	
offending	rules,	but	the	arbitration	court	found,	correctly,	that	the	rules	had	not	been	
properly	removed	because	only	the	annual	convention	had	that	power.9	Delegates	
to	the	following	convention	changed	the	rules	to	give	the	executive	council	plenary	
powers	 to	 avoid	 repetition	 of	 the	 problems	 encountered	 in	 the	 MSU	 case.	 The	
arbitration	courts	later	reinforced	this	centralisation	by	requiring	registered	unions	
to	give	their	committee	of	management	full	power	to	alter	rules	and	impose	levies.10	
This	allowed	unions	to	quickly	and	easily	adopt	the	instructions	of	the	courts,	but	it	
also	undermined	democracy	and	local	autonomy	by	giving	almost	complete	power	
to	a	small	group	of	federal	officials.	
	
By	1910	the	AWU	was	more	clearly	a	collegial	oligarchy.	The	executive	council	and	
annual	convention	remained	supreme;	each	branch	sent	one	delegate	to	convention	
for	every	2,000	members	uncapped,	and	delegates	were	elected	by	a	postal	 vote	
open	to	all	members	of	that	branch.	The	executive	council	consisted	of	the	president	
and	general	secretary,	elected	annually	by	a	postal	vote	open	to	all	AWU	members	
in	Australia,	one	vice-president	for	each	state	elected	by	a	postal	vote	open	to	all	
members	 in	 the	relevant	state,	and	one	councillor	 from	each	branch	elected	by	a	
postal	vote	open	to	all	members	of	 that	branch.11	The	same	branch	officials	were	
elected	 to	 the	 annual	 convention	 and	 executive	 council	 year	 after	 year,	 and	 a	
majority	coalition	of	these	officials	formed	a	controlling	group,	or	collegial	oligarchy,	
and	dominated	the	union.	
	
																																								 																				
9	Merritt,	The	Making	of	the	A.W.U.:	298,	306-307,	321.	
10	AWU	Annual	Convention	Report,	Australian	Worker,	17	February	1937,	16.	
11	Rule	63	AWU	Constitution	and	General	Rules,	1909-10,	AWU,	E154/1-2,	Noel	Butlin	Archives	
Centre	(NBAC),	ACT.	
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As	we	saw	in	the	previous	chapter,	in	1916	the	AWU	became	easily	the	biggest	union	
in	 NSW	 when	 the	 Railway	Workers	 and	 General	 Labourers	 Association	 (RWGLA)	
joined	the	AWU	as	the	NSW	Railway	Workers	Industry	Branch	(RWIB).	The	following	
year,	 the	 Rockchoppers	 and	 Sewer	 Miners	 Union	 (RSMU)	 had	 merged	 into	 the	
RWIB.12	Prior	to	its	fusion,	the	RSMU	had	been	a	militant	union	that	advocated	job	
control	and	direct	action.	Less	militant,	the	RWGLA	had	still	been	willing	to	strike,	
and	had	 fostered	a	 strong	culture	of	membership	 involvement.	Once	 it	became	a	
branch	of	the	AWU,	however,	the	collegial	oligarchy	was	easily	able	to	stifle	militancy	
and	 democracy	 within	 the	 RWIB,	 encouraging	 a	 reliance	 on	 arbitration,	 and	
establishing	an	increasingly	hierarchical	power	structure.		
	
The	RWIB	officials	were	easily	outnumbered	on	the	annual	convention	and	executive	
council	by	the	existing	officials.	The	RWIB	episode	is	also	a	further	example	of	the	
arbitration	 system’s	 facilitation	 of	 union	 oligarchy.	 Industrial	 judges	 deliberately	
altered	 jurisdictional	boundaries	 to	weaken	militant	unions,	allowing	conservative	
unions	 such	 as	 the	 AWU	 to	 absorb	 them.	 Judge	 Charles	 Heydon	 limited	 the	
jurisdiction	of	the	militant	RSMU,	“hemming	it	in	on	all	sides”,	and	weakened	it	to	
the	point	that	it	was	forced	to	amalgamate	with	the	AWU	in	1917.13	
	
As	late	as	the	1920s	the	AWU	retained	some	features	of	a	federal	oligarchy.	There	
was	an	“understanding”	that	the	federal	bodies	would	not	intervene	in	a	branch	if	its	
leaders	 were	 members	 of	 the	 controlling	 group.	 To	 that	 extent,	 Edelstein	 and	
Warner’s	description	of	a	federal	oligarchy	applied:	“‘live	and	let	live’	would	be	the	
motto	within	the	oligarchy”	or	“to	each	his	own	territory”.14	The	best	example	of	this	
occurred	in	NSW	from	1923	to	1933	when	the	federal	AWU	continued	to	support	the	
NSW	officials	despite	their	obvious	inability	to	repair	relations	with	Jack	Lang	and	the	
NSW	Labor	Party.	
	
																																								 																				
12	Peter	Sheldon,	"System	and	Strategy:	The	Changing	Shape	of	Unionism	Among	NSW	Construction	
Labourers,"	Labour	History	65(1993):	124,	29.	
13	Ibid.,	128-29.	
14	Edelstein	and	Warner,	Comparative	Union	Democracy:	Organisation	and	Opposition	in	British	and	
American	Unions:	44.	
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In	NSW,	a	complicated	interaction	between	the	state	and	federal	spheres	of	the	AWU	
worked	to	increase	the	autonomy	of	the	Central	Branch	and	reduce	the	autonomy	of	
the	Western	Branch	and	RWIB	in	the	1920s.	As	we	saw	in	chapter	one,	from	the	late	
1910s	to	the	early	1930s	Jack	Bailey	and	the	Central	Branch	leaders	were	part	of	the	
federal	collegial	oligarchy,	while	 the	Western	Branch	and	RWIB	officials	were	not.	
The	Central	Branch	leaders	could	therefore	use	their	power	at	the	federal	 level	to	
assert	 their	 own	 branch	 autonomy	while	 simultaneously	 bringing	 the	 other	 NSW	
branches	increasingly	under	federal	control.	The	most	significant	example	of	central	
rule	 by	 the	 collegial	 oligarchy	 occurred	 in	 June	 1920	when	 the	 executive	 council	
merged	the	Western	Branch	into	the	Central	Branch	in	NSW,	thus	doubling	the	power	
and	 prestige	 of	 the	 Central	 Branch	 officials	 and	 eliminating	 the	Western	 Branch	
officials.15	The	executive	council	said	it	was	“of	the	opinion	that	by	closing	the	branch	
practically	 the	 whole	 of	 the	 administration	 expenses	 would	 be	 saved,	 and	 more	
effective	 and	 cohesive	 organisation	 created”.16	But	 this	 was	 really	 a	 coup	 by	 the	
ruling	 group	 as,	 unlike	 previous	 branch	 mergers	 and	 closures,	 this	 was	 not	 in	
response	to	financial	emergency.	It	occurred	in	the	face	of	firm	opposition	from	the	
Western	Branch	officials.	Lane	reflected	that:	
the	mills	of	the	AWU	bureaucracy,	though	sometimes	they	grind	slowly,	yet	
sooner	or	 later	crush	their	victims.	Unable	to	defeat	Cullinan	at	the	annual	
ballots	…	or	to	in	any	other	way	prevent	him	holding	office,	it	was	brilliantly	
conceived	 that	 his	 elimination	 could	 be	 effected	 by	 the	 abolition	 of	 the	
Western	Branch	office.17	
The	deposed	Western	Branch	leaders	were	not	part	of	the	ruling	group	and	had	been	
a	 constant	 source	 of	 opposition,	 radicalism	 and	 attempts	 to	 enhance	 union	
democracy. 18 	Secretary	 Jack	 Cullinan	 had	 also	 increasingly	 threatened	 Bailey	 in	
elections	 for	 the	 NSW	 representative	 on	 the	 executive	 council.19	One	 of	 the	 key	
advantages	of	 local	autonomy	for	union	democracy	 is	that	 it	allows	the	growth	of	
alternative	leaderships	which	can	potentially	challenge	the	federal	leadership.	If	the	
																																								 																				
15	Central	Branch	Annual	Report,	31	May	1920,	12.	
16	Ibid.	
17	Ernest	Henry	Lane,	Dawn	to	Dusk:	Reminiscences	of	a	Rebel	(Brisbane:	William	Brooks,	1939):	188.	
18	Hearn	and	Knowles,	One	Big	Union:	A	History	of	the	Australian	Workers'	Union	1886-1994:	131.	
19	AWU	Annual	Convention	Report,	Australian	Worker,	14	February	1918,	17.	
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AWU	had	possessed	branch	autonomy,	Cullinan	and	the	Western	Branch	would	have	
remained	as	a	force	for	democracy	within	the	union.	
	
Cullinan	had	been	born	about	1871	and	worked	as	a	labourer	and	then	shearer	in	the	
Queensland	pastoral	industry	where	he	was	heavily	involved	in	the	strikes	of	1891	
and	1894.20	By	1900	he	was	shearing	around	Armidale	on	the	northern	tablelands	of	
NSW	before	travelling	to	New	Zealand	shearing	and	union	organising.21	By	1907	he	
was	back	 in	NSW	as	an	AWU	representative	 in	 the	western	NSW	sheds.22	He	was	
elected	a	Bourke	Branch	organiser	in	1911	and	was	Bourke	Branch	representative	to	
the	1911	NSW	Labor	Party	Annual	Conference	where	he	proposed	militant	reforms.23	
Cullinan	was	a	popular	organiser;	in	August	1911	he	visited	a	shed	in	Wilcannia	and	
the	local	AWU	representative	wrote	to	the	Worker	saying	that	Cullinan	had	“put	in	
some	 good	 work	 and	 made	 friends”. 24 	In	 1917	 he	 was	 elected	 Western	 Branch	
secretary	 when	 Arthur	 Blakeley	 left	 the	 position	 to	 enter	 the	 House	 of	
Representatives	for	Darling.25		
	
Lane	 praised	 Cullinan	 for	 his	 “pugnacious	 militancy,	 unshakable	 adherence	 to	
principle,	and	hatred	of	the	intrigue	and	trickery	of	the	AWU	heads”.26	Year	after	year	
Cullinan	had	gone	to	annual	convention	and	embarrassed	the	leadership	by	arguing	
for	reforms	which	would	have	undermined	the	oligarchy.	For	example,	he	suggested	
that	branch	officials	should	not	be	allowed	to	sit	on	the	executive	council	and	that	
no	 paid	 official	 should	 be	 an	 annual	 convention	 delegate. 27 	The	 fact	 that	 the	
executive	council	could	use	such	blunt	suppression	against	Cullinan	and	the	Western	
Branch	 without	 suffering	 a	 significant	 membership	 backlash	 demonstrates	
disempowerment	and	lack	of	interest	amongst	the	ordinary	members.	
																																								 																				
20	“Jack	Cullinan,”	Labour	Founder	Morning	Bulletin,	9	July	1951,	4.	
21	Correspondence,	Worker	(Wagga),	24	November	1900,	8;	Correspondence,	Worker	(Wagga),	29	
March	1902,	7.	
22	“Bourke	Branch,”	Worker	(Wagga),	15	August	1907,	15.	
23	“Bourke	Branch,”	Worker	(Wagga),	12	July	1911,	1;	“Saving	their	faces,”	Worker	(Wagga),	9	
February	1911,	15.	
24	“Wilcannia,”	Worker	(Wagga),	9	August	1911,	4.	
25	“AWU	officers	for	1919,”	Armidale	Chronicle,	25	January	1919,	6.	
26	Lane,	Dawn	to	Dusk:	Reminiscences	of	a	Rebel:	188.	
27	AWU	Annual	Convention	Report,	Australian	Worker,	8	February	1917,	19.	
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In	the	1930s	the	collegial	oligarchy	transformed	into	a	simple	official	hierarchy	under	
the	 domination	 of	 the	 Queensland	 Branch	 and	 its	 leader	 Fallon.	 The	 union’s	
centralised	constitution	allowed	Fallon	to	use	his	branch’s	massive	membership	to	
control	the	AWU	nationally.	By	1929	each	AWU	branch	sent	one	delegate	to	annual	
convention	 for	 every	 4,000	 members	 uncapped. 28 	Favourable	 conditions	 in	
Queensland,	most	notably	compulsory	unionism	from	1932	and	the	state’s	extensive	
public	works,	caused	the	Queensland	Branch	to	grow	larger	than	the	rest	of	the	AWU	
branches	combined.29	Of	27	delegates	to	the	annual	convention	in	1910,	twelve	were	
from	NSW,	six	from	Victoria	and	four	from	Queensland.	By	1935	Queensland’s	ten	
delegates	outnumbered	the	combined	total	of	eight	from	all	other	branches.	
	
Fallon	also	possessed	the	necessary	personal	characteristics	required	to	transform	
the	 AWU	 into	 a	 dictatorship	 (figure	 14).	 He	 was	 born	 about	 1890	 in	 Central	
Queensland,	son	of	an	Australian-born	shearer	who	participated	in	the	decade’s	big	
strikes.	A	strong	young	man	with	an	impressive	physique,	Fallon	left	school	at	a	young	
age	 to	 work	 in	 the	 transport,	 mining	 and	 pastoral	 industries.	 He	 enlisted	 in	 the	
Australian	Imperial	Force	in	1916	but	was	quickly	dismissed	due	to	poor	eyesight.	The	
following	 year	 he	was	 employed	 as	 a	municipal	worker	 and	 joined	 the	 AWU.	 He	
became	 an	 AWU	 organiser	 in	 1921	 and	 rose	 through	 the	 ranks	 to	 become	
Queensland	Branch	Secretary	in	1933.30	
																																								 																				
28	Rule	60	AWU	Constitution	1909-10;	Rule	32	AWU	Constitution	1929-30.	
29	Hearn	and	Knowles,	One	Big	Union:	A	History	of	the	Australian	Workers'	Union	1886-1994:	182.	
30	Lynette	Bergstrum,	Fallon,	Clarence	George	(Clarrie)	(1890–1950).	Australian	Dictionary	of	
Biography	14	1996.	
	
	
97	
	
Figure	14	Clarrie	Fallon	in	1931.31	
The	red-haired	Queenslander	was	nicknamed	“the	red	terror”	by	friends	and	enemies	
alike.	He	was	cold	and	ominous	and	demanded	unconditional	loyalty.	Fallon	was	an	
unapologetic	 elitist	who	was	 confident	 that	he	 knew	best	 and	 that	others	 should	
simply	obey.	He	ruled	the	AWU	through	fear,	openly	boasting	that	he	would	dismiss	
any	 official	 who	 refused	 to	 conform. 32 	He	 surrounded	 himself	 with	 thuggish	
lieutenants	such	as	the	infamous	“Midnight	Joe”	Bukowski,	so	named	for	his	habit	of	
visiting	dissidents	at	night	and	bashing	them.33		
	
Fallon’s	dictatorship	was	 the	ultimate	outcome	of	an	aspirational	and	hierarchical	
ethos	and	a	disempowered	and/or	uninterested	membership	which	had	enabled	the	
																																								 																				
31	AWU	Annual	Convention	Report,	Australian	Worker,	11	February	1931,	16.	
32	Harry	Knowles,	"Comparative	Labour	Biography:	An	Historical	Study	of	Leadership	in	the	
Australian	Workers’	Union"	(University	of	Sydney,	2003):	221,	229.	
33	Hearn	and	Knowles,	One	Big	Union:	A	History	of	the	Australian	Workers'	Union	1886-1994:	251.	
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officials	 to	 gradually	 increase	 their	 authoritarianism	 over	 several	 decades.	
Throughout	the	1930s	Fallon	became	increasingly	elitist	and	moved	the	AWU	further	
away	from	democracy.	When	it	came	time	to	review	the	union	rules,	for	example,	he	
did	not	consider	membership	involvement	in	the	process.	He	acknowledged	that	the	
constitution	“should	be	scrutinised	and	brought	up	to	date”	but	said	that	even	the	
27	union	officials	who	were	annual	convention	delegates	were	too	inexperienced	to	
do	the	job.	Instead,	the	13-man	executive	council	should	complete	the	task	because	
it	was	“composed	of	men	with	wide	experience	in	the	union	and	who	understood	the	
anomalies	 and	 good	 points	 of	 the	 constitution”.34	Fallon	 and	 his	 allies	 were	 also	
unapologetically	 authoritarian;	 when	 NSW	 delegates	 complained	 about	 the	
executive	 council	 governing	 their	 branch,	 Queensland	 delegate	 John	 Campbell	
dismissed	their	concerns	and	said	that	the	executive	council	was	merely	“using	a	little	
parental	control”.35	
	
The	 Queensland	 Branch	 controlled	 the	 annual	 convention	 but	 not	 the	 executive	
council	which	had	one	representative	from	each	state	and	one	representative	from	
each	branch.	It	seems	counterintuitive,	then,	that	Fallon	chose	to	control	the	union	
through	 executive	 council.	 He	 often	 successfully	moved	 that	matters	 be	 referred	
from	convention	to	executive	council	for	decision.36	Fallon	preferred	to	operate	from	
the	executive	council	because	it	was	smaller	at	13	members,	met	more	frequently	
and	its	business	was	secret	until	1939	when	it	began	to	release	censored	meeting	
reports	to	members	(figure	15).37		
	
Control	by	the	executive	council,	which	had	equal	representation	from	each	branch,	
also	concealed	Queensland’s	domination.	The	key	to	Fallon’s	power	on	the	executive	
council	 was	 that	 if	 he	 did	 not	 get	 his	 way,	 he	 could	 wait	 until	 the	 next	 annual	
convention,	or	call	a	special	convention,	and	pass	a	resolution	to	force	the	executive	
council’s	 hand,	 or	 even	 reconstitute	 it.	 At	 the	 1938	 annual	 convention	 Fallon	
																																								 																				
34	AWU	Annual	Convention	Report,	Australian	Worker,	8	February	1939,	17.	
35	AWU	Annual	Convention	Report,	Australian	Worker,	20	February	1935,	17-18.	
36	AWU	Annual	Convention	Report,	Australian	Worker,	12	February	1936,	17.	
37	AWU	Annual	Convention	Report,	Australian	Worker,	15	February	1939,	17.	
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successfully	blocked	an	attempt	to	have	Convention	held	once	every	three	years.	He	
knew	 that	 his	 power	 came	 ultimately	 from	 regular,	 Queensland-dominated	
Conventions.38	
	
	
Figure	15	The	AWU	executive	council	in	1936.	Beginning	top	left:	Clarrie	Fallon,	Harold	Hiosan,	M.J.	
Murphy,	J.C.	Lamont,	John	Barnes,	Edward	Grayndler,	Arthur	Watts,	William	Hegney,	Wilbert	Dale,	
David	Gunn,	John	McNeill,	W.H.	Nicol	and	Christopher	Dalton.39	
	 	
																																								 																				
38	AWU	Annual	Convention	Report,	Australian	Worker,	6	April	1938,	17.	
39	“The	Executive	Council	today,”	Australian	Worker,	29	January	1936,	3	(golden	jubilee	supplement).	
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By	repressing	the	NSW	Branch	Fallon	further	entrenched	his	domination	of	the	AWU	
nationally.	 He	 blamed	 NSW	 leaders	 Bailey	 and	 Buckland	 for	 the	 union’s	 falling	
membership	and	political	isolation	in	that	state	and	set	about	eliminating	them	by	
combining	 the	 Central	 Branch	 and	 RWIB	 into	 one	 NSW	 Branch	 in	 1933. 40 	NSW	
delegates	strongly	opposed	the	fusion	but	there	was	nothing	they	could	do.41	The	
AWU	had	promised	the	RWGLA	 local	autonomy	when	 it	entered	the	union	as	 the	
RWIB	 in	 1916,	 but	 because	 the	 AWU’s	 centralised	 constitution	 gave	 the	 federal	
annual	convention	and	executive	council	unlimited	control	over	the	branches	they	
could	 remove	 RWIB	 autonomy	 any	 time	 they	 chose.42	The	 executive	 council	 had	
gradually	taken	away	RWIB	autonomy	in	the	1920s	and	in	1933	destroyed	it.	RWIB	
officials	unsuccessfully	protested	that	the	RWGLA	had	entered	the	AWU	on	condition	
of	autonomy	and	accurately	predicted	that	the	merger	would	cause	some	members	
to	defect	to	the	ULU.43	
	
Completing	 the	 coup,	 the	 executive	 council	 failed	 to	 appoint	 any	 of	 the	 existing	
Central	Branch	or	RWIB	officials	to	administer	the	new	branch.	John	McNeill,	former	
Charleville	(Queensland)	and	Victoria	Branch	secretary	was	NSW	secretary,	and	RWIB	
member	 Chris	 Dalton	 was	 president.	 But	 this	 was	 not	 enough	 for	 Fallon;	 the	
executive	council	took	control	of	the	NSW	Branch	and	maintained	that	control	until	
1938,	despite	continual	calls	for	branch	autonomy	from	NSW	officials	and	members.	
The	repression	of	the	NSW	Branch	strengthened	Fallon’s	dictatorship	by	neutralising	
NSW,	 the	 state	most	 likely	 to	 challenge	Queensland	 for	AWU	dominance,	 and	by	
demonstrating	to	other	branches	the	consequences	of	disobedience.	Fallon	ruled	the	
AWU	at	the	apex	of	a	simple	official	hierarchy	until	he	died	suddenly	in	1950	aged	
63.44	
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Labourers,"	124.	
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The	 AWU’s	 lack	 of	 local	 autonomy	 continued	 within	 each	 branch.	 The	 branch	
executive	 ran	 the	 branch	 and	 consisted	 of	 a	 president,	 two	 vice-presidents,	 a	
secretary	and	15	executive	members.	Until	 1914	 the	entire	branch	executive	was	
elected	 at	 the	 annual	 meeting	 of	 the	 branch.45 	Annual	 convention	 changed	 this	
system	because	most	of	the	widely	dispersed	members	could	not	attend	the	annual	
meeting	which	was	easily	stacked	by	the	sitting	officials.46	Henceforth	the	president,	
vice-presidents	 and	 secretary	were	 elected	 annually	 in	 a	 postal	 ballot	 open	 to	 all	
branch	members	while	each	branch	was	divided	into	15	sections	and	the	members	
in	 each	 section	 formed	 a	 local	 committee	 and	 elected	 a	 representative	 to	 the	
executive.47	The	establishment	of	local	committees	could	have	marked	the	beginning	
of	a	move	towards	local	autonomy	within	the	branches.	But	the	scattered,	itinerant	
membership	 was	 unable	 to	 participate	 and	 the	 local	 committees	 were	 poorly	
attended	 and	 collapsed. 48 	From	 its	 entry	 into	 the	 union	 in	 1916	 the	 entire	
membership	elected	the	RWIB	executive	in	a	single	ballot	and	the	Central	Branch	did	
likewise	from	1920.49		
	
Some	 AWU	 worksites	 operated	 as	 local	 participatory	 democracies.	 Groups	 of	
shearers	 or	 navvies	 would	 elect	 a	 union	 representative	 (“rep”)	 and	 would	 make	
workplace	 decisions	 collectively.	 But	 as	 we	 have	 seen	 the	 AWU’s	 centralised	
constitution	meant	 that	 these	 local	participatory	democracies	had	no	power	over	
wider	union	issues	or	the	state-wide	and	nation-wide	elections.	The	fact	that	these	
local	 arrangements	 usually	 only	 lasted	 a	 few	months	 also	 limited	 their	 ability	 to	
organise	 or	 challenge	 the	 state	 and	 national	 leaders.	 The	 arbitration	 system’s	
industry-wide	 awards	 limited	 the	 possibility	 of	 local	 workplace	 negotiation	 or	 of	
members	voting	on	 local	employment	contracts.	At	best,	 they	might	 fiddle	at	 the	
margins.	
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September	1916,	1	(supplement).	
47	Rule	58	AWU	Constitution	1919-20.	
48	AWU	Annual	Convention	Report,	Australian	Worker,	8	February	1917,	19.	
49	AWU	Annual	Convention	Report,	Australian	Worker,	8	February	1917,	19;	AWU	Annual	
Convention	Report,	Australian	Worker,	26	February	1920,	17.	
	
	
102	
Membership	decision-making	
We	have	already	seen	that	direct	membership	decision-making	was	minimal	within	
the	AWU	and	that	where	 it	did	occur,	such	as	 in	the	election	of	state	and	federal	
officials,	it	was	undermined	by	undemocratic	rules.	In	this	section,	the	focus	is	on	the	
most	 fundamental	 membership	 decision	 of	 all:	 whether	 to	 join	 a	 trade	 union.	
Throughout	the	interwar	period	many	AWU	members	from	NSW	and	elsewhere	were	
dissatisfied	with	the	union	but	compulsory	unionism	removed	their	ability	to	leave	
the	AWU	even	if	they	were	unhappy	with	its	management.		
	
If	workers	in	industries	covered	by	the	AWU	wanted	to	join	a	union	they	usually	had	
to	join	the	AWU.	The	arbitration	courts	would	only	recognise	one	union	in	each	area	
of	 employment	 which	 meant	 that	 the	 first	 union	 in	 a	 field	 was	 very	 difficult	 to	
displace.	This	lack	of	competition	reduced	the	need	for	unions	to	appeal	to	members	
by	satisfying	their	demands.	Furthermore,	preference	for	unionists,	and	compulsory	
unionism	 in	 some	 jurisdictions	 such	 as	Queensland	 from	1932,	 forced	workers	 in	
relevant	industries	to	join	the	AWU.	In	the	1930s	the	rival,	radical	PWIU	attempted	
to	 replace	 the	 AWU	 in	 the	 pastoral	 industry	 by	 operating	 outside	 the	 arbitration	
system	 but	 the	 AWU	 leaders	 cooperated	 with	 the	 pastoralists	 to	 defeat	 this	
challenge.50		
	
Most	 Australian	 unions	 including	 the	 AWU	 advocated	 and	 pursued	 compulsory	
unionism.	The	Australian	Worker	argued	“nothing	could	be	dearer	to	the	heart	of	
trade	unionists	than	the	recognition	of	their	right	to	say	that	they	will	not	work	with	
blacklegs,	 who	 take	 all	 the	 benefits	 the	 organisation	 can	 give,	 and	 yet	 are	 too	
contemptibly	mean	to	contribute	their	[money]	for	its	maintenance.”51	Throughout	
the	interwar	period	the	AWU	was	able	to	win	preference	for	unionists	and	sometimes	
compulsory	unionism	in	its	arbitration	awards.	Compulsion	had	obvious	advantages	
for	unions	as	it	ensured	large	memberships,	full	coffers	and	prevented	“free	riders”	
from	receiving	the	benefits	of	unionism	without	paying	their	share	of	the	costs.	
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Yet	compulsory	unionism	also	meant	that	union	leaders	had	no	incentive	to	consult	
members	or	promote	democracy	in	order	to	retain	members,	and	that	the	members	
had	 no	 sanction	 with	 which	 to	 punish	 anti-democratic	 officials. 52 	In	 relation	 to	
political	parties,	Angelo	Panebianco	argued	that	the	ease	with	which	members	can	
leave	 the	party	 and	obtain	 the	 inducements	of	membership	elsewhere	 is	 the	 key	
determinant	 of	where	 a	 party	will	 sit	 on	 the	 continuum	between	democracy	 and	
oligarchy.	The	more	“substitutable”	the	party’s	“organisational	incentives”,	the	more	
democratic	an	organisation	will	need	to	be	in	order	to	retain	members.	We	can	apply	
this	same	reasoning	to	trade	unions,	and	the	low	to	non-existent	substitutability	of	
the	 AWU’s	 organisational	 incentives	 created	 by	 compulsory	 unionism	 allowed	 its	
officials	to	govern	oligarchically	without	fear	of	resignations.53	Clyde	Cameron,	South	
Australian	AWU	official	from	1939	to	1961,	recalled	that	“when	I	first	joined	the	AWU	
its	officials	were	little	more	than	glorified	public	servants	willing	to	accept	whatever	
pittance	arbitration	might	give,	relying	on	preference	to	unionists	to	prevent	mass	
resignations”.	For	Cameron,	this	was	part	of	the	“paralysing	price	unions	must	pay	
for	a	registered	monopoly	to	cover	given	callings	or	industries”.54	
	
The	NSW	Labor	Party	exacerbated	the	problem	of	compulsory	unionism	by	requiring	
all	party	members	to	be	a	member	of	 their	 trade	union.	For	example,	 in	1913	Mr	
Abigail	won	a	place	on	the	party’s	Central	Executive	as	a	league	representative	but	
he	was	removed	because	he	was	not	a	member	of	his	trade	union,	the	Typographical	
Association.	 Abigail	 said	 he	 and	 others	 had	 resigned	 from	 the	 Typographical	
Association	due	to	a	dispute	within	the	union	but	the	central	executive	ruled	that	this	
was	 not	 acceptable. 55 	Both	 the	 arbitration	 courts	 and	 the	 Labor	 Party	 did	 not	
consider	leaving	one’s	union	to	be	a	valid	expression	of	dissent,	despite	the	fact	that	
it	was	the	only	option	open	to	members	of	undemocratic	unions.	In	1926	“A	Railway	
Worker”	wrote	to	the	SMH	distancing	himself	 from	his	union’s	policies:	“what	we	
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‘compulsory	unionists’	are	sore	over	is	that	we	are	all	branded	‘crooks’	when	we	have	
no	say	in	anything”.56	
	
In	 office,	 the	 Lang	 Labor	 government	 displayed	 contempt	 for	 AWU	 members’	
freedom	of	choice.	In	1931	it	influenced	the	arbitration	system	to	transfer	jurisdiction	
for	various	construction	labourers	from	the	AWU	to	the	ULU,	thus	forcing	hundreds	
of	AWU	members	to	join	the	ULU.	Chairman	of	the	Conciliation	Committee,	Samuel	
Bird,	 a	 Lang	 loyalist	 and	 former	 Miners	 Federation	 official,	 refused	 to	 sign	 the	
rockchoppers’	award	for	the	RWIB	of	the	AWU.	Several	witnesses	claimed	Bird	had	
said	he	was	 following	 the	 instructions	of	 “the	powers	 that	be”,	meaning	Lang,	by	
transferring	preference	to	the	ULU	which	was	loyal	to	the	Lang	party.57	This	is	one	of	
many	examples	of	the	entanglement	of	union	and	ALP	factional	politics.	
	
Organised	opposition	
By	the	1920s	much	of	the	militancy	that	had	remained	in	the	AWU	membership	after	
the	strike	defeats	of	the	1890s	was	gone.	Yet	militancy	lived	on	amongst	a	minority	
of	members.	The	AWU	openly	proscribed	 internal	groupings	or	 factions;	 the	clear	
message	from	officials	was	that	factions	were	detrimental	to	the	union	and	would	
not	be	tolerated.	Officials	were	supposed	to	be	elected	as	individuals	on	their	merits	
rather	than	as	representatives	of	“divisive”	groups.	The	first	opposition	grouping	that	
the	leadership	attacked	in	this	period	was	the	Industrial	Workers	of	the	World	(IWW)	
which	had	made	some	headway	in	the	pastoral	industry	during	the	First	World	War	
in	the	context	of	a	radicalising	labour	movement.	The	Central	Branch	1917	Annual	
Report	warned	members	to	 look	out	for	the	IWW	“ticket	of	candidates”	and	their	
“conspiracy	to	get	control	of	the	union”.58		
	
Militant	 AWU	 members	 and	 rebel	 officials	 continually	 protested	 the	 oligarchy’s	
increasingly	undemocratic	actions.59	The	One	Big	Union	(OBU)	movement	formed	a	
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flagship	for	AWU	militants	around	1919.	In	1922,	a	group	of	militant,	dissident	AWU	
members	founded	the	BPG	to	try	to	reform	the	AWU	from	within.	The	1923	Central	
Branch	Annual	Report	stated	that	“we	must	have	more	solidarity	 in	our	union”	as	
“we	 cannot	 afford	 to	 have	 sections	 and	 factions	 within	 our	 ranks	 each	 fighting	
differently	to	the	other”.60	The	BPG	sent	a	long	list	of	reform	proposals	to	the	1925	
Annual	Convention	which	unsurprisingly	were	not	adopted	and,	in	a	typical	case	of	
AWU	 suppression,	 the	Australian	Worker	 did	 not	 even	 print	 the	 proposals	 in	 its	
detailed	annual	convention	report.61	
	
The	BPG	was	of	particular	concern	to	the	leadership	because	it	was	led	by	former	
AWU	President	and	Secretary	Arthur	Rae	(figure	16).	Born	in	1860	in	New	Zealand,	
he	was	the	son	of	a	painter	and	glazier.	Rae	worked	as	a	labourer	and	shearer	before	
moving	to	Australia	in	1889	where	he	organised	for	the	Wagga	Wagga	branch	of	the	
ASU	and	wrote	for	its	Hummer	newspaper.	The	following	year	he	was	jailed	for	one	
month	for	his	role	in	the	1890	Maritime	Strike.	He	was	president	of	the	AWU	in	1895	
and	secretary	from	1898	to	1899.	His	militancy	turned	to	radicalism	in	the	1910s,	in	
part	due	to	the	death	of	two	sons	in	the	First	World	War,	and	he	increasingly	opposed	
arbitration.	This	put	him	in	conflict	with	the	AWU	leadership	and	in	1919	he	sided	
with	the	militant	faction	in	its	unsuccessful	attempt	to	win	control	of	the	NSW	Labor	
Party	from	the	AWU	faction.	The	following	year	he	was	expelled	from	the	AWU	when	
he	refused	to	sign	a	pledge	of	loyalty	to	its	leaders.	In	1928	he	wrote	an	article	titled	
“The	curse	of	compulsory	unionism”	in	which	he	argued	that	arbitration	had	“doped”	
the	workers	with	 “legalism”	and	 they	had	 lost	 their	 independence	and	grassroots	
organisation.62	
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Figure	16	Arthur	Rae	c.	1917.63	
Buckland	argued	strongly	against	the	existence	of	the	BPG.	He	said	“the	keynote	of	
our	organisation	must	be	unity,	but	there	can	be	no	proper	unity	whilst	such	a	body	
as	the	BPG	exists”.64	The	leaders	misrepresented	the	BPG’s	attacks	on	themselves	as	
attacks	on	the	union	as	a	whole.65	The	BPG	complained	that	“whenever	 the	AWU	
officials	are	denounced	for	their	misconduct	or	neglect,	they	raise	the	cry	that	we	are	
the	enemies	of	the	union	and	are	seeking	to	destroy	it,	whereas	we	are	serving	the	
true	interests	of	the	union	by	exposing	those	who	are	living	on	the	game”.66	Officials	
bluntly	repressed	opposition	groups	such	as	the	BPG	by	banning	them	and	expelling	
their	members	from	the	union.67	They	even	barred	known	dissident	members	from	
attending	annual	convention	as	spectators.68	
	
In	1930	the	persistent	Rae	led	the	BPG	militants	to	form	the	rival	PWIU	and	challenge	
the	 AWU	 oligarchy	 from	without.	 At	 its	 first	 meeting	 Rae	 emphasised	 the	 “class	
character	of	the	new	union	and	its	fight	against	arbitration	and	the	anti-working-class	
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policy	of	the	AWU	officials”.69	The	CPA	had	a	strong	presence	within	the	PWIU	and	a	
majority	of	its	executive	were	CPA	members.	At	its	height	it	reached	2000	members,	
a	 fraction	of	 the	AWU’s	membership	of	over	100,000,	before	disbanding	 in	1936.	
Andrew	Moore	argues	that	it	“lost	the	will	to	live”	and	that	its	leadership	came	to	
believe	 its	struggle	against	 the	AWU	and	Graziers	Association	was	bound	to	 fail.70	
That	 failure	was	based	on	the	simple	 fact	 that	the	PWIU	was	too	radical	 for	most	
AWU	members.	Those	AWU	members	who	were	interested	in	the	union’s	internal	
politics	may	not	have	been	happy	with	the	oligarchy	but	that	did	not	mean	they	were	
Communists,	 revolutionaries	 or	 even	 that	 they	 opposed	 arbitration.	 The	
overwhelming	majority	of	AWU	members	chose	to	remain	in	the	oligarchical	AWU	
rather	than	join	a	union	of	Communist	radicals	outside	the	arbitration	system.	
	
In	the	late	1920s	a	grouping	called	the	“Rank	and	File	Committee”	emerged	within	
the	 RWIB.	 It	 collected	 membership	 dues	 from	 RWIB	 members	 and	 held	 £1	 per	
member	 in	 a	 fund	 to	 be	 paid	 to	 the	 AWU	only	 if	 it	made	 a	 series	 of	 democratic	
amendments	 to	 its	constitution.	The	Rank	and	File	Committee	was	backed	by	 the	
NSW	Labor	Council	and	NSW	Labor	Party,	which	were	both	in	conflict	with	the	AWU	
leadership.	The	RWIB	secretary	condemned	the	Committee	as	an	“insidious	plot	to	
lead	[members]	 into	a	maze	of	scabbery”.71	Australian	Worker	editor	Henry	Boote	
falsely	claimed	that	 the	Committee	had	“resulted	 from	efforts	of	an	alien	body	 in	
China	 [the	 Chinese	 Communist	 Party]	 to	 control	 the	 Labor	 movement	 in	 this	
country”.	The	AWU	was	supposedly	“the	only	body	courageous	enough	and	powerful	
enough	to	combat	the	conspiracy”.72	It	was	common	for	AWU	officials	to	falsely	label	
dissidents	as	Communists,	foreigners	and	traitors.	This	propaganda	played	upon	the	
nationalist	xenophobia	of	the	AWU	ethos;	anything	“foreign”	was	highly	suspicious	
and	anything	Asian	was	inherently	foul.	
While	organised	opposition	within	the	AWU	was	suppressed,	 involvement	 in	NSW	
Labor	Party	factional	conflicts	caused	the	AWU	leaders	to	face	organised	opposition	
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from	outside	the	union.	The	militant	 faction’s	Labor	Daily	 in	Sydney,	 for	example,	
regularly	attacked	the	AWU	oligarchs	and	described	the	union	as	“an	organisation	
whose	rank	and	file	consists	of	some	of	the	best	unionists	in	Australia,	but	which	has	
had	the	misfortune	to	suffer	from	the	blight	of	political	bossism”.73	Affiliation	also	
brought	Labor	Party	disputes	into	the	AWU.	For	example,	the	AWU’s	long-running	
conflict	with	Lang	caused	some	pro-Lang	AWU	members	to	join	opposition	groupings	
within	the	union	or	rival	unions	such	as	the	ULU	or	the	PWIU.74		
This	 external	 organised	 opposition	 could	 be	 highly	 damaging	 to	 the	 NSW	 AWU	
oligarchs.	Bailey’s	expulsion	from	the	Labor	Party	in	the	1923	ballot-box	scandal	is	
the	most	prominent	example.75	The	previous	year	Bailey	had	received	63	per	cent	of	
the	vote	(936	out	of	1477)	in	the	ballot	for	Central	Branch	president	but,	following	
the	ballot-box	scandal	in	December	1923,	his	vote	declined	more	than	20	per	cent	
(1379	out	of	3331).	Yet	because	the	anti-Bailey	vote	was	split	between	eight	other	
candidates,	he	still	won.76	Even	though	he	was	able	to	use	the	AWU’s	undemocratic	
rules	to	stay	in	power,	“Ballot-box	Bailey”	never	regained	his	legitimacy	within	the	
AWU	or	the	NSW	labour	movement.	
The	AWU	tried	to	use	its	influence	within	the	Labor	Party	to	silence	dissenters	within	
the	AWU.	In	1930	the	union	sought	to	have	the	NSW	Labor	Party	central	executive	
withdraw	the	endorsement	of	Senator	Rae	due	to	his	connection	with	the	BPG	which	
the	 AWU	 claimed	 was	 a	 “bogus	 organisation”	 as	 it	 was	 seeking	 to	 replace	 an	
established	 union.	 Rae	 countered	 successfully	 that	 the	 BPG	 was	 a	 rank-and-file	
reform	movement	within	the	AWU.77	In	1931	the	AWU	tried	again,	now	pointing	to	
Rae’s	association	with	the	PWIU	which	the	AWU	said	was	a	Communist	organisation.	
But	again,	the	union	was	unsuccessful.78	Depending	on	circumstances,	Labor	Party	
affiliation	could	either	provide	a	platform	for	union	dissenters	or	be	used	to	silence	
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them.	The	former	applied	more	than	the	latter	in	the	AWU	in	this	period	because	the	
AWU’s	militant	opponents	controlled	the	NSW	Labor	Party.	
	
The	absence	of	free	communication	
Communication	within	 the	AWU	was	 tightly	controlled	by	 the	sitting	officials.	The	
Australian	Worker	was	the	main	avenue	for	official	communication	in	NSW	and	the	
leadership	governed	it	closely.	There	was	no	culture	of	debate	or	free	speech	within	
the	AWU	and	 the	union	 rules	openly	 stated	 that	 the	Australian	Worker	 could	not	
print	anything	that	contradicted	union	policy.79	Member	letters	critical	of	the	union	
or	 officials	 were	 rarely	 printed.80	Henry	 Boote,	 its	 editor,	 pled	 lack	 of	 space	 and	
argued	that	the	Australian	Worker	should	be	“a	propagandist	instrument	in	the	Labor	
Movement”	rather	than	a	“mere	trade	chronicle”	which	it	would	become	“if	more	
space	had	to	be	given	to	members”.81	
	
Although	it	was	published	in	Sydney,	the	NSW	officials	did	not	have	complete	control	
over	 the	 Australian	 Worker.	 On	 the	 newspaper’s	 board	 of	 control	 were	 the	
secretaries	of	each	of	the	branches	in	which	the	newspaper	was	distributed,	Central,	
RWIB,	Victoria-Riverina,	Adelaide	and	Tasmania,	who	each	had	votes	on	the	board	in	
proportion	 to	 their	 branch’s	membership.82	Boote	was	 also	 a	 complicating	 factor	
(figure	17).	By	1920	he	had	gained	such	respect	throughout	the	labour	movement,	
especially	for	his	influential	role	in	the	1916	and	1917	anti-conscription	campaigns,	
that	it	became	problematic	for	the	AWU	officials	to	discipline	or	dismiss	him.	He	was	
also	far	more	radical	than	the	AWU	leaders	and	expressed	this	radicalism	whenever	
he	could.	Nevertheless,	when	they	were	united	the	officials	could	control	him.	Most	
famously	they	forced	him	to	stop	advocating	the	OBU	in	1919	and	from	one	issue	to	
the	 next	 the	 Australian	 Worker’s	 stance	 switched	 from	 strong	 support	 to	
condemnation.83	
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Boote’s	 talent	 as	 a	 propagandist	 was	 doubly	 impressive	 because	 he	 was	 self-
educated.	Born	in	England	in	1865,	the	son	of	a	textile	dealer,	he	left	school	at	age	
ten	and	was	a	printer’s	apprentice.	He	loved	to	read	and	write	and	spent	much	of	his	
spare	 time	 in	 libraries	 educating	 himself.	Working-class	 liberalism	and	 the	 radical	
libertarianism	 of	 Charles	 Bradlaugh	 especially	 influenced	 Boote. 84 	In	 1889	 he	
migrated	to	Australia	and	worked	as	a	compositor	in	Brisbane	where	he	discovered	
socialism	and	was,	he	recalled,	“born	again”	as	a	radical	author	and	activist.	He	edited	
some	smaller	 labour	newspapers	 in	 the	1890s	and	 then	became	Brisbane	Worker	
editor	 in	 1902,	 thus	 beginning	 his	 lifelong	 connection	with	 the	 AWU.	 In	 1911	 he	
separated	 from	 his	 wife	 of	 twenty	 years	 and	 moved	 to	 Sydney	 to	 write	 for	 the	
Australian	Worker	which	he	then	edited	from	1914	to	1943	when	he	retired	due	to	
illness.85	
	
Figure	17	Henry	Boote.86	
In	 1916	 Boote	 became	 a	 household	 name	 as	 the	 leading	 propagandist	 in	 the	 no	
conscription	campaign	during	which	he	was	prosecuted	under	the	War	Precautions	
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Act	and	fined.	Henceforth	his	weekly	Australian	Worker	editorials,	signed	“H.E.B.”,	
set	the	tone	and	parameters	for	much	of	the	debate	within	the	labour	movement.	
His	 ideology	 was	 radical	 but	 gradualist	 and	 he	 opposed	 Communists	 and	
revolutionaries	whom	he	regarded	as	unnecessary	and	dangerous	within	Australia’s	
democratic	political	system.	His	internationalism	was	confined	to	white	workers	and	
he	 opposed	 the	 communist	 arguments	 for	 racial	 equality.	 For	 Boote	 “coloured”	
immigration	was	a	tool	of	capitalism	which	would	destroy	white	workers’	wages	and	
conditions	as	well	as	Australia’s	moral	purity.87	
	
A	rare	example	of	Boote	and	the	Australian	Worker	acting	directly	against	the	NSW	
AWU	 leadership	 occurred	 in	 1923.	 As	 we	 have	 seen	 in	 previous	 chapters,	 a	
conservative	faction	led	by	Bailey	and	the	NSW	AWU	leadership	controlled	the	NSW	
Labor	 Party	 executive	 and	 had	 engaged	 in	 increasingly	 authoritarian	 behaviour.	
Eventually	 the	 rival	 militant	 faction	 capitalised	 on	 the	 reaction	 within	 the	 party	
against	this	authoritarianism	and	defeated	the	AWU-led	coalition	at	the	1923	Annual	
Conference.	In	the	lead	up	to	the	conference,	the	Australian	Worker	had	been	one	
of	the	most	vocal	critics	of	the	executive	which	had,	according	to	Boote’s	editorial,	
combined	“absurdity	and	tyranny	in	equal	proportions”.88		
	
An	unusual	confluence	of	factors	allowed	Boote	and	the	Australian	Worker	to	take	a	
position	 against	 the	NSW	AWU	 leadership.	 Boote	was	 personally	 opposed	 to	 the	
AWU	officials’	actions	and	he	was	able	to	act	accordingly	because,	first,	it	was	not	
technically	an	AWU	matter	as	Bailey	and	the	other	AWU	officials	on	the	executive	
were	acting	in	their	capacity	as	NSW	Labor	Party	officials.	Second,	the	federal	AWU	
leaders	were	divided	on	the	issue	and	ultimate	power	within	the	union	resided	at	the	
federal	level.	Some	of	the	federal	leaders	thought	that	Bailey	and	his	allies	were	being	
unreasonable	and	self-destructive	and	national	AWU	President	Arthur	Blakeley	said	
so	 publicly	 at	 the	 1923	 NSW	 Labor	 Party	 Conference.89	In	 this	 sense,	 Boote	 was	
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intervening	 in	 a	 dispute	 within	 the	 AWU	 leadership	 rather	 than	 opposing	 its	
oligarchy.	
	
Historians	have	exaggerated	the	extent	to	which	Boote	was	a	radical	rebel	within	the	
AWU.	Harry	Knowles,	in	a	typical	example,	argued	that	Boote	“was	a	thorn	in	the	side	
of	a	succession	of	AWU	leaders	as	he	followed	his	strong	socialist	beliefs	and	pursued	
causes	 to	 which	 his	 masters	 were	 often	 vehemently	 opposed”. 90 	The	 BPG,	
conversely,	 claimed	 at	 the	 time	 that	 “the	 [Australian]	Worker	 is	 not	 run	 for	 the	
members	but	for	the	officials”	and	that	while	“Boote	the	editor	is	an	able	man”	he	
“belongs	to	the	gang	in	office	body	and	soul	and	uses	his	abilities	to	twist	everything	
to	 their	advantage”.91	The	Labor	Daily	similarly	argued	 that	Boote	“prostitutes	his	
pen	at	the	behest	of	the	Macdonell	House	junta”.92	It	is	true	that	Boote	wrote	many	
great	socialist	articles	but	he	did	nothing	to	oppose	the	AWU	oligarchs.	He	attended	
annual	conventions,	often	served	as	returning	officer	in	union	elections	and	was	a	
confidant	of	officials	including	Fallon,	so	he	knew	very	well	how	undemocratic	the	
union	was	while	supporting	it	unwaveringly.	His	priority	was	remaining	editor	of	the	
Australian	Worker	where	his	writing	could	reach	as	many	workers	as	possible.93	He	
knew	that	to	keep	that	position	he	needed	to	conform	to	the	ruling	group	on	internal	
union	issues.	Perhaps	he	believed	strong	leadership	was	beneficial	for	members	or	
maybe	 he	 thought	 he	 could	 steer	 the	 AWU	 in	 more	 democratic	 directions	 from	
within,	but	the	ultimate	result	of	his	work	was	to	give	undeserved	credibility	to	the	
oligarchy.	
	
Boote	also	became	more	conservative	over	time.	In	1923	he	had	criticised	the	AWU-
controlled	NSW	Labor	executive	and	had	described	that	year’s	NSW	Labor	annual	
conference	as	a	story	of	“ballot-faking	crooks	and	a	tyrannical	Executive”.94	But	by	
1927	he	was	arguing	that:	
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it	was	at	 this	 [1923	NSW]	ALP	Conference	 that	 the	ballot	box	 scandal	was	
brought	forward	in	order	to	discredit	the	AWU.	The	two	things	went	together;	
the	attack	upon	the	AWU	and	the	effort	of	the	Communists	to	burst	into	the	
citadel	of	the	ALP	because	it	was	realised	by	these	schemers	that	the	AWU	
was	a	great	bulwark	of	constitutionalism	in	the	Political	Movement.95	
From	 the	mid-1920s	Boote	became	 increasingly	hysterical	 in	his	 anti-Communism	
and	faction-fighting	for	the	AWU	and	frequently	bent	the	truth	towards	these	ends.96		
His	claim	that	the	Chinese	Communist	Party	was	controlling	the	RWIB	Rank	and	File	
Committee	discussed	earlier	is	one	of	many	examples	of	his	extravagance.	
	
In	 addition	 to	 the	 Worker	 newspapers,	 AWU	 organisers	 were	 the	 other	 vital	
component	of	official	union	communication.	The	branch	secretary,	supervised	by	the	
branch	executive,	had	tight	control	over	the	organisers	who	were	union	employees	
who	 travelled	 their	 region	 collecting	 membership	 dues,	 enrolling	 and	 assisting	
members	 and	 organising	 the	 Labor	 vote	 in	 elections.	 In	 theory,	 branch	members	
elected	the	organisers	in	the	annual	ballot	but	in	practice	the	organisers	were	mostly	
allies	 of	 the	 secretary	 as	 he	 could	 sack	 them	 at	 any	 time	 and	 appoint	 as	 many	
additional	 organisers	 as	 he	 chose. 97 	From	 1933	 the	 annual	 convention	 barred	
organisers	from	sitting	on	the	branch	executive	to	prevent	the	secretary	from	being	
“controlled	by	the	people	he	was	supposed	to	control”.98	The	top	officials	used	the	
organisers	as	travelling	campaigners,	promoting	the	 incumbent	officials	and	union	
policy.99	
	
A	minority	of	isolated	AWU	members	in	NSW	only	received	information	about	the	
union	through	official	channels.	But	most	members	had	access	to	rival	 labour	and	
commercial	 newspapers	 and	 other	 sources	 of	 information	 that	were	 often	 highly	
critical	 of	 the	 AWU	 oligarchs.	 AWU	workplace	meetings	 and	 individual	members	
often	 sent	 letters	 to	 the	 Labor	Daily	 criticising	 the	AWU	 leaders.100	However,	 the	
																																								 																				
95	AWU	Annual	Convention	Report,	Australian	Worker,	23	February	1927,	18-19.	
96	“Why	the	AWU	is	Attacked	and	Vilified,”	Australian	Worker,	23	February	1927,	18-19.	
97	Knowles,	"Comparative	Labour	Biography:	An	Historical	Study	of	Leadership	in	the	Australian	
Workers’	Union,"	224.	
98	AWU	Annual	Convention	Report,	Australian	Worker,	1	March	1933,	17.	
99	Lane,	Dawn	to	dusk:	reminiscences	of	a	rebel:	305.	
100	Letters,	LD,	22	November	1924,	3;	Letters,	LD,	3	December	1924,	6.	
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AWU’s	ban	on	campaigning	in	elections	limited	the	opportunity	for	this	criticism	to	
be	translated	into	leadership	change.	As	Central	Branch	Secretary	Ike	Smith	admitted	
in	1910,	many	members	“voted	for	the	secretary	because	they	knew	his	name	best	
and	were	prepared	to	take	on	the	devil	they	knew	as	against	the	one	they	did	not”.101	
Furthermore,	 the	 bar	 on	 canvassing	 “against	 any	 candidate”	 in	 effect	 banned	
criticism	of	the	sitting	officials	around	election	time.	If	any	electoral	rival	had	used	
non-AWU	 communication	 to	 promote	 himself	 or	 criticise	 sitting	 officials,	 the	
incumbents	would	have	declared	his	candidacy	void.	The	leaders	were	able	to	take	
advantage	of	most	members’	disempowerment,	lack	of	interest	and	deference,	and	
use	the	power	of	incumbency	to	defeat	their	rivals.	
Conclusion	
The	 AWU	 did	 not	 possess	 any	 of	 the	 seven	 requirements	 of	 union	 democracy	
identified	in	the	sociological	literature.	Most	of	the	union’s	members	did	not	form	
lasting	occupational	communities,	its	rules	were	undemocratic,	there	was	a	large	gap	
in	 status	 and	 skills	 between	 officials	 and	 ordinary	members,	 local	 autonomy	 and	
membership	 decision-making	 were	 almost	 non-existent,	 the	 officials	 crushed	
opposition	groups	and	union	communication	was	strictly	controlled	by	the	leaders.	
Groups	like	the	BPG	and	prominent	dissidents	such	as	Cullinan	and	Rae	fought	for	
democratic	control	but	the	leadership	suppressed	them,	slandered	them,	expelled	
them	 and	 ultimately	 defeated	 them.	 The	 AWU	 experience	 accords	 with	Michels’	
expectations	 as	 the	members	were	unable	 to	 control	 their	 leaders	who	operated	
further	to	entrench	their	own	power.		
	
The	 officials,	 however,	 were	 only	 able	 to	 do	 so	 because	 of	 additional	 contextual	
factors.	 I	 have	 shown	how	 four	 contextual	 factors	 facilitated	AWU	oligarchy.	 The	
aspirational	 and	 hierarchical	 elements	 of	 the	 AWU	 ethos	 enabled	 the	 leaders	 to	
supress	rank-and-file	decision-making	and	deliberately	extend	the	status	and	skills	
gap	 between	 themselves	 and	 the	 membership.	 The	 nationalist	 and	 xenophobic	
aspects	of	the	ethos	allowed	the	leaders	to	discredit	dissidents	by	presenting	them	
as	 the	 agents	 of	 foreign	 Communists.	 The	 union’s	 founding	 constitution	 either	
																																								 																				
101	AWU	Annual	Convention	Report,	Australian	Worker,	19	January	1910,	4.	
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contained,	or	facilitated	the	development	of,	a	series	of	undemocratic	rules	and	it	
prescribed	a	highly	centralised	organisation	with	minimal	 local	autonomy	or	rank-
and-file	decision-making.	Most	of	the	scattered,	itinerant	membership	was	unable	to	
form	 occupational	 communities,	 participate	 in	 the	 short-lived	 local	 branch	
committees	or	generally	participate	in	the	union	in	any	way	beyond	postal	voting.	
The	 arbitration	 system’s	 industry-wide	 awards	 prevented	 local	 employment	
negotiation	and	membership	votes	on	employment	contracts.	Arbitration	also	made	
members	dependent	on	officials	and	further	undermined	participation	and	interest,	
as	most	members	did	not	understand	the	complicated	arbitration	system	and	had	no	
role	within	it.		
	
Affiliation	 to	 the	ALP	had	mixed	effects	on	AWU	democracy.	 Factional	opponents	
criticised	the	AWU	leaders	and	the	Labor	Daily	provided	a	forum	for	dissenting	voices	
within	the	AWU.	There	was	also	support	from	within	the	Labor	Party	for	the	BPG	and	
RWIB	Rank	and	File	Committee.	On	the	anti-democratic	side,	affiliation	with	the	ALP	
further	exacerbated	the	status	gap	between	officials	and	members	and	made	AWU	
leaders	more	desperate	to	keep	their	union	positions	even	if	it	meant	resorting	to	
undemocratic	means.	The	party’s	 requirement	 that	members	also	belong	 to	 their	
union	further	undermined	members’	ability	to	quit	the	AWU	in	protest.	Finally,	the	
AWU	 leaders	 could	 use	 their	 influence	 within	 the	 party	 to	 try	 to	 silence	 union	
dissenters.	
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CHAPTER	III:	AWU	CASE	STUDY	
Opposition	through	oligarchy:	The	AWU	and	the	1916	conscription	plebiscite	
	
In	 October	 1916	 the	 Australian	 government	 asked	 the	 electorate	 to	 approve	 the	
conscription	of	Australian	men	to	fight	overseas.	The	plebiscite	vote	occurred	at	the	
end	of	the	bloody	Somme	campaign	on	the	Western	Front	and	followed	a	divisive	
debate	 over	 conscription	 which	 had	 split	 the	 Labor	 Party	 and	 the	 nation.	 The	
Australian	 Workers	 Union	 (AWU)	 was	 a	 leading	 force	 in	 the	 campaign	 against	
conscription,	 particularly	 through	 its	Worker	 newspapers.	 The	 “no”	 conscription	
campaign	won	a	narrow	victory	by	72,476	votes	out	of	2.2	million	nationwide	(51.6	
per	cent	to	48.4	per	cent).1	
	
The	AWU	was	the	largest	and	most	politically	and	industrially	powerful	trade	union	
in	Australia	at	the	time,	so	it	was	well	placed	to	influence	the	conscription	debate.	
Given	 the	 closeness	 of	 the	 vote,	 historians	 have	 argued	 that	 conscription	 would	
probably	 have	 been	 introduced	 if	 not	 for	 the	 AWU’s	 strong	 campaign.2 	But	 the	
AWU’s	 anti-conscription	 campaign	 did	 not	 reflect	 universal	 opposition	 to	
conscription	within	the	union.		Many	ordinary	members	supported	conscription	and	
so	did	the	president	and	several	other	key	officials.		
	
This	case	study	assesses	the	AWU’s	anti-conscription	campaign	through	the	lens	of	
democracy	and	oligarchy	within	the	union.	Understanding	the	internal	governance	
of	trade	unions	can	help	us	understand	their	actions.	More	specifically,	the	particular	
model	 of	 oligarchy	 that	 exists	 within	 a	 union	 has	 important	 implications	 for	 its	
external	behaviour.	We	will	see	that	the	AWU’s	decision	to	oppose	conscription	was	
not	inevitable	and	did	not	necessarily	reflect	the	opinion	of	the	majority	of	members,	
who	had	little	effect	on	the	outcome.	Instead	it	reflected	the	views	of	a	handful	of	
state	branch	leaders	who	formed	a	collegial	oligarchy	and	dominated	the	union.	
	 	
																																								 																				
1	1,160,033	to	1,087,557	votes.	Mark	Hearn	and	Harry	Knowles,	One	Big	Union:	A	History	of	the	
Australian	Workers'	Union	1886-1994		(Melbourne	Cambridge	University	Press,	1996):	122.	
2	Ibid.;	Clyde	Cameron,	"Henry	Ernest	Boote:	It's	Wrong	to	be	Right,"	Labour	History	80(2001):	205.	
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Australian	labour,	the	First	World	War	and	conscription	
Most	Australians	 supported	 the	First	World	War,	at	 least	at	 the	beginning,	as	did	
most	labour	movement	leaders	including	those	from	the	AWU.	In	September	1914	
the	AWU	had	announced	that	it	was	“calling	a	truce”	with	employers	to	assist	the	
war	effort.		General	Secretary	Edward	Grayndler	said	that	the	AWU	“does	not	intend	
to	do	anything	that	will	cause	any	disruption	but	will	do	everything	it	can	to	assist	in	
the	gathering	of	Australia’s	rich	products”.3	By	September	1916	the	union	proudly	
claimed	that	30,000	of	its	100,000	members	had	joined	the	armed	services.4	There	
was	 a	 small	 minority	 of	 AWU	 leaders	 and	 members	 who	 opposed	 Australia’s	
involvement	in	the	war.	Most	notable	was	former	AWU	President	Arthur	Rae;	despite	
his	opposition	to	the	war,	three	of	his	sons	enlisted	and	two	died.5		
	
Most	 prominent	 individuals	 in	 the	 labour	 movement	 supported	 Australia’s	
involvement	 in	 the	 war	 but	 opposed	 conscription.	 Labour	 leaders	 opposed	
conscription	for	a	range	of	reasons:	nationalism,	the	belief	that	Australia	was	already	
doing	its	share,	civil	libertarian	concerns	about	military	compulsion,	concerns	about	
employers	replacing	conscripted	workers	with	cheaper	non-white	and	female	labour,	
and	anger	that	conscription	applied	to	human	life	but	not	to	capitalist	wealth.	The	
AWU	played	on	all	of	these	concerns	in	its	campaign.	Conservative	politicians,	most	
commercial	newspapers	such	as	the	Sydney	Morning	Herald	(SMH),	and	a	minority	
of	labour	leaders	supported	conscription.		
	
Arguments	for	conscription	centred	on	the	grave	threat	from	German	autocracy	and	
the	need	for	all	military-age	Australian	men	to	do	their	fair	share	in	defence	of	nation	
and	Empire.	Labor	Prime	Minister	William	Morris	(Billy)	Hughes	said	that	“in	June,	
July,	and	August	[1916]	fewer	than	one-third	of	the	number	required	have	enrolled.	
If	voluntaryism	fails,	is	the	nation	to	fail,	when	to	fail	is	to	perish?	No	patriot	can	deny	
the	necessity	of	reinforcements;	no	democrat	can	impugn	the	right	of	the	nation	to	
																																								 																				
3	“The	trades.	Australian	workers.	Declaring	a	truce,”	SMH	18	September	1914,	8.	
4	“The	AWU.	Hostile	resolution,”	SMH,	26	September	1916,	8.	
5	Harry	Knowles,	"Arthur	Rae:	A	‘Napoleon’	in	Exile,"	Labour	History	87(2004):	109.	
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demand	this	duty	from	its	citizens”.6	Many	ordinary	trade	unionists	also	supported	
conscription,	although	it	 is	difficult	to	estimate	what	proportion.	 In	April	1916	the	
Age	in	Melbourne	claimed	that	“if	a	vote	were	taken	of	the	rank	and	file	of	the	entire	
[labour]	movement	there	would	be	an	undoubted	demand	for	conscription”.7	The	
Age	was	pro-conscription	and	while	the	claim	was	plausible	it	was	as	yet	untested.		
	
Hughes	wished	to	 introduce	conscription	but	Labor	enjoyed	a	supermajority	of	31	
out	of	36	seats	in	the	Australian	Senate	and	most	of	those	Labor	Senators	opposed	
conscription.	Hughes	therefore	saw	a	plebiscite	as	a	way	to	pressure	them	to	change	
their	votes.8	The	fact	that	Labor	enjoyed	a	supermajority	in	the	Senate	may	well	have	
prevented	conscription	and	demonstrates	the	importance	of	voting	systems.	At	the	
time	the	Senate	was	elected	by	block	voting	in	each	state,	giving	the	party	with	the	
majority	in	a	state	all	of	its	Senate	seats.	Had	the	Senate	been	elected	by	proportional	
representation	within	each	state,	as	it	is	today,	Labor’s	Senate	majority	would	have	
been	much	smaller	and	Hughes	and	his	Labor	Party	allies	may	well	have	voted	with	
the	Liberal	opposition	and	introduced	conscription.	
	
The	historiography	
Graeme	 Freudenberg	 described	 the	 AWU’s	 Arthur	 Rae	 as	 “unusual	 among	 Labor	
leaders	 in	having	opposed	Australian	participation	 in	 the	war	 from	 its	outbreak”.9	
John	Hirst	argued	that	Henry	Boote	also	opposed	sending	men	overseas	 from	the	
outset	 and	 that	 the	 Australian	 Worker	 ignored	 the	 thousands	 of	 enlisted	 AWU	
members	for	the	first	year	of	the	war	before	Boote	begrudgingly	began	a	weekly	page	
titled	“Fighting	 in	 the	Old	World	 for	 the	New”.	He	discontinued	this	page	 in	early	
1916	around	the	time	the	conscription	debate	began.10		
																																								 																				
6	“Mr	Hughes’	Manifesto,”	AW	21	September	1916,	18.	
7	“Labor	and	Conscription,”	Age	13	April	1916,	6.		
8	Robin	Archer,	"Labour	and	Liberty:	The	origins	of	the	conscription	referendum,"	in	The	Conscription	
Conflict	and	the	Great	War,	ed.	Robin	Archer,	et	al.	(Clayton:	Monash	University	Publishing,	2016):	
37.	
9	Graham	Freudenberg,	Cause	for	Power:	The	Official	History	of	the	NSW	Branch	of	the	ALP		
(Leichardt	Pluto	Press,	1991):	108.	
10	John	Hirst,	"Labor	and	the	Great	War,"	in	Australian	Century:	Political	Struggle	in	the	Building	of	a	
Nation,	ed.	Robert	Manne	(Melbourne:	Text	Publishing,	1999):	56;	Jim	Hagan	and	Ken	Turner,	A	
History	of	the	Labor	Party	in	NSW	1891-1991		(Melbourne:	Longman	Cheshire	1991):	107;	Ian	
Turner,	Industrial	Labour	and	Politics		(Sydney:	Hale	&	Iremonger,	1979):	101.	
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Ian	Turner	argued	that	the	underlying	cause	of	the	Labor	split	over	conscription	was	
a	power	struggle	between	Labor’s	trade	union	leaders	and	politicians	for	control	of	
the	Labor	Party.	For	Turner,	the	primary	motivator	to	oppose	conscription	for	many	
Labor	 politicians	 was	 pressure	 of	 parliamentary	 deselection	 by	 this	 trade	 union	
base.11	John	Hirst	agreed	and	stated	that	“conscription	was	as	much	the	occasion	of	
the	Labor	split	as	the	cause	of	it”.12	Hirst	also	argued	that	the	labour	movement	used	
liberal	 arguments	 rather	 than	 more	 class-based,	 socialist	 arguments	 against	
conscription	primarily	for	tactical	reasons;	liberal	arguments	were	more	palatable	to	
the	majority	of	voters.13	Nick	Dyrenfurth	went	further	and	argued	that	the	“labour	
movement	was	not	in	theory	opposed	to	conscription”	because	it	fitted	well	within	
their	 trade	 unionist	 and	 socialist	 ideologies	 of	 compulsion,	 fairness	 and	 state	
organisation.	 Instead,	 labour	“objected	to	a	form	of	conscription	which	applied	to	
human	life	but	excluded	the	nation’s	wealth”.14		
	
Recently	Archer	has	argued	against	all	of	 these	positions	and	posited	that	“liberal	
arguments	 were	 central	 to	 how	 labour	 anti-conscriptionists	 understood	 their	
opposition”.15	Archer	showed	that	the	Australian	labour	movement	had	been	greatly	
influenced	 by	 a	 British	 liberal	 tradition	 which	 saw	 militarism,	 and	 therefore	
conscription,	as	opposed	to	a	free	society.	He	also	convincingly	countered	Hirst	and	
demonstrated	 that	 Labor’s	 liberalism	 was	 not	 newly	 “discovered”	 during	 the	
conscription	campaign	but	went	back	to	the	Labor	Party’s	foundation	and	had	been	
especially	evident	in	the	first	decade	of	the	twentieth	century	in	the	New	Liberalism	
of	both	 the	Deakinite	Liberals	and	 the	Labor	Party.	New	Liberalism	held	 that	 true	
individual	freedom	required	strong	unions,	government	welfare	and	state	economic	
intervention.16	Frank	Bongiorno	agreed	and	argued	that	“we	should	take	seriously	
																																								 																				
11	Ian	Turner,	Industrial	Labour	and	Politics:	113.	
12	John	Hirst,	"Australian	defence	and	conscription:	A	re-assessment	part	I,"	Australian	Historical	
Studies	25,	no.	101	(1993):	617.	
13	Ibid.,	617-18.	
14	Nick	Dyrenfurth,	"'Conscription	is	not	abhorrent	to	laborites	and	socialists':	revisiting	the	
Australian	labour	movement's	attitude	towards	military	conscription	during	World	War	I,"	Labour	
History	103(2012):	147.	
15	Archer,	"Labour	and	Liberty:	The	origins	of	the	conscription	referendum,"	40.	
16	Ibid.,	46.	
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Australian	anti-conscriptionists’	professions	of	a	love	of	freedom”	and	not	see	them	
as	“mere	window	dressing	for	economic	or	industrial	goals,	but	the	very	essence	of	
the	 anti-conscriptionist	 cause”. 17 	Archer’s	 argument	 is	 convincing	 but	 he	
overcorrects	by	underemphasising	the	extent	to	which	the	conscription	split	was	the	
culmination	of	years	of	conflict	within	the	Labor	Party,	especially	in	NSW,	between	
the	more	radical	trade	unionist	wing	and	the	more	conservative	politicians.	He	also	
dismisses	 too	 easily	 Dyrenfurth’s	 argument	 that	 conscription	was	 consistent	with	
trade	unionist	and	socialist	values,	which	I	will	return	to	below.	
	
There	 is	 a	 historical	 consensus	 that	 the	 AWU’s	 Worker	 newspapers	 were	
instrumental	 in	 the	 successful	 fight	 against	 conscription.18	Coral	 Lansbury	 argued	
that	the	Australian	Worker	was	“the	most	vehement	antagonist	of	conscription	and	
the	majority	of	AWU	members	opposed	'the	blood	vote'	[conscription]”	but	she	does	
not	provide	evidence	for	this	claim	of	AWU	membership	opinion.19	Dyrenfurth,	on	
the	 other	 hand,	 pointed	 out	 that	 some	 AWU	 members	 wrote	 to	 the	 Australian	
Worker	advocating	conscription.20	Mark	Hearn	and	Harry	Knowles	also	observed	that	
several	 key	 officials	 supported	 conscription,	 namely	 founding	 President	 William	
Spence,	his	son-in-law	and	Australian	Worker	manger	Hector	Lamond	and	Women’s	
Page	 editor	 Mary	 Gilmore. 21 	So	 in	 the	 historiography	 there	 is	 some	
acknowledgement	 that	 opposition	 to	 conscription	was	 not	 unanimous	within	 the	
AWU	but	there	is	no	real	exploration	of	the	internal	debate	within	the	union	or	why	
the	opponents	of	conscription	won	that	debate.	There	is	also	no	significant	analysis	
of	 the	opinion	of	 the	membership	other	 than	a	general	assumption	by	all,	except	
perhaps	Dyrenfurth,	that	a	large	majority	of	AWU	members	opposed	conscription.	
																																								 																				
17	Frank	Bongiorno,	"Anti-Conscriptionism	in	Australia,"	in	The	Conscription	Conflict	and	the	Great	
War,	ed.	Robin	Archer,	et	al.	(Clayton:	Monash	University	Publishing,	2016:	69.	
18	Ibid.,	79;	Hearn	and	Knowles,	One	Big	Union:	A	History	of	the	Australian	Workers'	Union	1886-
1994:	122.	
19	Coral	Lansbury,	"William	Guthrie	Spence	"	Labour	History	13(1967):	9.	
20	Dyrenfurth,	"'Conscription	is	not	abhorrent	to	laborites	and	socialists':	revisiting	the	Australian	
labour	movement's	attitude	towards	military	conscription	during	World	War	I,"	160.	
21Hearn	and	Knowles,	One	Big	Union:	A	History	of	the	Australian	Workers'	Union	1886-1994:	120.	
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Figure	18	The	Australian	Worker	says	no	to	conscription.22	
	
AWU	leaders	
In	January	1916	the	AWU	annual	convention	unanimously	passed	a	motion	that	“this	
convention	is	absolutely	opposed	to	the	principle	of	conscription	as	being	opposed	
to	the	spirit	of	our	time	and	race;	more	especially	is	this	so	in	Australia,	which	has	
contributed	more	men	under	the	voluntary	system	in	proportion	to	 its	population	
than	 any	 other	 portion	 of	 the	 British	 Empire”. 23 	This	 unanimous	 vote	 by	 the	
convention	 delegates	 implies	more	 unity	 than	 actually	 existed,	 however.	 Spence,	
																																								 																				
22	AW	21	September	1916,	1.	
23	“AWU	Convention,”	SMH	29	January	1916,	18.	
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Lamond	 and	 Gilmore	 supported	 conscription	 and	 so	 did	 a	 large	 number	 of	 the	
ordinary	members,	but	it	is	impossible	to	say	what	proportion.	Other	key	proponents	
of	conscription	such	as	NSW	Labor	Premier	William	Holman	also	had	strong	AWU	
backgrounds.	
	
AWU	conscriptionists	appealed	to	the	union’s	history	and	culture.	Lamond	called	on	
the	AWU’s	mythology	of	bushworker	mateship.	“I	refuse	to	believe	that	the	mates	of	
the	…	30,000	AWU	men	at	the	front	are	prepared	to	desert	them,”	he	declared,	“that	
has	never	been	in	the	spirit	of	the	bushman	as	I	have	known	him	…	Shall	we	who	
pride	ourselves	that	we	have	never	deserted	a	mate	in	his	hour	of	need,	desert	him	
now?”	 Lamond	 further	 argued	 that	under	 the	 voluntary	 system	 there	were	 three	
classes	of	men	who	enlisted:	 the	unemployed,	 the	young	and	 impressionable	and	
those	who	felt	it	was	their	duty	to	enlist.	He	argued	that	either	the	labour	movement	
should	oppose	the	war	altogether	or,	 if	 it	was	going	to	support	the	war,	 it	should	
send	“proper	fitting	forces	amongst	those	best	fitted	to	undertake	the	campaign”,	
and	that	meant	conscription.24	
	
Labour	 movement	 advocates	 of	 conscription	 also	 argued	 that	 conscription	 was	
ideologically	 consistent	 with	 socialism	 and	 unionism.	 Hughes	 argued	 that	
“compulsion	 is	 the	 essence	 of	 unionism”.	 D.H.	 Newman	 of	 the	 Federated	 Clerks	
Union	similarly	contended	that	
socialism	is	based	on	compulsion,	and	assumes	always	the	paramountcy	of	
the	common	cause.	It	is	a	policy	of	discipline,	allowing	no	more	liberty	than	is	
consonant	with	justice.	All	its	energies	are	directed	to	the	elimination	of	the	
shirker	 and	 the	 equitable	 distribution	 of	 the	 social	 burden.	 Compulsory	
unionism	is	pure	conscription.	It	insists	on	the	obligation	of	militancy	in	a	state	
of	war.	The	whole	crime	of	the	non-unionist	is	his	non-compliant	position.	
Boote	 replied,	 however,	 that	 to	 brand	 conscription	 as	 socialist	 was	 “the	 devil	 in	
disguise”.	“Socialism	will	free	men	not	enslave	them”,	he	wrote.25	Boote	challenged	
“the	 suggestion	 that	 because	 compulsion	 is	 justifiable	 in	 certain	 circumstances	 it	
																																								 																				
24	“Mr	Lamond	and	Conscription,”	SMH	19	October	1916,	11.	
25	Henry	Boote,	“Devil	in	disguise,”	AW	13	January	1916,	3.	
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must	be	just	and	proper	under	other	circumstances.”26	But	he	did	not	explain	how	
the	former	circumstances	were	to	be	distinguished	from	the	latter.	
	
Lamond	 campaigned	hard	 for	 conscription.	He	 supplied	 the	SMH	with	 a	message	
from	Lieutenant	Albert	Jacka,	an	AWU	member	who	had	won	the	Victoria	Cross	at	
Gallipoli.	Jacka’s	appeal	read:	"ANZACs	demand	to	be	reinforced.	Trust	Australia	will	
not	 leave	us	 in	the	 lurch.	Strong	regiments	mean	light	 losses”.	Lamond	added,	"in	
face	of	such	an	appeal,	how	can	any	AWU	man	refuse	to	vote	for	reinforcements?”27	
When	Jacka	had	won	the	Victoria	Cross	initially	the	commercial	press	had	failed	to	
report	that	he	was	a	unionist.	During	the	conscription	debate,	however,	the	press	
emphasised	that	Jacka	was	a	unionist	who	supported	conscription	to	influence	labour	
voters	in	favour	of	conscription.	The	Australian	Worker	retaliated	by	reporting	that	
Jacka’s	father	opposed	conscription	and	wanted	his	three	serving	sons	to	return	to	a	
“free	country”.28	
	
AWU	members	
Grayndler	 wrote	 that	 “the	 opinions	 in	 favour	 of	 conscription	 expressed	 by	 Mr	
Lamond,	and	the	attitude	attributed	by	him	to	Mr	Spence,	President	of	the	AWU,	are	
in	direct	conflict	with	the	views	and	policy	of	the	members	and	governing	body	of	
the	 AWU”. 29 	But	 what	 do	 we	 actually	 know	 of	 the	 opinion	 of	 members?	 The	
Australian	Worker	published	many	 letters	 from	members	against	conscription	but	
surprisingly	it	also	published	some	letters	supporting	conscription	until	September	
1916.	The	proportion	of	 letters	 for	and	against	conscription	 is	no	guide	 to	overall	
membership	opinion	as	the	newspaper	could	pick	and	choose	what	it	published,	and	
those	who	wrote	letters	to	the	editor	were	not	necessarily	a	representative	sample	
of	the	membership	anyway.	
	
																																								 																				
26	Henry	Boote,	“Devil	in	disguise,”	AW	13	January	1916,	3.	
27	“Jacka’s	message,”	SMH	27	October	1916,	7.	
28	“What	Jacka’s	father	thinks,”	AW	26	October	1916,	14.	
29	“Lamond	and	the	Worker,”	AW	21	September	1916,	7.	
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H.	Vivash	wrote	that	the	Australian	Worker’s	position	against	conscription	“does	not	
represent	the	opinion	of	the	rank	and	file”.	He	pointed	to	the	ideological	consistency	
between	compulsory	unionism	and	conscription:	“in	our	labour	organisations	we	do	
our	utmost	to	compel	every	employee	in	shop,	factory,	warehouse	or	public	works	
to	join	their	union,	so	that	he	does	his	share	of	militancy	in	the	fight	to	keep	up	wages	
and	 conditions”,	 the	 same	 logic,	 he	 said,	 should	 apply	 to	 military	 service.	 He	
concluded	with	an	accurate	prediction	of	the	coming	Labor	split:	“I	think	that	your	
[the	Australian	Worker’s]	attitude	is	 illogical	and	full	of	unnecessary	spleen,	and	if	
persevered	 with	 will	 rend	 the	 movement	 in	 twain”. 30 	“A	 Member	 of	 the	 AWU”	
similarly	wrote,	“in	our	unions	we	have	no	time	for	men	who	will	not	come	out	and	
fight	for	a	just	cause.	We	will	not	tolerate	any	person	who	has	personal	objections.	
We	term	him	a	‘scab’	and	a	‘parasite’”.31	The	writer	also	argued	in	class	terms,	saying	
that	to	date	the	vast	majority	of	volunteers	had	been	workers	and	conscription	could	
force	some	of	the	“idle	squatters	and	others	who	are	everlastingly	resting	their	feet”	
to	do	their	share.32		
	
Some	 AWU	 members	 acknowledged	 that	 conscription	 was	 distasteful	 but	
nevertheless	 necessary.	 T.	 Reynolds	 wrote	 to	 the	 Australian	 Worker	 that	 “the	
socialists	of	Germany,	of	England,	France,	Russia,	and	other	countries	are	up	against	
something	far	stronger	and	worse	than	even	the	Fat	Man	[capitalism],	and	instead	of	
helping	his	tongue-tied	brother	socialist	in	Germany,	the	Australian	is	trampling	him	
underfoot	by	trying	to	prevent	conscription”.33	T.C.	O’Brien	of	Queanbeyan	added	
that	“compulsion	is	a	nasty	medicine,	and	we	British-born	hate	it,	still	at	times	for	
our	own	good,	for	the	good	of	the	community,	or	the	good	of	the	nation	we	bow	to	
it”.34	Corporal	G.F.	Davis,	Secretary	of	the	Returned	Service	Association,	played	on	
these	 sentiments	 when	 he	 told	 a	meeting	 at	 the	 Sydney	 Domain	 “the	 AWU	 and	
[Labor	Party]	are	anti-conscriptionist	yet	50,000	unionists	in	NSW	have	gone	to	the	
																																								 																				
30	“Conscription,”	AW	11	May	1916,	20.	
31	Letters,	AW	17	August	1916,	17.	
32	Letters,	AW	17	August	1916,	17.	
33	Letters,	AW	3	September	1916,	17.	
34	Letters,	AW	9	March	1916,	17.	
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front”.	“Are	you	men	going	to	uphold	the	traditions	of	your	union?	If	so	assist	to	bring	
about	conscription”.35	
	
The	Australian	Worker	published	numerous	organiser	reports	claiming	that	member	
opinion	 was	 strongly	 against	 conscription.	 NSW	 Western	 Branch	 organiser	 Jack	
Cullinan	reported	 in	September	1916	 that	“the	 feeling	 in	 the	back	country	 is	very	
strong	against	conscription”.36	Central	Branch	organiser	A.B.	Berry	similarly	said	that	
“everywhere	the	members	are	unanimous	against	conscription”.37	Victoria-Rivernina	
organiser	Jack	Ryder	was	less	emphatic:	“conscription	is	the	burning	question	in	the	
sheds	and	on	the	track,	and,	 if	 the	 feeling	 in	most	of	 the	districts	 I	have	travelled	
through	is	any	criterion,	Hughes	will	not	have	the	cakewalk	he	anticipated”.38	These	
organisers’	reports	should	not	be	considered	proof	of	membership	opinion,	however,	
as	the	organisers	did	not	necessarily	speak	to	a	representative	sample	of	members,	
members	 were	 not	 necessarily	 honest	 with	 the	 organisers	 and	 the	 reports	 were	
written	and	published	as	part	of	the	AWU’s	anti-conscription	campaign.		
	
The	Australian	Worker	reported	various	anti-conscription	resolutions	passed	at	AWU	
workplaces	around	the	country.	These	“unanimous”	resolutions	are	more	a	reflection	
of	the	undemocratic	nature	of	open	votes	than	proof	of	unanimous	opposition	to	
conscription	at	those	workplaces.	Interestingly,	Gurley	shearing	shed	in	north-west	
NSW	adopted	a	resolution	that	“all	AWU	members	be	advised	to	fall	into	line”	with	
the	leaders’	position	against	conscription.	As	well	as	being	consistent	with	the	union’s	
authoritarianism	and	lack	of	free	speech,	this	resolution	also	suggested	that	not	all	
AWU	members	had	yet	“fallen	into	line”	against	conscription.39		
	
In	September	1916,	in	the	final	two	months	of	the	campaign,	the	Australian	Worker	
stopped	printing	any	support	for	conscription	from	AWU	members.	Boote	admitted	
that	“scores	have	sent	in	more	or	less	[pro]	conscription	verse	since	the	war	started;	
																																								 																				
35	“Domain	meeting,”	SMH	3	July	1916,	10.	
36	“Organisers’	reports,”	AW	14	September	1916,	21.	
37	“Organisers’	reports,”	AW	28	September	1916,	21.	
38	“Organisers’	reports,”	AW	19	October	1916,	25.	
39	“AWU	protests,”	AW	28	September	1916,	22.	
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and	the	volume	has	grown	with	the	months”.	But	he	said	“I	have	not	given	it	space	
because	while	it	would	please	some	it	would	displease	others”;	a	weak	justification	
for	 censorship. 40 	The	 fact	 that	 the	 paper	 published	 any	 opposing	 viewpoints	 is	
surprising	given	its	usual	closure	to	dissenting	voices	within	the	AWU.	As	we	have	
seen	 in	 previous	 chapters,	 Boote	 used	 the	 Australian	 Worker	 as	 his	 personal	
propaganda	instrument.	He	was	not	really	interested	in	member	opinion	if	it	did	not	
agree	with	his	own.	Nor	was	he	interested	in	facilitating	a	membership	debate	on	the	
issue	and	letting	members	make	up	their	own	minds.	He	believed	he	knew	what	was	
best	for	AWU	members	and	the	working	class	more	broadly.	
	
Power	within	the	AWU	
As	 demonstrated	 in	 the	 previous	 chapters,	 by	 the	 late	 1890s	 the	 AWU	 was	 an	
undemocratic	oligarchy	both	federally	and	within	each	individual	branch.	Therefore	
the	opinions	of	the	100,000	members	did	not	have	much	influence	on	the	debate	in	
1916.	But	it	is	not	enough	to	simply	say	the	AWU	was	an	oligarchy;	we	need	to	know	
what	type	of	oligarchy	it	was	in	order	to	know	exactly	which	union	officials	decided	
whether	the	union	would	support	conscription.	
	
As	we	saw	 in	 the	previous	chapter,	branches	each	had	one	representative	on	 the	
executive	council	and	a	maximum	of	three	convention	delegates.	This	meant	that	no	
one	branch	or	official	could	control	the	union	alone.	Instead,	it	was	governed	by	a	
majority	coalition	group	of	leading	officials	from	the	various	branches	who	sat	on	the	
executive	 council.	 The	 union	 was	 therefore	 a	 “collegial	 oligarchy”:	 a	 collective	
oligarchic	 leadership	 in	which	power	 is	shared	equally	amongst	a	central	group	of	
leaders.	
	
So	who	were	these	leaders?	There	 was	 the	 national	 general	 secretary	 and	 former	
secretary	of	the	Victoria-Riverina	Branch,	Edward	Grayndler;	national	president	and	
former	secretary	of	the	Victoria-Riverina	Branch,	John	Barnes;	NSW	Central	Branch	
president,	Jack	Bailey;	NSW	Central	Branch	secretary,	William	Lambert;	Queensland	
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Branch	secretary,	William	Dunstan;	Queensland	Branch	president,	William	Riordan	
and	 Adelaide	 Branch	 secretary,	 Frank	 Lundie. 41 	These	 seven	 men	 opposed	
conscription,	so	the	AWU	opposed	conscription.	
	
Most	of	the	seven	did	not	publicly	provide	their	arguments	against	conscription	but	
left	that	to	the	Worker	newspapers.	Grayndler	was	an	exception	and	said:	“I	hope	
the	 representatives	 of	 Labor	 everywhere	will	 prove	 loyal	 to	 the	 trust	 reposed	 in	
them,	and	will	throw	themselves	vigorously	into	this	fight	for	the	preservation	of	our	
civil	liberties	now	threatened	by	military	domination.	It	now	devolves	upon	us	to	save	
Australia	 from	 the	 impending	 evil	 of	militarism”.42	Presumably	 each	 of	 the	 other	
AWU	 leaders	 opposed	 conscription	 for	 a	 combination	 of	 the	 various	 reasons	 I	
discussed	earlier.	They	also	thought	conscription	could	seriously	weaken	the	AWU	
which	would	have	endangered	their	positions.	More	cynically,	conscription	provided	
the	officials	with	an	ideal	issue	on	which	to	fight	the	politicians	and	win	control	of	the	
Labor	 Party,	 especially	 in	 NSW	 where	 their	 Industrial	 Section	 was	 solidifying	 its	
control	of	the	party.	They	might	also	have	seen	the	developing	conscription	split	as	
their	chance	to	get	into	parliament,	which	most	of	them	subsequently	did.43	
	
The	executive	council	quickly	removed	Spence	and	Lamond	from	their	positions.	This	
is	typical	of	the	AWU’s	hard	majoritarian	view	of	democracy	which	did	not	tolerate	
dissent	from	the	majority	view	on	any	issue.	Spence	was	by	this	time	the	grand	old	
man	of	the	AWU.	He	was	70	years	old	and	ill	but	he	had	still	been	elected	president	
for	 1916	 by	membership	 vote	 and	was	 a	 Labor	member	 of	 the	 federal	 House	 of	
Representatives.	The	AWU	leaders	unconvincingly	alleged	that	Lamond	and	Hughes	
had	 somehow	 tricked	 Spence	 into	 supporting	 conscription.44	On	 the	 other	 hand,	
Hughes	said	of	Spence,	“I	have	fought	for	unionism	myself	all	my	life,	and	I	say	that	I	
would	rather	a	thousand	times	stand	by	the	side	of	this	venerable	and	great	leader	
																																								 																				
41	Ernest	Henry	Lane,	Dawn	to	dusk:	reminiscences	of	a	rebel	(Brisbane:	William	Brooks,	1939):	158,	
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101,	114,	158.	
42	“Some	Labor	opinions,”	AW	7	September	1916,	17.	
43	Don	Rawson,	"The	Organisation	of	the	Australian	Labor	Party	1916-1941"	(University	of	
Melbourne	1954):	14.	
44	Lansbury,	"William	Guthrie	Spence,"	10.	
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of	unionism,	expelled	from	the	organisation	which	he	founded,	than	with	those	men	
who,	abusing	the	great	power	vested	in	them,	have	driven	out	their	leader,	whose	
only	crime	is	patriotism”.45	
	
It	is	entirely	possible	that	other	AWU	officials	also	supported	conscription	but	chose	
to	stay	silent	because	they	knew	what	happened	to	dissenters.	The	SMH	reported	
that	“it	is	understood	that	all	officers	of	the	AWU	who	support	the	Prime	Minister	in	
the	forthcoming	campaign	on	conscription	will	share	the	same	fate	as	Mr	Spence”.46	
This	is	a	further	example	of	the	lack	of	free	speech	within	the	AWU.	The	executive	
council	did	not	allow	officials	to	promote	an	opinion	contrary	to	official	policy	even	
on	 external	 non-union	matters	 such	 as	 conscription.	 The	 lack	 of	 local	 autonomy	
within	the	union	meant	that	there	were	no	independent	local	leaderships	to	lead	a	
pro-conscription	argument	within	the	union.	
	
As	we	 saw	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 at	 this	 time	 the	 collegial	 oligarchy	was	 being	
challenged	 by	 radical	 officials	 from	 the	Western	 Branch	 such	 as	 Cullinan	 and	 by	
dissenters	in	the	Queensland	Branch	such	as	Ernest	Lane.	These	officials	led	the	anti-
conscription	 motion	 at	 the	 1916	 Annual	 Convention.	 The	 majority	 conservative	
faction	 agreed	 with	 the	 radicals	 on	 opposing	 conscription,	 a	 rare	 example	 of	
unanimity.	But	this	unanimity	probably	did	not	affect	the	outcome.	The	decision	was	
up	to	the	conservative	majority	group.	Given	their	lack	of	success	in	any	of	the	many	
conflicts	with	the	ruling	group,	it	seems	unlikely	that	the	radicals	could	have	won	on	
conscription.	
	
In	many	trade	unions	at	the	time,	especially	in	the	United	States,	the	president	had	
supreme	power,	was	almost	impossible	to	remove	and	ruled	the	union	essentially	as	
a	 dictator.	 Edelstein	 and	Warner	 label	 this	 type	 of	 oligarchy	 as	 a	 “simple	 official	
hierarchy”.	The	AWU	changed	into	a	simple	official	hierarchy	in	the	1930s	under	the	
dictatorship	of	Queensland	Branch	secretary	Clarrie	Fallon.	If	this	had	occurred	prior	
to	1916	with	Spence	as	dictator	then	his	support	for	conscription	would	have	decided	
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the	issue,	the	AWU	may	have	been	a	leading	force	in	the	campaign	for	conscription	
and	the	“yes”	vote	may	well	have	won.	But	 in	1916	the	union	was	still	a	collegial	
oligarchy,	so	neither	President	Spence	nor	any	other	individual	had	supreme	power.	
	
As	manager	of	the	Australian	Worker,	Lamond	controlled	the	newspaper	on	a	day-
to-day	basis.	But	ultimate	control	rested	once	again	with	the	collegial	oligarchy.	The	
secretaries	of	the	union’s	southern	branches	formed	the	Australian	Worker	board	of	
control.	According	to	the	union	rules,	the	board	of	control	had	complete	power	over	
“the	manager	and	editor	in	regard	to	management,	policy	of	the	paper,	and	all	other	
matters”. 47 	The	 board	 of	 control	 forced	 Lamond	 to	 resign	 and	 appointed	 the	
Australian	Worker’s	anti-conscriptionist	editor	Henry	Boote	as	acting	manager.	Boote	
and	 the	Australian	Worker	 then	 executed	 one	 of	 the	 great	 political	 campaigns	 in	
Australian	history.	
	
Conclusion		
We	 simply	 do	 not	 know	 the	 proportion	 of	 AWU	 members	 who	 supported	
conscription	 in	 1916.	 But	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 AWU	 was	 an	 oligarchy	 means	 that	
membership	opinion	had	little	influence	on	the	union’s	stance.	The	type	of	oligarchy	
that	existed	within	the	union	in	1916	determined	exactly	which	officials	decided	the	
issue.	 The	 union	 was	 a	 collegial	 oligarchy	 so	 the	 issue	 was	 not	 decided	 by	 the	
president,	nor	by	the	manager	of	the	union	newspaper,	nor	by	the	radical	minority	
faction,	but	by	the	majority	coalition	of	branch	leaders.	Trade	union	oligarchy,	like	
everything,	has	complicated	effects.	In	this	case	the	AWU’s	collegial	oligarchy	helped	
to	save	thousands	of	Australian	men	from	the	horror	of	the	Western	Front.	
	
The	AWU’s	key	role	in	the	campaign	against	conscription	became	an	important	part	
of	 the	union’s	mythology	and	AWU	officials	 frequently	 cited	 it	 over	 the	 following	
decades	as	one	of	the	union’s	great	achievements.	At	the	AWU’s	50th	anniversary	in	
1936,	NSW	Branch	Secretary	John	McNeill	said	“if	the	AWU	never	did	anything	other	
than	 that	 great	 and	glorious	 fight	 it	 put	up	 in	1916-17”	against	 conscription,	 that	
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would	 “be	 sufficient”.48		Many	militant	 AWU	members	 no	 doubt	 joked	 that	 their	
oligarchical	union	never	had	done	anything	else	worthwhile,	which	is	why	the	officials	
kept	rekindling	memories	of	this	particular	triumph.	
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CHAPTER	IV	
Foundations	of	Democracy:	The	Miners	Federation	
Throughout	 the	 interwar	 period,	 the	 Miners	 Federation	 was	 one	 of	 the	 most	
influential	 trade	 unions	 in	 New	 South	 Wales	 and	 Australia.	 It	 was	 also	 highly	
democratic.	This	chapter	and	the	next	examine	how	and	why	this	was	the	case	by	
studying	the	miners	and	their	unions	from	the	nineteenth	century	through	to	1939.		
Once	again,	the	seven	key	requirements	for	union	democracy	provide	my	framework.	
In	this	chapter	 I	examine	the	miners’	occupational	community,	rules,	membership	
decision-making,	organised	opposition,	equality	between	members	and	officials	and	
free	communication.	Chapter	five	then	focuses	on	local	autonomy	and	the	miners’	
crucial	 shift	 from	 local	democratic	community	 to	national	democratic	community.	
Comparison	with	 the	AWU	assists	 in	 identifying	 the	 factors	 that	made	the	Miners	
Federation	a	democratic	exception	to	the	oligarchic	norm.	
	
Like	 the	AWU,	the	Miners	Federation	had	a	centralised	constitution	and	a	culture	
that	 contained	 tensions	 between	 solidarity	 and	 egalitarianism	 on	 one	 side	 and	
competitiveness,	 hierarchy	 and	 aspirationalism	 on	 the	 other	 side.	 The	 most	
important	 difference	 was	 that	 miners	 worked	 and	 lived	 together	 in	 strong,	
permanent	 occupational	 communities.	 They	 lived	 with	 their	 families	 and	 their	
residential	neighbourhoods	were	usually	segregated	and	often	isolated.	The	dangers	
of	mining	further	encouraged	unity.	Arbitration	undermined	miners’	democracy	but	
this	was	 less	pronounced	than	 in	the	AWU,	as	the	miners	maintained	a	contested	
relationship	with	arbitration	and	continued	to	use	strikes.	Meanwhile,	ALP	affiliation	
had	mixed	effects	for	Miners	Federation	democracy	as	it	had	for	the	AWU.	
	
Historiography	
There	 is	 a	 historical	 consensus	 that	 the	Miners	 Federation	 was	 one	 of	 the	most	
democratic	unions	in	Australia	in	the	interwar	period.	Yet	the	literature	provides	little	
detailed	analysis	of	how	or	why	 this	was	 the	 case.1	There	have	been	 two	general	
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"Trade	Union	Democracy	and	the	Labor	Party	in	NSW	1880-1914,"	Historical	Studies	22,	no.	86	
(1986):	78-79;	Robin	Gollan,	The	Coalminers	Coal	Miners	of	New	South	Wales:	A	History	of	the	Union,	
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histories	of	the	Miners	Federation;	in	1963,	Robin	Gollan	published	The	Coalminers	
of	NSW,	and	in	1970,	Edgar	Ross,	Common	Cause	editor	from	1935	to	1966,	published	
the	 union’s	 official	History	 of	 the	Miners	 Federation.	Both	 authors	 provide	 useful	
narrative	and	inevitably	touch	on	the	union’s	internal	politics,	but	neither	offers	any	
sustained	 analysis	 or	 theoretical	 engagement.	 Marxist	 theory	 implicitly	 underlies	
both	 works	 and	 both	 historians	 tacitly	 argue	 against	Michels	 by	 contending	 that	
members	 placed	 important	 limits	 on	 officials.	 They	 also	 argue	 that	 the	 Miners	
Federation	was	 democratic	 and	 that	 the	 primary	 reason	 for	 this	was	 the	miners’	
strong	 communities.	 I	 expand	 on	 this	 argument	 with	 detailed	 analysis	 and	
comparison	with	the	AWU.2	
	
Unlike	the	rest	of	the	historiography,	Andrew	Metcalfe’s	history	of	the	lower	Hunter	
Valley	coalfields	in	the	Northern	NSW	District	from	1900	to	1960	is	highly	theoretical.	
He	devotes	some	attention	to	internal	democracy	within	the	Miners	Federation	and	
engages	with	some	of	the	organisational	theory.	Metcalfe	argues,	counter	to	Michels,	
that	oligarchy	was	a	strong	tendency	in	the	Miners	Federation	but	not	an	“iron	law”:	
The	iron	law	was	only	a	tendency	in	coalfields	politics,	tempered	in	significant	
and	historically	variable	ways	by,	for	example,	the	democratic	processes	 in	
the	Federation,	 the	persistence	of	organisationally	unsanctioned	modes	of	
practice,	the	organisational	looseness	of	the	ALP	and	Miners	Federation	and	
the	electoral	competition	between	the	group	of	leaders.3	
Nevertheless,	 he	 adopts	Michels’	 and	 Vladamir	 Lenin’s	 criticisms	 of	 regional	 and	
national	union	leaders	and	cites	them	frequently.4	He	argues	that	“pit	top	meetings	
were	a	prime	site	of	…	tension	for	while	rank	and	file	miners	saw	their	 leaders	as	
would-be	autocrats,	 the	 latter	 saw	members	as	 a	 challenge	 to	be	mastered”.5	He	
concludes	 in	 Michelsian	 terms	 that	 the	 miners	 “developed	 organisations	 which	
alienated	members	from	leaders	and	reconstituted	elements	of	the	seriality	of	class	
being	in	union	membership”.6	By	reconstituting	the	“seriality	of	class	being	in	union	
																																								 																				
1860-1960		(Parkville:	Melbourne	University	Press,	1963):	166;	Tom	O'Lincoln,	"The	militant	
minority:	Organising	rank	and	file	workers	in	the	thirties,”	Socialist	Action	(1986).	
2	Ibid.	
3Andrew	Metcalfe,	For	Freedom	and	Dignity:	Historical	Agency	and	Class	Structures	in	the	Coalfields	
of	N.S.W.		(Sydney:	Allen	&	Unwin,	1988):	191.	
4	Ibid.,	123.	
5	Ibid.,	89.	
6	Ibid.,	192.	
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membership”	he	is	referring	to	what	he	argues	was	the	union’s	deliberate	neglect	of	
the	non-faceworkers	to	the	advantage	of	the	faceworkers.	So	while	he	acknowledges	
that	oligarchy	was	a	tendency	and	not	an	iron	law,	his	analysis	is	not	far	from	that	of	
Michels	and	he	is	critical	of	Miners	Federation	democracy.	
By	 contrast,	 I	 will	 argue	 in	 line	 with	 the	 earlier	 historiography	 that	 the	 Miners	
Federation	 was	 highly	 democratic.	 Metcalfe	 holds	 the	 union	 to	 an	 unrealistic	
standard	 of	 democracy	 and	 then	 finds	 it	 wanting.	 It	 could	 be	 argued	 that,	 after	
studying	the	AWU	in	the	previous	two	chapters,	anything	would	look	democratic	by	
comparison.	But	it	is	precisely	because	this	thesis	is	comparative,	and	informed	by	
the	extensive	international	literature	on	trade	union	democracy,	that	we	have	seen	
how	rare	union	democracy	is	and	how	difficult	it	is	to	achieve.	With	this	knowledge	
we	 will	 see	 that,	 despite	 its	 flaws,	 the	 Miners	 Federation	 was	 impressively	
democratic.	
	
A	short	history	of	the	Miners	Federation	from	1915	to	1939	
The	 Miners	 Federation,	 officially	 the	 Australasian	 Coal	 and	 Shale	 Employees’	
Federation,	formed	in	1915.	Throughout	the	interwar	period	it	was	one	of	Australia’s	
most	 militant	 unions	 but	 its	 industrial	 success	 was	 limited	 by	 the	 oversupply	 of	
mining	labour.	The	Miners	Federation	was	the	amalgamation	of	regional	coal	mining	
unions	 in	Northern,	Southern	and	Western	New	South	Wales	 (NSW),	Queensland,	
Victoria	and	Tasmania.7	In	1916	the	NSW	coke	workers	joined	and	the	following	year	
the	Broken	Hill	metal	miners	 joined.8	Each	of	 the	 regional	mining	unions	became	
districts	of	the	Miners	Federation,	the	middle	tier	in	the	three	tiers	of	government:	
national,	district	and	 local	 lodge.	The	NSW	coalminers	are	 the	main	 focus	here	as	
they	made	up	a	large	majority	of	members	and	were	the	most	heavily	involved	in	the	
NSW	 Labor	 Party.	 The	 Broken	 Hill	 metal	 miners	 were	 geographically	 closer	 to	
Adelaide	than	Sydney	and	largely	independent	of	both.	Moreover,	they	already	have	
																																								 																				
7	Edgar	Ross,	A	History	of	the	Miners	Federation	of	Australia		(Sydney:	Australasian	Coal	and	Shale	
Employees’	Federation,	1970):	1.	
8	Ibid.	
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an	 extensive	 labour	 historiography.9 	Broken	 Hill	 miners	 are	 included	 in	 statistics	
unless	stated	otherwise.	
	
The	 Miners	 Federation	 was	 the	 most	 politically	 and	 industrially	 influential	 trade	
union	in	NSW	for	most	of	the	interwar	period.10	While	the	AWU	was	more	powerful	
nationally,	in	NSW	it	had	failed	in	its	aspirations	to	dominate	the	labour	movement	
as	 it	did	in	Queensland.	By	1922	around	80	per	cent	of	eligible	mineworkers	were	
Federation	members,	giving	it	20,000	members	divided	amongst	141	local	lodges.11	
This	membership	 number	 remained	 stable	 until	 1939.	 Australia’s	 coal	 production	
peaked	early	in	the	period	in	1913	at	12.5	million	tonnes,	10.5	million	tonnes	from	
NSW,	before	the	First	World	War	destroyed	Australia’s	coal	export	trade.12	Initially	
the	 Miners	 Federation	 tried	 to	 enrol	 skilled	 workers	 who	 worked	 alongside	 the	
miners	such	as	engineers,	but	this	was	unsuccessful	and	the	union	soon	looked	to	
cooperate	with	the	mining	craft	unions.13	
	
Miners	occupied	a	potentially	powerful	position	because	coal	was	so	crucial	to	the	
economy,	fuelling	industry,	railways,	electricity	and	household	cooking	and	heating.	
An	editorial	from	the	conservative	Sydney	Morning	Herald,	with	the	miners	in	view,	
bemoaned	 “the	 tendency	 of	 one	 section	 of	 the	 working	 men	 with	 an	 economic	
advantage	to	hold	a	pistol	at	the	heads	of	the	rest	of	the	community”.14	But	economic	
conditions	 and	 technological	 advancements	 nullified	 the	 miners’	 strong	 position.	
Australian	coalmining	declined	during	the	First	World	War,	and	unlike	most	industries	
it	 did	 not	 improve	 in	 the	 1920s,	 before	 declining	 even	 further	 during	 the	 Great	
Depression.15	Prior	to	the	First	World	War	Australia	had	exported	one	third	of	its	coal.	
The	war	destroyed	this	trade	and	until	the	Second	World	War	there	was	a	massive	
oversupply	 of	 coal	 and	 coalminers.16 	Gradual	 technological	 advances	 also	 meant	
																																								 																				
9	See	for	example	Julie	Kimber,	"'A	Case	of	Mild	Anarchy?':	Job	Committees	in	the	Broken	Hill	Mines,	
c1930	to	c1954,"	Labour	History	80(2001).	
10	Ross,	A	History	of	the	Miners	Federation	of	Australia:	4.	
11	“The	ballots,”	CC	27	January	1922,	4;	“Industrial	matters,”	Newcastle	Herald	6	April	1922,	5.	
12	Gollan,	The	Coalminers	Coal	Miners	of	New	South	Wales:	A	History	of	the	Union,	1860-1960:	137.	
13	Ross,	A	History	of	the	Miners	Federation	of	Australia:	311.	
14	Editorial,	“Industrial	peace,”	SMH	4	April	1922,	8.	
15	Gollan,	The	Coalminers	Coal	Miners	of	New	South	Wales:	A	History	of	the	Union,	1860-1960:	157.	
16	Ibid.,	11.	
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fewer	miners	were	needed	to	win	the	same	amount	of	coal.	Mining	unemployment	
was	part	of	a	broader	structural	unemployment	that	existed	in	Australia	from	1890	
to	1940.	
	
Most	 of	 the	 Miners	 Federation’s	 money	 came	 from	 compulsory	 levies	 taken	 in	
addition	to	membership	fees.	If	levies	are	included,	the	Miners	Federation	had	the	
highest	membership	fees	of	any	Australian	trade	union,	up	to	£30	per	year,	or	10	to	
15	per	cent	of	full-time	income.17	The	Northern	District	of	NSW	was	easily	the	largest	
in	membership	 and	 coal	 output,	 and	provided	 around	60	per	 cent	 of	 the	 union’s	
funds.18 	By	 the	 late	 1930s	 the	 North	 produced	 6.3	 million	 tonnes	 per	 year,	 the	
Southern	NSW	District	1.8	million	and	the	Western	NSW	District	1.4	million.19	
	
The	 top	 leadership	 of	 the	Miners	 Federation	was	 stable	 throughout	 the	 interwar	
period,	with	only	four	general	secretaries	and	three	presidents.	Jack	Baddeley	was	
the	founding	President	(1915-21)	followed	by	Dan	Rees	(1922-34)	and	then	Charlie	
Nelson	(1934-41).	Albert	Willis	was	General	Secretary	from	1915	to	1925,	followed	
by	 Arthur	 Teece	 (1925-26	 and	 1931-33),	 Dai	 Davies	 (1926-31)	 and	 Bill	 Orr	 1934-
1940). 20 	This	 is	 a	 similar	 level	 of	 leadership	 stability	 as	 the	 AWU	 and	 suggests	
oligarchy,	 but	 we	 will	 see	 that	 in	 the	 Miners	 Federation	 it	 was	 caused	 not	 by	
oligarchy,	but	by	membership	loyalty	and	satisfaction	with	the	leaders.	
	
Willis	was	highly	intelligent	and	unusually	well-educated	for	a	miner.	Born	in	1876	in	
Wales,	he	began	working	in	the	mines	at	10	years	old	while	continuing	his	schooling	
and	then	attended	university	on	a	bursary	at	London	Labour	College,	Ruskin	College,	
Oxford	University	and	King’s	College,	University	of	London.	He	was	a	mining	union	
official	in	Wales	before	emigrating	to	Australia	in	1911	where	he	quickly	rose	through	
the	ranks	of	the	Illawarra	Miners	Association,	becoming	acting	secretary	in	1913	and	
then	president.	A	Nonconformist	Protestant	and	lay	preacher,	he	received	much	of	
																																								 																				
17	“Union	bosses,”	SMH	27	March	1930,	10.	
18	“Balance	sheet,”	CC	17	February	1922,	6.	
19	“Last	year’s	coal	production,”	CC	11	March	1939,	3.	
20	The	Miners	Federation	of	Australia:	50th	Anniversary,			(Sydney:	ACSEF,	1965).	2.	
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his	initial	support	from	the	Illawarra’s	large	population	of	Nonconformist	miners	of	
Welsh	heritage.	He	was	a	guild	socialist	who	supported	decentralised	association	and	
participatory	rank-and-file	democracy.21	Baddeley,	meanwhile,	was	born	in	1881	in	
England	and	came	to	Australia	as	a	child.	He	began	working	around	collieries	in	the	
Northern	NSW	district	at	11	and	became	a	miner	at	16.	He	was	well	known	as	a	great	
cricketer	and	first	grade	footballer	and	was	elected	president	of	the	Northern	miners’	
union	 in	 1914.	 Initially	 a	 militant	 socialist	 who	 advocated	 strikes	 and	 criticised	
capitalism,	over	the	decades	he	became	increasingly	conservative	in	his	labourism.22	
	
Figure	19	The	first	Miners	Federation	Central	Council	in	1915.	John	(Jack)	Baddeley	is	
in	the	centre	of	the	front	row	and	Albert	Willis	is	next	to	him,	second	from	the	left	in	
the	front	row.23	
	
The	Miners	 Federation	 had	 a	 tumultuous	 relationship	with	 the	NSW	 Labor	 Party,	
frequently	 disaffiliating	 and	 reaffiliating. 24 	In	 1917,	 against	 the	 advice	 of	 the	
leadership,	the	miners	participated	in	the	massive	but	unsuccessful	General	Strike	in	
NSW.	In	response	to	the	failed	strike,	Willis	and	others	led	the	push	for	all	unions	to	
																																								 																				
21	Frank	Farrell,	"Albert	Willis,"	Australian	Dictionary	of	Biography	12(1990).	
22	Frank	Farrell,	"John	Baddeley,"	Australian	Dictionary	of	Biography	7(1979).	
23	Miners	Federation	of	Australia	Fiftieth	Anniversary,	(Sydney:	Miners	Federation	1965),	2.	
24	Ross,	A	History	of	the	Miners	Federation	of	Australia:	200.	
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combine	into	One	Big	Union	(OBU).	At	the	1919	NSW	Labor	Party	Annual	Conference	
the	miners	led	a	militant	faction	which	tried	to	introduce	the	OBU	into	Labor	Party	
policy.	When	they	narrowly	failed,	Willis	led	the	miners	out	of	the	ALP	and	into	the	
short-lived	Industrial	Socialist	Labour	Party.	The	Labor	Council	then	founded	an	OBU	
called	 the	 Workers	 Industrial	 Union	 of	 Australia	 (WIUA).	 Even	 though	 it	 was	
ultimately	 the	 only	 union	 that	 joined	 this	 OBU,	 from	 1	 January	 1921	 the	Miners	
Federation	changed	its	name	to	the	Mining	Department	of	the	WIUA.25	
	
In	the	early	1920s,	the	NSW	districts	of	the	Miners	Federation	reaffiliated	with	the	
NSW	Labor	Party	and,	under	the	leadership	of	Willis	and	Baddeley,	the	union	moved	
away	 from	 its	 dissident	 radicalism	and	 took	 a	 leading	 role	 in	 the	 party.	 Baddeley	
resigned	 as	Miners	 Federation	 president	 and	won	 the	 state	 seat	 of	 Cessnock	 for	
Labor,	 becoming	 Minister	 for	 Mines	 and	 then	 Deputy	 NSW	 Premier	 under	 Jack	
Lang.26	Lang	nominated	Willis	to	the	Legislative	Council	in	1925	and	made	him	vice-
president	of	the	Executive	Council	from	1925	to	1927	and	1930	to	1931.27	The	Miners	
Federation	had	 founded	 its	national	newspaper,	Common	Cause,	 in	 July	1921.28	It	
lasted	four	years	as	a	stand-alone	paper	before	becoming	a	supplement	to	the	NSW	
Labor	Party’s	official	newspaper,	the	Labor	Daily,	of	which	the	Miners	Federation	was	
the	chief	financier	and	Willis	the	founder	and	Managing	Director.29	
	
By	 1925	 unemployment	 and	 underemployment	 of	 miners	 was	 an	 ever-growing	
problem.30	There	was	growing	dissatisfaction	and	militancy	amongst	the	miners	and	
in	 1926	 the	 CPA	 introduced	 its	Militant	Minority	Movement,	 from	1931	Minority	
Movement	 (MM),	 to	 the	coalfields.31	When	Northern	NSW	coalowners	demanded	
huge	wage	reductions	and	locked	out	coalminers	in	1929,	10,000	men	were	out	of	
work	for	16	months.32	The	strength	of	the	MM	grew	immensely	during	the	lockout	
																																								 																				
25	Gollan,	The	Coalminers	Coal	Miners	of	New	South	Wales:	A	History	of	the	Union,	1860-1960:	166.	
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29	Ibid.	
30	Ross,	A	History	of	the	Miners	Federation	of	Australia:	326.	
31	Gollan,	The	Coalminers	Coal	Miners	of	New	South	Wales:	A	History	of	the	Union,	1860-1960:	184.	
32	Ibid.,	189.	
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as	 did	 dissatisfaction	with	 the	Miners	 Federation	 officials	 and,	 as	 a	 result,	 a	 rival	
Communist	leadership	emerged.33	The	most	prominent	of	these	Communist	leaders	
were	 the	 Scotsmen,	 Orr	 and	 Nelson,	 who	 had	 been	MM	 leaders	 in	 the	Western	
District.34	
When	he	was	a	MM	organiser	in	the	late	1920s	Orr	rode	his	motorbike	to	visit	nearly	
every	mine	in	NSW.35	In	1934	he	was	elected	secretary	and	Nelson	became	president.	
The	Miners	 Federation	 was	 the	 first	 major	 trade	 union	 with	 a	 Communist	 Party	
leadership.	 This	 was	 part	 of	 the	 rising	 influence	 of	 the	MM	 and	 CPA	which	won	
leadership	of	other	prominent	unions	in	the	1930s	such	as	the	Australian	Railways	
Union	(ARU).	Orr	had	been	born	in	Scotland	in	1900	and	began	working	in	the	mines	
at	nine	years	old.	He	then	served	as	a	soldier	in	the	First	World	War	before	emigrating	
to	Australia	and	working	as	a	miner	at	Lithgow.	In	the	late	1920s	he	attended	Nelson’s	
Marxist	study	groups	and	became	involved	in	the	Unemployed	Workers'	Movement,	
the	Mineworkers	Council	of	Action	and	 the	MM.	By	1939	an	overworked	Orr	had	
begun	to	succumb	to	alcoholism	and	he	retired	sick	in	November	1940.36		
Nelson	had	been	born	 in	1896	 in	Scotland,	began	working	 in	 the	mines	at	13	and	
emigrated	to	Australia	in	1914.	He	worked	in	railway	construction	and	was	a	member	
of	the	Industrial	Workers	of	the	World	(IWW)	in	1916	and	1917.	In	1925	he	began	
work	at	the	government	coal	mine	at	Lithgow	where	he	joined	the	CPA	and	MM	and	
became	 president	 of	 the	 Lithgow	 miners	 lodge	 in	 1931.	 He	 served	 as	 Miners	
Federation	president	from	1934	until	he	was	narrowly	defeated	in	the	1941	ballot	by	
fellow	Communist	Harold	Wells.37	
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Figure	20	William	(Bill)	Orr	and	Charles	(Charlie)	Nelson.38	
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In	the	early	1930s	the	relationship	between	the	Miners	Federation	and	Lang	began	
to	sour.	Lang	had	outmanoeuvred	Willis	and	the	two	became	bitter	enemies.	The	
Inner	Group’s	control	of	the	Labor	Daily	caused	the	Miners	Federation	to	break	with	
the	paper	in	1935	and	reintroduce	Common	Cause	as	a	stand-alone	publication.	The	
relationship	became	even	more	rancorous	under	the	Communist	leadership	and	Lang	
and	his	allies	 tried	unsuccessfully	 to	depose	Orr	and	Nelson	 in	Miners	Federation	
elections.	The	Miners	Federation	thereby	became	one	of	the	first	unions	in	which	the	
Labor	Party	leadership	openly	tried	to	replace	a	union	leadership,	a	precursor	to	the	
activities	of	the	Industrial	Groups	of	the	late	1940s	and	1950s.	The	Miners	Federation	
was	a	 leading	 force	 in	 the	opposition	 coalition	 that	 finally	defeated	 Lang	and	 the	
Inner	Group	in	1939.39	
Ideology	in	the	Miners	Federation	
Almost	 all	 Miners	 Federation	 officials	 identified	 as	 “militants”.	 Common	 Cause	
defined	a	militant	as	“one	who	wishes	to	see	something	done	instead	of	being	merely	
talked	 about”.40	More	 specifically,	militancy	meant	 advocating	 industrial	 action	 in	
addition	to,	or	instead	of,	arbitration	and	political	action.	Some	officials	were	militant	
reformists	while	others	were	radicals	who	embraced	various	forms	of	socialism	and	
anti-capitalism.	 The	 union’s	 official	 position	 throughout	 the	 period	 was	 against	
capitalism	 and	 for	 its	 replacement	 by	 a	 system	 of	 collective	 ownership.	 Miners	
Federation	 leaders	 and	 coalfields	 politicians	 openly	 condemned	 capitalism	 and	
employers.	In	practical	terms,	the	abolition	of	capitalism	would	be	achieved	through	
raising	working-class	consciousness	and	struggle,	industrial	unionism	and	industrial	
democracy,	which	occurs	when	workers	govern	their	workplaces.41	In	1926	Willis’s	
private	secretary,	Emil	Voigt,	wrote	a	five-part	series	of	articles	for	Common	Cause	
advocating	employee	management	of	workplaces	 through	 industrial	democracy.42	
The	Miners	Federation	also	called	for	the	nationalisation	of	all	coal	mines.43	
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In	1908	the	IWW	had	started	clubs	on	the	NSW	coalfields	which	were	instrumental	
in	the	successful	1916	miners’	strike	shortly	before	the	government	supressed	the	
IWW.44	Tom	“Bondy”	Hoare	was	one	of	the	founders	of	the	IWW	clubs	in	the	Hunter	
Valley	 and	 went	 on	 to	 become	 long-time	 Northern	 District	 President	 as	 a	 non-
Communist	radical	socialist	.45	The	Miners	Federation’s	official	history	recalled	Hoare	
as	“one	of	the	most	colourful	of	Federation	 leaders”.	“Stories	about	his	marathon	
speeches	are	 legendary”,	 it	 said,	and	“he	often	spoke	 literally	 for	hours	at	a	 time	
divesting	himself	of	more	and	more	of	his	clothing	as	he	warmed	to	his	task	of	driving	
home	the	lessons	of	the	class	struggle”.46	
It	 is	 difficult	 to	 say	 how	 widespread	 these	 militant	 and	 radical	 sentiments	 were	
amongst	the	ordinary	members.	Certainly,	some	members	were	not	anti-capitalist	
nor	even	militant,	and	a	few	complained	openly	about	the	organisation’s	radicalism.	
These	members	simply	wanted	to	improve	their	lot	by	working	hard	for	fair	wages	
and	conditions,	similar	to	the	ethos	of	the	AWU.	At	the	same	time,	however,	a	large	
majority	of	miners	frequently	participated	in	strikes,	thousands	joined	organisations	
like	the	IWW	and	MM,	and	radicals	like	Hoare	achieved	continued	success	in	union	
elections.	This	suggests	that	sympathy	for	radicalism	was	widespread	amongst	the	
membership	or,	at	the	very	least,	that	most	members	believed	that	radicals	made	
effective	union	officials.	
	
The	election	of	Orr	and	Nelson	resulted	primarily	from	their	militant	and	pragmatic	
focus	on	the	miners’	wages	and	conditions	and	not	 from	majority	support	 for	 the	
CPA. 47 	Nevertheless,	 after	 1934	 the	 Miners	 Federation’s	 anti-capitalism	 became	
more	explicitly	Communist;	the	members	elected	a	“representative	for	Soviet	Russia”	
in	each	annual	election.	Common	Cause	stressed	that	members	must	“honour	the	
leaders	of	Eureka	and	the	Russian	Revolution”	and	that	the	union	was	a	revolutionary	
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organisation:	“our	organisation	[is]	something	more	than	mechanism	for	collective	
bargaining	with	the	coalowners;	it	proclaims	us	as	revolutionaries!”48	
	
From	its	formation,	the	Miners	Federation	had	viewed	arbitration	with	suspicion.	In	
1929	Willis	said	to	other	trade	union	leaders:	
When	you	went	into	the	Arbitration	Court	you	put	your	heads	into	the	jaws	
of	the	machine.	You	knew	what	you	were	doing,	but	you	did	it,	and	now	you	
are	groaning	and	complaining	because	the	machine	is	crushing	you.	You	will	
be	simply	crushed	one	after	another.49	
In	the	1930s	this	criticism	became	even	more	pronounced.	The	union	condemned	
arbitration	as	pro-employer	and	as	weakening	union	organising	and	militancy.50	In	
1937	the	Miners	Federation	declared	its	policy	as	being	for	direct	negotiation	with	
owners	and	against	arbitration.51	The	union	frequently	threatened	to	withdraw	from	
arbitration	completely,	but	in	practice	it	continued	to	participate	in	the	arbitration	
courts	throughout	the	1930s.52	Only	the	Broken	Hill	metal	miners	refused	to	register	
with	the	Federal	Arbitration	Court.53	In	1937	Nelson	said	that	throughout	its	history	
the	Miners	Federation	had	been	“nominally	opposed	to	arbitration	and	yet	 it	had	
consistently	participated	in	court	proceedings	of	one	kind	or	another”.	Because	“the	
whole	industry	was	covered	by	awards	or	agreements	registered	in	a	court”	it	was	
“not	 possible	 to	 escape	 entirely	 from	 the	 existing	 legal	 net”. 54 	Communists	
recognised	that	arbitration	imposed	limits	on	their	freedom	of	action	but	Orr	argued	
it	 was	 still	 imperative	 to	 maintain	 militancy	 and	 industrial	 action	 because	 “the	
arbitration	court	would	never	give	them	what	they	were	not	strong	enough	to	take”	
through	strikes.55	
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The	 Miners	 Federation’s	 support	 for	 political	 action	 and	 the	 Labor	 Party	 also	
declined.	In	the	1920s	Willis	and	Baddeley	had	tied	the	union	to	the	NSW	Labor	Party	
and	Lang.	A	1922	change	to	the	Federation	preamble	was	subtle	but	telling,	 from	
pursuing	 its	 goals	 through	 “revolutionary	 industrial	 and	 political	 action”	 to	
“revolutionary	political	and	industrial	action”;	the	political	was	now	in	first	place.56	
But	by	the	mid-1930s	the	Miners	Federation	leadership	was	disillusioned	with	Lang	
and	Labor	and	once	again	stressed	the	limitations	of	political	action.	Orr,	in	line	with	
CPA	policy,	said	that	parliamentary	action	was	one	“form	of	struggle	to	be	used	by	
the	working	class”	but	“was	inadequate	of	itself”.57	Meanwhile	Common	Cause	now	
promoted	 Lenin’s	 analysis	 of	 why	 the	 working	 class	 could	 not	 be	 emancipated	
through	the	ballot	box.58	
	
Mining	masculinity	
Metcalfe	describes	a	“moral	civil	war”	amongst	the	miners	between	“larrikin”	and	
“respectable”	models	 of	 behaviour.59	This	 was	 interconnected	with	 the	 two	 rival	
forms	of	masculinity	we	have	seen	in	previous	chapters.	The	first	larrikin	masculinity	
was	misogynistic	and	hedonistic	celebrating	drinking,	gambling	and	sex.	Glorifying	
wasting	 money	 on	 gambling	 and	 drinking	 made	 a	 virtue	 out	 of	 many	 miners’	
unavoidable	poverty.60	The	responsibilities	of	providing	for	children	and	a	“nagging	
wife”	would	limit	time	and	money	spent	on	hedonistic	activities.	It	would	also	reduce	
the	 miner’s	 autonomy	 by	 removing	 his	 ability	 to	 withdraw	 from	 work	 that	 was	
demeaning	or	dangerous.61	Scorning	marriage	also	made	a	virtue	out	of	a	necessity	
as	 men	 outnumbered	 women	 in	 most	 mining	 areas. 62 	As	 Metcalfe	 argues,	
“aggressive	masculinity	 became	 an	 expression	 of	miners’	 solidarity	 and	misogyny	
could	double	as	a	mark	of	loyalty	to	workmates”.63	
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Privileging	mates	over	wives	and	children	was	also	part	of	a	“hard”	masculinity	that	
frowned	upon	too	much	emotion	or	sentiment.	Doris	Seeton	recalled	her	coalminer	
father	in	the	1930s	in	Lithgow	hiding	his	affection	for	the	pit	horses.	“Although	he	
appeared	to	be	hard,	he	never	let	us	keep	a	pet,	he	wouldn’t	appear	to	like	animals,	
I	think	he	might	have	deep	down.	Because	I	think	he’d	take	an	apple	for	the	horse.	
And	he’d	talk	about	how	the	horse	learned	to	open	his	lunch	tin	and	get	the	apple	
out	[Doris	laughs]”.64	
Responsible	masculinity	tied	in	with	respectable	behaviour.	Responsible	men	were	
providers	for	wives	and	children.	The	Miners	Federation	encouraged	this	view	and	
relief	pay	was	based	on	how	many	children	a	miner	had.	When	on	strike	or	out	of	
work	miners	went	 fishing	and	rabbiting,	asserting	their	masculinity	as	providers.65	
Dolly	 Potter,	 a	 founding	 member	 of	 the	 Women’s	 Auxiliaries,	 remembered	 the	
prevailing	attitude	that	“men	had	their	place	as	breadwinners	and	women	had	their	
place	as	housewives	and	mothers”.66	
	
Both	forms	of	masculinity	celebrated	strength,	bravery	and	hard	work	which	were	
synonymous	with	mining.	Jack	O’Shea	began	mining	in	the	late	1920s	at	Aberdare	
Extended	Colliery	in	Cessnock:		
Well	I	was	proud,	very	proud	…	I	was	going	to	be	a	miner.	That	was	a	real	job.	
A	man’s	job.	To	look	at	me	though	I	wasn’t	the	exact	image	of	a	big	miner.	In	
fact	I	was	the	smallest	bloke	in	the	pit.	I	must	have	weighed	no	more	than	6	
stone	[38kg]	in	a	big	heavy	overcoat.67		
Paradoxically,	 the	danger	of	mining	which	 the	miners	 fought	 so	hard	against	 also	
justified	their	claim	to	be	the	bravest	and	manliest	of	workers.	If	a	miner	worried	too	
much	about	safety	he	was	mocked	as	a	wimp	or	a	whiner.68	McKenzie	recalled	with	
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bravado	that	the	explosives	did	not	need	the	strict	care	required	by	the	safety	rules:	
“it’s	not	safety-wise	and	you	shouldn’t.	But	we	used	to”,	he	said.69	
Like	 in	 the	 AWU,	 disagreements	 were	 settled	 with	 fists.	 Miners	 revered	 sport	
especially	 bruising	 rugby	 league	 and	 boxing.	 In	 the	 1930s	 Lithgow	 had	 ten	 rugby	
league	teams.70	A	miner	recalled	“even	at	work	we	had	these	25	pound	weights	…	
we	used	to	 lift	 these	25	pound	weights	up,	see	who	could	 lift	 them	up	over	 their	
heads	 the	 most”.71 	This	 competitive,	 fighting	 masculinity	 paired	 well	 with	 union	
militancy	in	which	miners	fought	the	bosses	and	would	rather	strike	than	surrender	
their	pride.	McKenzie	believed	that	once	mining	became	completely	mechanised	in	
the	1970s	the	lack	of	physical	work	translated	into	a	“softer”	masculinity	and	a	lack	
of	union	militancy:	“the	coal	industry	now,	last	couple	of	years,	gone	pretty	cushy,	
they’re	pussycats	now.	They	don’t	strike	at	all.”72	
The	miners’	occupational	culture	and	community	
Like	AWU	members,	coalminers	worked	for	piecework	rates.	Where	shearers	were	
paid	per	sheep,	coalminers	were	paid	per	tonne	of	coal.	Contemporary	scholars	such	
as	the	Englishman	G.D.H.	Cole	argued	that	piecework	encouraged	individualism	and	
competition	amongst	workers	which	was	detrimental	to	union	solidarity.	As	we	saw	
in	chapter	one,	this	was	the	case	amongst	shearers	in	the	AWU.	Just	as	the	shearers	
had	their	tally	of	sheep	shorn,	the	miners	had	a	tally	board	of	the	coal	won	by	each	
pair	of	miners.73	A	delegate	to	the	1925	Miners	Federation	convention	observed	that	
piecework	 “breeds	 that	 selfishness	 that	 is	 not	 good	 or	 conducive	 to	 good	
comradeship”. 74 	Like	 the	 AWU,	 the	 miners’	 occupational	 community	 was	 not	
significantly	divided	by	race	or	gender	but	it	was	divided	by	occupation.	The	AWU’s	
early	 occupational	 hierarchy	 was	 between	 shearers	 and	 shedhands	 while	 in	 the	
Miners	Federation	it	was	between	faceworkers	and	non-faceworkers	like	wheelers	
who	used	horses	to	take	skips	full	of	coal	to	the	surface.	
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Figure	21	“Pit	pony”	at	the	Lithgow	Vale	Colliery,	NSW,	21	December	1932.75	
	
As	 in	 the	 AWU,	 the	 miners’	 culture	 contained	 tension	 between	 solidarity	 and	
egalitarianism	on	the	one	hand	and	aspirationalism,	competitiveness	and	hierarchy	
on	the	other.		Unlike	the	AWU,	however,	solidarity	and	egalitarianism	tended	to	win	
out	amongst	 the	miners	and	piecework	and	 stratification	did	not	 lead	 the	miners	
down	the	path	to	oligarchy	as	it	had	in	the	AWU.	A	first	point	of	distinction	is	that	the	
miners	or	 their	parents	had	brought	with	them	from	Britain	a	ready-made	mining	
culture	of	solidarity.76	Mining	was	a	family	affair;	fathers	apprenticed	their	sons	into	
the	mines	 and	often	 an	 extended	 family	would	work	 together	 in	 the	 same	mine.	
When	Greg	McKenzie	started	mining	in	the	1940s	in	Lithgow	the	other	fifteen	men	
in	his	small	mine	were	all	related.77		Furthermore,	the	miners’	piecework	was	not	as	
individualistic	 as	 that	of	 shearers	because	miners	worked	 the	 coal	 in	pairs	with	a	
“mate”	and	divided	their	profits	equally.78	Mates	would	often	work	together	their	
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entire	careers	and	for	this	reason	“a	mate	was	chosen	as	carefully	as	a	wife”.79	Jack	
Savage	began	coalmining	at	Big	Spur	Colliery	in	Victoria	in	1938	and	recalled	his	mate	
Merv	Crane:		
Merv	was	a	good	old	mate.	One	of	the	nicest	blokes	I	ever	worked	with.	We	
never	 had	 a	 cross	word	 in	 our	 life	…	 you	wouldn’t	 believe	 it.	 Any	 bastard	
working	with	me	for	three	years	and	not	having	a	row	you’d	wonder	why.	But	
that’s	fair	dinkum.80	
As	well	 as	being	 less	 individualistic,	direct	 comparison	and	competition	were	also	
more	difficult	in	mining	than	in	shearing	because	coal	was	much	easier	to	win	in	some	
parts	of	a	mine	than	it	was	in	others.	Mining	took	place	in	pairs	in	the	dark	and	did	
not	have	the	same	degree	of	sport	and	display	as	shearing.	
	
The	occupational	stratification	amongst	the	miners	was	generally	less	intense	than	
between	 the	 shearers	 and	 shedhands	 because	 there	 was	 a	 clearly	 established	
progression	amongst	the	miners	from	non-faceworker	to	faceworker.	There	were	still	
conflicts;	in	the	Northern	District	in	1911	wheelers	and	shiftmen	unsuccessfully	tried	
to	 form	 their	own	union	and	 split	 from	 the	miners.81	But	 this	 conflict	was	usually	
tempered	by	the	fact	that	non-faceworkers	were	not	perpetually	second-class	union	
members	but	were	 simply	waiting	 their	 turn,	 just	as	 the	current	 faceworkers	had	
done	before	them.82	Metcalfe	argues	that	the	union’s	deliberate	neglect	of	the	non-
faceworkers	 undermined	 solidarity	 and	 democracy	 but	 the	 effects	 were	 not	 as	
detrimental	as	he	claims.83	The	non-faceworkers	knew	that	wins	for	the	faceworkers	
were	also	wins	for	themselves	in	the	future.	
	
The	Miners	 Federation	was	 further	 able	 to	overcome	 the	 tendencies	 to	oligarchy	
because	of	a	range	of	interwoven	cultural	factors	that	distinguished	it	from	the	AWU.	
Most	 importantly,	 miners	 worked	 and	 lived	 together	 permanently	 in	 large	
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numbers.84	Miners	 and	 their	 families	 were	 strongly	 interconnected	 within	 social,	
religious,	 charitable	 and	 sports	 organisations.	 Because	 miners	 and	 their	 families	
constituted	the	majority	in	most	mining	towns,	they	dominated	the	towns’	social	life	
and	events.	In	the	Western	NSW	District	town	of	Lithgow,	for	example,	the	annual	
eight	 hours	 demonstration	 was	 the	 biggest	 social	 event	 of	 the	 year	 and	 was	
accompanied	 by	 banquets,	 smoke	 socials,	 dances	 and	 sports	 carnivals. 85 	Mining	
towns	usually	had	collective	enterprises	 such	as	 food	cooperatives	and	many	had	
union	theatres	and	other	forms	of	union	entertainment.86	The	Broken	Hill	district	ran	
summer	camps	for	members	and	their	families	on	South	Australian	beaches.87	All	of	
this	stood	in	stark	contrast	to	most	AWU	pastoral	workers	and	navvies	who,	when	
they	did	live	together	in	significant	numbers,	did	so	temporarily	and	without	families.	
	
In	1944	the	Women’s	Weekly	published	an	article	on	miners’	wives.	It	argued	that	
“loyalty	to	their	husbands	is	the	most	outstanding	characteristic	of	the	miners'	wives.	
Next	to	it	comes	their	loyalty	to	their	neighbours”.	The	article	noted	that	“most	wives	
deplore	frivolous	stoppages”	but	that	while	“a	wife	may	criticise	mine	stoppages	in	
the	home”,	“to	the	world	she	 is	completely	 in	agreement	with	her	husband”.	This	
partly	reflected	the	fact	that	women	were	not	yet	equal	public	political	participants	
and	were	expected	to	be	loyal	to	their	husband	who	was	the	head	of	the	household.	
The	 Women’s	 Weekly	 described	 miners’	 wives	 as	 “capable,	 ‘old-fashioned’	
housewives”	who	 “wage	 a	 continual	 battle	 against	 coaldust”.	 They	 rarely	worked	
outside	the	home	because	“there	are	no	crèches	and	kindergartens”	and	“the	miners'	
working	 hours	would	 not	 fit	 in	with	 the	working	 hours	 of	most	 jobs	 available	 to	
women”.	The	article	stressed	the	strong	community	in	coal	towns:	“a	coal	town	is	a	
friendly,	democratic	community”	and	“illness	or	trouble	brings	immediate	help	from	
the	neighbours”.88	
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Strikes	involved	whole	families	and	communities	and	further	reinforced	the	union’s	
occupational	 solidarity.	 Socialising	 and	 leisure	 increased	 during	 strikes	 and	
unemployment,	 especially	 the	Great	Depression.89	The	miners’	 co-op	 stores	were	
generous	with	credit	during	strikes,	as	were	shopkeepers,	 landlords	and	mortgage	
holders.	If	the	miners	declared	a	business	“black”	in	a	mining	town	it	was	ruined.90	
The	 miners	 also	 demonstrated	 their	 strong	 occupational	 community	 in	 their	
treatment	 of	 unemployed	 members.	 Although	 they	 could	 not	 vote	 on	 financial	
matters,	 unemployed	 members	 could	 still	 run	 and	 vote	 in	 union	 elections	 and	
received	free	copies	of	Common	Cause.91		
	
The	dangers	of	mining	and	the	need	to	struggle	together	to	 improve	safety	was	a	
further	incentive	for	unity.92	Coal	mining	was	hard,	dirty,	dangerous	work.	Methods	
did	not	 change	 significantly	 in	most	mines	between	1860	 and	1940.93	Coalminers	
worked	in	the	dark	in	mineshafts	deep	underground	and	it	could	take	more	than	an	
hour	to	get	from	the	surface	to	the	coalface.94	Once	there,	faceworkers	broke	coal	
from	the	coalface	by	a	combination	of	pick	and	explosives	before	loading	it	by	shovel	
into	 skips	 which	 the	 wheelers	 took	 to	 the	 surface. 95 	The	 physical	 exertion	 was	
compounded	by	the	extreme	heat	which	could	reach	50	degrees	celsius.96	Shift	work	
also	added	to	the	burden	with	many	miners	working	3pm	to	midnight	or	the	“dog	
watch”	 from	 midnight	 to	 8am. 97 	The	 Women’s	 Weekly	 stressed	 the	 anxiety	
experienced	by	wives	every	day	when	their	husband	left	for	work.	It	quoted	one	wife	
who	said	“your	husband	may	have	been	a	miner	for	twenty	years,	but	you	never	lose	
that	feeling	of	anxiety	for	him".98	
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A	NSW	coalminer	who	worked	for	40	years	between	1902	and	1976	had	a	one	in	four	
chance	of	death	or	serious	injury,	making	it	probably	the	most	dangerous	occupation	
in	 the	 country.99	The	 greatest	 immediate	danger	was	being	 crushed	by	 collapsing	
tunnels	or	heavy	machinery.	Safety	equipment	and	personnel	were	non-existent	and	
if	a	miner	was	trapped	his	workmates	would	use	their	shovels	to	hack	off	the	pinned	
limb	and	then	carry	him	several	kilometres	to	the	surface.	Many	did	not	survive	the	
journey.	The	smell	of	blood	and	the	sounds	of	screaming	and	splintering	bone	must	
have	traumatised	the	rescuers	who	knew	it	could	just	as	easily	have	been	them.100	
	
More	insidious	lung	and	eye	diseases	from	gas	and	dust	were	commonplace,	as	was	
hearing	loss	from	explosions.101	Metal	miners	faced	the	added	danger	of	poisoning.	
In	1920	a	doctor	found	that	87	per	cent	of	the	244	miners	he	examined	at	Broken	Hill	
had	an	occupational	disease:	142	had	damaged	lungs	from	silicosis	and	74	had	liver	
and	kidney	damage	from	lead	poisoning.102	The	absence	of	toilets	added	the	stench	
of	human	excrement	to	the	sweat,	heat	and	humidity	and	increased	the	spread	of	
infectious	diseases.103	The	miners’	dangers	and	discomforts	were	greater	than	those	
of	the	AWU	navvies	and	far	greater	than	those	of	pastoral	workers	and	this	translated	
into	a	different	kind	of	mateship.	As	Carol	Lansbury	argues,	“true	mateship	is	created	
when	one	man’s	life	is	wholly	dependent	on	that	of	another.	It	occurs	in	wartime,	at	
sea	and	always	at	the	coalface”.104	
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Figure	22	Coal	miner	working	at	the	coalface	at	the	Lithgow	Vale	Colliery,	New	
South	Wales,	21	December	1932.105	
	
As	we	saw	in	chapter	one,	many	AWU	members	aspired	to	leave	the	working	class	
and	 become	 landholders.	 Until	 the	 early	 twentieth	 century,	 most	 shearers	 were	
smallholders,	perhaps	shearing	to	make	money	to	buy	more	land.	Some	miners	had	
similar	goals	to	leave	the	working	class	and	a	few	even	bought	mines,	but	this	was	
not	 a	 realistic	 aim	 for	 most.	 This	 reality	 helped	 to	 promote	 solidarity	 and	 class	
consciousness	amongst	the	miners	because	if	their	lot	was	going	to	improve,	it	would	
be	through	winning	higher	wages	for	workers	rather	than	by	escaping	the	working	
class.	Many	miners	 did,	 however,	 wish	 for	 their	 sons	 to	 escape	 the	 dangers	 and	
hardships	 of	 mining,	 if	 not	 the	 working	 class.	 The	Women’s	 Weekly	 noted	 the	
“unwavering	 ambition	of	miners	 and	 their	wives	 is	 to	 ‘get	 the	 children	out’”	…	A	
miner	tells	you	with	thankfulness	in	his	voice,	‘no,	my	boy's	not	in	the	mines,	he	is	in	
the	railways’,	or	‘I	got	all	mine	out’”.106	
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The	union	leadership	was	another	key	factor	distinguishing	the	AWU	from	the	Miners	
Federation.	AWU	officials	praised	competitive	piecework	as	strengthening	the	union.	
AWU	president	Barnes	said:		
this	competitive	interest,	which	made	the	work	of	shearing	sheep	more	like	a	
game	 than	 otherwise,	 drew	 into	 the	 union	 ranks	 the	most	 intelligent	 and	
competent	in	the	country	–	for	there	is	no	place	in	the	ranks	of	the	shearer	
for	 the	 loafer	 who	 watches	 the	 clock	 and	 waits	 for	 pay	 day	 –	 and	 so	 an	
organisation	 was	 built	 up	 which	 is	 the	 envy	 of	 the	 organisers	 of	 other	
unions.107		
Conversely,	from	the	1920s	one	of	Miners	Federation’s	key	policies	was	abolition	of	
the	piecework	system.108	In	1924	the	Labor	Daily	published	an	article	titled	“Insidious	
evil	 of	 the	 piecework	 system”. 109 	Piecework	 was	 not	 abolished,	 but	 the	 Miners	
Federation	did	successfully	introduce	rules	which	restricted	individual	competition.	
Coal	was	more	easily	won	at	some	worksites	than	others.	A	seniority	system	existed	
in	the	union	which	controlled	promotions	and	dismissals:	last	in,	first	out.	However,	
worksites	were	 not	 allocated	 by	 seniority.	 The	 “cavil”	 (Latin	 for	 quibbling)	 was	 a	
quarterly	lottery	by	which	worksites	were	randomly	allocated.	This	ensured	fairness	
over	 the	 long	 term	 and	 prevented	managers	 from	 rewarding	 certain	miners	with	
good	sites	and	punishing	others	with	bad	ones.110		
	
The	“darg”	(Scottish	for	a	day’s	work)	was	more	controversial	amongst	the	members.	
It	was	a	union	rule	which	specified	a	maximum	number	of	skips	 that	each	pair	of	
miners	could	use.	This	rule	capped	the	amount	of	coal	a	pair	could	mine	so	that	it	
remained	relatively	even.111	A	reduced	darg	could	also	be	used	as	a	form	of	go-slow	
industrial	action.112	The	Miners	Federation	rationed	work	when	it	was	limited	during	
downturns	and	the	Great	Depression.113	Members	were	also	forbidden	from	working	
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in	more	than	one	colliery	or	in	more	than	one	job.114	There	was	always	tension	when	
the	 Miners	 Federation	 tried	 to	 introduce	 a	 measure	 that	 could	 limit	 members’	
earnings.	 Many	 miners	 opposed	 the	 darg	 throughout	 the	 period.115 	In	 1921	 the	
Central	Council	proposed	a	nine	day	fortnight	to	share	work	but	the	proposal	was	
defeated	at	the	ballot	by	a	4:1	majority.116	Yet	during	the	Depression	most	miners	
recognised	the	pragmatic	need	for	work-sharing	which	became	commonplace;	men	
worked	a	five	day	fortnight,	two	days	one	week	and	three	the	next.117		
	
The	Miners	Federation	rules	
The	Miners	Federation	rules	were	highly	democratic,	combining	participatory,	direct	
and	representative	democracy	in	a	formulation	that	gave	the	members	a	great	deal	
of	 control.	 The	 lodges	 operated	 primarily	 as	 participatory	 democracies	 in	 which	
issues	were	debated	and	voted	on	by	members	at	daily	pit	top	meetings	and	frequent	
lodge	meetings.	There	were	also	pragmatic	elements	of	representative	democracy	as	
lodge	members	 elected	 a	 lodge	 secretary,	 president,	 treasurer	 and	management	
committee	quarterly	and	a	representative	to	the	district	delegate	board	annually.118		
	
At	the	district	level,	the	union	was	a	representative	democracy.	The	district	delegate	
boards	consisted	of	a	district	executive	-	secretary,	president	and	vice-president	each	
elected	annually	by	a	district-wide	ballot	-	plus	the	lodge	delegates	who	had	votes	in	
proportion	to	their	lodge’s	membership.119	In	1923	the	union	abolished	the	district	
Delegate	Boards	citing	their	high	costs.120	Travel	costs	for	141	lodge	representatives	
were	 expensive,	 but	 the	 reform	 reduced	 democracy	 and	 concentrated	 power	 by	
giving	 all	 of	 the	 delegate	 board’s	 authority	 to	 the	 three	members	 of	 the	 district	
executive.	
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At	the	national	level,	the	Miners	Federation	was	a	combination	of	representative	and	
direct	democracy.	Members	elected	all	national	representatives	in	an	annual	ballot	
using	preferential	voting.121	There	were	few	restrictions	on	nominating	for	office	and	
by	 1935	 even	 unemployed	 members	 could	 nominate. 122 	The	 central	 executive	
managed	 the	 union	 and	 comprised	 a	 general	 secretary,	 president	 and	 vice-
president.123	The	central	executive	was	answerable	to	the	central	council	which	was	
the	highest	authority	 in	 the	union	and	was	made	up	of	district	 representatives	 in	
proportion	to	their	membership.124	Districts	with	2000	or	less	members	elected	one	
representative	to	the	central	council,	between	2000	and	6000	two	representatives	
and	over	6000	elected	 three.125	By	1935	districts	with	between	6,000	and	11,000	
members	 had	 three	 representatives,	 over	 11,000	 four	 representatives	 and	 one	
additional	representative	for	every	3,000	or	part	thereof.126	In	1936	five	councillors	
represented	the	Northern	District,	two	represented	each	of	the	Southern,	Western,	
Broken	Hill	and	Queensland	districts	and	one	represented	Victoria.127	
	
As	 in	most	 representative	organisations,	 there	was	 tension	between	 the	 views	of	
representatives	as	delegates	and	 trustees.	 The	union’s	1916	Rules	 suggested	 that	
representatives	were	trustees	when	it	advised	members:	“trust	your	officers	and	be	
careful	 in	 selecting	 them”.128	But	 in	 practice,	 as	we	will	 see,	 the	 attitude	 of	 both	
members	and	officials	was	more	towards	representatives	as	delegates.	This	was	in	
stark	contrast	to	the	AWU	which	promoted	its	leaders	as	trustees	to	be	obeyed	by	
the	members.	
	
Unlike	 the	AWU’s	 executive	 council,	 the	 central	 council’s	 power	was	 subject	 to	 a	
series	of	democratic	limitations.	Most	importantly,	all	central	council	decisions	went	
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back	to	the	 lodges	and	needed	majority	support	amongst	the	membership	before	
becoming	 union	 policy	 (direct	 democracy). 129 	Each	 lodge	 had	 one	 vote	 per	 25	
members	 or	 part	 thereof	 with	 all	 of	 a	 lodge’s	 votes	 going	 with	 the	 majority.	
Furthermore,	unlike	in	the	AWU,	the	central	council	could	only	dismiss	officials	with	
ballot	approval	of	members	and	there	were	by-elections	to	replace	officials	who	left	
office.130	From	1925	special	conventions	became	the	union’s	highest	authority	and	
were	 held	 at	 the	 districts’	 request.	 Members	 directly	 elected	 delegates	 to	
conventions	and	no	central	councillors	could	be	delegates.	This	was	a	reform	that	
dissidents	like	Jack	Cullinan	unsuccessfully	tried	to	implement	in	the	AWU	to	break	
the	oligarchy.131	While	the	AWU	rules	enabled	the	leaders	to	entrench	their	control,	
the	Miners	Federation	rules	successfully	operated	to	prevent	 the	accumulation	of	
too	much	power	into	a	small	group	of	top	officials.	
	
Membership	decision-making	
All	central	council	decisions	needed	to	be	approved	by	the	members	directly	in	open	
votes	at	their	lodge	meetings.	The	members	usually	adopted	council	decisions,	but	
some	 were	 rejected.132 	Unlike	 AWU	members,	 Miners	 Federation	 members	 also	
voted	on	all	 district	 employment	 contracts,	 strikes	 and	political	 affiliations.	 These	
votes	were	 sometimes	 by	 ballot	 but	 usually	 by	 open	 vote	 at	 lodges	 or	 aggregate	
meetings	of	all	the	lodges	in	an	area.	Famously,	the	northern	miners	rejected	their	
leaders’	 compromise	agreement	during	 the	1929	 lockout.	133	Pressure	 from	below	
and	 the	 miners’	 culture	 of	 membership	 authority	 was	 obvious	 at	 meetings	 with	
routine	verbal,	and	occasionally	physical,	abuse	of	officials.	“You’ve	sold	us”	was	a	
common	 accusation	 flung	 at	 officials	 promoting	 a	 compromise	 agreement.134	The	
lodges	 and	 districts	 facilitated	 further	 membership	 decision-making.	 Lodges	
operated	as	participatory	democracies	 in	which	members	voted	on	 local	 issues	at	
daily	pit	top	and	regular	lodge	meetings.	Members	also	sometimes	exercised	direct	
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democracy	by	voting	on	district	issues.	For	example,	in	the	early	years	of	the	Miners	
Federation	the	Southern	NSW	District	required	a	membership	ballot	to	approve	all	
district	money	spending.135	
	
The	Miners	Federation	encouraged	maximum	participation.	Voting	turnout	in	ballots	
was	almost	always	over	50	per	cent	and	usually	around	75	per	cent,	far	higher	than	
the	AWU	which	peaked	around	25	per	cent.136	The	Miners	Federation’s	1916	rules	
advised	members	to	“be	regular	in	your	attendance	at	branch	meetings”,	“have	your	
say	during	debate	but	cheerfully	accept	the	will	of	the	majority”	and	“remember	that	
the	lodge	meeting	and	not	the	sidewalk	or	the	nearest	gin	mill	is	the	place	to	discuss	
union	affairs”.137	Some	lodges	even	imposed	compulsory	attendance	with	fines	for	
not	attending	monthly	lodge	meetings.138		
	
Many	employers	and	conservative	politicians	and	commentators	argued	that	open	
votes	were	not	democratic	because	the	more	reasonable	and	conservative	miners	
were	often	bullied	into	voting	for	militant	proposals	like	strikes.	They	argued	that	if	
secret	ballots	were	used	many	stoppages	would	not	have	occurred.139	Some	Miners	
Federation	members	made	similar	arguments	and	campaigned	for	secret	ballots	to	
replace	open	voting.140	One	miner	observed	 in	1923	that	many	members	“sit	at	a	
meeting	and	watch	which	way	the	hands	go	and	vote	against	their	conscience”.141	
These	 campaigns	 for	 secret	 ballots	were	occasionally	 successful	 in	 the	 1930s	 and	
several	lodges	replaced	open	voting	with	the	compulsory	secret	ballot	enforced	with	
fines	for	 failing	to	vote.142	However,	most	officials	countered	that	open	discussion	
and	voting	was	essential	to	the	union’s	participatory	democracy.	
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Metcalfe	described	what	he	called	a	culture	of	“larrikin	conformism”	in	the	coalfields.	
As	 a	 result	 of	 their	 strong	 occupational	 culture	 and	 masculine	 mateship,	 miners	
showed	a	“strong	tendency	to	suppress	by	ridicule	any	attempt	at	differentiation”.143	
He	quoted	a	mine	manager	who	observed	that	“the	miners	are	the	greatest	cowards	
on	earth.	I’ve	seen	it	happen	at	pit	top	meetings.	I’ve	seen	everybody	looking	around.	
And	the	fellow	next	to	him	puts	his	hand	up	and	the	next	one	puts	his	hand	up	…	and	
so	this	one	puts	his	hand	up.	And	he’s	quite	aggressive	about	it	once	he’s	made	his	
mind	 up”.144	Tom	McMahon,	 a	 miner	 at	 Aberdare	 Central	 in	 the	 Northern	 NSW	
District,	presented	a	different	image:	“I’ll	tell	you	what	…	if	a	bloke	didn’t	agree	with	
something	at	a	union	meeting	he	got	up	and	spoke	his	piece.	We	weren’t	sheep	to	
be	herded	along	this	way	and	that	way.	Everybody	who	wanted	to	have	a	say	could	
have	a	say.	Then	when	all	the	talking	was	done,	we’d	reach	a	decision	and	stick	to	it.	
We	stuck	by	each	other	–	at	work	and	 in	our	towns”.145	Presumably	the	extent	to	
which	 miners	 openly	 disagreed	 with	 the	 majority	 varied	 at	 different	 lodges	 at	
different	 times,	 but	 even	McMahon’s	 recollection	 demonstrates	 that	 the	miners’	
emphasis	on	sticking	to	decisions	and	sticking	by	each	other	could	make	opposition	
difficult.	
Open	votes	taken	at	large	aggregate	meetings	were	particularly	open	to	intimidation.	
The	 biggest	 of	 these	 meetings	 would	 occur	 with	 leaders	 speaking	 from	 a	 hotel	
balcony	 down	 to	 hundreds	 of	members	 in	 the	 street	 below.	 They	 often	 featured	
alcohol,	raucous	behaviour,	abuse	of	officials,	fights	and	loud	aggressive	minorities.	
These	volatile	crowds	would	abuse	an	official	one	minute	and	then	cheer	him	the	
next	after	a	short	speech.146	This	was	certainly	not	a	place	for	reasoned	debate	and	
disagreement.	
	
Ironically,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Miners	 Federation’s	 high	 levels	 of	 membership	
decision-making,	members	had	little	choice	over	the	most	fundamental	decision	of	
all:	whether	or	not	to	be	a	member	of	the	union.	In	this	way	the	Miners	Federation	
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was	the	same	as	the	AWU,	and	most	other	Australian	unions,	which	sought	security	
and	numerical	strength	through	compulsory	unionism.	Through	arbitration	awards	
the	Federation	won	compulsory	unionism	in	most	mines.147	In	mines	where	they	had	
not	 officially	 forced	 all	 miners	 to	 join,	 the	 Miners	 Federation	 and	 its	 members	
brought	 huge	 pressure	 to	 join	 through	 exclusion,	 bullying,	 intimidation	 and	
violence.148	There	were	often	strikes	because	members	 refused	to	work	alongside	
non-members.149	In	1936	the	first	grade	Weston	rugby	union	team	refused	to	take	
the	field	against	Maitland	because	one	of	the	players	worked	at	a	non-union	colliery.	
The	Northern	District’s	official	policy	was	to	seek	out	non-unionists	in	all	sports	and	
instruct	 Miners	 Federation	 members	 not	 to	 play	 against	 them.150 	The	 Northern	
miners'	acting	president	John	Kellock	congratulated	the	Weston	club	on	its	action.	It	
was	the	duty	of	every	unionist	to	“refuse	to	speak,	to	play	beside,	or	against,	or	have	
any	association	whatever	with	men	who	were	working	in	mines	not	recognised	by	
the	Federation”.151	
	
In	oligarchical	unions	like	the	AWU,	one	of	few	ways	that	members	could	influence	
the	leaders	was	by	leaving	or	threatening	to	do	so,	and	compulsory	unionism	stripped	
them	of	this	last	remaining	power.	In	democratic	unions	like	the	Miners	Federation,	
however,	compulsory	unionism	did	not	destroy	union	democracy	because	unionists	
did	 not	 need	 to	 leave	 or	 threaten	 to	 leave	 the	 union	 to	 influence	 the	 leaders.	
Nevertheless,	 compulsory	unionism	did	have	more	 subtle	 negative	 effects	 on	 the	
Miners	Federation.	A	majority	of	workers	forcing	the	minority	to	join	their	union	is	
democratic	 in	 a	 hard	 majoritarian	 sense.	 But	 most	 theorists	 hold	 that	 a	 healthy	
democracy	requires	minority	rights	in	addition	to	majority	rule.152	By	breaching	these	
minority	rights,	the	Miners	Federation	weakened	its	moral	authority	and	unity.		
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Even	 some	 Miners	 Federation	 insiders	 recognised	 the	 problems	 of	 compulsory	
membership.	Ross	wrote	in	the	official	history	that	“the	history	of	the	Federation	…	
tells	 of	 the	 apathy	 and	 conservatism	 that	 can	 follow	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 unionism	
becoming	 a	 ‘formal’	 thing	 with	 compulsory	 membership”. 153 	Like	 the	 AWU,	 the	
Miners	Federation	sought	a	short	cut	to	strength	through	compulsion	and	in	doing	
so	created	an	uninterested	and	even	hostile	section	of	members.	The	fact	that	votes	
in	 elections	 were	 rarely	 over	 75	 per	 cent	 suggests	 that	 a	 significant	 minority	 of	
members	were	reluctant	or	at	least	apathetic.		
	
Organised	opposition	
The	 Miners	 Federation	 frowned	 upon	 organised	 factions,	 parties	 or	 tickets	 of	
candidates	in	union	elections	but	did	not	ban	them	like	the	AWU.	In	1922	a	ticket	was	
circulated	which	included	the	sitting	Northern	District	treasurer	A.	Lewis.	He	denied	
any	 involvement	and	said	that	organising	tickets	for	elections	was	“not	 in	keeping	
with	 the	 traditions	 and	 practices”	 of	 the	 union.154	All	 the	 same,	 allied	 individuals	
worked	together	 in	unofficial	 factions,	as	 they	do	 in	all	organisations.	 In	1924	the	
ever-vigilant	SMH	 identified	a	“militant	element”	factional	opposition	based	in	the	
Northern	 fields. 155 	Metcalfe	 argued	 that	 “factionalism	 constrained	 rank	 and	 file	
involvement	by	giving	organised	subgroups	considerable	control	over	the	rest	of	the	
membership”.156	This	 argument	 runs	 counter	 to	 the	 sociological	 consensus	which	
argues	 that	organised	opposition	 is	 crucial	 to	union	democracy.	 Lipset	and	others	
argue	 that	 factional	 conflict	 gives	 members	 greater	 electoral	 choice,	 stimulates	
interest	and	debate	within	the	union	and	holds	officials	to	account.157	This	is	exactly	
what	occurred	in	the	Miners	Federation	when	the	MM	and	then	Lang	challenged	its	
leaders.	
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The	first	open	factional	organisation	within	the	union	came	in	1928	when	the	MM	
formed	 its	 miners	 section. 158 	The	 AWU	 would	 not	 have	 tolerated	 any	 openly	
Communist	 organisation	 and	 other	 unions,	 such	 as	 the	 Boilermakers	 Union,	
specifically	 banned	MM	members	 from	 nominating	 for	 positions,	 but	 the	Miners	
Federation	maintained	 its	commitment	 to	 freedom	of	organisation	and	speech.159	
The	MM	created	councils	of	action	including	strike	relief	and	publicity	committees	at	
each	mine	 and	MM	 officials	 such	 as	 Orr	 made	 bitter	 attacks	 against	 the	Miners	
Federation	 Executive	 in	 the	CPA	newspaper,	 the	Workers'	Weekly,	 before	he	 and	
Nelson	 successfully	 deposed	 the	 sitting	 leadership	 in	 1934.160 	Just	 as	 Lipset	 and	
others	 would	 have	 predicted,	 organised	 opposition	 enhanced	 democracy	 by	
stimulating	 membership	 interest	 and	 debate	 and	 providing	 electoral	 alternatives	
which	eventually	led	to	leadership	renewal.	
	
In	1934	the	anti-Communist	Lang	Labor	Party	established	a	faction	within	the	Miners	
Federation	and	openly	tried	to	depose	Orr	and	Nelson	from	the	leadership.161	Lang	
toured	mining	areas	campaigning	for	his	candidates.	This	was	one	step	further	than	
the	 Labor	Party	had	 gone	with	 the	AWU	where	 it	 had	 instead	 supported	existing	
dissidents	like	the	Bushworkers	Propaganda	Group	and	rival	unions	like	the	United	
Labourers	Union	and	Pastoral	Workers	 Industrial	Union.162	Even	 though	 Lang	was	
very	 popular	 in	 the	 coalfields,	 his	 candidates	were	 easily	 defeated;	 evidently	 the	
majority	of	miners	did	not	agree	with	Lang’s	criticisms	of	the	Communist	leadership.	
While	the	direct	 interference	of	the	Labor	Party	 in	union	elections	was	potentially	
divisive,	 the	 episode	 arguably	 enhanced	 democracy	 by	 increasing	 membership	
interest	and	participation	and	holding	the	existing	leaders	to	account	with	a	strong	
opposition.		
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Metcalfe	argues	in	Michelsian	terms	that	the	members’	unwavering	support	for	Lang	
in	 state	 parliament	 and	 for	 Orr	 and	 Nelson	 in	 the	Miners	 Federation	 leadership	
reveals	 that	 members	 relied	 “on	 individual	 leaders	 rather	 than	 on	 critical	
consideration	of	policies”.163	Perhaps	this	is	so,	but	it	could	equally	be	argued	that	
support	 for	 these	 leaders	 demonstrated	 the	members’	 ability	 to	 distinguish	 state	
parliamentary	politics	 from	union	politics.	 Jim	Comerford,	a	member	of	Richmond	
Main	Miners’	Lodge	since	1927,	recalled	that	the	men	were	generally	intelligent	and	
interested	 and	 did	 not	 follow	 leaders	 blindly.	 They	 “gave	 loyal	 support	 to	 their	
elected	 representatives	 so	 long	as	 they	merited	support.	 Just	as	deliberately	 they	
would	decide	to	replace	anyone	who	they	felt	should	be	replaced”.164	
	
Lang’s	factional	involvement	in	the	Miners	Federation	was	not	the	first	nor	the	only	
time	the	Labor	Party	organised	to	depose	Communists	from	union	office.	In	1928	the	
NSW	 Labor	 Party	 Executive	 successfully	 organised	 for	 the	 defeat	 of	 Communist	
officials	and	delegates	in	the	Sheet	Metal	Workers	and	Clerks	Union.165	In	the	mid-
1930s	 Lang	 and	 the	 Inner	 Group	 also	 unsuccessfully	 organised	 to	 depose	 the	
Communist	Australian	Railways	Union	(ARU)	leadership.166	When	they	could	not	win	
internal	elections,	the	Inner	Group	formed	the	Railway	Operating	Employees	Union	
to	rival	the	ARU.167	The	Inner	Group	also	formed	a	new	Metal	Trades	Union	and	tried	
to	enrol	members	from	existing	metal	unions.168	
	
Equality	of	salary,	status,	skill	and	education	
Miners	Federation	officials	received	good	salaries;	in	1921	Willis	as	secretary	earned	
£534	 per	 annum	 excluding	 expenses	 and	 president	 Baddeley	 £221.169	The	 lowest	
paid	 fulltime	miners	 earned	 £236	 per	 year,	 around	 half	 as	much	 as	Willis.170	The	
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highest	paid	miners	could	earn	£20	per	week,	around	£1000	per	year	 if	work	was	
consistent,	but	it	never	was.	By	1939	the	secretary’s	salary	was	almost	the	same	in	
nominal	and	real	terms	(there	had	been	just	0.5	per	cent	deflation	between	1921	and	
1939)	at	£547	but	 the	president’s	 salary	had	more	 than	doubled	 to	£481.171	They	
both	earned	about	half	as	much	as	the	highest	paid	Australian	trade	union	officer,	
AWU	 General	 Secretary	 Edward	 Grayndler,	 who	 received	 £1000	 per	 year.172 	The	
officials	also	received	many	fringe	benefits.	Central	council	members	enjoyed	first-
class	rail	travel,	but	did	not	celebrate	it	as	openly	as	AWU	officials,	and	in	1939	the	
president	 claimed	 £269	 on	 expenses	 and	 the	 secretary	 £271. 173 	There	 is	 some	
evidence	of	resentment	amongst	the	members	regarding	the	officials’	salaries.	This	
tended	to	be	expressed	most	forcefully	during	industrial	action	and/or	work	rationing	
when	some	members	complained	that	officials	should	get	“darg	rates”.174	
	
The	miners’	 leaders	were	very	much	part	of	the	social	elite	 in	mining	towns	along	
with	business	 owners	 and	politicians,	 and	most	 coalfields	 politicians	were	 former	
Miners	Federation	officials.	Labor	Party	affiliation	increased	the	status	gap	between	
ordinary	 members	 and	 officials	 like	 Willis	 and	 Baddeley	 who	 became	 politicians	
and/or	 powerful	 members	 of	 the	 extra-parliamentary	 party.	 Miners	 Federation	
leaders	were	guests	of	honour	at	important	events	and	frequently	interacted	with	
other	 local	 elites	 like	 judges,	 politicians	 and	 businessmen.175	The	 elite	 status	was	
exemplified	 at	Miners	 Federation	 and	 Labor	 Party	 events	where	 the	 officials	 and	
politicians	 would	 sit	 on	 the	 stage	 looking	 down	 at	 the	 audience.	 Yet	 there	 was	
nothing	 like	the	self-aggrandisement	of	the	AWU	officials.	While	the	AWU	leaders	
organised	monuments	for	deceased	leaders	and	made	pilgrimages	to	their	graves,	in	
the	Miners	Federation	that	honour	was	reserved	for	ordinary	members	or	officials	
who	 had	 become	 union	martyrs.	 The	Miners	 Federation	 erected	 a	 memorial	 for	
Norman	Brown	to	commemorate	his	death	when	he	was	shot	by	police	during	the	
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lockout	 at	 Rothbury	 colliery	 on	 16	 December	 1929,	 and	miners	made	 an	 annual	
pilgrimage	to	the	monument	on	that	date	each	year.176		
	
Most	Miners	Federation	officials	were	former	miners	with	limited	education;	Willis	
was	 an	 obvious	 exception.	 But	 like	 the	 AWU	 officials,	Miners	 Federation	 officials	
gained	significant	education	and	skills	on	the	job.	The	union	aimed	to	limit	this	gap	
by	educating	members	on	important	issues.	There	were	frequent	educational	articles	
in	 Common	 Cause	 and	 the	 union	 held	 study	 classes	 and	 educational	 leagues	 for	
members	 to	 learn	 about	 radical	 and	 Marxist	 economics,	 political	 theory	 and	
history.177	The	Educational	Committee	of	the	Women’s	Auxiliaries	also	ran	education	
and	discussion	classes	for	women	and	youths.178	It	was	the	MM,	however,	in	keeping	
with	Communist	 tactics,	which	worked	hardest	 to	 train	 the	minds	of	miners	with	
films,	lectures	and	pamphlets.179	
	
Miners	Federation	education	was	more	indoctrinating	than	empowering.180	Rather	
than	 seeking	 to	 build	 the	 miners’	 critical	 thinking	 skills,	 classes	 provided	
oversimplified	sketches	of	radical	economics	and	philosophy.	Less	formal	education	
and	 discussion	 occurred	 at	 each	 coal	 town’s	 “log	 of	 knowledge”,	 a	 place	 where	
miners	would	gather	to	discuss	and	debate	topical	issues.	These	informal	gatherings	
were	probably	more	practical	and	less	indoctrinating	than	official	union	education.181	
	
The	inequality	of	salary,	status,	skill	and	education	between	officials	and	members	
was	detrimental	to	Miners	Federation	democracy.	Officials	often	believed	that	they	
knew	better	than	the	members.	In	1923	Hoare	criticised	“the	destructive	tendencies	
which	 are	 prevalent	 amongst	 numbers	 of	 enthusiasts	 who	 lack	 the	 necessary	
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scientific	knowledge”.	“Enthusiasm	without	intelligence	leads	us	up	a	blind	alley”,	he	
concluded.182	But	the	miners’	strong	democratic	culture	prevented	anything	like	the	
arrogance	of	the	AWU	leaders	who	openly	proclaimed	that	their	members	should	
obey	them	unquestioningly.	
	
Free	communication	
The	most	important	avenue	of	communication	within	the	Miners	Federation	was	its	
newspaper	Common	Cause.	Within	the	period	under	consideration,	Common	Cause	
had	three	distinct	phases.	From	1921	to	1925	it	was	a	stand-alone	newspaper,	from	
1925	to	1935	it	was	a	supplement	within	the	Labor	Daily,	and	finally	it	was	a	stand-
alone	newspaper	once	again	from	1935	to	1939	and	beyond.	Gollan	argued	that	“it	
was	not	peculiarly	a	miners’	paper	but	a	propaganda	vehicle	for	a	simplified	socialist	
critique	of	capitalism”	which	“reported	briefly	some	news	from	the	coalfields	under	
the	heading	‘King	Coal’”.183	But	this	understates	the	extent	to	which	Common	Cause	
was	an	important	site	of	free	communication	within	the	union.	
	
The	Miners	Federation	rules	provided	that	the	central	council	appointed	the	editor	
and	sub-editor	of	Common	Cause	and	determined	“the	interpretation	of	the	union	
policy	to	be	advocated	in	the	paper	and	the	management	of	the	same”.184	This	had	
the	 potential	 to	 make	 the	 paper	 a	 mouthpiece	 for	 the	 leadership.	 A	 Miners	
Federation	member	cited	Australian	Worker	control	by	the	AWU	executive	council	
as	a	cautionary	example	and	argued	that	members	should	directly	elect	the	Common	
Cause	editors.185	Unlike	in	the	AWU,	however,	the	Miners	Federation	had	a	culture	
of	democracy	and	free	speech	and	the	leaders	and	editors	encouraged	criticism	and	
debate.	In	1921	Willis	said	that	“there	may	be	room	for	criticism	of	policy	and	such	
criticism	 together	 with	 any	 suggestion	 for	 improvement	 will	 be	 welcomed”	 in	
Common	Cause.186		
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Editor	 Samuel	 Rosa	 frequently	 appealed	 for	 criticism	 of	 the	 newspaper	 and	 the	
union. 187 	He	 published	 detailed	 criticism	 of	 individual	 officials	 and	 policies	 and	
argued	 that	 all	members	 “have	 the	 right	 to	 [Common	 Cause]	 columns”	 including	
“hostile	 critics”. 188 	The	 newspaper	 demonstrated	 strong	 independence	 from	 the	
leadership.	 For	 example,	 in	 1922	 it	 advised	members	 to	 vote	 against	 the	 central	
council’s	 proposed	 9	 day	 fortnight. 189 	Nevertheless,	 the	 leaders	 did	 use	 the	
newspaper	 to	promote	 themselves.	 Baddeley	wrote	 a	weekly	 column	 called	 “The	
Baddeley	report”	which	included	his	photograph.190	Lodge	press	representatives	sent	
local	news,	 issues	and	arguments	to	Common	Cause	and,	unlike	 in	the	AWU,	they	
were	free	to	express	their	views	even	when	they	were	opposed	to	union	policy.191	
Free	 communication	 also	 occurred	 in	 the	 many	 pit	 newspapers	 that	 existed	 at	
individual	mines.	Pit	newspapers	became	increasingly	common	from	the	late	1920s	
as	 the	MM	grew	 in	 influence	and	encouraged	 local	newspapers	as	a	 rank-and-file	
organising	tool.192	
	
When	Common	Cause	became	a	supplement	of	the	Labor	Daily	in	1925	its	role	as	an	
avenue	for	free	Miners	Federation	communication	declined.	It	was	reduced	to	only	
a	 few	 pages	 and	 lost	 much	 of	 its	 industrial	 content.	 Nevertheless,	 in	 1928	 the	
Common	Cause	supplement	published	detailed	and	harsh	critiques	by	the	MM	of	the	
sitting	 officials.	 John	 Hitchen,	 MM	 organiser	 at	 Coledale,	 wrote:	 “Away	 with	
bureaucracy!	Away	with	oligarchy!	It	is	an	organised	rank	and	file	we	need,	not	an	
entrenched	oligarchy”.	However,	the	substance	of	Hitchen’s	criticism	was	against	the	
officials’	support	for	arbitration	and	he	did	not	substantiate	his	claims	of	“entrenched	
oligarchy”	within	the	union.193	The	fact	that	the	union’s	official	newspaper	published	
harsh	 criticism	 from	 a	 faction	 that	 was	 increasingly	 threatening	 to	 defeat	 the	
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incumbent	 leadership	 is	 an	 impressive	 example	 of	 freedom	 of	 speech	 and	 press	
within	a	union.		
	
When	Common	Cause	broke	away	from	the	Labor	Daily	in	1935	it	announced	that	it	
would	once	again	“fulfil	its	role	as	an	organ	providing	free	exchange	of	ideas,	opinions	
and	 criticism	…	 there	will	 be	more	 space	 and	 greater	 scope	 for	 discussion	 in	 the	
future”.194	Orr	 instructed	that	“our	members	must	read	and	study	Common	Cause	
and	when	necessary	offer	 criticism”.195	In	 reality,	 however,	 under	 the	Communist	
leadership	Common	Cause	lost	much	of	its	independence	and	role	as	an	avenue	of	
free	communication.	Orr	and	Nelson	appointed	Edgar	Ross,	former	President	of	the	
Broken	 Hill	 MM,	 as	 editor	 of	 Common	 Cause.	 In	 conformity	 with	 the	 CPA’s	
hierarchical	 organisation,	 under	 Ross’s	 editorship	 the	 newspaper	 became	 highly	
supportive	of	the	leadership.196	Headlines	like	“Orr	builds	up	an	unanswerable	case”	
became	the	norm	and	criticism	disappeared.197	If	the	members	had	directly	elected	
the	editor	this	decline	in	free	speech	may	have	been	avoided.	
	
Orr	 and	Nelson	 also	used	other	 avenues	of	 official	 union	 communication	 to	 their	
electoral	 advantage.	 In	 1934	 they	 sent	 circulars	 to	 all	 miners’	 lodges	 in	 NSW	 to	
counteract	Lang’s	propaganda	against	 them.198	They	also	 took	advantage	of	other	
forms	of	communication	such	as	 the	 rise	of	 radio.	Radio	stations	 in	mining	 towns	
gave	airtime	to	Miners	Federation	officials	in	slots	such	as	2CK	Cessnock’s	“Mining	
News”	segment.199	This	was	not	an	opportunity	for	discussion,	debate	or	rank-and-
file	input	but	rather	a	forum	for	the	leaders	to	promote	themselves	and	their	views.	
Willis	and	Lang	were	especially	 interested	 in	 the	power	of	 radio	as	we	will	 see	 in	
chapter	ten.200	
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197	“Orr	builds	up	unanswerable	case,”	CC	1	April	1939,	6.	
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Blaming	the	propaganda	battle	between	the	Lang	and	Communist	candidates	in	the	
union’s	1934	elections,	in	1935	the	Miners	Federation	introduced	a	new	rule	banning	
campaign	material.201	This	advantaged	the	incumbents	as	it	made	it	harder	for	rivals	
to	become	known	to	the	members.	This	prohibition	on	campaign	material	was	not	as	
bad	 as	 the	 AWU’s	 ban	 on	 election	 campaigning	 as	Miners	 Federation	 candidates	
could	still	tour	mines	and	seek	media	publicity.	The	close	mining	communities	also	
meant	that	information	could	travel	through	informal	workplace	and	social	channels	
in	a	way	that	it	could	not	amongst	the	scattered	AWU	membership.	By	the	end	of	the	
interwar	 period	 the	 Communist	 Miners	 Federation	 leadership	 had	 eroded	 free	
communication	somewhat	but	to	nowhere	near	the	extent	as	had	occurred	in	the	
AWU.	
	
Conclusion	
Miners	 Federation	 democracy	 had	 its	 weaknesses.	 Open	 votes	 and	 compulsory	
membership	 could	 undermine	 democracy	 through	 pressure,	 intimidation,	 apathy	
and	hostility.	Inequality	between	officials	and	members	encouraged	elitism	amongst	
the	leaders	and	free	communication	within	the	union	declined	under	the	Communist	
leadership.	But	compared	with	the	AWU,	and	by	the	standards	of	the	literature	on	
other	large,	national	unions	in	Australia	and	internationally,	the	Miners	Federation	
was	highly	democratic.		
	
Democratic	rules,	high	levels	of	membership	decision-making	and	strong	organised	
opposition	all	 facilitated	 this	democracy.	At	 its	 foundation	was	 the	miners’	 strong	
occupational	community	and	democratic	culture	through	which	members	were	able	
to	pressure	leaders	“from	below”	and	elect	officials	who	believed	in	high	levels	of	
rank-and-file	control.	Labor	Party	affiliation	had	mixed	effects.	On	the	pro-democracy	
side	 it	 provided	 organised	 opposition	 to	 the	 sitting	 officials	 but	 on	 the	 anti-
democracy	side	it	increased	the	status	gap	between	members	and	officials,	increased	
membership	 passivity	 by	 privileging	 political	 action	 over	 industrial	 action,	 and	
reduced	the	capacity	of	Common	Cause	to	facilitate	free	union	communication.
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CHAPTER	V	
Building	a	national	Miners	Federation	
Strong	occupational	 communities	are	essential	 for	union	democracy.	This	 chapter	
focuses	in	on	the	issue	of	local	autonomy	and	investigates	how	the	Miners	Federation	
remained	democratic	while	shifting	away	from	local	occupational	communities	and	
local	 democracy	 and	 towards	 a	 national	 occupational	 community	 and	 national	
democracy.	Federation	created	new	opportunities	for	the	miners	but	it	also	created	
challenges.	Throughout	the	interwar	period	there	were	tensions	between	traditional	
local	 loyalties	 on	 one	 side	 and	 the	 new	 national	 organisation	 on	 the	 other.	 To	
overcome	these	 local	 loyalties,	 the	Miners	Federation	successfully	built	a	national	
mining	community.	
	
Much	of	the	organisational	work	of	the	Miners	Federation	from	1915	to	1939	was	
concerned	with	resisting	local	challenges	in	order	to	hold	the	federation	together.	
This	was	rarely	a	problem	in	the	AWU,	which	had	been	organised	from	the	top	down	
and	 had	 not	 been	 built	 on	 strong	 existing	 local	 unions.	 Advocates	 of	 federation	
amongst	the	miners	needed	to	overcome	two	forms	of	local	loyalty.	First,	“localism”	
is	an	ideology	that	privileges	location	over	other	forms	of	identity	with	the	effect	of	
promoting	unity	between	classes	and	concealing	class	interests.1	Second,	what	I	will	
call	“localised	occupational	communities”	occur	when	workers	feel	strong	loyalty	and	
communion	with	 the	 workers	 in	 their	 industry	 in	 their	 location	 but	 far	 less	 with	
workers	 in	 the	 same	 industry	 in	 other	 locations.	 This	 is	 a	 related	 but	 distinct	
phenomenon	from	localism	because	localised	occupational	communities	may	or	may	
not	be	loyal	to	other	groups	and	individuals	in	their	locality	such	as	employers.	
	
Local	 loyalties	 manifested	 in	 a	 range	 of	 problematic	 ways	 within	 the	 Miners	
Federation.	 Unauthorised	 local	 stoppages	 undermined	 the	 very	 reasons	 that	 the	
Federation	had	been	created,	as	they	challenged	its	claim	to	be	a	united,	disciplined	
organisation	that	would	fight	as	one	unit,	speak	as	one	voice	and	honour	agreements	
and	awards.	Furthermore,	some	members’	reluctance	and	refusal	to	pay	strike	levies	
																																								 																				
1	Erik	Eklund,	"The	'Place'	of	Politics:	Class	and	Localist	Politics	at	Port	Kembla,	1900-30,"	Labour	
History	78(2000):	95.	
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for	 distant	miners	 threatened	 the	 financial	 security	 of	 the	 union.	 Local	 decisions	
being	made	 at	 the	 national	 level	 undermined	 the	 effectiveness	 and	 unity	 of	 the	
Miners	Federation	because	miners	nationally	did	not	understand	 issues	as	well	as	
locals	did,	and	the	interests	of	the	miners	in	one	location	were	often	opposed	to	the	
interests	 of	 those	 in	 another.	 Localism	 and	 positive	 relationships	 between	 mine	
owners	and	miners	further	undermined	Miners	Federation	unity	and	caused	many	
smaller	 collieries	 to	 be	 outside	 the	 Federation.	 The	 Great	 Depression	 further	
encouraged	 local	 thinking	 amongst	 some	 miners	 with	 increased	 hostility	 to	
“outsiders”	taking	“local	work”.	
	
Yet	the	Miners	Federation	overcame	these	challenges	and	became	one	of	the	most	
powerful	 and	 successful	 unions	 in	 Australian	 history.	 Crucially,	 unlike	 other	 big	
national	unions,	notably	 the	AWU,	the	miners	did	so	while	remaining	democratic.	
They	achieved	this	impressive	feat	by	building	a	strong	national	mining	community.	
This	 was	 a	 different	 kind	 of	 community	 from	 the	 miners’	 longstanding	 local	
occupational	communities	because	a	national	mining	community	was	one	in	which	
all	the	members	could	not	know	or	interact	with	one	another.	It	was	therefore	what	
Benedict	Anderson	called	an	“imagined	community”.2	
	
Just	as	Anderson	argued	that	daily	newspapers	printed	in	the	common	tongue	were	
the	key	to	the	formation	of	national	imagined	communities,	the	Miners	Federation’s	
national	newspaper,	Common	Cause,	was	a	key	component	in	the	construction	of	the	
miners’	 national	 imagined	 community.	 Common	 Cause	 exposed	 miners	 to	 the	
thoughts	and	practices	of	miners	nationwide.	It	highlighted	their	shared	experiences,	
interests	and	dangers	and	recounted	the	history	of	mining	and	the	 improvements	
won	through	collective	struggle.	Shared	entertainment	and	sport	between	regions	
further	 enhanced	 national	 sentiment,	 as	 did	 the	 national	 organisation	 of	 the	
Women’s	Auxiliaries	in	the	1930s.	
	
																																								 																				
2	Benedict	Anderson,	Imagined	communities:	reflections	on	the	origin	and	spread	of	nationalism		
(London:	Verso,	1991).	
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Rising	 levels	 of	 class	 consciousness	 amongst	 the	 miners	 was	 the	 final	 crucial	
ingredient	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 national	 mining	 community.	 The	 historiography	
explains	the	interwar	rise	in	class	consciousness	amongst	the	miners	as	a	result	of	
the	workplace	conflict	that	is	inherent	to	mining,	the	social	and	economic	conditions	
of	 the	First	World	War	and	Great	Depression,	 and	 the	period’s	prominent	 radical	
ideologies	 and	 organisations	 like	 the	 Communist	 Party	 of	 Australia	 (CPA)	 and	 its	
Militant	Minority	(MM).	I	add	to	this	analysis,	elaborating	on	it	in	relation	to	the	more	
practical	 application	 of	 anti-capitalist	 ideology	 by	 the	 leadership,	 the	 effects	 of	
changing	mine	management	techniques,	and	the	increasing	inclusion	of	women	in	
the	 miners’	 community.	 These	 factors	 combined	 to	 create	 a	 national	 mining	
community	 which	 formed	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 Miners	 Federation’s	 national	
organisational	democracy.	
	
Figure	23	Coal	miners	next	to	a	coal	train	at	Gartlee	mine	near	Newcastle	in	1898.3	
	
	
	
																																								 																				
3	Ralph	Snowball.	NLA	210118543.	
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Historiography	
Robin	Gollan	argued	that	the	formation	of	the	Miners	Federation	in	1915	succeeded	
where	 previous	 attempts	 had	 failed	 because	 of	 the	 miners’	 increased	 militancy	
brought	about	by	the	First	World	War,	a	growing	awareness	amongst	the	miners	that	
“division	 meant	 weakness”	 and	 the	 able	 leadership	 of	 Albert	 Willis	 and	 Jack	
Baddeley.4	The	successful	1916	strike	then	“cemented	the	bonds	of	the	Federation”.5	
Edgar	Ross	highlighted	the	same	factors	but	argued	more	explicitly	in	terms	of	class	
consciousness,	contending	that	it	was	“many	years	before	experience	convinced	of	
the	truth	of	class	transcending	sectional	interests,	of	the	need	for	national	unity	to	
achieve	common	aims”.6	
	
These	historians	argued	that	class	consciousness	came	easily	to	the	miners	due	to	
the	owners’	naked	exploitation	of	mineworkers	and	disregard	for	their	safety.	The	
fact	that	class	consciousness	became	stronger	during	the	First	World	War	and	over	
the	 interwar	period	was	primarily	 due	 to	 the	 social	 and	economic	 circumstances,	
most	notably	the	Great	Depression.	Although	they	did	not	use	this	terminology,	both	
historians	acknowledged	that	in	order	to	succeed	the	Miners	Federation	needed	to	
convince	 various	 localised	 mining	 communities	 to	 become	 part	 of	 a	 national	
community	of	miners.	But	the	fact	that	these	histories	had	little	focus	on	the	miners’	
internal	 structure,	 organisation	 or	 democracy	 means	 that	 these	 issues	 were	 not	
explored	in	detail.		
	
Gollan	and	Ross	gave	even	 less	attention	 to	 localism.	Throughout	 their	narratives	
they	tacitly	acknowledged	some	instances	of	 localism	but	they	never	explored	the	
tensions	 between	 localism	 and	 national	 organisation	 or	 class	 consciousness. 7	
Instead,	their	overriding	arguments	concerned	the	high	levels	of	class	conflict	that	
existed	between	the	miners	and	mine	owners.	Gollan	presented	the	class	conflict	as	
																																								 																				
4	Robin	Gollan,	The	Coalminers	Coal	Miners	of	New	South	Wales:	A	History	of	the	Union,	1860-1960		
(Parkville:	Melbourne	University	Press,	1963):	135.	
5	Ibid.,	148.	
6	Edgar	Ross,	A	History	of	the	Miners	Federation	of	Australia		(Sydney:	Australasian	Coal	and	Shale	
Employees’	Federation,	1970):	3.	
7	Gollan,	The	Coalminers	Coal	Miners	of	New	South	Wales:	A	History	of	the	Union,	1860-1960:	119.	
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timeless,	 arguing	 that	 in	mining	 “more	 than	 in	 any	other	 industry	 employers	 and	
employees	 have	 faced	 each	 other	 as	 enemies”. 8 	Later,	 he	 continued	 that	
“generations	of	industrial	struggle	prepared	miners	for	the	blunt	assertion	that	the	
working	class	and	the	employing	class	have	nothing	in	common”.9	
	
Jim	Comerford	began	mining	in	1927	and	was	Miners	Federation	President	from	1953	
to	1973.	His	book	Lockout	detailed	the	1929	Northern	district	lockout,	based	partly	
on	his	own	memories	and	partly	on	historical	research.	He	argued	that	the	miners’	
militancy	
sprang	from	close-knit,	one	industry	communities	sited	close	to	each	other.	
Everything	in	the	nature	and	dangers	of	mining	worked	to	bring	on	the	clearly	
distinctive	outlook	 among	 the	people	of	 those	pit	 towns	 and	 villages	with	
their	Miners	Federation	lodges,	fiercely	attached	to	their	district	and	central	
organisations.10	
He	 conflated	 miners’	 local	 loyalty	 with	 loyalty	 to	 their	 district	 and	 central	
organisations.	For	Comerford,	the	first	led	logically	into	the	latter.	I	will	demonstrate,	
however,	that	it	was	not	always	so	straightforward,	and	that	local	loyalties	often	led	
to	hostility	to	the	district	and	national	organisations.	
	
Raymond	 Markey’s	 argument	 is	 closer	 to	 my	 own	 than	 Gollan’s.	 Markey	 briefly	
recognised	that	because	of	the	miners’	strong	local	structure	and	history,	“much	of	
the	 history	 of	mining	 unionism	 consists	 of	 a	 struggle	 between	 lodge	 and	 district	
hegemony”. 11 	He	 suggested	 that	 miners	 had	 strong	 local	 communities	 but	 that	
“intercommunity	links”	between	areas	“remained	weak	in	the	nineteenth	century”.	
He	 also	 tacitly	 acknowledged	 the	 existence	 of	 localism:	 “under	 circumstances	 of	
underemployment	an	individual	lodge’s	interests	might	become	identified	with	those	
of	the	local	employers”.12	His	analysis	ended	in	1910	whereas	I	am	concerned	with	
how	these	issues	continued	to	play	out	in	the	decades	following	1915.	
																																								 																				
8	Ibid.,	1.	
9	Ibid.,	123.	
10	Jim	Comerford,	Lockout		(Sydney:	CFMEU,	2006):	17.	
11	Raymond	Markey,	"Trade	Union	Democracy	and	the	Labor	Party	in	NSW	1880-1914,"	Historical	
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12	Ibid.	
	
	
173	
	
There	have	been	several	important	studies	of	localism	in	Australian	mining	towns.13	
As	Barry	McGowan	observed:	
mining	 society	 was	 complex,	 involving	 a	 mosaic	 of	 occupations,	 working	
arrangements,	 ethnic	 and	 religious	 backgrounds	 and	 allegiances.	 Referring	
solely	to	time	worn	clichés	of	class	and	struggle	simply	will	not	do.	A	number	
of	historians	and	sociologists	have	suggested	localism	as	an	additional	aid.14	
Greg	Patmore	 studied	 localism	 in	 Lithgow	 from	1869	 to	 1932.	He	 concluded	 that	
localism	had	both	positive	and	negative	effects	on	the	Lithgow	labour	movement.	On	
the	positive	side,	strikers	received	support	from	local	businesses	but	on	the	negative	
side	local	unionism	fragmented	the	labour	movement	and	support	for	independent	
labour	 political	 candidates	 weakened	 the	 Labor	 Party. 15 	As	 well	 as	 being	 a	
manufacturing	centre,	Lithgow	was	an	important	coal	mining	town	in	the	Western	
NSW	District.	
	
Local	autonomy	in	the	Miners	Federation	
The	Miners	Federation	had	a	highly	centralised	constitution	 in	which	districts	and	
lodges	 had	 little	 formal	 autonomy	 and	 the	 central	 council	 had	 complete	 power	
(assuming	it	could	gain	majority	endorsement	for	its	actions	in	the	nationwide	lodge	
votes).16	On	paper	this	centralisation	seems	similar	to	the	AWU,	but	unlike	the	AWU	
the	Miners	Federation	was	 formed	 through	 the	 fusion	of	 strong	 local	bodies	with	
decades	of	autonomous	operation.17	This	meant	that	in	practice	the	central	council	
did	 not	 have	 as	much	 control	 over	 the	 lodges	 as	 the	 constitution	 suggested.	 The	
central	 council	 often	 pragmatically	 allowed	 the	 districts	 and	 lodges	 significant	
autonomy.	 Local	 variations	 in	 mining	 conditions	 meant	 that	 by	 necessity	 lodges	
retained	a	 large	negotiating	 role.18	Industrial	 agreements	and	awards	operated	as	
																																								 																				
13	Barry	McGowan,	"Class,	Hegemony	and	Localism	:	the	Southern	Mining	Region	of	New	South	
Wales,	1850-1900,"	Labour	History	78(2000);	Greg	Patmore,	"Localism	and	Labour:	Lithgow	1869-
1932,"	Labour	History	78(2000).	
14	Barry	McGowan,	Dust	and	Dreams		(Sydney:	UNSW	Press,	2010).	183.	
15	Patmore,	"Localism	and	Labour:	Lithgow	1869-1932,"	53.	
16	Miners	Federation	Rules	1916,	E165/1/1,	NBAC,	10-11.	
17	Mark	Hearn	and	Harry	Knowles,	One	Big	Union:	A	History	of	the	Australian	Workers'	Union	1886-
1994		(Melbourne	Cambridge	University	Press,	1996):	29.	
18	Markey,	"Trade	Union	Democracy	and	the	Labor	Party	in	NSW	1880-1914,"	78-79.	
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minimum	standards,	at	least	in	theory,	and	there	were	local	fortnightly	negotiations	
for	prices	based	on	the	difficulty	of	extraction.19	
	
Most	of	the	lodges	cooperated	with	the	Federation	most	of	the	time	but	the	central	
officials	 knew	 they	 could	 not	 simply	 dictate	 to	 them.	When	 they	 left	 the	 central	
officials	no	other	choice,	lodges	were	expelled	from	the	Federation	and	it	was	normal	
for	 several	 lodges	 to	 be	 outside	 the	 Federation	 at	 any	 one	 time. 20 	But	 unlike	
temporary	 AWU	 workplaces,	 mining	 lodges	 could	 remain	 healthy	 without	 the	
Federation,	which	could	not	afford	to	alienate	too	many,	so	appeasement	prevailed	
and	 lodges	 were	 usually	 welcomed	 back	 into	 the	 fold	 fairly	 quickly.	 Strong	 local	
organisation	enhanced	democracy	because	 it	meant	that	there	were	always	 lodge	
leaders	 who	 could	 form	 rival	 leaderships	 to	 challenge	 the	 district	 and	 federal	
officials.21	
	
The	 arbitration	 courts	 encouraged	 union	 centralisation	 and	 discipline	 within	 the	
Miners	Federation	as	they	had	within	the	AWU.	Arbitration	courts	refused	to	hear	
the	miners’	case	while	any	collieries	were	stopped.22	Arbitration	thereby	forced	the	
Miners	 Federation	 to	 either	 control	 or	 expel	 rebel	 lodges. 23 	In	 response	 to	
unauthorised	 stoppages,	 Justice	 H.	 B.	 Higgins,	 President	 of	 the	 Commonwealth	
Arbitration	Court	from	1907	to	1920,	said	“apparently	the	men	are	not	loyal	to	the	
public	nor	 to	 their	own	union”	and	“if	 the	executive	were	not	able	 to	control	 the	
union	there	must	be	other	men	to	take	charge.	No	union	[is]	worthy	unless	it	secures	
the	 loyalty	 of	 the	men”.24	Central	 control	 over	 stoppages	 also	 allowed	 for	 better	
state-wide	or	nationwide	industrial	tactics.	Despite	these	pressures,	the	strong	local	
occupational	communities	and	history	of	local	lodge	autonomy	meant	that	expansion	
of	central	control	was	contested	and	slow.		
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21	Ross,	A	History	of	the	Miners	Federation	of	Australia:	346.	
22	“Coal	mining	difficulty,”	Newcastle	Herald	20	October	1916,	4.	
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Localism	and	localised	mining	communities	before	the	Miners	Federation	
By	the	early	twentieth	century	the	miners’	occupational	communities	were	strong	
but	they	were	primarily	 localised	to	 individual	mining	towns.	Local	unionists	often	
resisted	regional	or	national	organisation	because	they	believed	that	they	would	lose	
autonomy	and	have	to	follow	the	orders	of	distant	leaders	who	did	not	understand	
local	issues.25	On	the	other	hand,	pressures	and	incentives	promoting	regional	and	
national	organisation	included	preventing	workers	from	other	areas	acting	as	strike-
breakers	 in	 local	 disputes,	 access	 to	 funds	 during	 strikes,	 admission	 to	 state	 and	
federal	arbitration	courts	and	increased	political	and	economic	influence.26	
	
Nevertheless,	there	was	often	more	to	divide	mining	communities	from	one	another	
than	 there	 was	 to	 unite	 them.	 Before	 Federation,	 local	 and	 district	 agreements	
usually	provided	for	miners’	wages	to	rise	and	fall	with	owners’	profits.	The	miners	
and	owners	in	each	location	had	interests	in	common	against	the	miners	and	owners	
of	rival	mines.	The	classic	example	occurred	in	the	Northern	NSW	coalfields	in	1878	
and	1879.	The	coal	mines	there	operated	in	a	cartel	known	as	the	“Vend”,	which	set	
a	universal	minimum	price.	Lambton	owners	started	selling	below	the	Vend	price	to	
increase	 their	market	 share	 and	 the	 Lambton	miners’	 lodge	 cooperated	with	 the	
owners	 as	 a	 larger	 market	 share	 meant	 more	 work	 and	 higher	 wages. 27 	This	
generated	 great	 hostility	 towards	 the	 Lambton	miners	 and	 the	 Northern	miners’	
union	expelled	the	Lambton	lodge.	
	
In	the	1910s	letters	to	the	editor	in	local	newspapers	from	professed	members	of	the	
miners’	 unions	 often	 advocated	 cooperation	 with	 mine	 owners.	 “Not	 satisfied”	
complained	 about	 the	 Northern	 leaders’	 radicalism	 and	 hoped	 that	 “more	
harmonious	 feeling	 may	 be	 created	 between	 employers	 and	 employees	 for	 the	
general	advancement	and	prosperity	of	the	coal	trade”.28	Another	wrote	favourably	
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26	Ibid.	
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of	an	owner,	reminding	readers	that	“he	has	spent	a	few	hundred	thousand	pounds	
in	opening	out	a	colliery	in	the	vicinity	of	Kurri	Kurri	which	has	been	the	means	of	
providing	work	 for	 about	 800	 persons”.29	“Old	Newcastle	miner”	 argued	 similarly	
against	 radicalism,	 the	 Industrial	 Workers	 of	 the	 World	 (IWW)	 and	 strikes	 and	
advocated	“an	expansion	of	the	Newcastle	coal	trade	that	is	so	urgently	needed	to	
fill	the	stomachs	by	those	who	are…	dependent	on	the	coal	mining	industry	of	the	
north”.30	
	
In	 1907	 the	Northern	miners	 had	 adopted	 the	 IWW	preamble	which	began:	 “the	
working	class	and	the	employing	class	have	nothing	in	common”.31	But	in	reality	mine	
owners	and	mining	unions	often	cooperated.	During	the	1909	strike	the	Northern	
miners	made	a	clever	deal	with	two	independent	coal	owners	at	Young	Wallsend	and	
Ebbw	Vale:	the	union	would	allow	members	to	keep	working	in	those	mines	and	the	
owners	and	the	union	would	split	the	inflated	profits	caused	by	the	scarcity	of	coal.		
Unfortunately	 for	 the	miners,	 the	government	blocked	 the	 scheme	by	 refusing	 to	
carry	the	coal	on	the	railways.32	
	
Owners	 and	 unions	 also	 cooperated	 when	 the	 coal	 trade	 in	 their	 region	 was	
threatened.	In	1911	the	Northern	miners	adopted	a	resolution	encouraging	the	NSW	
Minister	for	Mines	to	set	a	minimum	price	for	coal	leaving	the	port	of	Newcastle.33	
Later	that	year	the	Mayor	of	Newcastle	convened	a	meeting	of	the	local	chamber	of	
commerce,	politicians	and	trade	unions	to	object	to	control	of	Newcastle	Harbour	by	
the	Sydney	Harbour	Trust.34	In	1916	coal	owners	and	union	representatives	travelled	
to	Melbourne	together	to	lobby	the	federal	government	to	assist	the	Newcastle	coal	
trade.35	
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Employers	 and	 governments	 encouraged	 local	 thinking	 and	 local	 loyalty	 amongst	
miners.	Owners	and	state	industrial	tribunals	deliberately	made	agreements	so	that	
they	ended	 in	different	districts	at	different	 times	 to	discourage	union	campaigns	
across	multiple	districts.36	Mine	owners	would	often	agree	 to	meet	and	negotiate	
with	miners	and	representatives	from	their	own	mine	or	region	but	not	from	larger	
district	bodies.37	
	
Financial	disputes	within	districts	encouraged	local	lodge	loyalty.	It	is	not	surprising	
that	members	did	not	enjoy	paying	strike	levies	for	other	miners,	which	were	usually	
about	5	per	cent	of	their	salary	but	could	be	as	high	as	20	per	cent.38	Members	felt	
that	 they	were	 constantly	paying	 levies	 to	 support	miners	 from	other	 lodges	 and	
then,	when	 they	 needed	 support,	 the	 district	 officials	 refused.	 Disputes	 between	
lodges	and	between	the	district	and	lodges	over	money	were	commonplace.	In	1910	
the	 Northern	 district	 delegate	 board	 rejected	 a	 request	 for	 funds	 from	 Young	
Wallsend	Lodge.	In	reply,	the	lodge	unsuccessfully	requested	a	refund	of	a	strike	levy	
it	 had	paid	earlier	 that	 year.39	Miners	 also	 complained	 that	when	mines	 that	had	
enjoyed	good	employment	for	years	went	on	strike,	they	were	supported	by	others	
who	had	had	little	work.40	Members	especially	resented	recent	arrivals	to	a	mine	or	
district	 receiving	 strike	 pay.	 During	 the	 1910	 strike	 the	 Northern	 delegate	 board	
voted	that	relief	money	would	not	be	paid	to	any	“fresh	applicants”.41	
	
Local	miners	did	not	like	being	told	what	to	do	by	district	officials	who	they	often	felt	
did	not	understand	local	conditions.	In	1914	the	Northern	miners	expelled	the	Minmi	
lodge	for	signing	an	agreement	with	their	owners	that	barred	district	officials	sitting	
on	the	local	arbitration	board.42	Minmi	miner	Walter	Rawling	complained:	“I	do	not	
see	what	good	any	of	the	executive	officers	are	on	local	arbitration	boards	as	in	nine	
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cases	out	of	ten	the	local	secretary	has	to	explain	to	them	for	two	or	three	hours”	
and	even	then	“they	cannot	conduct	the	case	half	as	well	as	the	local	officers”.43		
	
Miners	especially	did	not	like	being	told	what	to	do	by	district	officials	in	regard	to	
political	affiliation.	In	1910	the	Northern	miners	officials	advocated	affiliation	with	
the	 Labor	Party.	Many	members	 complained	 that	 they	did	not	 support	 the	 Labor	
Party,	usually	because	it	was	too	conservative,	and	that	they	did	not	want	their	union	
dues	being	used	to	support	a	party	they	opposed.	David	Williams	feared	that	“the	
time	is	at	hand	when	union	officials	shall	say	to	everyone	seeking	employment	‘you	
must	accept	the	same	religion	and	support	the	same	political	party	as	us	if	you	want	
to	become	a	member	of	our	society’”.44	Dave	McNeill	wrote	that	“I	and	others	right	
through	 the	 five	 lodges	 of	 the	 West	 Wallsend	 district	 have	 pointed	 out	 that	 a	
determined	and	bitter	fight	will	be	made	on	this	question	of	political	freedom”.45	
	
These	 widespread	 local	 sentiments	 meant	 that	 even	 as	 moves	 for	 a	 national	
federation	were	growing	in	the	early	1910s,	there	were	others	campaigning	to	scale	
back	 district	 amalgamations.	 In	 1911,	 lodges	 in	 the	 Teralba	 and	Maitland	 regions	
unsuccessfully	 tried	 to	 create	 smaller	 district	 unions	 separate	 from	 the	 Northern	
union.46	In	1914	the	Albadere	 lodge	submitted	a	resolution	for	 the	abolition	of	all	
central	positions.47	This	was	a	reaction	against	the	financial	cost	of	central	officials	
which	Albadere	thought	was	unnecessary.48	
	
Prior	to	the	successful	Federation	in	1915	there	had	been	several	failed	attempts.	By	
1910	the	Northern,	Southern,	Western	NSW	and	Victorian	mining	unions	had	formed	
the	Federated	Coal	and	Shale	Workers	Association	but	it	was	primarily	consultative	
and	did	not	have	any	authority	over	the	districts.	Even	this	toothless	federation	was	
too	much	for	some	localist	miners,	and	there	were	various	attempts	to	disband	it.49	
																																								 																				
43	Ibid.	
44	David	Williams,	“Colliery	Employees	Federation,”	NH	15	March	1911,	11.	
45	David	McNeill,	“Colliery	Employees	Federation,”	NH	19	November	1910,	11.	
46	An	old	Newcastle	miner,	“Colliery	Employees	Federation,”	NH	12	May	1911,	6.	
47	“Delegate	board	meeting,”	NH	16	October	1914,	4.	
48	Walter	Rawling,	“The	Miners	Federation,”	NH	3	June	1914,	10.	
49	Andrew	Grey,	“Federated	coal	and	shale	workers,”	NH	2	January	1911,	7.	
	
	
179	
John	Brown,	 secretary	 of	 the	Aberdare	miners	 lodge,	 argued	 that	 the	 lodges	had	
better	local	knowledge,	that	the	association	had	no	power	over	districts	anyway	so	
it	was	pointless,	and	that	there	were	already	more	than	enough	well	paid	officials	
without	a	federation.50	
	
Challenges	to	the	Federation	
Local	sentiments	did	not	just	disappear	with	Federation	in	1915.	Even	by	1936	J.N.	
Teerman	complained	in	Common	Cause	that	“petty	inter-lodge	jealousy	and	distrust”	
was	“rampant”	and	“must	be	liquidated	before	any	lasting	measure	of	unity	can	be	
achieved”. 51 	He	 argued	 that	 all	 individual	 lodge	 picnics	 and	 outings	 “should	 be	
converged	into	a	combined	picnic	sports	day	for	the	purpose	of	bringing	the	whole	
of	the	mineworkers	and	their	families	together”.	He	also	proposed	additional	sports	
competitions	between	lodges	and	districts	and	ended	his	letter:	“mass	contact,	rank	
and	file	control!”52	
	
The	most	common	manifestation	of	local	loyalty	was	local	stoppages	which	had	not	
been	authorised	by	the	central	union.	These	continued	to	be	a	major	problem	for	the	
Miners	Federation	central	officials	 throughout	the	 interwar	period.	Between	1919	
and	 1922	 there	were	 900	 separate	 stoppages	 on	 the	 Northern	 coalfields,	mostly	
unauthorised. 53 	Unauthorised	 stoppages	 undermined	 the	 Federation’s	 ability	 to	
convince	owners,	governments,	arbitration	courts	and	the	public	that	it	was	a	united,	
disciplined	 organisation	 that	 would	 honour	 agreements.	 Metcalfe	 argued	 that	
“support	 for	 petty	 stoppages	 drew	 on	 reluctance	 to	work	 and	 the	 interaction	 of	
resentments	and	loyalties	within	the	workforce”.54	It	also	drew	on	suspicion	of	the	
arbitration	 system	 and	 the	 motives	 and	 loyalties	 of	 national	 Miners	 Federation	
officials.	
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Arbitration	 judges,	mine	owners	and	union	 leaders	all	wanted	discipline.	Metcalfe	
argued	 that	 this	was	 a	Michelsian	 example	of	 the	 elite	 interests	 of	 union	 leaders	
being	opposed	to	the	interests	of	members.	He	argued	that	“officers’	credibility	and	
effectiveness	 with	 owners,	 arbitration	 courts,	 political	 leaders	 and	 other	 union	
officials	 depended	 on	 their	 ability	 to	 predict	 and	 control	 the	 actions	 of	 their	
members.	 To	 do	 their	 job	 therefore	 they	 had	 to	 stifle	 a	 range	of	 their	members’	
political	 responses”. 55 	Certainly	 many	 members	 believed	 this	 was	 the	 case.	 A	
meeting	of	1200	striking	miners	in	Adamstown	in	1923	expressed	these	suspicions	of	
distant	officials.	A	slim	majority	endorsed	the	officials’	compromise	agreement	with	
the	 owners	 but	 the	 SMH	 reported	 that	 the	 meeting	 was	 marked	 by	 frequent	
interruptions	 and	 “general	 pandemonium”.	 Arthur	 Teece’s	 claim	 that	 “if	 the	
members	of	the	Maitland	district	had	had	their	way	the	Federation	would	have	been	
broken	 up”	 was	met	 with	 “uproar”.	 There	 were	 cries	 of	 “you	 have	 sold	 us”	 and	
“adjourn	the	meeting”.	Willis	then	said	that	the	men	who	were	trying	to	bring	the	
meeting	to	a	close	were	the	“enemies	of	labour”	and	“out	to	wreck	the	Federation”.	
He	 would	 “fight	 the	 whole	 damned	 lot	 of	 them”.	 The	 crowd	 replied	 with	 more	
“uproar”	and	further	cries	of	“you’ve	sold	us!”56	
	
All	the	same,	Metcalfe’s	argument	underplays	the	extent	to	which	the	countervailing	
tendencies	 of	 rank-and-file	 pressure	 on	 the	 leaders	 and	 the	 leaders’	 belief	 in	
democracy	 could	 counteract	 the	 tendency	 to	elitism.	 For	example,	 Jack	Savage,	 a	
miner	 in	 the	 Western	 District	 in	 the	 1930s,	 recalled	 that	 the	 Neubecks	 lodge	
“produced	one	of	the	best	secretaries	the	Western	District	ever	had.	A	fellow	by	the	
name	of	Jock	Jamison	and	he	was	a	true	believer	in	every	bloody	thing.	The	men	were	
never	wrong	and	he	always	stuck	by	the	principle	that	men	wouldn’t	be	fighting	if	
they	 wasn’t	 bloody	 right”. 57 	Federation	 officials	 consistently	 and	 sometimes	
successfully	lobbied	for	the	arbitration	courts	to	be	complemented	by	local	tribunals	
to	hear	local	grievances	on	short	notice.58	In	1926,	moreover,	some	Northern	district	
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officials	sought	to	reorganise	the	Federation	to	better	deal	with	local	disputes.	The	
plan	 involved	appointing	 local	dispute	committees	but	 it	also	 involved	moving	the	
Federation	 headquarters	 from	 Sydney	 to	 Newcastle	 and	 abolishing	 the	 central	
council.	It	was	really	an	attempted	coup	by	the	giant	Northern	district	to	take	over	
the	Federation,	and	the	central	council	rejected	it.59	Unauthorised	stoppages	were	
the	biggest	problem	within	the	Federation	and	therefore	made	a	good	cover	for	the	
attempted	take-over.	
	
Levies	were	another	source	of	tension.	Many	miners	did	not	see	why	they	should	pay	
for	what	they	saw	as	the	follies	of	distant	miners.	In	1923	a	section	of	Barrier	men	
refused	to	pay	the	15	per	cent	Maitland	levy	and	the	Federation	ordered	the	Barrier	
district	to	expel	any	who	had	not	paid.60	Many	Queenslanders	also	refused	to	pay	the	
levy,	especially	at	Ipswich.	The	Miners	Federation	took	one	Ipswich	member	to	the	
local	police	court	and	won	the	right	to	force	him	to	pay	the	levy.61	
	
Federation	decisions	 to	 provide	or	 refuse	 relief	 payments	 to	 striking	 lodges	were	
always	controversial.	As	had	been	the	case	within	the	districts	prior	to	Federation,	
many	members	felt	that	they	were	constantly	paying	levies	to	support	miners	from	
other	 areas	 but	 when	 they	 needed	 support	 the	 Federation	 refused.	 In	 1932	 the	
Wallsend	miners	lodge	refused	to	pay	the	5	per	cent	levy	for	Wonthaggi	in	Victoria	
because	they	had	received	no	financial	support	during	their	own	stoppage	earlier	in	
the	year.62	At	the	1925	Convention	a	motion	had	passed	which	appeared	to	take	the	
power	 to	 authorise	 strikes	 from	 the	 central	 council	 and	 give	 it	 to	 the	 district	
executives	while	 still	 using	 the	 central	 funds.	 This	 situation	was	 clearly	 financially	
unsustainable	 and	 the	 central	 council	 rejected	 that	 interpretation.	 In	 response,	 a	
minority	of	Northern	officials	and	members	moved	unsuccessfully	to	split	from	the	
Federation.63	
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Both	 stoppages	 and	 levies	 were	 part	 of	 the	 wider	 problem	 of	 local	 issues	 being	
decided	by	the	national	organisation.	As	we	saw	 in	the	previous	chapter,	national	
decisions	were	made	in	a	highly	democratic	way.	Central	council	needed	to	approve	
stoppages,	relief	pay	and	levies	but	then	their	decisions	were	submitted	to	the	lodges	
nationwide	for	approval	or	rejection.64	Yet	this	high	level	of	national	democracy	did	
not	 change	 the	 fact	 that	decisions	were	not	being	made	at	 the	 local	 level	 by	 the	
people	involved,	and	many	miners	did	not	appreciate	“outside	interference”.	Even	
by	1955,	when	Walter	“Pincher”	Smart	became	Southern	President,	he	recalled	that	
when	 he	 visited	 local	 lodges	 “there	 was	 some	 kind	 of	 trouble	 at	 nearly	 every	
meeting.”65	When	he	addressed	a	rowdy	pit	top	meeting	at	Scarborough,	one	of	the	
men	stood	up	and	said:	
I’ve	never	heard	so	much	bullshit	in	my	life.	This	bloody	fellow	comes	out	here	
from	Corrimal	pit	top,	trying	to	tell	us	what	to	do?	Tell	him	to	piss	off!	We’ve	
had	enough	of	him!66	
These	disputes	often	led	to	fist	fights	between	members	and	even	between	members	
and	officials.	Such	conflicts	were	said	to	have	been	settled	in	the	“bull	paddock”.67	
Smart	recalled	that	“in	those	days	many	an	argument	was	settled	in	this	way	without	
any	holding	of	grudges”.68	
	
National	 control	 over	 local	 issues	 was	 problematic	 not	 only	 because	miners	 and	
officials	nationwide	did	not	understand	issues	as	well	as	the	people	involved,	but	also	
because	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 miners	 in	 one	 location	 were	 often	 opposed	 to	 the	
interests	of	miners	in	another	location.	In	late	1929,	during	the	Northern	lockout,	the	
Northern	district	leaders	supported	a	compromise	with	owners	and	the	end	of	the	
lockout.	But	the	representatives	from	other	districts	on	the	central	council	blocked	
the	resumption.	The	SMH	claimed	that	even	though	they	were	paying	a	12.5	per	cent	
levy,	the	other	districts	were	still	better	off	because	the	removal	of	Northern	coal	
from	the	market	meant	more	demand	and	higher	prices.69	Whether	or	not	the	SMH	
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was	correct	about	the	motivations	of	the	central	councillors,	many	northern	miners	
believed	that	it	was.	The	SMH	reported	widespread	feeling	in	the	north	against	the	
Federation	which	undesirably	“centralise[d]	authority	which	should	be	in	the	hands	
of	the	lodge	members”.70	In	1932	the	John	Darling	lodge	refused	the	central	council’s	
instruction	for	a	sympathy	strike	with	the	Newcastle	branch	of	the	Seamen’s	Union.	
Members	nationwide	supported	the	sympathy	strike,	but	it	was	easy	for	them	to	take	
a	principled	stand	of	class	solidarity	because	it	did	not	affect	their	wages.71	
	
A	similar	example	occurred	when	miners	at	Wonthaggi	in	Victoria	went	on	strike	in	
1934.	Representatives	from	NSW	coal	owners	quickly	travelled	to	Melbourne	seeking	
to	exploit	the	situation	and	secure	coal	contracts	for	a	minimum	of	between	one	and	
two	years.72	This	would	have	meant	more	work	for	NSW	miners	and	former	trade	
union	official	George	Waite	wrote	that	the	NSW	miners	were	“quite	willing	to	levy	
themselves	a	few	shillings	weekly	to	prolong	the	struggle	at	Wonthaggi	whilst	they	
are	 financial	 gainers	 thereby”. 73 	The	 1934	 strike	 was	 successful	 but	 ill	 feelings	
towards	NSW	miners	remained.	Three	years	 later	when	Wonthaggi	went	on	strike	
again	some	miners	complained	that	they	were	being	“sacrificed”	in	the	interests	of	
NSW	members	and	they	quickly	voted	to	resume	work.74	
	
Localism	and	cooperation	with	employers	continued	long	after	Federation.	As	much	
as	 radical	 officials	 and	members	 preached	 the	 class	 war,	 the	 fact	 remained	 that	
miners	and	owners	often	had	interests	in	common.	Throughout	the	interwar	period	
the	Miners	Federation	called	 for	owners	 to	establish	cartels	and	criticised	owners	
and	 miners	 who	 undercut	 prices.75	Some	 workers	 hated	 their	 mine	 owners,	 but	
relations	between	owners	and	miners	were	amicable	 in	other	places.	 Jack	Savage	
was	a	miner	at	Big	Spur	Colliery	in	Portland,	Victoria	in	the	1930s.	Arthur	Earnshaw	
owned	Big	Spur	and	his	brother	Ike	was	a	horse	trainer	in	Sydney.	Savage	recalled	
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that	 he	 often	 spoke	 to	 Arthur	 about	 horseracing	 and	 asked	 for	 insider	 tips.76	At	
smaller	mines	with	single	owners	and	several	dozen	miners	there	were	often	positive	
relationships	 between	 employers	 and	 employees	 and	 the	 interests	 of	 owner	 and	
workers	were	more	obviously	aligned.	During	strikes,	smaller	mines	would	offer	to	
pay	their	workers	double	to	stay	on	as	coal	prices	increased	due	to	decreased	supply.	
Both	miners	and	owners	 could	make	a	 lot	of	money,	even	 if	 it	meant	 the	miners	
would	 be	 expelled	 from	 the	Miners	 Federation.	 For	 this	 and	 other	 reasons	many	
smaller	mines	were	outside	the	Federation.77	
	
During	the	First	World	War,	a	series	of	mining	company	amalgamations	led	to	the	
formation	 of	 Amalgamated	Collieries	which	 enjoyed	 virtually	 a	monopoly	 on	 coal	
production	from	1920	to	1927.	This	created	huge	profits	for	owners	and	high	wages	
for	miners	but	the	rest	of	society	bore	the	costs	through	inflated	coal	prices.78	In	1928	
members	of	the	Abadere	Central	lodge	met	the	owners	of	their	colliery	and	reached	
agreement	without	the	Federation.79	The	SMH	claimed	that	many	other	lodges	also	
wished	 to	 deal	 directly	with	 their	 employer	 because,	 “in	 the	words	 of	 one	 lodge	
official”,	the	Miners	Federation	executive	“has	never	veered	from	a	policy	of	using	
any	 minor	 pinprick	 as	 justification	 for	 poisoning	 the	 relations	 between	 the	
proprietors	and	their	employees”.80	
	
The	 mine	 owners	 and	 their	 organisations	 encouraged	 localism.	 C.M.	 McDonald,	
President	of	the	Northern	Collieries	Association,	said	that	“the	coalowners	deplore	
the	 cunning	 attempts	 being	 made	 to	 create	 a	 spirit	 of	 hostility	 and	 intolerance	
between	the	owners	and	the	mine	workers	whose	interests	are	practically	identical”.	
He	 continued	 that	 “although	 the	 owners	 have	 suffered	 seriously	 at	 the	 hands	 of	
[Miners	Federation]	officialdom,	they	have	no	quarrel	with	the	rank	and	file	of	mine	
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workers	who,	generally	speaking,	are	industrious	and	loyal	and	good	citizens”.	The	
owners	would	meet	with	the	men	but	not	the	“unhelpful”	officials.81	
	
The	MM’s	growth	from	the	late	1920s	was	based	in	part	on	encouraging	a	return	to	
miners’	 local	organising	through	its	focus	on	job	committees.	This	occurred	during	
the	 Comintern’s	 “Third	 Period”	 in	 which	 it	 encouraged	 Communists	 to	 establish	
alternative	structures	to	the	existing	“social	fascist”	unions.82	The	MM	advocated	job	
control	through	militant	job	committees	at	each	mine.	In	1934	the	MM’s	James	Jack	
was	elected	Northern	president,	defeating	Hoare	who	the	MM	dismissed	as	a	“left	
phrase	monger”.	 Jack	 said	 “it	 is	 only	 rank	 and	 file	 control	 of	 the	workers,	 by	 the	
workers	that	will	allow	them	to	work	out	their	own	destiny	…	I	will	at	all	times	be	
subservient	 to	 the	 rank	 and	 file”. 83 	However,	 the	 CPA	 advocated	 “democratic	
centralism”	in	which	members	were	free	to	discuss	and	debate	an	issue	but	once	the	
majority	had	decided	all	members	must	fall	in	line	with	the	decision.	It	did	not	really	
advocate	 any	 more	 local	 autonomy	 than	 currently	 existed	 within	 the	 Miners	
Federation.		
	
In	fact,	at	the	1928	Miners	Federation	Convention,	the	MM	proposed	to	abolish	all	
the	 districts	 and	 replace	 the	 central	 council	 with	 a	 general	 secretary	 and	 five	
organisers.84	The	proposal	was	defeated	by	a	two	to	one	majority	and	even	many	
who	 voted	 for	 the	 MM	 plan	 did	 so	 more	 from	 dissatisfaction	 with	 the	 current	
leadership	 than	 from	 support	 for	 centralisation. 85 	Unlike	 the	 highly	 democratic	
Miners	Federation,	 the	CPA	was	an	authoritarian	hierarchy	which	extolled	“unity”	
through	 top-down	“iron	discipline”,	 similar	 to	 the	AWU	 in	organisation	but	not	 in	
ideology.86	For	example,	the	CPA	general	secretary	personally	chose	the	Communist	
candidates	 for	 Miners	 Federation	 elections. 87 	CPA	 tactics	 involved	 facing	 the	
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capitalists	 as	 a	 disciplined	 force	which	 in	 practice	 required	 an	 obedient	 rank	 and	
file.88	But	Communist	Miners	Federation	leaders	soon	learned	that	the	miners	were	
not	easy	to	control.	In	1936	the	Communist	leadership	ordered	strikes	at	Lambton	
but	the	members	simply	refused.89	
	
Finally,	 unemployment	 and	 underemployment	 caused	 by	 the	 Great	 Depression	
reinforced	some	miners’	local	loyalties.	Even	in	January	1928	before	the	Depression,	
the	Western	district	adopted	a	resolution	that	unemployed	members	of	the	district	
receive	 first	 preference	 for	 jobs. 90 	During	 the	 Depression	 the	 Western	 district	
pragmatically	ruled	that	only	those	who	had	lived	in	the	area	for	more	than	three	
months	would	receive	relief	payments.91	The	Broken	Hill	district	similarly	closed	the	
books	to	all	but	local	residents	in	1931	and	this	continued	after	the	Depression.92	In	
1939	the	Southern	district	delegate	board	closed	the	books,	refusing	to	accept	any	
new	members	because	of	lack	of	work.93	Yet	the	Depression	also	strengthened	the	
national	outlook	and	class	consciousness	of	many	members,	as	we	will	 see	 in	 the	
following	section.	
	
Keeping	it	together:	Creating	a	national	mining	community	
Advocates	 of	 Federation	 needed	 to	 overcome	 local	 loyalties	 and	 build	 a	 national	
mining	community	but	they	were	not	building	completely	from	scratch.	There	was	a	
limited	 national	 mining	 community	 that	 existed	 before	 Federation.	 For	 example,	
regional	mining	unions	had	sometimes	given	donations	to	other	regions.94	One	of	the	
most	generous	occurred	in	1912	when	the	Southern	miners	levied	sixpence	per	man	
fortnightly	to	support	the	Western	region’s	Lithgow	strikers.95	In	1868	the	southern	
NSW	 miners	 had	 paid	 a	 20	 per	 cent	 levy	 for	 Newcastle	 strikers.96 	This	 financial	
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support	 for	 strikes	 was	 not	 necessarily	 completely	 altruistic;	 as	 we	 have	 seen,	
stoppages	in	one	region	meant	increased	demand	in	others.	
	
The	leaders	of	the	district	unions	visited	and	spoke	in	other	districts.97	Districts	also	
advised	one	another	of	unemployment	so	others	would	not	come	looking	for	work.98	
The	three	NSW	districts	jointly	lobbied	the	NSW	government	on	legislation	and	other	
issues.99	There	was	also	clearly	some	feeling	of	community	amongst	miners	not	only	
within	Australia	but	also	between	Australia	and	Britain.	Australian	regional	unions	
sent	money	to	striking	British	miners	in	1912.100	They	also	sent	money	and	expressed	
sympathy	during	British	mine	disasters.101	
	
In	the	1910s	the	push	for	miners	to	combine	into	a	national	union	was	strengthened	
by	a	desire	to	participate	in	the	Federal	Arbitration	system	and	by	popular	ideologies,	
which	 encouraged	 larger	 union	 organisation.	 Federation	 received	 encouragement	
from	 radical	 organisations	 including	 the	 IWW.	 In	 1911	 T.	 Johnson	 wrote	 to	 the	
Newcastle	 Herald	 encouraging	 his	 fellow	Northern	members	 to	 reject	 capitalism,	
form	a	 single	 industrial	mining	union	and	 join	 the	 IWW.102	From	around	1910	 the	
officials	of	the	various	regional	unions	increasingly	advocated	federation.	In	1911	the	
Northern	 miners	 appointed	 an	 organiser	 to	 work	 towards	 all	 coal	 unions	
combining.103	Three	quarters	(21	of	28)	of	delegates	at	a	quarterly	delegate	board	
meeting	supported	 the	move	 towards	 federation.104	President	David	Watson	said:	
“the	 present	 system	 of	 [employers]	 playing	 fast	 and	 loose	 with	 the	 respective	
organisations	or	using	one	against	another	must	continue	no	longer”.	In	the	past	“the	
men	of	one	state	or	one	district	had	unconsciously	perhaps	worked	against	the	men	
of	another	state	or	district	and	the	result	had	been	disastrous.	In	the	future	they	must	
make	their	demands	conjointly	 if	 they	wished	to	be	successful”.	But	he	cautioned	
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that	they	should	not	be	revolutionary:	“if	there	was	any	hope	for	settled	conditions	
and	peace	in	the	coalmining	industry	it	would	be	through	intelligent	organisation”.105	
	
Building	a	national	mining	occupational	community	meant	creating	what	Anderson	
famously	called	an	“imagined	community”	amongst	people	who	did	not	and	could	
not	 have	 regular	 face-to-face	 interactions.	 Anderson	 argued	 that	 the	 national	
community	"is	imagined	because	the	members	of	even	the	smallest	nation	will	never	
know	most	of	their	fellow-members,	meet	them,	or	even	hear	of	them,	yet	 in	the	
minds	of	each	lives	the	image	of	their	communion".106	So	it	was	within	the	Miners	
Federation.	 Anderson	 identified	 print	 capitalism	 and	 especially	 daily	 newspapers	
printed	in	the	common	language	as	the	key	to	the	formation	of	national	imagined	
communities	from	the	late	eighteenth	century.	As	we	saw	in	the	previous	chapter,	
Gollan	dismissed	Common	Cause	as	“not	peculiarly	a	miners’	paper	but	a	propaganda	
vehicle	 for	 a	 simplified	 socialist	 critique	 of	 capitalism”.107 	I	 disagree	 with	 Gollan;	
Common	Cause	was	a	 key	 component	 in	 the	 construction	of	 the	miners’	national	
imagined	community.	
	
Figure	24	Common	Cause	masthead	in	1924	depicting	different	types	of	workers	
with	a	man	representing	“mining”	standing	in	the	centre.108	
It	 is	 difficult	 to	 quantify	 exactly	 how	 influential	Common	Cause	was	 amongst	 the	
Miners	Federation	membership.	All	Federation	members	received	a	copy	of	Common	
Cause	automatically	as	part	of	membership	so	circulation	does	not	tell	us	much.	For	
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the	period	1890	to	1930,	Martyn	Lyons	and	Lucy	Taksa	estimated	that	87	per	cent	of	
“lower-middle	class”	and	55	per	cent	of	“working	class”	families	in	NSW	purchased	
at	least	one	daily	newspaper	and	more	would	have	read	newspapers	on	an	irregular	
basis.	The	authors	concluded	that	“these	rates	for	newspaper	reading	suggest	a	high	
literacy	rate,	as	well	as	involvement	in	the	world	of	the	printed	word”.109	These	rates	
suggest	that	the	majority	of	Miners	Federation	members	and	their	families	probably	
read	the	weekly	Common	Cause	regularly	and	also	read	at	least	one	additional	daily	
newspaper.	The	Miners	Federation’s	leaders	certainly	thought	Common	Cause	was	
influential	and	important.	Jim	Comerford,	Federation	president	from	1953	to	1973,	
considered	the	establishment	of	Common	Cause	to	be	one	of	the	Miners	Federation’s	
most	outstanding	achievements.110		
	
The	union’s	leaders	recognised	the	importance	of	the	national	newspaper	and	they	
and	the	editors	deliberately	used	it	to	unite	the	miners.	In	1921	Willis	said	“Common	
Cause	is	absolutely	essential	to	our	organisation	for	the	purpose	of	keeping	in	touch	
with	the	whole	of	our	members”.111	When	he	launched	the	new	Common	Cause	in	
1935	Orr	was	even	more	explicit,	saying	that	“the	official	organ	will	devote	its	main	
attention	to	welding	together	a	firm	unity	of	all	mineworkers	in	the	struggle”.112	The	
following	year	he	celebrated	the	fact	that	“the	union	is	now	in	possession	of	its	own	
official	organ	which	can	speak	 to	 the	membership	on	a	Commonwealth	basis	and	
develop	a	uniformity	of	thought	on	the	major	issues	affecting	the	organisation”.113	
	
In	the	previous	chapter	we	saw	that	Common	Cause	passed	through	three	distinct	
phases	 in	 the	 interwar	 period,	 but	 the	 newspaper’s	 efforts	 to	 unite	 the	 miners	
nationally	remained	consistent	throughout.	By	its	very	nature	as	a	national	miners’	
newspaper	it	exposed	members	to	the	experiences	and	opinions	of	miners	in	other	
parts	 of	 Australia.	 Common	 Cause	 also	 frequently	 highlighted	 the	 interests	 that	
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Australian	miners	shared,	the	dangers	of	mining	and	the	need	to	struggle	together	to	
improve	safety.	For	example,	in	1938	Common	Cause	published	a	full	page	of	sheet	
music	for	a	song	about	the	dangers	of	mining	titled	“Don’t	go	down	the	mine,	Dad!	
(A	little	child’s	dream)”.114	There	were	weekly	reports	on	mine	accidents	and	deaths	
in	 Australian	mines	 and	 the	 newspaper	 published	 safety	 inspectors’	 reports	 from	
around	 the	 country.115 	When	 accidents	 occurred	 it	 also	 called	 for	 donations	 for	
victims	and	their	families.116	
	
Common	 Cause	 featured	many	 articles	 on	 the	 history	 of	 nineteenth-century	 coal	
mining	in	Australia	and	Britain	and	the	terrible	wages	and	conditions	which	had	only	
been	 improved	 by	 collective	 struggle. 117 	In	 the	 1920s	 editor	 Samuel	 Rosa,	 a	
prominent	 member	 of	 Sydney’s	 bohemia,	 published	 a	 weekly	 column	 titled	 “A	
Political	History	of	Australia”,	a	serialised	version	of	his	book	of	the	same	name.118	
Terry	Irving	argued	that	Rosa’s	history	was	a	ground-breaking	and	radical	departure	
from	the	conservative	academic	Australian	history	of	the	time	which	set	the	path	for	
the	 subsequent	 histories	 of	 Brian	 Fitzpatrick	 and	 Robin	 Gollan.	 It	 provided	 a	
materialist	 account	 by	 placing	 politics	 firmly	 in	 “the	 economic	 development	 of	
society”	and	highlighted	the	role	of	popular	struggle	in	political	and	social	change.119		
Rosa	 encouraged	 miners,	 when	 reading	 his	 history,	 to	 “let	 it	 fill	 you	 with	 that	
implacable	determination	on	which	success	is	firmly	based,	to	hold	what	has	been	
won	at	such	bitter	cost	and	struggle	over	the	past	century”.120	
	
Entertainment	further	fostered	connections	between	different	mining	communities.	
Sometimes	the	leadership	encouraged	this	activity	but	more	often	it	came	from	local	
impetus.	Local	committees	formed	concert	parties,	which	would	visit	other	areas	and	
perform.	 Evan	 Thomas	 Phillips	 was	 a	 Northern	 miner	 in	 the	 late	 1920s	 and	
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remembered	that	the	coalfields	concerts	“were	very	entertaining	and	of	a	very	high	
cultural	standard	because	there	were	some	very	outstanding	musicians	and	singers	
on	the	coalfields”.	“There	was	no	shortage	of	artists	and	the	groups	would	do	a	great	
circuit	of	the	mining	towns	and	villages”,	he	recalled.121	
	
Women	formed	their	own	organisation	within	the	Miners	Federation	in	1934.	As	a	
national	 organisation,	 the	 Women’s	 Auxiliaries	 officially	 extended	 the	 Miners	
Federation’s	 national	 community	 to	minefield	women.	 They	were	 for	 the	 “wives,	
mothers,	 sisters	 and	 daughters”	 of	 Miners	 Federation	 members	 and	 “any	 other	
women	interested”.122	The	auxiliaries	had	grown	out	of	the	women’s	department	of	
the	CPA’s	Unemployed	Workers	Movement	during	 the	Great	Depression.123	Other	
Communist	led	unions	such	as	the	Australian	Railways	Union	(ARU)	and	Waterside	
Workers	also	formed	Women’s	Auxiliaries	 in	the	1930s,	but	these	unions	were	30	
years	behind	the	NSW	Labor	Party	which	possessed	a	Women’s	Central	Organising	
Committee	from	1904.124	
	
This	30	year	gap	partly	reflected	the	differences	between	trade	unions	and	the	Labor	
Party,	which	I	will	explore	 in	following	chapters,	and	partly	the	fact	that	coalfields	
communities	 were	 generally	 slower	 in	 progress	 for	 women	 than	 the	 cities.	 Doris	
Seeton	remembered	growing	up	as	the	daughter	of	a	coalminer	in	interwar	Lithgow.	
She	was	“aware	of	great	 injustices	between	what	people	were	allowed	to	do.	My	
brother	was	allowed	so	much	more	freedom	than	I,	simply	because	he	was	male”.125	
	
The	Auxiliaries	 took	 the	crucial	work	 that	women	had	done	to	 foster	 local	mining	
communities	 and	 brought	 it	 to	 the	 national	miners’	 community.	 They	 distributed	
propaganda,	 did	 relief	 work	 during	 strikes	 and	 organised	 entertainment,	 annual	
picnics,	social	and	sports	events,	education	and	discussion	classes	 for	women	and	
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youths.126	Common	 Cause	 also	 introduced	 a	women’s	 page	 titled	 “For	Minefields	
Women”.127	Irene	Orr,	wife	of	Miners	Federation	Secretary	Bill	Orr,	was	the	founding	
national	Secretary	of	the	Women’s	Auxiliaries.	Its	Constitution	stated	that	“women	
have	a	special	and	important	part	to	play	in	the	social,	industrial	and	political	work	
of	the	minefields,	with	special	reference	to	work	amongst	the	women	and	children	
for	 support	of	 the	campaigns	of	 the	Federation”.128	The	Women’s	Auxiliaries’	 first	
objective	was	“to	assist	the	Miners	Federation	in	its	campaigns	to	safeguard	the	lives,	
health	 and	 economic	well-being	of	 the	mineworkers	 including	 in	 times	of	 strikes,	
lockouts	etc.,	the	provision	of	relief	and	the	organising	of	suitable	propaganda	and	
social	activities”.129		
	
Figure	25	The	pink	cover	of	the	Women’s	Auxiliaries	Constitution	1934.130	
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Increasing	class	consciousness	amongst	the	miners	further	assisted	the	formation	of	
a	national	miners’	community.	Class	consciousness	did	not	appear	automatically.	As	
Gollan	and	Ross	argue,	the	Federation	was	born	out	of	a	rise	in	class	consciousness	
caused	 by	 the	 social	 and	 economic	 conditions	 of	 the	 First	 World	 War	 and	 the	
prominent	radical	ideologies	of	groups	like	the	IWW.	They	argue	that	miners	were	
particularly	sympathetic	to	radical	critiques	of	capitalism	because	the	exploitation	of	
workers	by	owners	was	so	transparent	in	the	mining	industry	where	owners	clearly	
put	profits	ahead	of	worker	safety.	For	Gollan	and	Ross,	the	economic	hardships	of	
the	Great	Depression	then	increased	the	miners’	class	consciousness	even	further	in	
the	1930s.	
	
The	historiography	has	correctly	identified	the	major	factors	in	the	development	of	
the	 miners’	 class	 consciousness.	 Jack	 O’Shea	 worked	 at	 the	 Aberdare	 Extended	
Colliery	in	the	Northern	district	between	the	wars	and	recalled	that	“after	Rothbury	
we	became	more	hostile	towards	the	NSW	Government	and	the	bosses	who’d	locked	
us	out	of	our	pits”.131	Times	were	very	tough	and	O’Shea	deliberately	blew	off	part	
of	 a	 finger	 during	 the	 Depression	 for	 the	 compensation	 money.132 	Darcy	 Rowan	
worked	at	the	BHP	Nebo	mine	in	the	Southern	District	in	the	1930s.	“The	company	
pushed	and	pushed”	he	remembered,	“they	had	visions	of	Nebo	becoming	their	‘star’	
pit	no	matter	what	it	cost	in	human	terms”.133	I	want	to	add	to	the	existing	analysis	
by	 focusing	 on	 three	 additional	 factors	 that	 contributed	 to	 the	 miners’	 class	
consciousness:	 the	Miners	 Federation	 leaders’	more	 practical	 application	 of	 their	
radical	 ideologies,	 the	effects	of	 changing	mine	management	 techniques,	and	 the	
inclusion	of	women	in	the	miners’	occupational	community.	
	
From	the	beginning	of	the	Miners	Federation,	its	leadership	was	openly	anti-capitalist	
and	explicitly	 sought	 to	 foster	class	consciousness	amongst	 the	miners.	Willis	and	
other	leaders	led	the	unsuccessful	push	for	all	unions	to	combine	into	One	Big	Union	
to	face	the	government	and	capitalists	as	a	united	force.	As	the	1920s	and	then	the	
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1930s	went	on	the	leaders	increasingly	applied	their	anti-capitalism	in	practice.	They	
ignored	and	concealed	the	common	interests	of	owners	and	miners	where	they	arose	
and	depicted	mining	as	a	zero	sum	game.	They	also	ignored	and	concealed	the	many	
rivalries	 and	 hostilities	 that	 existed	 amongst	 mine	 owners.	 According	 to	 Miners	
Federation	leaders,	the	owners	were	a	united	enemy	and	part	of	a	united	capitalist	
class.	These	depictions	were	inaccurate	and	oversimplified	complicated	interactions	
and	relationships	within	the	mining	industry	and	between	the	mining	industry	and	
the	rest	of	society.	But	this	depiction	was	useful	in	enhancing	class	consciousness	and	
uniting	 Australian	miners	 against	 a	 common	 enemy.	 It	was	 also	 derivative	 of	 the	
“class	struggle	ideology”	identified	by	Miriam	Dixson.134	
	
In	 1927	 the	 coal	 owners	 approached	 the	Miners	 Federation	 leadership	 to	 join	 a	
deputation	to	the	NSW	government	to	reduce	state	coal	charges.	As	we	saw	above,	
the	miners’	unions	and	owners	had	cooperated	 in	similar	ways	many	times	 in	the	
past,	but	not	 this	 time.	Three	years	 later	 the	SMH	was	still	decrying	 the	“ruthless	
leaders	 of	 the	miners”	who	 “would	 not	 even	 reply	 to	 the	 request”.135	Comerford	
questioned	why	the	leaders	did	not	cooperate	with	the	owners	and,	ever	the	wages-
and-conditions	pragmatist,	proposed	that	perhaps	they	did	not	want	to	get	drawn	
into	a	discussion	that	could	lead	to	propositions	for	wage	cuts.	As	he	then	pointed	
out,	however,	the	miners	could	easily	have	agreed	to	the	deputation	on	the	condition	
that	wage	cuts	were	off	the	table.	For	Comerford,	then,	the	leaders’	actions	do	not	
make	sense	and	he	concludes	that	they	made	a	“tactical	error”.136		
	
The	leaders’	behaviour	does	make	sense,	however,	if	we	see	it	as	ideologically	driven.	
It	 was	 straightforward	 compliance	 with	 their	 insistence	 that	 the	 owners	 and	 the	
workers	had	nothing	in	common.	They	were	showing	the	members	that	even	when	
the	interests	of	bosses	and	workers	appeared	to	be	aligned,	they	were	not	going	to	
cooperate	with	 them	 as	 a	matter	 of	 principle.	 Simultaneously,	 the	 leaders	made	
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renewed	 efforts	 to	 connect	 the	 Miners	 Federation	 with	 other	 working-class	
organisations.	The	 short-lived	Maritime	Transport	and	Mining	Union	 in	Newcastle	
included	the	Miners	Federation,	Seamen’s	Union	and	Waterside	Workers	Federation.	
The	 Federation	 also	 became	more	 closely	 involved	 in	 the	 Labor	 Councils	 and	 the	
ACTU.137		
	
The	Miners	Federation’s	 focus	on	class	consciousness	 increased	further	under	the	
Communist	 leadership	 from	 1934.	 After	 their	 election,	 Orr	 and	Nelson	 sought	 to	
revive	 the	 Combined	 Mining	 Unions	 Council	 which	 included	 all	 mining	 industry	
unions	and	had	collapsed	spectacularly	when	the	craft	unions	abandoned	the	Miners	
Federation	during	the	1929	Northern	lockout.138	Working-class	organisations	could	
be	 forgiven,	 but	 capitalists	 could	 not.	 The	 leaders	 encouraged	 a	 simple,	 militant	
outlook:	 “us	 versus	 them”.	When	MM	member	 James	 Jack	was	 elected	Northern	
district	president	in	1934	he	told	the	miners	that	his	advice	to	them	would	always	be	
the	same	no	matter	the	circumstances:	“I	will	advise	you	to	fight…	I	do	not	care	what	
the	result	may	be.	Better	to	go	down	fighting”.139As	we	will	see	in	the	following	case	
study,	the	Communist	Miners	Federation	leaders	still	tacitly	acknowledged	the	reality	
that	miners	and	mine	owners	sometimes	had	interests	in	common,	and,	in	extreme	
circumstances	such	as	the	threat	of	mechanisation,	the	leaders	sought	cooperation	
with	the	owners.	But	they	did	not	dwell	on	these	contradictions	and	maintained	that	
“struggle	between	the	coal	owners	and	the	mineworkers	is	inevitable".140			
	
An	additional	factor	that	cultivated	class	consciousness	amongst	the	miners	was	a	
series	of	changes	 in	mine	management	which	degraded	relations	between	miners	
and	managers	in	some	mines.	Piecework	allowed	miners	significant	autonomy	over	
when	 and	 how	 they	worked	 and	was	 an	 important	 factor	 in	 the	miners’	 spirit	 of	
independence	 which	 made	 them	 more	 likely	 than	 most	 other	 workers	 to	 resist	
authoritarian	employers.	Piecework	limited	employers’	ability	to	control	the	amount	
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of	coal	or	metal	that	was	extracted.	Individual	miners	might	choose	to	work	less	than	
a	full	shift	on	any	given	day	because	they	had	already	earned	enough	money	for	that	
week	or	because	they	chose	to	attend	entertainment	or	social	gatherings.	The	1930	
Royal	 Commission	 into	 the	 coal	 industry	 concluded	 that	 “on	 frequent	 occasions,	
mines	have	been	thrown	idle	on	account	of	the	attendance	by	employees	at	horse	
and	dog	races”	and	recommended	that	“every	effort	be	made	to	abolish	these	mid-
week	race	meetings	of	every	description	and	to	reduce	the	number	of	such	meetings	
at	weekends”.	141	
Different	employers	responded	to	the	miners’	independence	in	different	ways.	In	the	
interwar	 period	 local	 ownership	was	 increasingly	 replaced	 by	 ownership	 by	 large	
companies.	Some	of	these	large	companies,	such	as	BHP,	adopted	an	authoritarian	
position	 and	 aggressively	 confronted	 the	miners,	while	 others	 such	 as	 the	Collins	
House	 Group	 adopted	 more	 progressive,	 consultative	 management. 142 	Arthur	
McIvor	and	Christopher	Wright	distinguish	between	the	“confrontational	approach”	
and	the	rise	of	“welfarism”	amongst	employers	in	interwar	Australia.	They	cite	BHP	
as	the	prime	example	of	confrontational	management	and	argue	that	the	company	
“victimised	union	delegates,	established	a	company	union,	used	staff	employees	to	
act	as	strike-breakers,	and	in	the	1920s,	used	a	lock-out	and	closure	of	its	steel	plant	
to	win	major	reductions	in	wages	and	working	conditions”.143	On	the	other	hand,	the	
Collins	 House	 Group	 “were	 receptive	 to	 new	 ideas	 about	 industrial	 health	 and	
welfare	being	promoted	 in	Great	Britain	and	 the	United	States	as	part	of	 a	more	
sophisticated	 approach	 to	 industrial	 relations”.	 This	 approach	 sought	 “long	 term	
stability	and	efficiency	of	 the	workforce”	and	“better	working	conditions	was	one	
means	of	ensuring	this	outcome”.144	
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These	alternative	management	approaches	were	most	clearly	displayed	 in	Broken	
Hill.	Until	the	late	1920s	BHP	was	the	dominant	mining	company	in	the	region	and	its	
authoritarian	 management	 caused	 tense	 relations	 between	 owners	 and	 miners.	
From	the	late	1920s,	however,	the	influence	of	BHP	declined	and	the	Collins	House	
Group	 came	 to	 dominate	 the	 Broken	 Hill	 Mine	 Managers	 Association	 and	 “the	
acrimony	which	had	previously	 been	 felt	 between	 the	unions	 and	 the	 companies	
gave	way	to	an	attitude	of	‘give	and	take’”.145	
Broken	 Hill’s	 turn	 towards	 more	 cooperative	 mine	 management	 was	 more	 the	
exception	 than	 the	 norm,	 however.	 Beris	 Penrose’s	 analysis	 of	 lead	 poisoning	 in	
Mount	Isa	mine	in	the	1930s	provides	an	illustrative	case	study	of	the	dire	effects	of	
authoritarian	mine	management.	 In	 1932,	 110	miners	 received	 compensation	 for	
lead	poisoning	but	the	management	rejected	union	calls	for	the	appointment	of	a	
safety	 inspector.	The	management	only	employed	young	miners	and	“shift	bosses	
who	had	little	or	no	experience	in	lead	mining	or	smelting”.	The	CPA	argued	that	this	
“allowed	management	 to	 accelerate	 the	 pace	 of	 work”	 by	 forcing	 inexperienced	
workers	who	did	not	know	better	“to	rush	back	into	dust	and	fracteur	fumes”	at	great	
cost	to	their	health.146	
	
Some	 of	 these	 companies,	 again	 most	 notably	 BHP,	 introduced	 “scientific	
management”	 and	 production	 techniques.	 The	 ideas	 of	 “scientific	 management”	
entered	Australia	 from	 the	US	 around	 the	 time	of	 the	 First	World	War	 and	were	
synonymous	with	“time	and	motion	experts”	with	stop	watches	examining	workers	
and	assessing	how	they	could	speed	up	and	deskill	them,	breaking	work	down	into	
smaller,	more	repetitive	tasks.147	This	degree	of	division	of	labour	was	not	possible	
in	coal	mines	but	“scientific	management”	took	other	forms	such	as	creating	a	clearer	
divide	between	miners	and	managers	by	training	mine	managers	through	a	cadetship	
program.	 In	 the	 past,	mine	managers	 had	 been	 former	miners	 but	 the	 cadetship	
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program	enrolled	young	men	who	had	never	worked	as	miners.148	Rowan	recalled	
that	“experienced	miners	were	ignored	by	company	people	who	thought	they	knew	
everything	there	was	to	know”.149	“There	were	lots	of	cases	where	the	miners	knew	
better	than	these	young	cadets.	The	old	hands	could	see	dangers	where	the	cadets	
had	no	idea.	It	was	the	cause	of	a	lot	of	conflict”,	he	said.150	Tom	McMahon	worked	
at	Aberdare	Central	colliery	in	the	interwar	period	and	recalled:	“there	were	some	
bastard	bosses	that	I	wouldn’t	even	talk	to	today,	even	though	I’ve	been	retired	for	
33	years”.151	“We	were	on	one	side	and	the	bosses	were	on	the	other	side”.152	
Employer	indifference	to	mining	accidents	encouraged	this	view.	Jock	Graham	lost	
his	leg	in	a	mining	accident	in	the	1920s.	He	later	wrote	a	poem	titled	“A	Man	of	the	
Earth”.	The	third	stanza	read:	
The	court	is	the	gauge	that	determines	my	wage,	
	The	parson	looks	after	my	soul,	
	My	hands	are	my	boss's,	his	gains	are	my	losses,	
	My	body	is	bartered	in	coal,	
	The	gaps	in	the	lines	red	roll	of	the	mines,	
	Show	death	has	been	taking	its	toll,	
	While	snipers	at	maimed	men	and	dead	men	and	famed	men,	
	Grow	fat	on	the	blood	of	the	coal.153	
This	 poem	 reflected	 the	 view	 of	 many	 miners,	 probably	 most,	 that	 they	 were	
exploited	by	their	bosses	who	cared	more	about	profits	than	safety.	By	the	1930s,	
there	 was	 widespread	 sympathy	 amongst	 Miners	 Federation	 members	 for	 the	
officials’	depiction	of	mining	as	a	zero	sum	game.	As	Graham	said,	the	bosses’	gains	
were	the	miners’	losses,	and	vice	versa.	The	localism	of	earlier	decades,	and	the	fact	
that	owners	and	miners	often	did	have	interests	in	common,	was	ignored	for	what	
miners	saw	as	the	greater	truth	of	the	class	war.	
	
Finally,	the	Women’s	Auxiliaries	and	the	miners’	gradual	acceptance	that	women	had	
a	public	role	to	play	in	the	Miners	Federation	further	enhanced	class	consciousness.	
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The	relegation	of	women	to	the	private	domestic	sphere	had	caused	a	cleavage	in	
the	minefields	working	class	between	men	and	women.	From	the	1930s,	the	belief	
grew	 amongst	 the	 miners	 that	 a	 true	 working	 class	 needed	 to	 include	 women.	
Common	Cause	encouraged	this	view	and	it	published	a	poem	by	Cecil	Watts	which	
concluded:	
	 In	lowly	little	villages	they	plan	for	better	things,	
	 And	a	surer	hope,	a	greater	strength,	each	new	dawning	brings	
For	it’s	no	longer	Jack	and	Joan,	it	is	united	‘We’.	
Oh	comrades	toast	the	Ladies	of	the	Strike	Auxiliary.	
Dolly	 Potter,	 a	 founding	 member	 of	 the	 Women’s	 Auxiliaries,	 recalled	 how	 the	
women	 cultivated	 this	 united	 “we”:	 “if	 it	wasn’t	 helping	 local	 causes	 it	would	 be	
raising	money	for	miners	elsewhere	caught	up	in	a	battle	with	the	bosses”.154	This	
quotation	 is	 revealing	 in	 its	 class	 terminology.	 The	 women	 helped	 miners	 from	
“elsewhere”	against	“the	bosses”.	It	did	not	matter	where	the	conflict	was	occurring;	
for	Potter	it	was	all	part	of	the	one	struggle	between	the	workers	and	the	capitalists.	
	
Conclusion	
A	democratic	national	miners’	union	required	a	national	miners’	community.	Formal	
national	democracy	began	at	Federation	in	1915	but	the	national	miners’	community	
did	not	instantly	come	into	existence.	It	had	to	be	built	and	in	order	to	build	it	the	
Miners	 Federation	 needed	 to	 overcome	 longstanding	 local	 loyalties.	 The	 union’s	
officials	 and	 members	 built	 their	 national	 community	 through	 their	 national	
newspaper,	Common	Cause,	 shared	entertainment	 and	 sport,	 the	 creation	 of	 the	
Women’s	Auxiliaries	and	the	development	of	class	consciousness.	In	explaining	the	
development	of	 class	 consciousness	 I	 have	 focused	especially	on	 three	previously	
neglected	 factors:	 the	 leaders’	practical	 application	of	 anti-capitalist	 ideology,	 the	
influence	of	changing	mine	management	techniques	and	the	inclusion	of	women	in	
the	miners’	community.	The	fact	that	centralisation	was	slow	and	contested	allowed	
the	Miners	Federation	to	retain	high	levels	of	local	autonomy	and	prevented	the	rise	
of	an	oligarchical	central	leadership	similar	to	that	of	the	AWU.
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CHAPTER	VI:	MINERS	FEDERATION	CASE	STUDY	
The	miners	fight	mechanisation	1935-36	
By	 1935	 Broken	 Hill	 Proprietary	 (BHP)	 was	 the	 largest	 coal	 mining	 company	 in	
Australia.	 Looking	 approvingly	 at	 mechanisation	 in	 American	 coalmines,	 BHP	
announced	plans	to	open	the	first	fully	mechanised	coal	mine	in	Australia	at	Lambton	
B	 colliery	 near	 Newcastle	 in	 NSW.	 Militantly	 anti-union,	 the	 company	 saw	
mechanisation	 as	 a	 way	 of	 cutting	 costs	 and	 further	 weakening	 the	 Miners	
Federation	which	had	suffered	from	increasing	unemployment	since	the	First	World	
War.	 In	 turn,	 the	 Miners	 Federation	 leadership	 understood	 the	 disastrous	
unemployment	that	would	result	from	full	mechanisation	and	vowed	to	resist	it.	The	
focal	point	of	the	campaign	was	an	electric	coal	loader	in	the	Lambton	B	coalmine.	
	
This	 case	 study	 is	 of	 the	 Miners	 Federations’	 unsuccessful	 five	 month	 campaign	
against	the	electric	coal	loader,	and	mechanisation	more	broadly,	from	September	
1935	to	January	1936.	The	campaign	has	received	little	attention	from	historians;	it	
was	 short	 and	 unsuccessful	 and	 seemed	 to	 be	 struggling	 against	 inevitable	
technological	 “progress”	 touted	 by	 capitalists	 and	Marxists	 alike.	 However,	 these	
contradictions	also	make	for	an	instructive	case	study.	We	see	a	Communist	Miners	
Federation	 leadership	 fighting	 mechanisation	 in	 the	 same	 month	 as	 successful	
mechanisation	in	Soviet	Union	coalmines	is	making	world	news.	More	importantly	
for	my	purposes,	we	see	the	complexities	of	Miners	Federation	democracy	in	action.	
Central	leadership,	a	national	mining	community	and	working-class	solidarity	chafe	
against	 local	 community,	 local	 autonomy,	 membership	 decision-making	 and	
pragmatic	concerns	for	jobs,	wages	and	conditions	all	in	ways	that	demonstrate	the	
union’s	high	levels	of	democracy.	
	
Developments	in	mechanisation		
In	the	1920s	coal	mining	in	Australia	became	increasingly	mechanised	with	electric	
boring	machines	and	coal-cutting	machines	gradually	replacing	picks	and	explosives.	
Between	 1929	 and	 1934	 Australian	 coal	 production	 increased	 slightly	 while	
employment	 fell	by	10,000	men;	production	per	miner	 increased	50	per	cent	and	
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wages	fell	25	per	cent.1	Mechanisation	caused	similar	effects	in	other	industries.		In	
1912-13	the	Australian	wheat	farming	industry	sowed	733,269	acres	of	wheat	and	
employed	 58,840	 men	 but	 by	 1929-30	 cultivation	 had	 increased	 sevenfold	 to	
5,409,408	acres	while	employment	had	decreased	to	38,049	men.2	
	
In	August	1935	BHP	announced	a	massive	share	release.	It	would	issue	1.5	million	
shares	at	£1	each;	this	was	one	share	for	every	two	existing	shares.	BHP	planned	to	
use	 this	 capital	 for	 development	 including	 further	mechanisation	 in	 its	 collieries.3	
Electric	loading	machines	would	be	used	to	load	coal	into	skips	at	the	coalface	and	
locomotives	would	replace	wheelers	and	horses	to	take	the	skips	to	the	surface.	In	
addition	 to	 the	 existing	 cutting	 and	 boring	machines,	 this	 would	 entail	 complete	
mechanisation	 from	 coalface	 to	 surface.	 In	 early	 September	 1935	 the	 Miners	
Federation	central	council	decided	to	fight	further	mechanisation.4	According	to	the	
central	council	mechanisation	would	result	in	the	majority	of	coalminers	losing	their	
jobs	and	the	destruction	of	most	coal	towns.	Miners	Federation	secretary	Bill	Orr	said	
that	 with	 complete	 mechanisation	 “a	 single	 colliery	 in	 America	 is	 producing	 3.5	
million	tons	of	coal	annually.	Three	such	mines	could	supply	 the	whole	Australian	
market	and	ruin	all	other	coalmining	centres	 in	Australia”.5	Unlike	 in	other	unions	
such	 as	 the	 Australian	 Workers	 Union	 (AWU),	 however,	 the	 Miners	 Federation	
Central	 Council	 did	 not	 have	 absolute	power.	 In	 late	 September	 a	 conference,	 to	
which	 every	 lodge	 in	 the	 northern	 district	 sent	 a	 representative,	 met	 to	 decide	
whether	 to	endorse	 the	 central	 council	 decision.	 The	 conference	did	endorse	 the	
campaign	and	the	fight	against	mechanisation	began.6	
	
Class	struggle	versus	cooperation	and	localism	
The	Miners	Federation	national	leadership	linked	mechanisation	to	the	broader	issue	
of	“anarchic	cut-throat	competition”	between	coal	producers	which	they	said	was	
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the	cause	of	coal	companies	looking	to	mechanise.	The	central	council	advocated	a	
government	set	selling	price	for	coal	which	would	allow	for	higher	wages.	National	
president	Charlie	Nelson	 said	 “the	price	of	 coal	 is	 considerably	below	 the	 cost	 of	
production,	 and	 is	 being	 maintained	 there	 by	 the	 intense	 exploitation	 and	
annihilation	of	the	coalminer.	The	time	has	arrived	for	a	definite	understanding,	and	
concrete	 action	must	be	 taken	 to	 stabilise	 the	price	of	 coal	…	 there	has	been	no	
declared	Newcastle	selling	price,	and	intensive	competition	has	been	a	feature	of	the	
coal	trade”.7	General	Secretary	Bill	Orr	added	that	city	people	who	paid	50/-	per	ton	
for	coal	should	know	that	the	miners	received	just	5/-	per	ton	in	wages.8	
	
The	Miners	Federation	reached	out	to	the	big	mine	owners	and	sought	a	cooperative	
agreement	to	set	a	minimum	price	of	coal.9	But	little	progress	was	made	because	all	
parties	knew	that	any	agreement	would	be	undercut	by	 rival	mines.	 In	 the	1920s	
most	mine	owners	belonged	to	the	Northern	Collieries	Association	but	by	1935	the	
two	largest	coal	companies,	BHP	and	J&A	Brown	Abermain	Seaham	Collieries,	were	
outside	 the	 Association	 and	 determined	 to	win	 a	 competitive	 price-war,	 as	were	
many	smaller	mines.10	Almost	all	the	small	mines	in	Australia	were	in	the	Northern	
NSW	district	 and	 in	 1935	 small	mines	whose	miners	were	 not	Miners	 Federation	
members	employed	551	miners	and	produced	246,697	tons	of	coal	(4.34	per	cent	of	
the	Northern	district	output).11	
	
Orr	 and	Nelson	were	both	members	 of	 the	CPA	and	 they	distributed	 a	 pamphlet	
criticising	 mechanisation	 in	 class	 struggle	 terms	 which	 concluded	 that	 “struggle	
between	the	coal	owners	and	the	mineworkers	is	inevitable".12	But	their	actions	in	
criticising	competition	and	calling	for	a	set	coal	price	tacitly	acknowledged	that	mine	
owners	 were	 not	 one	 united	 force	 and	 that	miners	 and	 owners	 had	 interests	 in	
common.	 The	 best	 course	 of	 action	 for	 the	 Miners	 Federation	 appeared	 to	 be	
																																								 																				
7	“Coal	mines,”	SMH	19	September	1935,	11.	
8	“Mechanisation,”	AW	20	November	1935,	7.	
9	“Coal	prices,”	SMH	20	September	1935,	12.	
10	“Miners	may	cooperate	with	owners,”	SMH	20	September	1935,	12.	
11	”Small	coal	mines,”	SMH	27	November	1936,	13.	
12	William	Orr,	Mechanisation:	threatened	catastrophe	for	the	coalfields,	Miners	Federation,	Sydney,	
1935.	
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cooperation	with	owners	to	raise	coal	prices	to	the	advantage	of	both.	The	Miners	
Federation	leaders	never	publicly	acknowledged	these	contradictions	with	their	class	
struggle	ideology	but	their	actions	demonstrate	that	they	were	sometimes	willing	to	
prioritise	wages-and-conditions	pragmatism	above	ideology.	This	approach	explains	
why	they	were	successful	leaders	of	the	Miners	Federation	even	while	only	a	small	
proportion	of	Miners	Federation	members	were	Communists.	
	
Localism	was	also	a	relevant	factor	which	challenged	class	struggle	ideology.	Massive	
unemployment	of	miners	caused	by	mechanisation	would	hurt	entire	coal	towns	so	
business	 people	 in	 those	 towns	 were	 worried.	 Northern	 district	 President	 Tom	
“Bondy”	Hoare	told	media	that	“the	Federation	was	sure	of	having	a	plentiful	supply	
of	speakers	from	outside	its	ranks”	at	the	meetings	that	would	be	arranged	in	protest	
against	mechanisation.	Some	of	the	speakers	would	be	business	people,	“who	could	
see	 their	 own	 affairs	 being	 affected	 by	 the	 reduced	 employment	 which	
mechanisation	would	cause”.13	
	
Meanwhile	the	Southern	NSW	miners	delegate	board	decided	to	“circularise	all	shire	
and	 municipal	 councils,	 business	 people,	 and	 others	 dependent	 on	 the	 industry,	
asking	for	their	cooperation	in	the	fight	against	rationalisation	and	mechanisation”.14	
In	November	1935	 the	Miners	 Federation	held	meetings	with	 small	 businesses	 in	
various	Newcastle	 districts	 and	 reported	 that	 “many	 small	 business	 people	 agree	
with	the	Miners	Federation	that	the	introduction	of	machinery	which	may	increase	
coalfields	 unemployment	 is	 undesirable”. 15 	Coal	 town	 churches	 were	 equally	
concerned.	At	the	Provincial	Synod	of	the	Church	of	England	in	New	South	Wales,	the	
Reverend	A.	R.	Holmes	of	Wallsend	in	Western	Newcastle	told	the	gathering	that	he	
came	from	a	mining	district	“where	the	whole	town	is	likely	to	be	wiped	out	by	the	
mechanisation	of	the	coal	mining	industry”.	He	called	on	coal	companies	to	“run	their	
business	on	Christian	principles”.16	
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15	“Lambton	B	mine,”	SMH	2	November	1935,	16.	
16	“Coal	produced,”	SMH	15	November	1935,	12.	
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Many	Marxists	viewed	mechanisation	as	both	inevitable	and	desirable	as	a	way	of	
increasing	productive	capacity	which	would	be	crucial	in	the	eventual	transition	from	
capitalism	to	socialism.17	Yet	CPA	members	Orr	and	Nelson	led	the	Miners	Federation	
against	mechanisation	and	had	 the	official	 support	of	 the	CPA.18	Ironically,	 in	 late	
1935	the	purported	success	of	mechanisation	in	coal	mines	in	the	Soviet	Union	was	
making	world	news.	The	USSR	claimed	that	one	man,	Alexey	Stakhanov,	had	cut	310	
tons	in	6	hours.	He	was	meant	to	exemplify	the	possibilities	of	socialism	in	contrast	
to	capitalist	wage	labour.	The	average	output	per	miner	before	mechanisation	had	
been	7	tons	per	shift.19	A	Jackaroo	from	north-west	NSW,	Michael	Kartzoff,	wrote	to	
the	SMH:	“can	the	members	of	the	Communist	Party	who	are	associated	officially	
with	the	Miners	Federation	and	have	been	to	Russia	offer	any	adequate	reason	why	
Australian	coal	industry	should	not	be	as	thoroughly	mechanised	as	Russia’s	is?”20	In	
taking	 the	 position	 against	 mechanisation	 Orr,	 Nelson	 and	 the	 CPA	 once	 again	
demonstrated	 that	 they	 could	 prioritise	 pragmatic	 responses	 to	 Australian	
conditions.	It	was	also	acceptable	to	cooperate	with	small	businesses	against	large	
businesses	like	BHP.	
	
The	 CPA’s	 newspaper	 Workers’	 Weekly	 contained	 regular	 articles	 opposing	
mechanisation	and	supporting	the	miners’	fight.21	“J.	McC”	wrote	a	humorous	article	
titled	“Some	problems	of	mechanisation”	in	which	he	said:	
the	mine	bosses	have	decided	that	they	will	certainly	do	all	in	their	power	to	
prevent	good	men	from	being	kept	down,	that	is,	when	it's	a	case	of	keeping	
them	down	a	mine	and	paying	them	wages	when	they	can	get	a	machine	to	
do	the	job	at	a	fraction	of	the	cost.	
He	also	included	a	jab	at	the	AWU:	
And	 again,	 this	 trend	 towards	mechanisation	opens	 a	 big	 field.	When	one	
pictures	 weary	 AWU	 officials	 worried	 with	 the	 weighty	 problems	 of	
sabotaging	cane-cutters'	strikes,	tolling	long	into	the	night	jerking	open	stiff	
																																								 																				
17	Edgar	Ross,	A	History	of	the	Miners	Federation	of	Australia		(Sydney:	Australasian	Coal	and	Shale	
Employees’	Federation,	1970):	357.	
18	“Mechanisation,”	SMH	20	November	1935,	19.	
19	“Mechanisation	in	Soviet	mines,”	SMH	14	October	1935,	11.	
20	“Mechanisation,”	SMH	16	October	1935,	8.	
21	“Miners	strike	against	rationalisation	menace	wide	support	against	mechanisation,”	Workers'	
Weekly	15	November	1935,	3.	
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sliding	panels,	one	can't	but	think	how	much	simpler	it	would	be	if	all	ballot	
boxes	 were	 fitted	 with	 automatic	 sliding	 panels—press	 a	 button	 and	
democratically	elect	yourself	at	leisure.22	
Twelve	years	later	the	ballot	box	scandal	was	still	remembered	fondly	by	those	on	
the	labour	left.		
	
BHP	refused	to	cooperate	with	either	the	Miners	Federation	or	rival	coal	companies.	
From	the	1910s	 it	had	adopted	a	strongly	anti-union	stance	across	 its	business.	 It	
brought	 many	 of	 its	 senior	 managers	 from	 the	 United	 States	 where	 they	 had	
experience	 in	 successful	 union	 busting. 23 	In	 November	 1935	 BHP	 refused	 an	
invitation	to	meet	with	the	Miners	Federation,	Northern	Collieries	Association	and	
J&A	Brown	Abermain	Seaham	Collieries	Ltd.24		
	
The	strike	at	Lambton	B	
The	 fight	 against	 further	mechanisation	 centred	 on	 Lambton	 B	 colliery.	 BHP	 had	
bought	the	mine	several	years	earlier	but	it	had	not	been	operational	since.	That	was	
about	 to	 change	 as	 the	 company	 began	 installing	 electric	 loading	 machines	 and	
electric	locomotives.25	Nelson	said	“the	gravity	of	the	position,	should	this	be	given	
general	application	 in	 the	coalmining	 industry,	will	be	all	 too	evident	 to	everyone	
dependent	on	the	coalmining	industry	for	a	livelihood.	It	means	that	thousands	at	
present	employed	in	coalmining	will	ultimately	be	displaced,	with	no	hope	of	ever	
again	entering	the	 industry."26	Northern	district	vice-president	 John	Kellock	added	
"the	position,	put	plainly,	means	organised	resistance	or	our	complete	extinction”.27	
He	continued:	“a	crew	of	twelve	men…	will	perform	the	whole	operation	[at	Lambton	
B],	and	 the	 loading	machine	will	handle	between	300	 to	400	 tons	a	day.	This	 is	a	
complete	break	with	all	 past	 customs	and	 traditions	of	 this	organisation,	 and	will	
completely	eliminate	the	miners	and	wheelers	in	the	industry."28	This	reference	to	
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23	Christopher	Wright,	"The	Formative	Years	of	Management	Control	at	the	Newcastle	Steelworks	
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25	“Coal	mines,”	SMH	19	September	1935,	11.	
26	Ibid.	
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“customs	and	traditions”	 is	 important.	Miners	Federation	 leaders	needed	to	work	
within	 the	 miners’	 customs	 and	 traditions	 upon	 which	 their	 strong	 occupational	
communities	were	based.	Work,	community,	organisation	and	democracy	amongst	
miners	all	operated	according	to	longstanding	practice.	
	
The	 central	 council	 ruled	 that	 no	Miners	 Federation	members	 were	 to	 work	 the	
mechanised	 loader.29	However,	 it	quickly	became	more	pragmatic	and	said	 that	 if	
BHP	was	prepared	to	concede	a	six	hour	day	and	a	guaranteed	minimum	wage	 it	
would	 consider	 supplying	 labour	 for	 the	 new	 machines.30 	On	 1	 November	 1935	
Lambton	B	opened	with	Miners	Federation	miners	and	the	loader	was	not	used.31	
One	week	 later	mine	managers	began	to	use	the	 loader	and	the	Northern	district	
management	committee	ordered	a	strike.32	But	as	we	saw	in	the	previous	chapter,	
the	Miners	Federation	retained	high	levels	of	local	autonomy	so	it	was	not	enough	
that	 the	 central	 council,	 Northern	 management	 committee	 and	 conference	 of	
northern	 lodge	 representatives	 had	 all	 declared	 against	 mechanisation.	 The	 final	
decision	 to	strike	was	up	 to	 the	men	at	Lambton	B	who	belonged	to	 the	Durham	
Miners'	Lodge.	On	11	November	a	lodge	meeting	held	outside	the	Lambton	B	colliery	
unanimously	 supported	 the	 strike.33	The	 fact	 that	 the	members	got	 to	decide	 the	
issue	exemplifies	the	high	levels	of	membership	decision-making	and	local	autonomy	
in	 the	Miners	 Federation.	 Simultaneously,	 however,	 it	 seems	 unlikely	 that	 every	
miner	 at	 Lambton	 B	 genuinely	 supported	 the	 strike.	 The	 unanimous	 vote	 for	 the	
strike	also	exemplifies	the	democratic	deficits	of	open	voting	at	which	it	would	have	
been	difficult	to	vote	or	speak	against	the	majority.	
	
The	 Miners	 Federation	 enlisted	 the	 help	 of	 the	 Labor	 Party.	 Demonstrating	 the	
powerful	influence	that	the	union	had	over	coalfields	MPs,	the	central	and	northern	
executive	officers	called	a	meeting	at	NSW	Parliament	House	with	all	the	Lang	Labor	
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32	“Strike	ordered,”	SMH	9	November	1935,	18.	
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state	members	representing	coalmining	electorates.34	Unsurprisingly,	the	members	
agreed	 to	 support	 the	 fight	 against	mechanisation.35	Soon	 caucus	meetings	 of	 all	
Lang	Labor	MPs	state	and	federal	had	agreed	to	support	the	campaign.36		
	
Even	though	relations	between	Lang	Labor	and	the	Miners	Federation	were	strained	
by	1935,	Lang	Labor	had	nothing	to	lose	by	supporting	the	miners.	In	opposition	in	
NSW	and	federally,	there	was	not	much	they	could	do	anyway.	MPs	questioned	the	
Nationalist	 NSW	 Premier	 and	 Prime	 Minister	 during	 question	 time	 and	 the	
Nationalists	replied	that	mechanisation	was	good	because	cheap	coal	would	lead	to	
coal	 industry	expansion	and	more	 jobs.	Cheap	coal	would	also	cause	expansion	 in	
other	 industries	 that	 used	 coal. 37 	Jack	 Beasley	 in	 the	 House	 of	 Representatives	
proposed	a	select	committee	to	investigate	the	actions	of	BHP	on	numerous	grounds	
including	 “the	 proposal	 of	 the	 company	 further	 to	 mechanise	 the	 coal-bearing	
deposits	 in	 the	 Newcastle	 district,	 thus	 creating	 more	 unemployment”.	 Prime	
Minister	Joseph	Lyons	replied	that	Beasley's	only	complaint	was	that	the	company	
was	successful.38	
	
In	November	1935	a	conference	between	the	Miners	Federation	and	the	coalmining	
craft	 unions	 unanimously	 supported	 the	 Miners	 Federation’s	 anti-mechanisation	
policy	and	the	refusal	to	work	Lambton	B	while	the	electric	loader	was	in	operation.	
The	 craft	 unions	 involved	 were	 the	 Federated	 Engine-drivers	 and	 Firemen's	
Association	 (FEDFA),	 the	Amalgamated	Engineering	Union,	 the	Maitland	Deputies'	
Association,	the	Newcastle	Deputies'	Association,	the	Federated	Colliery	Mechanics'	
Association	and	the	Electricians'	Union.	The	unions	agreed	to	support	the	campaign	
subject	 to	 endorsement	 by	 their	members	which	 suggests	 similarly	 high	 levels	 of	
membership	 decision-making	 in	 the	 mining	 craft	 unions	 as	 in	 the	 Miners	
Federation.39	However,	 the	 subsequent	membership	meetings	 refused	 to	 support	
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the	miners.40	Once	again	the	mining	craft	unions	had	failed	to	support	the	Miners	
Federation,	just	as	they	had	five	years	earlier	during	the	northern	district	lockout.		
	
In	January	1936	the	mechanisation	dispute	took	a	new	turn	as	the	Miners	Federation	
Central	Council	and	Northern	district	officials	recommended	a	nation-wide	strike	in	
solidarity	 with	 the	 Seamen’s	 Union.	 The	 seamen	 were	 striking	 over	 employers’	
victimisation	 of	 some	members.	 Again	 the	Miners	 Federation	 	 leaders’	 decisions	
needed	 to	 be	 endorsed	 by	membership	 votes	 in	 aggregate	meetings	 around	 the	
country.	Conditions	for	a	large-scale	coalminers’	strike	were	not	good.		The	Miners	
Federation	funds	were	low	and	the	coal	companies	and	other	industries	possessed	
large	stockpiles	of	coal	“at	grass”.	Relief	payments	for	striking	miners	would	break	
the	Miners	Federation	long	before	these	industries	ran	out	of	supplies.	Unemployed	
members	of	the	Miners	Federation	would	also	lose	their	government	relief	 if	they	
refused	to	accept	work	as	strike-breakers.41		
	
Nevertheless,	the	radical	Miners	Federation	leaders	encouraged	members	to	support	
the	strike.	Hoare	said	that	a	strike	would	“lead	to	the	building	up	of	working	class	
solidarity	 and	 to	 the	 ultimate	 victory	 of	 this	 [working]	 class	 over	 their	 economic	
opponents”. 42 	The	 SMH	 said	 it	 was	 an	 attempt	 by	 the	 Communist	 Minority	
Movement	(MM)	to	restore	prestige	that	it	was	rapidly	losing	as	the	Seamen’s	strike	
failed. 43 	The	 SMH	 editorial	 employed	 a	 nautical	 metaphor	 and	 encouraged	 the	
Miners	Federation	members	“that	the	seamen	have	thrown	overboard	all	reason	and	
discipline	in	a	revolt	which	cannot	possibly	succeed	is	no	ground	for	the	miners	being	
stampeded	into	doing	the	same”.44	
	
Miners	 Federation	members	 in	 NSW	 overwhelmingly	 voted	 against	 the	 strike.	 At	
Kurri	Kurri	only	32	miners	voted	for	the	strike	and	785	against	it	while	at	Newcastle	
the	members	listened	to	a	speech	by	Orr	in	favour	of	the	strike	before	voting	it	down	
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by	256	votes	to	34.	The	miners	did	not	follow	their	leaders	blindly.	Because	of	the	
Miners	 Federation’s	 strong	 local	 organisation	 and	 autonomy,	 there	 were	 local	
leaders	able	to	lead	the	“no”	campaign.	The	secretary	of	the	Richmond	Main	lodge,	
for	 example,	 told	members	 "if	 you	accept	 this	 resolution,	 you	will	 be	 committing	
industrial	suicide”.45	
	
Following	 the	 decisive	 defeat	 of	 the	 strike	motion	 in	NSW	 the	 federal	 leadership	
continued	 to	 campaign	 for	 the	 strike	 in	 other	 states	 that	 had	 not	 yet	 voted.	
Extraordinarily,	 the	 leaders’	goal	was	to	win	a	national	majority	 for	the	strike	and	
force	 the	NSW	members	 to	 strike	against	 their	will.	 This	displays	a	hard,	national	
majoritarian	view	of	democracy	and	a	dismissal	of	local	autonomy	by	the	Communist	
leaders.	At	Ipswich	in	south	east	Queensland	Nelson	told	a	meeting	of	miners	that	
they	 should	 ignore	 the	 result	 in	NSW.	He	 appealed	 to	 the	miners	 by	 referring	 to	
pragmatic	“vital	 issues”	such	and	“mechanisation	of	industry”	and	“stabilisation	of	
wages	 and	 hours”.	 He	 said	 the	 assistance	 of	 the	 seamen	 in	 the	 fight	 against	
mechanisation	would	be	invaluable	and	if	the	miners	wanted	the	seamen’s	support,	
they	must	back	them	now.	However,	the	Ipswich	miners	voted	against	a	strike	by	257	
votes	to	67	and	the	motion	was	similarly	defeated	nationwide.46	The	minority	vote	
of	67	 for	 the	 strike	demonstrates	 that	open	mass	votes	did	not	always	prevent	a	
minority	from	voicing	its	opinion.	Even	if	the	national	leaders	had	managed	to	win	a	
slim	majority	in	the	overall	vote,	it	seems	unlikely	that	they	could	have	successfully	
forced	 the	NSW	miners	 to	 strike	 against	 their	will.	 Local	 autonomy	 in	 the	Miners	
Federation	 was	 still	 too	 strong	 for	 that	 and	 although	 the	 union	 had	 successfully	
created	a	national	imagined	community	of	miners,	the	face-to-face	local	and	district	
communities	remained	stronger.	
	
Although	 the	 leaders	 such	 as	 Orr	 and	 Nelson	 attempted	 to	 justify	 the	 strike	 in	
pragmatic	 as	 well	 as	 class	 terms,	 the	 members’	 voting	 suggests	 the	 pragmatic	
arguments	were	unconvincing	 then	and	 they	appear	equally	unconvincing	now.	 It	
seems	 that	 in	 this	 instance	 ideology	and	 loyalty	 to	 the	MM	and	CPA,	which	were	
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leading	 the	 seamen’s	 strike,	 overcame	 pragmatic	 thinking	 for	 the	 leaders.	 Direct	
membership	decision-making	and	local	autonomy	saved	the	Miners	Federation	from	
pursuing	a	hopeless	and	disastrous	strike	which	would	have	left	it	broke	and	seriously	
weakened.	 This	 example	 runs	 counter	 to	 two	 widely	 held	 views	 in	 the	 union	
democracy	 scholarship:	 that	 leaders	 are	 usually	 more	 conservative	 than	 their	
members	 and	 that	 leaders	 are	 in	 a	 position	 to	make	more	 informed	and	 rational	
decisions	than	members.47	
	
Meanwhile	 the	 local	anti-mechanisation	strike	at	Lambton	B	continued	and	on	10	
January	1936	BHP	advertised	for	strike-breaking	miners	to	replace	the	striking	Miners	
Federation	members.48	BHP	quickly	received	hundreds	of	applications	for	the	strike-
breaking	jobs	and	the	SMH	reported	that	the	company	was	confident	it	could	just	as	
easily	replace	mining	craft	unionists	employed	at	Lambton	B	if	they	joined	the	Miners	
Federation	strike.49	This	was	the	problem	that	faced	every	Miners	Federation	strike	
in	the	interwar	period.	There	were	simply	far	more	miners	than	jobs	and	miners	who	
had	been	unemployed	for	months	or	years	were	willing	to	risk	the	odium	of	being	
called	a	“scab”.	
	
On	12	January	the	central	council	endorsed	the	actions	of	the	Wallarah	miners	lodge	
in	refusing	to	supply	coal	to	ships	staffed	by	strikebreaking	seamen.50	Once	again	this	
demonstrates	 the	 strong	 local	 autonomy	 and	 complexity	 of	 Miners	 Federation	
politics	 as	 the	 Wallarah	 lodge	 was	 pursuing	 the	 sympathy	 strike	 despite	 its	
overwhelming	rejection	by	Miners	Federation	members	state	and	nation-wide.	The	
central	council	announced	a	2.5	per	cent	levy	on	all	members	to	support	the	Lambton	
B	men,	the	Wallarah	men	and	donations	to	the	Seamen’s	Union.51	Members	did	not	
enjoy	paying	levies	and	this	may	have	caused	tensions	if	it	had	lasted	for	more	than	
a	few	weeks.	
																																								 																				
47	Lipset,	Trow,	and	Coleman,	Union	Democracy:	The	Internal	Politics	of	the	International	
Typographical	Union.	
48	“Mineowners,”	SMH	11	January	1936,	15.	
49	“Lambton	B,”	SMH	14	January	1936,	10.	
50	“Miners	attitude,”	SMH	13	January	1936,	11.	
51	“Call	for	non-union	miners,”	AW	15	January	1936,	8.	
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On	the	morning	of	15	January	the	Lambton	B	miners	met	at	the	pit	top	and	spoke	
with	the	district	and	national	leaders	Hoare,	Orr	and	Nelson.	By	this	stage	the	leaders	
had	accepted	the	hopelessness	of	the	strike	and	they	recommended	a	return	to	work	
and	the	end	of	the	campaign	against	the	electric	loader.52	This	was	a	complete	defeat	
for	 the	 Miners	 Federation	 and	 it	 ended	 a	 five	 month	 campaign	 against	
mechanisation.	 Mechanisation	 developed	 gradually	 in	 Australian	 coal	 mines	 but,	
fortunately	for	the	Miners	Federation,	its	effects	were	more	than	compensated	for	
by	the	surge	in	demand	for	Australian	coal	during	the	Second	World	War.	
	
Conclusion	
In	the	NSW	General	Strike	of	1917	the	Miners	Federation	members	had	ignored	their	
leaders	 and	 joined	 the	 strike	 with	 disastrous	 results.	 The	 union’s	 high	 levels	 of	
democracy	had	hurt	it	in	that	instance	while	undemocratic	unions	like	the	AWU	had	
been	spared.	But	in	the	fight	against	mechanisation	and	the	unsuccessful	seamen’s	
strike	 between	 1935	 and	 1936	 the	Miners	 Federation’s	 democracy	 saved	 it.	 The	
members	resisted	their	leaders’	ill-conceived	call	to	join	a	disastrous	strike	in	which	
the	miners	would	have	been	starved	back	to	work	long	before	the	stockpiles	of	coal	
were	 exhausted.	 The	 Miners	 Federation’s	 new	 Communist	 leadership	 learned	 a	
valuable	lesson;	the	miners	were	not	easily	controlled	from	above.	This	case	study	
provides	an	example	of	union	members	being	 less	radical	and	more	sensible	than	
their	 leaders	which	 runs	 counter	 to	 the	 assumptions	 in	much	 of	 the	 trade	 union	
democracy	 literature.	 It	 also	demonstrates	 the	 complexities	of	Miners	 Federation	
organisation	and	the	union’s	high	levels	of	democracy	and	local	autonomy	in	action.
																																								 																				
52	“Men	resume	work,”	AW	22	January	1936,	8.	
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CHAPTER	VII	
Democratic	impulses:	The	community	and	rules	of	the	NSW	Labor	Party	
The	 historiography	 of	 the	 interwar	 NSW	 Labor	 Party	 is	 infused	 with	 cynicism.	
According	to	historians,	the	party	was	stuck	in	an	almost	timeless	loop	of	oligarchy	in	
which	unprincipled	union	leaders	vied	for	power.	Some	such	as	Don	Rawson	argue	
that	these	men	sought	power	largely	for	its	own	sake	while	for	others,	like	Miriam	
Dixson,	some	union	leaders	sought	power	to	promote	their	radical	ideologies.	Either	
way,	 the	 consensus	 is	 that	 control	 of	 the	 party	 passed	 between	 different	 sets	 of	
oligarchs	and	culminated	in	the	corrupt	rule	of	Jack	Lang	and	his	“Inner	Group”.	For	
these	historians,	the	structural	basis	of	the	oligarchy	was	the	fact	that	trade	union	
leaders	enjoyed	disproportionate	and	undemocratic	power	within	the	party.1	
This	chapter	and	the	following	two	assess	the	extent	to	which	the	NSW	Labor	Party	
was	democratic	or	oligarchic,	how	and	why	this	was	the	case,	and	how	the	Labor	
Party	influenced	the	unions	and	was	influenced	by	them.		This	chapter	focuses	on	the	
party’s	community	and	rules,	while	chapter	eight	will	examine	internal	opposition,	
local	autonomy	and	membership	decision-making	and	chapter	nine	will	assess	the	
party	in	terms	of	extra-parliamentary	control,	free	communication,	corruption	and	
violence.	
	
I	 argue,	 in	 line	with	 the	 historiography,	 that	 the	 party	was	 an	 oligarchy,	 that	 the	
historiography’s	note	of	cynicism	is	well-founded,	and	that	its	identification	of	union	
leaders’	disproportionate	power	as	the	chief	anti-democratic	influence	is	correct.	But	
the	historiography	fails	to	recognise	adequately	the	countervailing	tendencies	and	
forces	that	were	operating	within	the	party	in	support	of	democracy,	and	the	many	
resulting	 improvements	 in	 democracy	 that	 occurred	 between	 1910	 and	 1939.	 By	
glossing	 over	 the	 countervailing	 tendencies,	 historians	 have	 presented	 an	 overly	
pessimistic	view	of	the	party	and	this	 in	turn	has	caused	them	to	misinterpret	key	
																																								 																				
1	Miriam		Dixson,	Greater	than	Lenin?	Lang	and	Labor	1916-32		(Melbourne:	University	of	Melbourne	
Political	Science	Department,	1977);	Don	Rawson,	"The	Organisation	of	the	Australian	Labor	Party	
1916-1941"	(University	of	Melbourne	1954);	Bede	Nairn,	The	'Big	Fella':	Jack	Lang	and	the	Australian	
Labor	Party	1891-1949		(Melbourne:	Melbourne	University	Press,	1986);	Graham	Freudenberg,	
Cause	for	Power:	The	Official	History	of	the	NSW	Branch	of	the	ALP		(Leichardt	Pluto	Press,	1991);	Jim	
Hagan	and	Ken	Turner,	A	History	of	the	Labor	Party	in	NSW	1891-1991		(Melbourne:	Longman	
Cheshire	1991).	
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events.	For	example,	in	this	chapter	I	argue,	contrary	to	the	historiography,	that	the	
1927	Rules	enhanced	party	democracy.	
	
We	 have	 seen	 how	 the	 Miners	 Federation’s	 strong	 occupational	 community	
facilitated	democracy	and	how	the	absence	of	such	in	the	AWU	promoted	oligarchy.	
In	 the	 NSW	 Labor	 Party	 there	 was	 not	 an	 occupational	 community	 per	 se,	 as	
members	came	 from	all	occupations	and	also	 included	professionals,	 farmers	and	
businessmen.	 But	 some	 local	 branches	 had	 strong	 roots	 in	 local	 working-class	
communities	 and	 this	 gave	 them	 significant	 power	 over	 local	 issues.	We	will	 see	
several	 examples	 of	 local	 branches	 winning	 victories	 over	 powerful	 state-level	
factions.	 These	 local	 communities	 had	 limited	 influence	 on	 the	 party	 as	 a	whole,	
however,	 because	 they	 were	 localised	 and	 could	 not	 match	 the	 state-wide	
organisation	of	the	trade	unions.	
	
The	1927	Rules	instituted	a	group	system	for	the	purpose	of	electing	representatives	
to	the	party’s	supreme	bodies.	This	enhanced	democracy	as	it	gave	every	section	of	
the	 party	 at	 least	 one	 central	 executive	 and	 annual	 conference	 representative,	
enabled	 the	 ordinary	 members	 to	 directly	 elect	 representatives	 to	 the	 central	
executive,	and	allowed	for	the	development	of	local	power	bases	independent	of	the	
state-level	factions.	The	party	leaders	were	motivated	to	institute	these	changes	by	
pressure	 from	 ordinary	 members,	 desire	 to	 enhance	 their	 own	 popularity	 and	
legitimacy,	their	support	for	internal	democracy,	and	the	need	to	curb	infighting.	
	
Historians	 have	 incorrectly	 assumed	 that	 it	 was	 always	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 the	
controlling	 faction	 to	make	 the	 party	 less	 democratic.2	I	will	 demonstrate	 several	
examples	 where	 it	 was	 in	 the	 controlling	 faction’s	 interest	 to	 enhance	 party	
democracy	in	certain	respects.	These	democratic	improvements	were	undermined,	
however,	by	the	fact	that	the	1927	Rules	continued	to	give	too	much	power	to	the	
leaders	of	affiliated	trade	unions.	This,	along	with	Lang’s	overwhelming	popularity	
with	party	members,	allowed	him	to	secure	his	domination	in	the	1930s.	
																																								 																				
2	Rawson,	"The	Organisation	of	the	Australian	Labor	Party	1916-1941,"	117.	
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Requirements	for	party	democracy	
In	previous	chapters	I	have	used	the	seven	key	requirements	for	union	democracy	as	
a	framework	for	my	analysis.	With	slight	modifications	these	requirements	are	also	
useful	for	analysing	party	democracy.	Democratic	rules,	local	autonomy,	rank-and-
file	 decision-making,	 internal	 opposition	 and	 free	 communication	 are	 equally	
important	 for	 party	 democracy	 as	 for	 union	 democracy.	 Political	 parties	 will	 not	
usually	have	an	occupational	community	because	their	members	will	come	from	a	
diverse	range	of	occupations,	but	a	strong	party	community	from	the	local	branch	
level	 to	the	national	 level	 facilitates	party	democracy	by	allowing	for	membership	
interest,	involvement	and	empowerment.	At	the	local	level,	party	democracy	may	be	
based	on	existing	communities	such	as	working-class	suburban	communities.	At	the	
state	and	national	level	party	communities	must	be	imagined	communities.	
	
Comparison	of	salary,	status,	skill	and	education	between	members	and	officials	was	
more	complicated	in	the	Labor	Party	than	in	the	trade	unions	because	members	and	
leaders	 came	 from	 such	diverse	backgrounds	 and	most	 extra-parliamentary	party	
positions	were	unpaid.	Political	parties	also	have	an	additional	category	of	members,	
the	politicians.	The	status	of	 the	politicians	compared	with	the	members,	and	the	
extent	 to	 which	 a	 party	 controls	 its	 politicians,	 is	 an	 important	 additional	
consideration	when	assessing	party	democracy,	which	I	address	in	chapter	nine.	The	
purported	 aim	 of	 Labor	 Party	 democracy	 was	 for	 the	 members	 to	 direct	 the	
politicians	as	their	delegates	in	parliament,	and	without	extra-parliamentary	control	
that	was	not	possible.3	
	
The	false	assumption	of	trade	union	democracy	
NSW	 unionists	 in	 the	 interwar	 period	 frequently	 argued	 that	 trade	 union	 power	
within	 the	 Labor	 Party	was	 democratic	 because	 the	 union	 leaders	 and	 delegates	
“represented”	hundreds	of	thousands	of	members.	For	example,	Albert	Thompson,	
organiser	for	the	Milk	and	Ice	Carters	Union,	wrote	a	letter	to	the	Australian	Worker	
																																								 																				
3	Terry	Irving	and	Sean	Scalmer,	"Labour	intellectuals	in	Australia:	modes,	traditions,	generations,	
transformations,"	International	Review	of	Social	History	50,	no.	1	(2005):	9.	
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responding	to	Inner	Group	criticisms	of	certain	trade	union	leaders.	He	wrote	that	
“to	castigate	officials	in	whom	thousands	of	organised	workers	have	reposed	their	
faith	 by	 placing	 them	 in	 charge	 of	 their	 economic	 and	 industrial	 affairs”	 because	
“they	express	an	opinion,	or	even	dare	to	express	the	desires	of	the	rank	and	file	they	
represent,	 is…	 callously	 stupid”. 4 	This	 argument	 is	 based	 on	 what	 I	 will	 call	 the	
“assumption	of	trade	union	democracy”	which	was	a	false	assumption	in	many	cases,	
as	we	saw	with	the	AWU.	
	
The	assumption	of	trade	union	democracy	extended	to	the	effect	that	trade	union	
affiliation	had	on	the	Labor	Party.	In	1937,	when	criticising	the	Inner	Group,	Labor	
Council	Secretary	Robert	King	said	that	“in	place	of	the	democratic	basis	and	sincere	
labour	ideals	of	the	Labor	Party	as	originally	founded	by	the	trade	unions…	today	we	
have	 a	 party	 machine	 run	 along	 the	 lines	 of	 a	 fascist	 dictatorship”.5	This	 line	 of	
reasoning	was	that	trade	unions	were	democratic	organisations	and	therefore	their	
involvement	 in	 the	 Labor	 Party	 would	 inherently	 influence	 the	 party	 towards	
democracy.	Both	assumptions	are	false.	
	
NSW	Labor	Party	historiography	
Historians	 are	 sceptical	 of	 purported	 ideological	 motivations	 behind	 factional	
manoeuvering	in	the	interwar	NSW	Labor	Party.	For	Jim	Hagan,	
it	is	possible	to	read	the	history	of	the	NSW	labour	movement	in	the	[1920s]	
as	sordid	farce.	Some	of	its	members	were	men	of	unprincipled	and	naked	
political	 ambition	 who	 indulged	 in	 corrupt	 practices	 to	 further	 their	 own	
interest	and	the	 interest	of	whichever	faction	supported	them	at	the	time.	
The	 factions	 themselves	 did	 deals	 and	 switched	 allegiances	 with	 every	
appearance	of	cynicism.6	
More	recently,	Rodney	Cavalier	argued	similarly	that	
NSW	 Labor	 seemed	 to	 be	 heading	 for	 a	 Shakesperian	 resolution.	 As	men	
without	principle	vied	for	power,	the	blood	shed	in	each	powerplay	washed	
																																								 																				
4	“Letters,”	Australian	Worker	(AW)	8	December	1937,	7.	
5	“Labor	Council,”	AW	24	November	1937,	14.	
6	Jim	Hagan,	"Lang	and	the	Unions,	1923-32,"	in	Jack	Lang,	ed.	Heather	Radi	and	Peter	Spearritt	
(Neutral	Bay:	Hale	&	Iremonger,	1977):	38.	
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into	the	next	and	the	next	and	the	next.	The	beneficiary	was	John	Thomas	
Lang.	Serious	evil	will	triumph	when	good	men	have	abandoned	the	field.7	
Historians	focus	especially	on	the	bitter	personal	conflicts	between	faction	leaders,	
such	as	Jack	Bailey	of	the	AWU	versus	Albert	Willis	of	the	Miners	Federation,	and	on	
the	 oligarchical	 rise	 of	 Lang	 and	 his	 Inner	 Group.8 	As	 with	 the	 AWU,	 there	 is	 a	
historiographical	consensus	that	the	Labor	Party	from	1916	to	1939	was	an	oligarchy,	
but	much	less	focus	on	how	or	why.	Don	Rawson’s	1954	PhD	thesis	provides	the	most	
detailed	analysis	of	interwar	NSW	Labor	Party	internal	politics.	Don	Aitkin	observed	
that	it	is	“probably	the	best-known	thesis	on	an	Australian	subject	never	to	have	been	
published”	and	it	has	set	the	agenda	of	the	historiography	to	the	present.9	There	is	a	
note	 of	 inevitability	 and	 even	 timelessness	 to	 the	 party’s	 oligarchy	 presented	 by	
Rawson,	 and	much	of	 the	 subsequent	 historiography,	which	 gives	 it	 a	Michelsian	
flavour	even	though	no	historian	engages	with	Michels	or	his	iron	law	of	oligarchy.	
	
Rawson	argues	 that	 in	 the	many	disputes	which	divided	 the	party	 in	 the	 interwar	
period	 “it	 is	 difficult	 to	 determine	 any	 clearly-marked	 differences	 of	 principle	
between	 the	 two	 [sides]”. 10 	For	 Rawson,	 the	 story	 of	 the	 interwar	 extra-
parliamentary	NSW	Labor	Party	is	almost	entirely	one	of	the	personal	drive	for	power	
and	its	rewards.	By	the	late	1930s,	Lang	and	his	Inner	Group	had	become	“not	only	a	
close	oligarchy	but	one	with	a	number	of	unhealthy	and	corrupt	features”.11	But	this	
was	 nothing	 new:	 “‘stuffed’	 conferences,	 rigged	 selection	 ballots	 and	 occasional	
physical	violence	were	well	known	 in	the	Labor	Party	before	Lang	and	there	 is	no	
evidence	that	he	used	them	any	more	frequently	than	his	predecessors,	but	he	was	
in	a	position	to	use	them	more	effectively”.12	
	
																																								 																				
7	Rodney	Cavalier,	Power	Crisis:	The	Self-destruction	of	a	State	Labor	Party	((Melbourne:	Cambridge	
University	Press,	2010):	15.	
8	Nairn,	The	'Big	Fella':	Jack	Lang	and	the	Australian	Labor	Party	1891-1949:	130.	
9	Don	Aitkin,	“Donald	William	Rawson	obituary,”	1997.	
10	Rawson,	"The	Organisation	of	the	Australian	Labor	Party	1916-1941,"	19.	
11	Ibid.,	314.	
12	Ibid.,	313.	
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There	is	also	a	historical	consensus	that	power	within	the	interwar	NSW	Labor	Party	
was	built	upon	union	foundations.13	In	1915	most	of	the	unions	combined	forces	into	
an	“Industrial	Section”,	took	control	of	the	annual	conference	and	changed	the	party	
rules	 to	entrench	 their	 power.	Cavalier	 argues	 that	 the	1916	Conference	was	 the	
“great	 dividing	 line”	 in	 NSW	 Labor	 history:	 “Before	 1916,	 the	 Labor	 Party	 was	
controlled	by	its	[branch]	members.	After	1916,	it	was	under	the	control	of	affiliated	
trade	unions,	which	meant	that	the	party	was	in	the	hands	of	whatever	coalition	of	
union	officials	could	command	a	majority	at	the	annual	conference”.14	
	
Vere	Gordon	Childe,	in	his	classic	1923	study	of	the	NSW	Labor	Party,	How	Labour	
Governs,	was	generally	supportive	of	this	extension	of	union	power.	His	main	focus	
was	criticising	the	useless	and	untrustworthy	Labor	politicians,	and	he	praised	the	
Industrial	Section	as	“a	genuine	revolt	of	the	unionist	backbone	of	the	party	against	
the	time-serving	and	inaction	of	the	politicians”,	adding	that	“it	was	in	the	interests	
of	the	politicians	to	strengthen	the	league	representation	in	comparison	with	that	of	
the	unions,	since	the	latter	were	most	inclined	to	be	critical”.	However,	Childe	was	
also	aware	of	the	negative	side	of	union	power,	heavily	criticising	the	AWU	faction	
which	took	control	of	the	central	executive	in	1919	“not	to	further	any	principles	or	
ideals,	but	to	reward	their	friends	and	supporters	with	seats	in	Parliament”.15	
Rawson	expanded	on	Childe’s	critique	of	union	power.	He	contended	that	from	1916	
onwards	“the	argument	that	the	politicians	should	be	subject	to	the	party	as	a	whole	
now	was	extending	to	mean	that	the	party	should	be	subject	to	the	trade	unions”	
and	this	control	was	 largely	undemocratic	because	“the	rank	and	file	unionist	had	
never	had	much	voice	in	the	way	his	union	was	represented	at	ALP	Conferences”.16	
No	historian	has	investigated	the	effects	of	the	unions’	internal	politics	on	the	party.	
When	the	 Industrial	Section	broke	up	 in	1919,	Rawson	argued	that	“it	was	at	 this	
																																								 																				
13	Irwin	Young,	"Conflict	within	the	NSW	Labor	Party	1919-1932"	(University	of	Sydney,	1961);	
Dixson,	Greater	than	Lenin?	Lang	and	Labor	1916-32;	Geoff	Robinson,	When	the	Labor	Party	Dreams		
(Australian	Scholarly	Publishing,	2008).	
14	Cavalier,	Power	Crisis:	The	Self-destruction	of	a	State	Labor	Party:	15.		
15	Vere	Gordon	Childe,	How	Labour	Governs:	A	Study	of	Workers'	Representation	in	Australia		
(London:	The	Labour	Publishing	Company	1923).	
16	Rawson,	"The	Organisation	of	the	Australian	Labor	Party	1916-1941,"	117.	
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stage	that	we	see	for	the	first	 time	a	process	which	was	to	become	typical	of	 the	
Labor	Party	in	NSW	over	the	next	twenty	years”:	
A	faction	based	upon	a	number	of	unions	revolts	against	the	existing	control	
of	the	party	machine	and	takes	control	itself.	Then	an	‘inner	group’	within	the	
faction	asserts	its	right	to	pre-eminence	and	begins	to	cast	off	its	former	allies,	
frequently	 expelling	 them	 from	 the	 party.	 Eventually	 the	 stage	 is	 reached	
where	there	are	at	least	as	many	unions	outside	as	inside	the	ruling	group.	
These	 outsiders	 combine	 with	 the	 aid	 of	 as	 many	 party	 branches	 and	
politicians	as	they	can	get	to	support	them,	and	sometimes	with	the	support	
of	the	remnants	of	the	old	defeated	faction.	Eventually	they	overthrow	the	
‘inner	group’	and	the	process	starts	again.17	
Here	Rawson	has	identified	a	useful	and	largely	accurate	pattern,	but	the	timeless	
inevitability	 of	 the	 process	 also	 obscures	 important	 changes	 that	 occurred	
throughout	the	period	and	underplays	the	influence	of	countervailing	forces.	
	
Dixson,	 and	more	 recently	 Geoffrey	 Robinson,	 have	 also	 analysed	 interwar	 NSW	
Labor	 in	 terms	 of	 union	 power	 bases.	 They	 are	 less	 concerned	 with	 internal	
organisation	 than	 Rawson	 and	 Cavalier	 and,	 unlike	 them,	 they	 are	 supportive	 of	
union	power	because	they	argue	it	caused	the	second	Lang	NSW	government	to	be	
“the	most	radical	government	in	Australian	history”.	This	was	not	because	of	“Lang’s	
personality”	but	because	he	 “allied	himself	with	 a	 group	of	 radical	 unionists	who	
expounded	a	class	struggle	ideology”.18	Robinson	demonstrated	that	from	the	time	
he	became	NSW	Labor	parliamentary	leader	in	1923	until	1932,	Lang	and	his	personal	
allies	were	largely	dependent	on	a	shifting	alliance	of	unions	for	their	power	within	
the	party.	Following	“Lang’s	electoral	defeat	in	1932”,	however,	“his	union	support	
declined,	and	his	cronies	and	advisors	became	increasingly	influential”.	The	loss	of	
union	 support	was	especially	apparent	after	1934,	and	 it	was	 then	 that	 the	 Inner	
Group	increasingly	used	the	advantages	of	incumbency	and	corruption	to	maintain	
its	 power.	 But	Robinson	 too	 argues	 that	 this	was	nothing	new	as	 “accusations	of	
ballot	rigging	were	a	consistent	theme	of	interwar	NSW	Labor	politics”.19	
	
																																								 																				
17	Ibid.,	11.	
18	Robinson,	When	the	Labor	Party	Dreams:	1.	
19		ibid.,	27.	
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Although	they	do	not	acknowledge	it,	there	is	an	important	difference	between	the	
arguments	 of	 Dixson	 and	 Robinson	 on	 one	 side	 and	 Rawson	 and	 Cavalier	 on	 the	
other.	For	Rawson	and	Cavalier	the	factional	battles	are	almost	entirely	about	“men	
without	principle	[vying]	for	power”	whereas	for	Dixson	and	Robinson	the	 leading	
trade	 unionists	 were	 seeking	 influence,	 at	 least	 in	 part,	 for	 ideological	 causes.	
Unsurprisingly,	there	is	truth	on	both	sides	and	I	demonstrate	that	both	ideology	and	
personal	 power	 were	 key	 drivers	 for	 most	 participants.	 	 It	 is	 not	 his	 focus,	 but	
Robinson	 briefly	 provides	 some	 explanation	 of	 the	 underlying	 forces	 behind	 the	
ideological	radicalism	in	NSW.	He	says	that	unlike	in	the	rest	of	Australia	“in	NSW	the	
left	was	eventually	victorious”	because	“miners	had	more	weight	in	NSW	labour,	the	
ambitions	 of	 the	 AWU	 divided	 it	 from	 potential	 allies,	 but	 personalities	 were	
significant,	the	leadership	of	the	NSW	left	was	more	pragmatic,	the	centre	of	trade	
union	 opinion	was	more	 radical	 and	 Lang	was	willing	 to	 seek	 the	 support	 of	 the	
left”.20	
	
In	addition	to	the	unions,	Lang’s	 intraparty	power	was	also	based	on	his	 immense	
personal	popularity	which	allowed	him	to	“appeal	over	the	heads	of	party	and	union	
officials	 to	 rank	and	 file	members”.21	He	was	a	 large,	 imposing	man	appropriately	
nicknamed	“the	Big	Fella”.	Dixson	argues	that	he	possessed	many	of	the	key	features	
of	 Australian	 masculinity:	 “physical	 strength,	 anti-intellectualism,	 anti-
authoritarianism-in-conjunction-with-authoritarianism	 in	 personal	 relationships;	
‘underdoggery’;	 an	 emotional	 bleakness	 and,	 correlatively,	 a	 tendency	 to	 keep	
women	 at	 an	 emotional	 distance”.22 	He	 enjoyed	 the	 support	 of	 the	 majority	 of	
ordinary	Labor	Party	and	union	members	until	at	least	1938.23		
	
This	popularity	was	largely	based	on	his	personal	magnetism,	his	legislative	record	as	
NSW	Premier	and	his	populist	reputation	for	standing	up	for	the	“people”	against	the	
“elites”	during	the	Great	Depression.	It	was	also	based	in	part	on	the	fact	that	direct	
																																								 																				
20	Ibid.,	23.	
21	Hagan	and	Turner,	A	History	of	the	Labor	Party	in	NSW	1891-1991:	85.	
22	Dixson,	Greater	than	Lenin?	Lang	and	Labor	1916-32:	10.	
23	Rawson,	"The	Organisation	of	the	Australian	Labor	Party	1916-1941,"	312.	
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communication	with	the	ordinary	party	and	union	members	was	an	increasing	source	
of	power	throughout	the	interwar	period.	This	was	especially	evident	in	the	official	
NSW	Labor	Party	newspaper,	the	Labor	Daily,	which	Lang	and	his	allies	controlled	for	
most	of	the	period	and	used	to	foster	his	popularity.	Hagan	and	Turner	argued	that	
the	Labor	Daily	was	of	“immense	propaganda	value	to	whomever	sought	to	control	
internal	party	elections”.24	
	
Historians	 contend	 that	 Lang	 and	 the	 Inner	 Group	 finally	 lost	 power	 in	 1939	 in	
conformity	with	Rawson’s	pattern	above.	 They	overreached	and	 refused	 to	 share	
power	 with	 the	 union	 leaders;	 the	 ousted	 union	 leaders	 combined	 to	 create	 an	
opposition	coalition	and	eventually	defeated	Lang.	The	fact	that	it	was	increasingly	
apparent	 that	 Labor	 could	 not	 win	 an	 election	 under	 Lang	 “strengthened	 Lang’s	
opponents	and	demoralised	his	supporters”	until	he	was	finally	defeated.25	
	
The	historiography	has	given	less	attention	to	how	internal	governance	within	the	
various	labour	organisations	affected	one	another.	Bede	Nairn	said	that	from	1917	
to	1923,	“the	AWU	had	developed	its	own	brand	of	internal	control	and	sought	to	
transfer	it	to	the	[Labor]	Party	Executive”.26	Raymond	Markey	argued	that	upon	its	
foundation	in	1891,	the	NSW	Labor	Party	based	its	party	and	local	branch	structure	
on	 “the	urban	 craft	 unions,	 or	maritime,	 coal	mining	 and	other	 unskilled	 unions”	
which	 all	 shared	 a	 “localised,	 participatory	 mode	 of	 organisation”.	 From	 1895,	
however,	 with	 the	 unions	 greatly	 weakened	 by	 the	 1890s	 strikes,	 the	 AWU	 and	
professional	Labor	politicians	imposed	their	“more	centralised,	bureaucratic	form	of	
government”	on	 the	party	 and	on	 the	 re-emerging	unions.27	I	will	 expand	on	 this	
analysis.		
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25	Rawson,	"The	Organisation	of	the	Australian	Labor	Party	1916-1941,"	314.	
26	Nairn,	The	'Big	Fella':	Jack	Lang	and	the	Australian	Labor	Party	1891-1949:	48.	
27	Raymond	Markey,	"Trade	Union	Democracy	and	the	Labor	Party	in	NSW	1880-1914,"	Historical	
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NSW	Labor	Party	communities	
Labor	Party	members	came	from	all	walks	of	life	and	almost	every	occupation.	Most	
were	generally	of	the	“working	class”	but	even	this	broad	term	does	not	capture	the	
party	as	there	were	many	professionals,	businessmen	and	farmers	within	the	ranks.	
Like	 the	 AWU	 and	 Miners	 Federation,	 the	 NSW	 Labor	 Party’s	 community	 was	 a	
combination	of	local	face-to-face	community	in	the	local	branches	and	an	imagined	
community	 across	 the	 state.	 As	 with	 the	Worker	 newspapers	 in	 the	 AWU	 and	
Common	 Cause	 in	 the	Miners	 Federation,	 party	 newspapers	 such	 as	 Labor	 News	
(1918-24)	 and	 the	 Labor	 Daily	 (1922-38)	 were	 crucial	 in	 creating	 the	 state-wide	
imagined	community.	In	1928	Rozelle	East	branch	member	A.E.	Arundel	commended	
the	 Labor	 Daily	 for	 doing	 “something	 to	 bind	 [the	 party’s]	 scattered	 sections	
together”.28	
In	 1929	 the	 NSW	 Labor	 Party	 reported	 branch	 membership	 of	 24,361. 29	
Unfortunately	membership	figures	are	not	available	for	other	years	because	it	would	
be	instructive	to	see	how	they	rose	and	fell	in	response	to	circumstances	inside	and	
outside	 the	 party.	 As	we	 saw	 in	 the	 thesis	 introduction,	 organisational	 incentives	
which	cause	people	to	become	party	members	can	be	either	“collective	incentives”	
of	solidarity	with	party	ideology,	or	“selective	incentives”	of	material	gain	or	status.		
Angelo	Panebianco	argues	that	leaders’	legitimacy	in	the	eyes	of	ordinary	members	
depends	on	their	ability	to	control	and	distribute	organisational	incentives.30	
People	joined	Labor	Party	branches	with	a	range	of	different	motivations.	Support	
for	 the	 party’s	 ideology	 was	 important	 for	 many,	 probably	 most,	 but	 party	
membership	was	also	a	way	to	socialise,	network,	promote	a	business	or	find	a	job.	
Individuals	also	joined	as	a	favour	to	a	friend	or	relative	to	vote	for	him	or	her	in	a	
ballot	(“branch	stacking”).31	Labor	officials	often	rewarded	their	supporters,	relatives	
and	friends	with	“jobs	for	the	boys”	within	the	party,	unions	and	labour	newspapers.	
When	in	government	at	local,	state	or	federal	levels	these	spoils	could	extend	to	a	
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29	Rawson,	"The	Organisation	of	the	Australian	Labor	Party	1916-1941,"	93.	
30	Angelo	Panebianco,	Political	Parties:	Organisation	and	Power		(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	
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wide	range	of	public	sector	jobs,	although	this	occurred	on	a	minor	scale	compared	
with	US	urban	patronage.32	The	Labor	Daily	publicly	defended	this	practice	of	hiring	
relatives:	“if	Bill	Smith’s	great-grandson	is	the	deputy-assistant	office	boy	then	Bill	
Smith	knows	he	has	got	a	real	battler	for	Labor	with	him	and	not	a	whisperer	and	
white	ant”.33		
Michael	Hogan’s	history	of	the	Glebe	local	Labor	Party	branch	in	inner-Sydney	from	
1891	to	2003	is	the	only	detailed	study	of	a	local	political	party	branch	in	Australian	
history.34	Hogan	shows	 that	around	1920	 the	branch	was	sufficiently	organised	 to	
enjoy	autonomy	from	its	state	and	federal	MPs	and	from	the	party	central	executive.	
This	autonomy	was	achieved	because	the	branch	had	capable	local	leaders	and	its	
“core	of	Catholic	membership	gave	it	strong	roots	in	the	local	community”.35	He	finds	
that	branch	membership	was	highest	during	 three	periods	of	 state-level	 factional	
struggle:	 between	 Lang	 and	 the	 AWU	 (mid-1920s),	 between	 Lang	 and	 the	
Socialisation	Units	(mid-1930s)	and	between	Lang	and	the	Industrialists	(late-1930s).	
This	 suggests	 that	 factionalism	 enhanced	 party	 democracy	 by	 stimulating	
membership	interest	and	providing	for	opposition	and	potential	leadership	renewal,	
similar	to	what	we	saw	in	the	Miners	Federation	in	previous	chapters.36	Hogan	argues	
that	by	studying	the	party	at	the	branch	level	the	
view	 from	 below	 presents	 an	 explanation	 for	 particular	 events	 rather	
different	from	the	generally	accepted	view	from	above.	The	rank	and	file,	at	
least	in	Glebe,	have	not	always	conformed	to	the	generalisations	that	party	
and	 factional	 leaders	might	 have	wished,	 and	 their	 allegiances	 have	 been	
determined	by	peculiar	and	local	factors	not	generally	discussed	in	the	wider	
literature.37	
While	a	detailed	exploration	of	local	branch	politics	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis,	
in	 this	 section	 and	 throughout	 the	 remaining	 chapters	 I	 will	 discuss	 a	 series	 of	
examples	of	local	branches	successfully	resisting	state-level	factions	on	local	issues.	
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The	organisation	and	community	of	each	branch	varied	but	many	held	regular	social	
functions	in	addition	to	branch	meetings.	These	occurred	especially	when	fundraising	
was	needed	for	an	election	campaign	or	a	strike.	During	the	1929	timber	workers’	
strike,	 local	 party	 members	 raised	 money	 through	 house	 parties,	 gift	 evenings,	
euchre	 parties,	 dances,	 street	meetings	 and	 doorknocking.	 The	 party’s	 organising	
secretary	A.J.	Macpherson	also	made	collections	outside	the	Sydney	Cricket	Ground	
each	weekend	 and	 used	 the	 party	 car	 to	 deliver	 300	 loaves	 of	 bread	 to	 strikers’	
homes.38	This	solidarity	fostered	a	sense	of	community	amongst	the	members	and	
provided	a	degree	of	social	security	in	a	time	of	minimal	government	welfare.	
	
The	party	encouraged	the	development	of	a	NSW	Labor	community	through	state-
wide	 events.	 In	 1924	 the	 party	 held	 its	 first	 annual	 picnic	 and	 4,000	 members	
attended	at	Clifton	Gardens	in	Mosman	in	north-east	Sydney.	Attendees	participated	
in	a	wide	range	of	sporting	events	and	 family	activities.39	That	year	 the	party	also	
held	 its	 first	ever	 Labor	Ball	 at	 the	Paddington	Town	Hall.	 Each	branch	selected	a	
young	woman	to	be	its	entrant	in	the	“Queen	of	the	May”	pageant.	The	object	was	
“to	raise	funds	for	the	party,	and,	at	the	same	time,	to	foster	a	better	spirit	among	
members	of	the	Labor	movement”.40	In	front	of	a	crowd	of	1200	Lang	crowned	Miss	
Daphne	 Houghton	 of	 Balmain	 Queen	 of	 the	 May.	 Houghton	 was	 surrounded	 by	
heralds,	pages,	and	maids	of	honour	and	dressed	in	a	white	satin	and	crimson	cloak	
as	 she	 collected	 her	 prize.41	In	 1932	 the	 Central	 Executive	 announced	 a	 plan	 to	
further	“stimulate	interest”	in	the	party	amongst	young	people.	The	chief	strategies	
were	 interleague	sports	competitions	and	the	production	of	working-class	plays.42	
None	of	these	techniques	was	particularly	innovative;	they	were	borrowed	from	the	
unions	in	many	cases	and	the	unions	had	borrowed	them	from	religious	and	social	
organisations	that	pre-dated	unionism.	
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Unlike	in	the	AWU	and	Miners	Federation,	women	played	a	significant	role	within	the	
NSW	Labor	Party	from	the	late	nineteenth	century	onwards.	The	main	reason	for	this	
difference	was	that	the	pastoral,	construction	and	mining	workforces	were	almost	
entirely	male	whereas,	from	1902,	half	the	NSW	electorate	was	female,	as	was	an	
increasing	proportion	of	 the	white-collar	workforce.	 If	 the	Labor	Party	was	 to	win	
elections	it	would	need	to	appeal	to	women	as	well	as	men.		
	
The	involvement	of	women	had	similarly	positive	effects	on	the	party	community	as	
it	 had	 on	 the	 Miners	 Federation	 community,	 with	 women	 coordinating	 welfare,	
distributing	propaganda	and	organising	entertainment	and	sporting	events.	But	 in	
addition	 to	 this	more	 traditionally	 female	work,	 from	 the	early	 twentieth	 century	
Labor	Party	women	also	began	to	perform	more	traditionally	male	public	political	
roles:	 acting	 as	 delegates,	 running	 in	 internal	 elections	 and	 speaking	 at	 political	
rallies.43	The	party	rules	provided	affirmative	action	for	women	delegates	to	annual	
conference	which	 I	will	discuss	 in	more	detail	below.	Labor	women	also	 formed	a	
Women's	 Central	 Organising	 Committee	 in	 1904	which,	 by	 1930,	 represented	 26	
metropolitan	branches	and	six	unions.44	The	party	organised	social	sport	for	women	
including	 tennis	and	vigoro	 (a	sport	combining	 tennis	and	cricket).45	In	 its	 internal	
empowerment	 of	 women	 the	 Labor	 Party	 was	 thirty	 years	 ahead	 of	 the	 Miners	
Federation	and	eighty	years	ahead	of	the	AWU.	
Feminist	Labor	women	such	as	Annie	Golding	and	Kate	Dwyer	fought	for	their	right	
to	be	heard	publicly	both	in	society	and	within	the	Labor	Party.	Many	within	the	party	
supported	more	traditional	roles	for	women	and	continued	to	promote	men	as	sole	
breadwinners,	especially	during	times	of	high	unemployment.	In	1930,	for	example,	
“E.G.”	of	Aberdare	wrote	to	the	Labor	Daily	that	“all	those	women	who	have	fathers	
and	 husbands	 able	 to	 support	 them	 should	 be	 forced	 to	 give	 their	 jobs	 to	
unemployed	 men”. 46 	The	 Labor	 Daily	 claimed	 to	 support	 women	 running	 for	
parliament	but	in	a	qualified	and	patronising	way.	While	stating	that	in	theory	women	
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should	 be	 allowed	 to	 run	 for	 office,	 the	 Labor	 Daily	 editorial	maintained	 that	 as	
electioneering	 was	 a	 “highly	 technical	 matter”	 and	 involved	 “sustained	 physical	
effort”,	 it	was	natural	that	women	would	not	be	well-represented	in	parliament.47	
Nevertheless	in	1931	Lang	appointed	Catherine	Green	and	Ellen	Webster	as	the	first	
women	ever	to	sit	in	the	NSW	Legislative	Council.	At	the	time	both	were	prominent	
members	of	the	NSW	Labor	Party	central	executive.	
	
The	 Labor	 Daily	 recorded	 local	 branch	 affairs	 in	 significant	 detail.	 In	 1924	 the	
newspaper	 reported	 that	 the	 Edgecliff	 branch	 Christmas	 tree	 committee	 had	
organised	 a	 night	 of	 presents	 and	 refreshments	 for	 children	 with	 a	 band	 and	
“chocolate	waltzes,	balloon	and	streamer	dances”.48	The	party	provided	services	that	
in	the	later	twentieth	century	were	performed	by	local	councils;	the	St	Peters	branch	
in	far	western	Sydney,	for	example,	had	a	library.49	Merrylands	branch	followed	suit	
and	A.E.	 Dixon	 reported	 enthusiastically	 that	 “we	 at	Merrylands	 formed	 a	 library	
some	eighteen	months	ago	and	the	interest	taken	in	it	is	beyond	all	expectations”.50	
The	Labor	Daily	also	sponsored	the	first	grade	rugby	league	competition	which	was	
called	the	“Labor	Daily	Cup”,	the	equivalent	of	today’s	National	Rugby	League	(NRL)	
Telstra	Premiership.51	
	
The	NSW	Labor	Party	ran	education	and	skills	classes	for	members.	As	we	have	seen	
in	previous	chapters,	education	can	be	empowering	and/or	indoctrinating.	The	SMH	
argued	that	Labor	Party	education	was	the	latter:	“it	is	strange	that	such	turbulent	
zealots	 should	 imagine	 themselves	 capable	 of	 educating	 anyone”.52	For	 the	 SMH	
editors,	the	fact	that	T.	Paine,	a	former	member	of	the	CPA,	was	the	President	of	the	
inaugural	Labor	Party	speaking	class	confirmed	their	suspicions.	By	1930	there	were	
100	 pupils	 participating	 in	 classes	 in	 the	 federal	 electorates	 of	 East	 Sydney	 and	
Barton.	 The	 curriculum	 covered	 articulation,	 conduct	 of	 meetings,	 debating	
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technique	and	public	speaking.53	Macpherson	said	the	“establishment	of	classes	at	
important	 centres”	 had	 “the	 object	 of	 training	 young	men	 to	 become	 proficient	
platform	 speakers”. 54 	These	 classes	 were	 more	 empowering	 than	 indoctrinating	
because	 they	 were	 teaching	 skills	 which	 could	 be	 used	 to	 advocate	 any	 political	
position	 rather	 than	 teaching	 oversimplified	working-class	 economic	 and	 political	
theory.	
	
Local	 branches	were	 strongest	where	 they	were	 built	 upon	 existing	 communities	
such	as	 the	Catholic	community	 identified	by	Hogan	 in	Glebe	or	existing	working-
class	and	trade	union	communities.	In	some	areas	the	local	trade	union	community	
and	Labor	Party	community	were	one	and	the	same	and	this	allowed	some	unions	to	
bring	their	culture	directly	into	the	Labor	Party.	This	blurring	was	especially	strong	
for	miners	and	railway	workers,	who	had	always	been	able	to	vote	 in	Labor	Party	
selection	ballots	at	 the	pit	head	and	rail	depots.55	At	 the	1928	NSW	Labor	Annual	
Conference	the	distinction	between	party	and	union	branches	dissolved	completely	
for	the	miners	when	President	Webster	ruled	that	Miners	Federation	 lodges	were	
Labor	 Party	 branches. 56 	The	 Miners	 Federation	 therefore	 brought	 its	 strong	
democratic	lodge	culture	into	coalfields	Labor	Party	branches.57	
	
Overall,	however,	the	 local	branches	could	not	match	the	organisational	power	of	
the	union	bureaucracies	 at	 the	 state	 level.	On	 the	annual	 conference	and	 central	
executive	 the	 unions,	 which	 usually	 meant	 the	 union	 leaders,	 enjoyed	 majority	
control.	 Furthermore,	 hundreds	 of	 unknown	 unionists	 –	who	 often	worked	 away	
from	home	in	other	parts	of	the	state	-	would	flood	into	each	branch	at	preselection	
time	and	greatly	outnumber	the	branch	members.58	There	were	usually	some	unions	
and	some	branches	on	both	sides	of	a	party	division.	But	on	both	sides	the	union	
leaders	wielded	the	most	power.	The	unions	had	numerous	advantages	over	the	local	
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leagues	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 ability	 to	 exercise	 power	 within	 the	 party.	 They	 were	
organised	 state-wide	 and	 large	 unions	 like	 the	 AWU	 and	Miners	 Federation	 had	
extensive	funds	and	salaried	fulltime	staff	and	officials.	Before	1923	the	politicians	
had	led	the	branches	in	checking	union	power	but,	once	Lang	became	parliamentary	
leader	and	allied	himself	with	the	unions,	there	was	no	state-wide	leadership	for	the	
branches	and	they	became	increasingly	powerless	at	the	state	level.	Branches	with	
strong	communities	did	retain	some	power	over	local	issues,	as	we	will	see	below.	
	
The	NSW	Labor	Party	Rules	
Founded	in	1891,	the	NSW	Labor	Party’s	centralised	structure	was	set	by	the	mid-
1890s;	 annual	 conference	 had	 unlimited	 power	 and	 the	 central	 executive	 had	
unlimited	power	between	conferences.	In	theory,	the	annual	conference	and	central	
executive	controlled	the	politicians.	Local	branches	(through	Electorate	Councils)	and	
affiliated	unions	elected	or	appointed	delegates	to	annual	conference	according	to	
their	membership,	 and	 annual	 conference	 elected	 the	 central	 executive	 by	 block	
vote.59	
	
Annual	conferences	were	colourful	affairs.	Former	delegate	“F.C.B.”	recalled	annual	
conferences	in	the	early	1920s	for	the	SMH:		
Stirring	times	they	were,	for	fisticuffs	often	flew	freely,	and	an	ugly	right	was	
a	greater	asset	in	supporting	a	charge	than	a	wealth	of	evidence	of	the	most	
convincing	 kind.	 Conferences	 in	 those	 days	 were	 occasions	 on	 which	
everybody	 accused	 everybody	 else	 of	 the	 basest	motives,	 and	 the	 lowest	
crimes;	 delegates	 vied	 with	 one	 another	 in	 hurling	 about	 epithets	 and	
expletives	in	the	most	indiscriminate	fashion.60	
This	all	unfolded	in	a	large	room	on	the	ground	floor	of	the	Trades	Hall	in	Sydney	with	
hard	chairs	arranged	in	a	quadrangle.	The	air	was	thick	with	tobacco	smoke	and	noisy	
electric	fans	laboured	overhead.	At	the	front	of	the	hall	the	president	sat	with	a	large	
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bell	to	maintain	order	and	the	senior	vice-president	sat	at	the	rear	to	keep	the	back	
rows	in	line.61	
Prior	to	the	1927	Rules,	the	AWU	had	used	its	money	to	distort	party	democracy	by	
paying	delegate	expenses	for	some	rural	branches.	Many	rural	branches	could	not	
afford	the	delegates’	fees,	transport	and	accommodation	expenses	so	the	AWU	had	
paid	expenses	for	loyal	delegates.	In	1928	NSW	Labor	President	Jim	Graves	said	that	
year’s	 annual	 conference	 “compared	 more	 than	 favourably	 with	 former	 ALP	
conferences”	 as	 all	 delegates’	 expenses	 “were	 met	 either	 by	 the	 bodies	 they	
represented	or	by	their	own	sacrifice”	as	opposed	to	the	former	arrangement	when	
“many	of	the	country	delegates	were	the	guests	of	the	AWU	oligarchy”.62	
	
The	 annual	 conference	 delegates	 elected	 the	 central	 executive	 by	 block	 voting.	
Under	the	block	voting	system,	each	voter	had	the	same	number	of	votes	as	there	
were	places	to	be	filled	(approximately	30).	The	voter	put	an	“X”	in	the	box	of	each	
candidate	for	whom	he	or	she	wished	to	vote,	and	the	candidates	with	the	highest	
number	 of	 votes	were	 elected.	 Block	 voting	 is	 renowned	 for	 its	 disproportionate	
representation	 of	 voters.	 Factions	 can	 promote	 “tickets”,	 organised	 lists	 of	
candidates	for	the	election,	and	the	most	popular	ticket	is	guaranteed	to	win	every	
position. 63 	This	 system	 thereby	 enabled	 dominance	 by	 a	 small	 group	 of	 faction	
leaders	who	could	organise	the	most	popular	ticket.	Conference	delegates	had	either	
to	vote	for	a	major	ticket	or	waste	their	vote,	and	central	executive	aspirants	had	
either	to	submit	to	the	controlling	faction	or	be	excluded	from	their	ticket.	
	
Block	voting	facilitated	and	encouraged	the	winner-take-all	factionalism	that	defined	
the	NSW	Labor	 Party	 from	1916	 to	 1927.	 Even	when	 its	 advantage	was	 slim,	 the	
faction	 with	 the	 most	 annual	 conference	 delegates	 won	 every	 central	 executive	
position,	while	 the	opposing	 faction	got	nothing.	A	majority	was	not	necessary,	 a	
faction	simply	needed	more	delegates	than	any	other	faction.	For	example,	a	ticket	
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that	achieved	40	per	cent	of	the	vote	would	win	every	position	if	the	remainder	of	
the	 vote	 was	 divided	 between	 two	 tickets	 that	 each	 achieved	 30	 per	 cent.	 This	
oversimplifies	things	somewhat	because	some	popular	individuals	appeared	on	more	
than	 one	 ticket,	 and	 not	 all	 delegates	 voted	 a	 straight	 ticket.	 Nevertheless,	 the	
desperation	to	create	the	largest	annual	conference	grouping	caused	bitter	hostility	
between	rival	factions	that	could	easily	slide	into	dirty	tactics	and	corruption.64		
	
This	 system	 also	 encouraged	 party	 splits.	 In	 1919,	 for	 example,	 the	 conservative	
faction	enjoyed	a	slight	majority	of	127	annual	conference	delegates	to	the	militant	
faction’s	 112	 delegates.	 But	 this	 bare	majority	 still	 gave	 the	 conservative	 faction	
every	position	on	the	central	executive.	Rawson	argued	that	“the	voting	on	[previous]	
issues	had	not	prepared	the	Industrialists	for	the	result	of	the	ballot	for	the	central	
executive	 which	 was	 almost	 a	 clean	 sweep	 for	 the	 ‘Moderate’	 faction…	 their	
overwhelming	defeat	left	the	Industrialists	ready	to	believe	that	the	ballot	had	been	
interfered	with”.65	But	this	argument	reveals	Rawson’s	lack	of	understanding	of	block	
voting	 in	 which	 a	 slight	 majority	 does	 deliver	 a	 “clean	 sweep”.	 Defeated	 and	
unrepresented,	many	members	of	the	militant	faction	broke	away	to	form	the	short-
lived	Industrial	Socialist	Labour	Party.66	
	
Dissident	democratic	activists	within	the	AWU	brought	their	activism	into	the	Labor	
Party.	 In	 1916	 Arthur	 Blakeley	 from	 the	 AWU	Western	 Branch	 submitted	 a	 new	
proposed	 method	 of	 electing	 the	 Labor	 Party	 central	 executive.	 NSW	 would	 be	
divided	into	15	districts	and	the	branch	and	union	members	resident	in	each	district	
would	elect	a	representative.67	This	was	similar	to	the	AWU’s	rules	from	1914	to	1920	
in	which	each	branch	was	divided	 into	15	 local	committees	and	each	elected	one	
representative.68	This	reform	was	not	enacted	but	it	would	have	been	a	democratic	
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improvement	through	decentralisation	and	direct	membership	election	of	executive	
members,	both	of	which	later	occurred	under	the	1927	Rules.	
	
At	that	same	1916	Annual	Conference,	 Jack	Cullinan,	also	from	the	AWU	Western	
Branch,	successfully	moved	that	politicians	not	be	allowed	as	conference	delegates	
or	on	the	executive.69	This	was	similar	to	his	unsuccessful	attempts	within	the	AWU	
to	 prevent	 individuals	 sitting	 on	 the	 branch	 executives	 and/or	 federal	 executive	
council	and	also	being	annual	convention	delegates.	The	AWU	annual	convention	and	
the	 NSW	 Labor	 Party	 annual	 conference	 were	 supposed	 to	 direct	 and	 judge	 the	
performance	of	the	executives	and	politicians	respectively,	so	it	did	not	make	sense	
for	individuals	to	be	annual	conference	delegates	and	direct	and	judge	themselves.	
Allowing	the	same	small	group	of	 individuals	to	occupy	multiple	positions	allowed	
them	to	create	and	entrench	an	oligarchy	as	had	occurred	in	the	AWU	and	to	a	lesser	
extent	the	NSW	Labor	Party	under	William	Holman	from	1910	to	1916.	The	oligarchic	
AWU	had	served	as	a	training	ground	for	democratic	labour	activists	like	Cullinan.		
	
By	the	early	1920s	many	NSW	Labor	Party	members	were	 increasingly	dissatisfied	
with	the	party’s	constitutional	arrangements.	The	1926	Annual	Conference	elected	a	
committee	to	draft	new	party	rules.	The	militant	faction	controlled	it,	with	Willis	as	
the	chairman	and	his	private	secretary	Emil	Voigt	the	secretary,	but	there	were	also	
two	 representatives	 from	 rural	 local	branches.70	The	multi-talented	Voigt	was	 the	
primary	author	of	 the	1927	Rules.71	Short,	 lean	and	athletic,	Voigt	was	 the	5	mile	
running	 gold	 medallist	 at	 the	 1908	 London	 Olympics,	 and	 had	 emigrated	 from	
England	in	1911.	In	Australia	he	worked	as	a	mechanical	engineer	before	joining	the	
Labor	Council	research	bureau	and	becoming	a	Trades	Hall	Red.	In	1925,	he	founded	
the	 Labor	 Council’s	 radio	 station	 2KY,	 became	Willis’s	 private	 secretary	 and	 soon	
abandoned	 revolutionary	 communism.72	Voigt	 argued	 that	 the	 1927	 Rules	would	
give	 “fair	 and	 just	 representation	 to	 every	 section	 of	 the	 party”.73	Willis	 similarly	
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maintained	that	 the	new	rules	provided	for	“decentralisation”	and	that	once	they	
came	into	operation,	no	one	would	“be	able	to	organise	any	ticket	for	the	executive”	
which	would	 instead	 be	 “fixed	 back	 there	 by	 the	 rank	 and	 file”.74	The	 new	 rules	
largely	fulfilled	these	promised	democratic	improvements.	
	
The	 Labor	 Party	 branches	 in	 each	 state	 electorate	 formed	 an	 electorate	 council.	
Under	the	1927	Rules,	electorate	councils	came	together	 in	groupings	of	five,	and	
each	 grouping	 elected	 two	 (rural	 electorate	 councils)	 or	 three	 (metropolitan	 and	
district	 electorate	 councils)	 delegates	 to	 annual	 conference.	 The	 five	 electorate	
councils	in	each	grouping	would	take	turns	to	elect	one	annual	conference	delegate	
each	in	rotation.	One	in	three	metropolitan	delegates	and	one	in	four	rural	delegates	
had	to	be	women.	Each	trade	union	group	(see	detail	below)	elected	one	delegate	
for	every	1,500	members.	The	unions	in	a	group	would	elect	one	delegate	each	in	
rotation,	regardless	of	each	union’s	membership.		
	
The	control	exercised	by	ordinary	union	members	over	these	elections	varied	greatly,	
depending	 on	 each	 union’s	 level	 of	 democracy,	 as	 had	 been	 the	 case	 under	 the	
former	 rules.	 In	 some	unions	 such	as	 the	AWU	and	Miners	 Federation,	 delegates	
were	 elected	 by	 membership	 vote,	 while	 in	 others	 they	 were	 selected	 by	 the	
leadership.75	As	we	saw	in	chapters	one	and	two,	even	in	some	unions	like	the	AWU	
where	members	elected	 the	delegates,	 the	elections	were	 so	undemocratic	 as	 to	
essentially	 amount	 to	 leadership	 selection.	 Kilburn,	 a	 member	 of	 the	 rules	
committee,	 dismissed	 AWU	 criticism	 of	 the	 new	 rules.	 He	 said	 that	 the	 criticism	
“comes	 well	 from	 the	 AWU	 oligarchy…	 there	 is	 an	 old	 saying,	 ‘search	 your	
conscience’,	I	suggest	that	the	AWU	should	search	for	a	conscience”.76	
	
Under	the	1927	Rules	the	party’s	general	secretary,	organising	secretary,	president,	
and	two	vice-presidents	were	still	elected	by	majority	vote	at	the	annual	conference.	
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But	 the	 remainder	 of	 the	 central	 executive	was	 elected	 in	 a	 group	 system.	 Voigt	
based	the	system	on	the	group	system	that	the	NSW	Labor	Council	had	adopted	in	
1923.77	There	were	 eleven	 trade	 union	 groups:	 AWU,	Miners	 Federation,	metals,	
building,	 food,	manufacturing,	public	utilities,	printing/non-manual/miscellaneous,	
transport	(water),	transport	(land),	and	wood.	Each	trade	union	group	elected	one	
member	of	the	central	executive	for	every	7,000	members,	to	a	maximum	of	three.	
There	 were	 also	 four	 electorate	 council	 groups.	 The	 metropolitan	 and	 district	
electorate	 council	 group	 elected	 four	 central	 executive	 representatives,	 and	 the	
northern,	west-central,	 and	southern	 rural	electorate	council	 groups	each	elected	
two	central	executive	 representatives.78	Local	branch	members	 in	each	electorate	
council	group	directly	elected	the	group’s	central	executive	representatives	using	the	
preferential	voting	system.	Meanwhile,	the	trade	unions	elected	or	appointed	one	
delegate	for	every	1,000	members	or	part	thereof,	and	these	delegates	then	met	in	
their	trade	union	groups	to	elect	each	group’s	central	executive	representatives,	also	
using	preferential	voting.79	The	first	central	executive	elected	under	the	new	rules	
contained	10	electorate	council	representatives	and	16	trade	union	representatives	
(figures	26	and	27).80	
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Figure	26:	Simple	but	divisive:	the	NSW	Labor	Party	Rules	immediately	preceding	the	
1927	Rules.	
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Figure	27:	The	NSW	Labor	Party’s	complicated	1927	Rules.81	
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The	commercial	press	and	the	AWU	branded	the	new	rules	the	“Red	Rules”.82	There	
has	 been	 some	 historical	 debate	 over	 whether	 the	 new	 rules	 were	 in	 fact	 a	
Communist	conspiracy.	Rawson	said	that	“once	the	rules	saw	the	light	of	day	it	was	
fairly	 clear	 that	 the	 admission	of	 Communists	was	not	 intended”.83	Nairn	 agreed,	
arguing	that	the	new	rules	were	never	“red”,	and	that	claims	to	the	contrary	were	
“irrational	and	mischievous	propaganda”.84	Yet	Miriam	Dixson	asserted	 that	 there	
was	“more	than	red-baiting	in	the	use	of	the	term	‘Red	Rules’”.	She	quoted	rule	59	
which	stated	that	“any	delegate	elected	by	a	plebiscite	of	his	trade	union	group	shall	
be	 deemed	 a	 fit	 and	 proper	 person	 to	 represent	 his	 organisation	 at	 the	 annual	
conference”,	 and	 argued	 that	 “many	 Communists	 and	 their	 friends	 would	 have	
become	delegates	under	 this	 rule,	 so	 in	 this	sense	the	rules	were	 ‘red’”.85	Dixson,	
however,	was	mistaken.	An	individual	needed	to	be	a	Labor	Party	member	to	become	
a	conference	delegate.	The	rules	barred	members	of	other	organisations	which	ran	
parliamentary	 candidates,	which	at	 the	 time	 included	 the	Communist	Party,	 from	
membership	 of	 the	 Labor	 Party. 86 	Furthermore,	 the	 Federal	 ALP	 rules	 already	
prevented	Communist	Party	members	from	joining	any	state	branch	of	the	party.87	
Finally,	the	1927	Conference	amended	the	new	rules	to	ban	Communists	explicitly.88	
Mark	Hearn	and	Harry	Knowles,	meanwhile,	confused	the	issue.	They	argued	that	“in	
return	for	strengthening	Lang’s	position,	the	rules	were	relaxed	to	allow	members	of	
the	Communist	Party	to	also	hold	membership	of	the	ALP”.89	The	1927	Rules	never	
allowed	Communist	Party	members	to	be	members	of	the	Labor	Party	as	well,	and	
Lang	was	the	driving	force	behind	the	explicit	ban	on	Communists.90	
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The	historical	consensus	is	that	the	1927	Rules	were	designed	cynically	to	advantage	
those	who	drafted	 them.91	Robert	Cooksey	argued	 that	“elections	where	 the	 final	
electors	were	at	one	or	two	removes	from	the	rank	and	file”	instituted	by	the	1927	
Rules	“especially	furnished	opportunities”	for	factional	control.		He	cites	the	fact	that	
annual	conference	delegates	were	“elected	by	and	from	groups	of	state	Electorate	
Councils	who	were	at	two	removes	from	the	rank	and	file,	and	union	groups,	made	
up	of	delegates	from	component	unions	who	were	at	one	remove	from	the	rank	and	
file”.92	But	in	making	this	assertion	Cooksey	assumes	that	all	the	delegates	in	each	
electorate	 council	 and	 trade	 union	 group	 came	 together	 to	 elect	 the	 group’s	
conference	delegates	in	a	single	vote.	In	fact,	electorate	councils	and	trade	unions	
within	 a	 group	 elected	 one	 delegate	 each	 in	 rotation.	 Each	 annual	 conference	
delegate	was	elected	by	a	single	electorate	council	or	trade	union,	one	step	removed	
from	the	ordinary	members,	the	same	as	under	the	former	rules.	
	
Both	Rawson	and	Cooksey	argued	that	the	militant	faction	leaders	designed	the	1927	
Rules	to	further	entrench	their	control	of	the	party,	and	that	they	did	so	primarily	by	
designing	the	rules	so	that	they	“favoured	a	faction	whose	strength	was	spread	over	
a	 number	 of	 unions”. 93 	But	 the	 new	 rules	 did	 not	 advantage	 a	 faction	 whose	
“strength	was	spread	over	a	number	of	unions”	any	more	than	the	former	rules	had.	
Under	both	sets	of	rules,	the	unions	selected	approximately	two-thirds	of	the	annual	
conference	delegates.	The	1927	Rules	also	gave	the	unions	approximately	two-thirds	
of	the	central	executive	representatives,	and	the	electorate	councils	approximately	
one-third.	But	if	the	unions	had	voted	together	under	the	former	rules	they	would	
have	won	every	executive	position,	as	I	explained	in	the	discussion	of	block	voting	
above.94	The	establishment	of	a	controlling	faction	had	required	considerable	union	
support	since	1916	and	this	continued	unchanged	under	the	1927	Rules.	
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In	contrast,	the	1927	Rules	introduced	position	sharing	on	the	central	executive.	The	
new	rules	dispersed	central	executive	places	throughout	the	party,	with	every	trade	
union	 and	 electorate	 council	 group	 selecting	 at	 least	 one	 representative.	 This	
position	 sharing	 guaranteed	 that	 there	 would	 always	 be	 a	 minority	 factional	
opposition	on	the	central	executive.	For	example,	the	militant	faction	would	never	
control	the	three	AWU	representatives.	The	positions	were	dispersed	so	widely	and	
evenly	 throughout	 the	 party	 that	 the	 position	 sharing	 caused	 a	 genuine	
decentralisation	of	power.	
	
Two	 additional	 changes	 further	 instituted	 power	 decentralising.	 First,	 every	 party	
member	 in	 NSW	 could	 now	 vote	 directly	 for	 their	 respective	 electorate	 council	
representatives	 on	 the	 central	 executive.	 In	 1928,	 3,419	 local	 branch	 members,	
divided	 into	 their	 four	 groups,	 directly	 elected	 the	 ten	 electorate	 council	
representatives.	 That	 this	was	 only	 around	 15	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 total	membership,	
however,	 casts	 doubt	 on	 how	 effectively	 the	 party	 facilitated	 membership	
participation. 95 	Second,	 the	 group	 system	 allowed	 for	 the	 development	 of	 local	
power	bases	independent	of	the	state-level	factions.	More	localised	alliances	could	
win	control	of	a	group	and	independently	control	its	annual	conference	and	central	
executive	representatives.	These	two	key	changes	made	central	executive	elections	
less	predictable	and	more	difficult	for	state-level	faction	leaders	to	control.	The	new	
voting	system	was	also	significant;	preferential	voting	avoided	vote	splitting	and	also	
allowed	 electors	 to	 vote	 for	 “third	 party”	 candidates	without	wasting	 their	 vote.	
Willis	 had	 observed	 the	 democratic	 advantages	 of	 preferential	 voting	 within	 the	
Miners	Federation	 for	 some	years.	 Like	block	voting,	however,	preferential	 voting	
was	still	a	non-proportional	voting	system	in	which	a	majority	secured	every	position	
within	a	group.96		
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One	of	 the	 few	advantages	of	 block	 voting	was	 that	 there	had	been	no	electoral	
boundaries	or	groupings	that	incumbents	could	manipulate	through	gerrymandering	
or	malapportionment.	The	new	rules	failed	to	reward	union	groups	with	over	21,000	
members	with	additional	places	on	the	central	executive.	As	the	AWU	was	the	only	
union	 in	 NSW	 with	 over	 21,000	 members,	 this	 was	 presumably	 by	 the	 militant	
faction’s	design.	The	AWU	could	justifiably	complain	that	it	should	have	received	five	
rather	than	three	places	on	the	central	executive	(35,000	members	divided	by	7,000	
equals	 five).	 But	 Rawson’s	 contention	 that	 the	 new	 rules	 made	 it	 “difficult	 or	
impossible	for	the	AWU	to	control	the	party	again”	is	an	exaggeration.97	To	the	extent	
that	the	AWU	leadership	had	ever	“controlled”	the	party,	they	had	always	relied	on	
the	support	of	a	coalition	of	conservative	union	and	branch	delegates.	The	new	rules	
did	not	prevent	them	from	once	again	forming	such	a	coalition.98	
	
The	former	rules	had	contained	affirmative	action	provisions	for	women.	Electorate	
councils	 in	 five-member	 electorates	 had	 elected	 five	 delegates	 plus	 two	 woman	
delegates	to	annual	conference,	and	electorate	councils	in	three	member	electorates	
had	elected	three	delegates	plus	one	woman	delegate.99	Kate	Deverall	argued	that	
the	 1927	 rules	 removed	 affirmative	 action	 provisions	 for	 women,	 but	 this	 is	
incorrect.100	The	1927	Rules	provided	slightly	better	affirmative	action	 for	women	
than	the	former	rules.	One	in	three	metropolitan	annual	conference	delegates	and	
one	in	four	rural	delegates	now	had	to	be	women.101	
	
Deverall	also	argued	that	some	Labor	women	opposed	the	1927	rules	because	they	
believed	“the	system	of	group	representation”	would	“prevent	women	being	elected	
to	the	executive”.	Because	“female	delegates	came	from	a	wide	range	of	electorates,	
predominately	 in	 metropolitan	 Sydney”,	 proposals	 “favouring	 regional	 areas	 or	
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unions	stood	to	have	an	adverse	effect	on	women's	representation”.	Additionally,	
“the	 group	 system	 also	 made	 it	 more	 difficult	 for	 women	 to	 combine	 forces	 on	
conference	floor	in	support	of	particular	people	or	policies”.102	These	arguments	are	
plausible,	 but	 it	 seems	 more	 likely	 that	 grouping	 Labor	 women	 together	 in	 the	
metropolitan	electorate	council	group	would	improve	their	chances	of	gaining	places	
on	 the	 central	 executive.	 Indeed	 one	 woman,	 Mary	 Dunn,	 received	 the	 highest	
number	of	votes	in	the	first	metropolitan	group	central	executive	election	in	1928.	
But	both	possibilities	assume	that	women	voted	together	as	women,	when	in	reality	
there	was	usually	a	mix	of	women	on	both	sides	of	an	issue	or	factional	dispute.	The	
overall	 gender	 composition	 of	 the	 central	 executive	 did	 not	 change	 notably:	 five	
women	out	of	32	members	in	1926,	and	four	women	out	of	30	members	in	1928.103	
	
Panebianco	would	expect	 the	 leadership	 to	decentralise	power	 in	 response	 to	an	
increase	 in	 the	 substitutability	 of	 the	 organisational	 incentives	 that	 the	 party	
provided	its	members.	But	no	significant	increases	are	apparent	around	1927.	The	
most	 obvious	 way	 that	 the	 substitutability	 of	 the	 organisational	 incentives	 could	
increase	 significantly	 in	 the	 short	 term	 is	 through	 the	emergence	of	 a	 rival	party.	
According	to	Panebianco,	the	decentralisation	of	power	would	therefore	have	been	
more	likely	in	1919	when	breakaways	formed	a	rival	party,	or	in	the	early	1920s	when	
the	Communist	Party	of	Australia	was	on	 the	 rise,	or	especially	 in	1931	when	the	
Federal	ALP	expelled	Lang	Labor	and	 formed	a	 rival	official	Federal	Labor	Party	 in	
NSW.	Instead,	the	power	decentralising	occurred	in	1927	when	the	threat	from	rival	
parties	was	at	its	lowest.	For	Panebianco,	power	decentralising	would	also	be	more	
likely	when	the	Labor	Party	was	out	of	government,	and	therefore	had	less	power	
and	prestige	with	which	to	maintain	or	enhance	its	organisational	incentives.	But	the	
1927	Rules	were	written	and	enacted	during	the	first	Lang	Labor	government	of	1925	
to	1927.104	It	was	not	high	 substitutability	of	 the	party’s	organisational	 incentives	
that	 led	 to	 the	 1927	 Rules.	 Instead,	 pressure	 from	 ordinary	 members,	 desire	 to	
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enhance	their	own	popularity	and	legitimacy,	support	for	 internal	democracy,	and	
the	need	to	curb	infighting	motivated	the	party	leaders	to	introduce	the	reforms.	The	
greater	clout	of	unions	such	as	the	Miners	Federation	also	allowed	them	to	import	
elements	of	their	democracy	into	the	party.	
	
The	majority	of	the	party	had	been	calling	for	a	group	system	for	years.	The	1923	
NSW	Trade	Union	 Conference,	 for	 example,	 passed	 a	motion	 by	 125	 votes	 to	 13	
supporting	“the	principle	of	election	of	the	ALP	Executive	directly	from	the	industrial	
trade	union	groups	and	electoral	groups,	in	place	of	promiscuous	election	from	the	
floor	 of	 annual	 conference”. 105 	The	 ordinary	 branch	 members	 overwhelmingly	
supported	the	1927	Rules.	In	July	1927,	193	local	branches	declared	their	support	for	
the	new	rules,	while	only	20	branches	declared	their	opposition.106	The	1927	Rules	
were	partly	a	response	by	the	militant	faction	leaders	to	this	pressure	from	below.	
As	identification	with	the	party’s	ideology	was	an	organisational	incentive	for	most	
members,	 the	 leadership’s	 legitimacy	 depended	 on	 its	 ability	 to	 be	 seen	 to	 be	
pursuing	“rank	and	file	control”.107	
	
Support	 for	 internal	democracy	amongst	the	 leaders	and	their	desire	to	make	the	
party	 organisation	 fairer	 and	 stronger	 was	 also	 a	 factor.	 As	 discussed	 in	 the	
introduction,	 most	 militant	 faction	 leaders	 believed	 in	 at	 least	 some	 degree	 of	
membership	control.	Furthermore,	they	did	not	consider	enhanced	party	democracy	
to	be	a	threat	to	their	high	standing.	Willis,	for	example,	had	experienced	repeated	
success	in	elections	within	the	highly-democratic	Miners	Federation.108	Lang	too	was	
already	 popular	 with	 ordinary	 party	 members. 109 	Militants	 argued	 that	 only	
unpopular	figures	like	the	oligarchic	AWU	leadership	had	anything	to	fear	from	rank	
and	file	control.110		
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The	militant	faction	leaders	were	also	aware	that	the	constant	infighting	within	the	
party	 was	 electoral	 poison,	 and	 so	 sought	 to	 incorporate	 the	 troublesome	
conservative	minority.111	In	1929	SMH	correspondent	“F.C.B.”	wrote:	
ALP	conferences	lost	their	glamour	and	punch	two	years	ago,	when	the	new	
rules	robbed	them	of	the	right	to	select	the	ALP	executive.	The	executive	has	
always	meant	power	and	position	to	its	members,	and	the	scramble	at	the	
old	conferences	for	appointment	was	as	hectic	as	it	was	undignified.112	
Many	 militant	 faction	 members	 had	 also	 experienced	 the	 damaging	 1919	 split.	
Allowing	the	conservative	faction	minority	representation	on	the	central	executive	
would	enfranchise	and	contain	opposition,	reducing	the	chances	of	another	rupture.	
Central	executive	decisions	were	by	simple	majority	vote,	so	a	minority	did	not	have	
any	significant	power	anyway.	This	is	a	good	example	of	why	position	sharing	does	
not	necessarily	 involve	 sharing	power.	 Furthermore,	 removing	 the	election	of	 the	
central	 executive	 from	 the	 proceedings	 would	 make	 for	 more	 harmonious	 and	
productive	annual	conferences.	
	
Yet	the	1927	Rules	coincided	with	a	centralisation	of	power	within	the	party.	By	1930	
an	increasingly	oligarchic	“Inner	Group”	of	Lang	loyalist	political	advisers	and	trade	
union	leaders	controlled	the	central	executive	and	annual	conference,	and	by	1934	
the	Inner	Group	had	resorted	to	outright	corruption	of	party	procedures.113	But	this	
centralisation	of	power	occurred	in	spite	of	the	1927	Rules,	not	because	of	them.	The	
majority	of	party	members,	 trade	union	 leaders	and	annual	 conference	delegates	
genuinely	supported	Lang	until	at	 least	1938.114	I	have	shown	above	that	 it	would	
therefore	have	been	easier	for	Lang	and	his	supporters	to	dominate	the	party	under	
the	former	rules.	
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The	new	rules	made	it	more	difficult	for	a	coalition	of	trade	union	leaders	to	control	
the	party,	but	they	did	not	remove	this	possibility	altogether.	From	the	perspective	
of	internal	party	democracy,	this	was	the	rules’	great	flaw.	The	trade	unions	selected	
the	 majority	 of	 annual	 conference	 and	 central	 executive	 representatives	 and	 it	
appears	 that	within	most	 trade	 unions	 the	 leaders	 firmly	 controlled	 their	 union’s	
representatives.	This	was	certainly	the	case	in	the	AWU,	and	it	allowed	a	relatively	
small	number	of	 key	union	 leaders	 to	 form	a	coalition	and	effectively	 control	 the	
party	with	minimal	input	from	the	thousands	of	ordinary	party	and	union	members.	
The	fact	that	trade	union	 leaders	continued	to	enjoy	paramount	power	under	the	
1927	 Rules	 helped	 the	 Inner	 Group	 to	 consolidate	 its	 dominance,	 but	 equally	
important	was	Lang’s	popularity	throughout	the	party.	
	
A	case	could	be	made,	in	line	with	Beer’s	analysis	of	the	British	Labour	Party	discussed	
in	 the	 introduction,	 that	 the	 rule	 of	 Lang	 and	 the	 Inner	 Group	 was	 not	 actually	
oligarchical	and	that	it	only	appeared	that	way	because	of	“a	broad	consensus	in	the	
party”.115 	Most	 party	 members	 supported	 Lang,	 and	most	 of	 those	 who	 did	 not	
simply	abandoned	 the	party.	 Following	 the	adoption	of	 the	1927	Rules,	 the	AWU	
disaffiliated,	and	 in	1931	the	entire	conservative	wing	of	 the	party	broke	away	to	
form	the	official	NSW	Branch	of	the	Federal	ALP,	in	opposition	to	Lang	Labor.116	But	
this	“broad	consensus”	did	not	merely	cause	the	rule	of	Lang	and	his	allies	to	appear	
oligarchic,	but	in	fact	enabled	them	to	establish	a	genuinely	oligarchic	rule,	as	we	will	
see	in	coming	chapters.117	
	
The	controlling	faction	increased	its	dominance	after	1932	despite	the	fact	that	the	
substitutability	of	Lang	Labor’s	organisational	incentives	increased	significantly,	with	
the	existence	of	a	rival	official	Labor	Party,	and	the	electoral	defeat	of	the	second	
Lang	Labor	government	that	year.	Once	again,	this	fails	to	conform	to	Panebianco’s	
expectations.118 	Michels’	 explanations	 for	 how	 leaderships	 entrench	 their	 rule	 is	
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more	convincing	in	this	case.	Lang	and	his	allies	were	able	to	use	their	positions	to	
control	the	party	and	further	cement	their	power.	The	ordinary	members’	“genuine	
cult	for	the	leaders”	was	clearly	evident,	especially	with	Lang.119	
	
With	the	defeat	of	Lang	and	the	Inner	Group	in	1939	the	party	rules	reverted	to	the	
pre-1927	situation	 in	which	electorate	councils	and	unions	directly	elected	annual	
conference	delegates	who	then	elected	the	central	executive	at	the	conference.	The	
rules	had	come	full	circle	and	returned	to	the	deeply	flawed	block	voting	system	in	
which	the	most	popular	ticket	won	every	central	executive	position.	This	occurred	at	
the	1939	Unity	Conference	where	the	anti-Lang	group	had	approximately	60	per	cent	
of	 the	 delegates	 but	won	 every	 central	 executive	 position.120	Ironically,	 the	 1927	
Rules	were	more	democratic	than	the	rules	that	replaced	them	in	1939	as	part	of	the	
supposed	“re-democratisation”	of	the	party,	but	both	sets	of	rules	gave	too	much	
power	to	union	leaders.	
	
Conclusion	
Lang’s	 domination	 of	 the	 NSW	 Labor	 Party	 in	 the	 1930s	 is	 one	 of	 countless	
international	 examples	 of	 the	 strong	 tendency	 towards	 oligarchy	 within	 formally	
democratic	 political	 parties.	 The	 1927	 Rules	 contained	 a	 key	 flaw	 from	 the	
perspective	of	party	democracy	in	that	they	invested	a	large	amount	of	power	in	the	
hands	 of	 trade	 union	 leaders.	 Although	 some	 local	 party	 branches	 had	 strong	
communities	they	were	not	organised	enough	to	counter	union	power	effectively.	
Lang	used	his	alliance	with	key	union	leaders	and	his	popularity	with	ordinary	party	
members	to	cement	his	control.	In	accordance	with	Michels’	iron	law	of	oligarchy,	
Lang	and	his	allies	were	able	 to	use	 their	positions	 further	 to	entrench	 their	own	
power.	Contrary	to	Panebianco’s	expectations,	this	shift	towards	oligarchy	occurred	
despite	 a	 significant	 increase	 in	 the	 substitutability	 of	 Lang	 Labor’s	 organisational	
incentives.	The	1927	Rules	could	therefore	be	interpreted	as	further	evidence	that	
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democracy	within	political	parties	is	a	hopeless	cause.	I	have	argued,	however,	that	
the	adoption	of	the	1927	Rules	is	also	an	example	of	how	oligarchy	can	be	resisted	
within	political	parties.		
	
Despite	their	flaws,	the	1927	Rules	significantly	decentralised	power	within	the	party	
by	giving	every	major	grouping	at	 least	one	representative	on	its	supreme	bodies,	
enabling	 the	ordinary	members	 to	elect	 central	executive	 representatives	directly	
and	allowing	 for	 the	development	of	 local	power	bases	 independent	of	 the	state-
level	factions.	The	militant	faction	leaders	were	motivated	to	institute	these	reforms	
by	 pressure	 from	 ordinary	 members,	 a	 desire	 to	 increase	 their	 legitimacy	 and	
popularity,	support	for	a	degree	of	internal	democracy,	and	with	the	goal	of	reducing	
infighting.	 The	1927	Rules	 therefore	 support	 those	who	have	 argued,	 contrary	 to	
Michels,	that	political	parties	can	successfully	repel	the	tendency	towards	oligarchy,	
while	also	demonstrating	 the	potentially	anti-democratic	 influence	of	 trade	union	
leaders	within	labour	parties.121
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CHAPTER	VIII	
Organised	opposition:	Factions,	membership	decision-making	and	local	autonomy	
within	the	NSW	Labor	Party	
Organised	opposition	existed	within	the	NSW	Labor	Party	in	a	variety	of	forms.	This	
chapter	 focuses	 on	 three:	 factionalism,	 membership	 decision–making	 and	 local	
autonomy.	 Rival	 factions	 provided	 organised	 opposition	 to	 the	 party	 leadership.	
Membership	decision-making	deteriorated	throughout	the	interwar	period	but	some	
local	branches	organised	to	oppose	the	decline.	Finally,	the	ruling	NSW	Labor	faction	
successfully	opposed	the	federal	Australian	Labor	Party’s	(ALP)	attempts	to	reduce	
the	autonomy	of	state	branches	within	the	party.	
	
The	 NSW	 Labor	 Party	 generally	 tolerated	 factionalism.	 Factions	 enhanced	 party	
democracy	 throughout	 the	 period	 by	 holding	 one	 another	 to	 account,	 providing	
opposition	in	elections	and	stimulating	membership	interest	and	debate.	Trade	union	
affiliation	 had	mixed	 effects	 here.	 Supporting	 democracy,	 individual	 trade	 unions	
were	 the	most	 important	building	blocks	of	 the	party-wide	 factions.	Undermining	
democracy,	however,	each	union	also	operated	within	the	party	as	 its	own	quasi-
faction	 and	 the	 power	 of	 each	 union	 was	 not	 necessarily	 proportionate	 to	 its	
membership	numbers.	All	unions	operated	as	quasi-factions,	even	those	with	only	
one	 delegate,	 but	 the	 larger	 the	 union	 the	more	 likely	 it	was	 to	wield	 significant	
power.	
	
Pre-selections	 of	 parliamentary	 candidates	 were	 the	 primary	 site	 of	 direct	
membership	 decision-making	 within	 the	 party.	 Over	 time,	 however,	 the	 central	
executive	 increasingly	 took	 this	 power	 for	 itself.	 Local	 party	 communities	 were	
sometimes	 strong	 enough	 to	 successfully	 resist	 the	 executive,	 but	 this	 was	 the	
exception	rather	than	the	norm.	At	other	times	the	ruling	faction	actually	increased	
membership	decision-making,	but	for	its	own	advantage.	
	
From	the	mid-1920s	the	NSW	Labor	Party	enhanced	democracy	by	asserting	its	local	
autonomy	from	the	federal	ALP.	In	this	situation	local	autonomy	especially	enhanced	
democracy	because	the	federal	ALP	conference	and	executive	were	undemocratic	
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with	 equal	 representation	 from	 unequally	 sized	 state	 branches	 and	 three	 steps	
removed	 from	members	 (branch	members	à	 electorate	 council	à	 state	 annual	
conference	à	 federal	 conference/executive).	 This	 assertion	 of	 NSW	 branch	 local	
autonomy	 was	 another	 example	 of	 the	 controlling	 faction	 cynically	 improving	
democracy	in	its	own	interests.	
	
While	they	were	enhancing	NSW	autonomy	against	the	federal	ALP,	the	NSW	Labor	
leaders	 were	 undermining	 local	 autonomy	 within	 the	 NSW	 party.	 The	 central	
executive	gradually	expanded	its	own	authority	at	the	expense	of	the	local	branches,	
electorate	councils,	trade	unions	and	even	annual	conference,	which	was	supposed	
to	be	superior	to	the	central	executive.	The	central	executive	selected	parliamentary	
leaders,	 failed	 to	 hold	 annual	 conferences,	 barred	 unions	 from	 electing	 certain	
delegates	 and	 tried	 to	 prevent	 affiliated	 unions	 from	holding	 conferences.	 In	 the	
1930s	the	Inner	Group	delegated	central	executive	power	to	sections,	committees	
and	individual	members	of	the	executive	so	that	a	huge	amount	of	power	came	to	
be	wielded	by	a	handful	of	Inner	Group	leaders.	
	
Historians	have	recognised	the	importance	of	1916	in	setting	the	scene	for	much	of	
what	was	to	come	in	the	following	decades.	That	year	the	Industrial	Section	changed	
the	rules	to	entrench	union	dominance,	barred	politicians	from	the	central	executive	
and	expelled	high-profile	politicians	including	the	NSW	Premier	William	Holman	and	
Prime	 Minister	 Billy	 Hughes.	 But	 historians	 have	 not	 adequately	 recognised	 the	
importance	of	the	1923	dispute	between	the	politicians	and	the	AWU	faction.	This	
was	the	first	time	a	central	executive	asserted	the	right	to	choose	the	parliamentary	
leader	 and	 to	 suppress	 free	 speech	 within	 the	 movement.	 It	 was	 also	 the	 first	
significant	test	of	the	federal	ALP	executive’s	power	to	intervene	in	state	affairs.	
	
Factionalism	
Throughout	 the	 interwar	 period	 the	 NSW	 Labor	 Party	 broadly	 tolerated	 internal	
organised	 opposition,	 except	 for	members	 of	 the	 Communist	 Party.	 This	 internal	
organised	opposition	manifested	in	factions,	which	are	stable	alliances	of	individuals	
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within	 a	 political	 party. 1 	Informal	 factions	 always	 exist	 within	 any	 ostensibly	
democratic	political	party.	As	Rodney	Cavalier	argues:	
Factions	are	the	unavoidable	consequence	for	an	organisation	in	which	there	
is	a	democratic	and	competitive	struggle	for	power	…	in	any	grouping	much	
above	 two,	 alliances	will	 form:	 people	 have	 ideas	 in	 common,	 interests	 in	
common.	 Ambitions	 overlapping	 cause	 individuals	 to	 coalesce	 …	 Alliances	
may	 be	 shifting;	 they	 may	 exist	 for	 a	 single	 purpose.	 When	 alliances	 are	
settled	and	become	part	of	the	institutional	arrangements	of	the	party,	more	
formalised	factions	become	part	of	the	landscape.2	
At	their	most	formalised,	factions	can	become	“a	party	within	the	party”,	with	their	
own	meetings,	 elected	officers	 and	 journals.3	The	 first	 and	 last	 public,	 formalised	
faction	within	the	interwar	NSW	Labor	Party	was	the	Industrial	Section	from	1915	to	
1919.	After	that	organised	factions	still	existed	but	they	were	more	clandestine	and	
did	not	publicly	acknowledge	their	existence.	
After	1919	factionalism	and	especially	“tickets”	for	party	elections	were	tolerated	but	
frowned	upon.	Leading	officials	hypocritically	spoke	against	factionalism	even	while	
they	organised	factions	surreptitiously.	At	the	1923	Annual	Conference,	for	example,	
Albert	Willis	was	 a	 leading	 organiser	 for	 the	militant	 faction	 but,	when	 his	 ticket	
swept	 the	 ballot	 and	 he	 won	 the	 presidency,	 he	 falsely	 presented	 himself	 as	 a	
peacemaker	who	“refused	to	take	sides”	and	had	not	been	nominated	for	president	
by	either	faction	but	by	his	“colleagues	the	miners”.4	
	
In	1926	the	annual	conference	amended	the	party	rules	to	ban	factional	organising.	
Rule	30	provided	that	“if	any	members	are	 found	holding	secret	meetings	 for	 the	
purpose	 of	 creating	 a	 section	 or	 faction,	 such	members	may	 be	 reported	 to	 the	
conference,	and	if	found	guilty	shall	not	be	allowed	to	take	their	seats.	Further,	such	
member	or	members	will	not	be	eligible	for	any	office	or	position	in	the	movement”.5	
Under	the	1927	Rules	the	annual	conference	no	longer	elected	the	central	executive	
																																								 																				
1	Rodney	Cavalier,	Power	Crisis:	The	Self-destruction	of	a	State	Labor	Party	((Melbourne:	Cambridge	
University	Press,	2010):	37.	
2	Ibid.	
3	Michael	Hogan,	"Template	for	a	Labor	Faction:	The	Industrial	Section	and	the	Industrial	Vigilance	
Council	of	the	NSW	Labor	Party,	1916-1919,"	Labour	History	96(2009):	79.	
4	“Mr	Dooley	Readmitted,”	Australian	Worker,	June	13,	1923,	5.	
5	“Labour	club,”	SMH	26	February,	15.	
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but	 it	did	still	elect	 important	committees	such	as	the	agenda	committee	and	the	
appeals	committee.	Tickets	 for	 these	committees	were	now	against	 the	 rules	and	
needed	to	be	organised	in	secret;	the	days	of	openly	handing	out	“how	to	vote”	cards	
at	 annual	 conference	 were	 over. 6 	The	 SMH	 summed	 up	 the	 strange	 position	
concisely:	“although	the	constitution	of	the	party	prohibits	secret	factional	meetings,	
the	rules	in	this	regard	have	little	effect”.7	Every	significant	person	in	the	party	broke	
this	rule	and	no	one	was	ever	disciplined,	so	we	can	say	that	while	factionalism	was	
technically	banned,	in	reality	it	was	tolerated	except	in	the	case	of	Communists	or	
members	of	other	rival	political	parties.	
	
As	 I	explained	 in	 the	 introduction	to	this	 thesis,	 from	1923	to	1931	the	party	was	
divided	 into	 two	main	 factions,	a	controlling	militant	 faction	 led	by	Willis	and	 the	
Miners	 Federation	 and	 Jock	 Garden	 and	 the	 Trades	 Hall	 Reds,	 and	 a	 minority	
conservative	faction	 led	by	the	AWU.	After	the	conservative	faction	split	 from	the	
party	in	1931,	the	factional	divide	amongst	the	militants	increasingly	became	those	
loyal	to	Lang	versus	those	who	opposed	him.	We	have	already	seen	throughout	the	
thesis	how	rival	factions	enhanced	democracy	by	scrutinising	one	another,	providing	
alternatives	 in	elections	and	 stimulating	membership	 interest	 and	debate.	 Indeed	
organised	opposition	 is	one	of	the	reasons	historians	have	so	much	evidence;	any	
alleged	misconduct	was	widely	 publicised	 by	 rivals.	 The	 ballot-box	 scandal	 is	 one	
example.	Unions	such	as	the	AWU	and	Miners	Federation	and	union	leaders	such	as	
Jack	 Bailey	 and	Willis	 were	 instrumental	 in	 the	 factions	 and	 so	 the	 unions	must	
receive	much	of	the	credit	for	the	democracy-enhancing	effects	of	factionalism.	
	
In	1930	the	socialisation	units	formed	within	the	party	and	quickly	became	the	basis	
for	new	factions.	The	units	had	their	own	newspaper	called	Socialisation	Call	with	a	
claimed	circulation	of	40,000	and	presented	a	socialisation	committee	segment	on	
2KY. 8 	There	 was	 a	 generational	 divide	 between	 the	 leaders	 of	 the	 socialisation	
																																								 																				
6	“NSW	Labor	Conference,”	3	April	1929,	15.	
7	“ALP	Conference,”	20	March	1926,	17.	
8	Nick	Martin,	"'Bucking	the	Machine':	Clarrie	Martin	and	the	NSW	Socialisation	Units	1929-35,"	
Labour	History	93(2007):	187.	
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movement	 and	 those	 of	 the	 Inner	 Group;	most	 socialisation	 leaders	 were	 junior	
union	officials	under	40	years	old.9	Clarrie	Martin,	for	example,	was	a	Teachers	Union	
official	who	lived	and	organised	in	Sydney,	Newcastle	and	then	Young	on	the	south	
west	 slopes	 of	 NSW.	 His	 grandson	 Nick	 Martin	 argued	 that	 he	 “represented	 a	
different	strand	within	the	NSW	ALP	from	the	dominant	industrial	left”	with	a	guild	
socialist	 ideology	 based	 on	 “decentralised	 power,	 industrial	 unionism	 and	 the	
expansion	of	workers'	education”.10	This	 ideological	position	was	similar	to	that	of	
Willis	up	to	the	1920s.	Martin	became	a	Labor	MLA	in	1930	when	he	won	the	seat	of	
Young.11	Some	members	of	the	socialisation	movement,	such	as	Jack	Hughes,	were	
also	members	of	the	CPA	and	were	participating	in	the	ALP	without	disclosing	that	
membership.	
	
Many	within	the	broad	Inner	Group	coalition	were	current	or	former	militants	and	
radicals	and	initially	saw	the	socialisation	units	as	complementary	to	the	ruling	group.	
The	 conflict	 began	 at	 the	 1931	 Annual	 Conference	 when	 the	 socialisation	 units	
proposed	that	Labor’s	policy	for	the	next	election	should	be	government	regulation	
to	implement	socialism	within	three	years;	“socialism	in	our	time”.	The	Inner	Group	
opposed	this	electoral	poison	but	the	proposal	won	a	narrow	victory.	The	following	
day	the	Inner	Group	successfully	rescinded	the	motion	with	only	around	one	third	of	
annual	conference	delegates	supporting	it,	mostly	from	the	local	branches.12		
	
Undeterred,	and	now	in	open	conflict	with	the	Inner	Group,	the	socialisation	units	
sought	to	win	control	of	the	party.	Martin	complained	in	his	diary	that	Lang	behaved	
in	“a	dictatorial	and	undemocratic	fashion”.	He	was	one	of	the	only	MLAs	who	openly	
disagreed	with	Lang	 in	caucus.13	The	socialisation	units	 rejected	Queensland	AWU	
leader	Clarrie	Fallon’s	offer	of	an	unholy	alliance	between	the	AWU	and	socialisation	
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10	Ibid.,	181.	
11	Ibid.	
12	Ibid.,	184.	
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units	to	defeat	the	Inner	Group.	The	Labor	Daily	refused	to	publicise	socialisation	unit	
events	and	was	increasingly	critical	of	its	leaders	like	Martin	and	Bill	McNamara.14		
	
At	 the	 1933	 metropolitan	 conference	 the	 socialisation	 units	 enjoyed	 a	 strong	
majority	 but	 the	 Labor	Daily	misrepresented	 the	 outcome	of	 the	 conference	 and	
subsequently	only	published	branch	resolutions	against	socialisation	while	ignoring	
those	in	favour.	Martin	wrote	in	his	diary	“ye	gods,	it's	quite	impossible	to	overcome	
the	Labor	Daily	 influence	and	Lang	idolatry	...	What	a	travesty	it	is	that	the	official	
organ	can	declare	a	conference	majority	to	be	traitors	and	get	away	with	it”.15	At	the	
1933	 Annual	 Conference	 the	 Inner	 Group	 supporters	 easily	 outnumbered	 the	
socialisation	supporters	and	passed	a	motion	disbanding	the	units.	
	
The	Inner	Group	had	successfully	repressed	the	socialisation	movement	by	using	the	
official	party	apparatus	and	newspaper.	After	the	1933	Annual	Conference	the	Inner	
Group	 expelled	 some	 socialisation	 advocates	 and	 internal	 divisions	 within	 the	
socialisation	movement	sped	up	its	dissolution.	The	Inner	Group’s	suppression	of	the	
units	was	made	easier	by	the	fact	that	Lang	was	still	very	popular	throughout	the	
party	and	there	simply	was	not	majority	support	for	socialisation	amongst	party	and	
union	members,	 let	 alone	 the	wider	 electorate.	 Several	 years	 earlier	Martin	 had	
lamented	in	his	diary	the	absence	of	the	radicalism	necessary	to	implement	socialism:	
“the	people	seem	to	be	growing	even	more	conservative	and	I	am	convinced	that	we	
will	 never	 have	 a	 chance	 of	 introducing	 any	 radical	 measures	 and	 also	 winning	
office”,	he	wrote.16		
	
Perhaps	most	 important	 of	 all,	 the	 socialisation	 units	 did	 not	 win	much	 support	
amongst	union	 leaders.	The	second	Lang	government	had	done	enough	to	please	
even	 the	more	 radical	 union	 leaders	 and	 they	 saw	 no	 advantage	 in	 toppling	 the	
current	leadership	in	exchange	for	a	socialisation	policy	which	would	lead	to	certain	
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electoral	defeat.17	Even	Martin	himself	wrote	in	his	diary	that	the	socialisation	policy	
would	 “probably	mean	political	wilderness	 for	15	 years”.18	Socialisation	had	been	
defeated	but	the	sentiments	against	Lang	and	the	Inner	Group	remained	amongst	a	
significant	minority	of	the	party.	Unions	such	as	the	Miners	Federation	and	Australian	
Railways	Union	(ARU),	which	had	supported	the	socialisation	units,	never	re-entered	
the	Lang	fold	and	as	the	1930s	progressed	they	were	joined	by	more	unions	until	the	
stage	was	set	for	Lang’s	defeat.	
From	the	mid-1930s	this	growing	coalition	of	union	leaders	argued	two	clear	truths:	
Lang	and	the	Inner	Group	were	oligarchical	and	corrupt	and	NSW	Labor	would	not	
win	a	general	election	under	Lang.19	The	union	leaders	also	wanted	to	restore	their	
own	power	within	the	party.	Former	allies	of	Lang	turned	on	him	one	after	another,	
deriding	his	corruption,	egotism	and	delusion.	This	list	included	Lang’s	closest	allies	
from	 the	 1920s	 and	 early	 1930s	 such	 as	Willis,	 Garden,	Oscar	 Schreiber	 and	 Ted	
Magrath.		
At	 a	 1936	 anti-Lang	Conference	Robert	 (Bob)	 King,	NSW	 Labor	 Council	 Secretary,	
recalled	his	time	on	the	committee	that	decided	Labor’s	1932	election	slogan.	The	
committee	 decided	 on	 “Labor	 is	 right	 and	 Labor	 is	 always	 right”.	 They	 sent	 it	 to	
Macquarie	Street	and	“heard	no	more	about	it”	until	they	saw	pamphlets	and	posters	
declaring	 “Lang	 is	 right!”. 20 	J.J.	 Maloney	 of	 the	 Boot	 Trades	 union	 received	
thunderous	applause	when	he	told	a	subsequent	conference	that	“Lang	is	the	most	
blundering	tyrant	who	ever	became	leader	of	any	political	party	in	the	world”.21	Even	
when	they	were	outside	the	party,	the	AWU	and	its	newspapers	provided	effective	
opposition	to	the	Inner	Group.	In	1937	the	NSW	Labor	Council	passed	a	resolution	
“that	we	urge	all	Laborites	to	read	the	Australian	Worker	regularly	each	week	as	it	is	
giving	the	important	news	of	happenings	within	the	party	that	are	suppressed	by	the	
Labor	Daily”.22	
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Opponents	 threw	every	 insult	 they	could	 think	of	at	Lang	and	his	allies.	 Lang	was	
“dictator-in-chief”,	23	“arrogant”,	“tyrannical”	and	“reckless”.24	His	Inner	Group	was	
the	“old	gang”25,	a	“junta”,	a	“fascist	dictatorship”26,	an	“oligarchy”27,	“treacherous	
and	 dishonest	 political	 gangsters” 28 ,	 “yes	 men”,	 “crawlers”,	 “time-servers”,	
“splitters”29,	“lower	than	the	sewer	rats”30,	“ballot-fakers	and	rule	 jugglers”.31	The	
Inner	Group	tried	to	suppress	internal	opposition,	as	we	will	see	in	detail	below	in	
the	 section	 on	 local	 autonomy,	 but	 they	 were	 unsuccessful	 largely	 due	 to	 the	
structure	of	 the	Labor	Party	 itself.	The	unions	came	 into	the	party	as	 ready-made	
quasi-factions	with	their	own	salaried	staff,	funds,	organisations	and	members.	The	
Inner	Group	tried	to	counter	this	organised	union	opposition	by	running	their	own	
candidates	in	union	elections	with	the	hope	of	taking	control	of	the	unions.	This	was	
unsuccessful	 but	 it	 marked	 the	 beginnings	 of	 tactics	 that	 were	 more	 fully	 and	
successfully	 expressed	by	 the	 anti-Communist	 Industrial	Groups	 in	 the	 1940s	 and	
1950s.	
	
In	1937	the	central	executive	began	to	target	individuals,	threatening	to	withdraw	
the	endorsement	of	Labor	local	council	members	who	were	also	union	officials	unless	
those	 officials	 supported	 Lang.	 The	 central	 executive	 withdrew	 the	 municipal	
endorsements	of	W.E.R.	Bates	and	J.	Morey,	both	of	the	Clerks	Union.32	The	Inner	
Group	also	resorted	to	bribery	and	gave	Trades	Hall	typists	movie	tickets	in	return	
for	 their	 votes	 in	 a	 Clerks	Union	ballot.33	None	of	 these	 Inner	Group	 attempts	 to	
control	the	unions	was	successful.	As	we	saw	with	the	Miners	Federation	in	chapter	
four,	many	 union	members	who	 supported	 Lang	were	 equally	 loyal	 to	 their	 own	
union	leaders	and	did	not	appreciate	“outside	interference”	in	their	unions.	
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The	involvement	of	trade	unions	as	ready-made	quasi-factions	within	the	Labor	Party	
also	had	anti-democratic	effects	within	the	party.	Unions	often	used	their	positions	
to	attempt	to	influence	Labor	Party	decisions	in	ways	that	gave	them	more	power	
than	their	membership	numbers	warranted.	From	the	early	twentieth	century,	the	
AWU	constitution	had	held	that	“any	member	of	parliament	who	fails	to	advocate	
the	 preamble	 and	 constitution	 of	 the	 AWU	 shall	 not	 be	 eligible	 to	 continue	 his	
membership	 in	 the	 union”. 34 	This	 provision	 potentially	 undermined	 Labor	 Party	
democracy	 as	 once	 an	 AWU	member	 became	 a	 politician	 they	 were	 pledged	 to	
following	 the	policy	of	 the	party’s	annual	conference	and	caucus	decisions.	When	
AWU	 and	 Labor	 Party	 policy	 diverged,	 the	 AWU	 constitution	 attempted	 to	 force	
“their”	politicians	to	privilege	AWU	policy	over	Labor	Party	policy.	
	
The	 internally	 democratic	 Miners	 Federation	 also	 attempted	 to	 control	 “their”	
politicians	in	a	similar	way.	With	its	members	concentrated	in	mining	electorates,	the	
Miners	 Federation	 was	 in	 the	 strongest	 position	 of	 any	 union	 in	 the	 state	 to	
successfully	promote	or	block	the	pre-selection	of	politicians.	Coalfields	MPs	could	
not	win	 pre-selection	without	Miners	 Federation	 support	 and	 the	 union	 took	 full	
advantage.	In	1938,	for	example,	the	AW	reported	that	“pressure	is	to	be	exerted	by	
the	Miners	Federation	to	force	their	parliamentary	representatives	to	join	forces	with	
the	[anti-Lang]	unions	who	are	seeking	to	clean	up	the	Labor	movement	in	NSW”.	If	
the	politicians	refused	“action	would	be	taken	to	defeat	them	in	the	[pre-selection]	
ballots”	and	they	would	be	expelled	from	the	Miners	Federation	which	“would	place	
them	in	an	exceedingly	embarrassing	position”.35	
	
The	Miners	Federation	leaders	threatening	to	expel	“disobedient”	politicians	based	
on	 their	 votes	 within	 the	 Labor	 Party	 was	 a	 problem	 involving	 the	 contested	
definition	of	labour	democracy.	Did	an	MP	represent	the	NSW	Labor	Party	members	
as	a	whole	or	did	he	represent	the	party	members	in	his	electorate?	The	Labor	Party	
constitution	favoured	the	former	view	with	each	MP	being	pledged	to	follow	annual	
conference	decisions	and	to	vote	as	one	in	parliament.	But	a	view	of	Labor	MPs	being	
																																								 																				
34	“NSW	Labor	Conference,”	AW	14	June	1922,	15.	
35	“Labor	dispute,”	AW	16	December	1936,	18.	
	
	
254	
responsible	first	to	party	members	in	their	own	electorates	would	have	been	equally	
valid	 from	a	democratic	 standpoint	with	 the	added	advantage	of	promoting	 local	
autonomy.		
	
The	 Clerks	 Union	 was	 another	 union	 that	 tried	 to	 wield	 disproportionate	 power	
within	the	Labor	Party.	All	Labor	Party	members	had	to	belong	to	a	union	and	the	
most	 common	 union	 for	 Labor	 politicians	 was	 the	 Clerks	 Union	 which	 organised	
office	 support	 workers.	 This	 was	 the	 closest	 fit	 for	 many	 Labor	 MPs	 who	 were	
professionals	 and	 businessmen.	 In	 1926	 the	 Clerks	 Union	 expelled	 Premier	 Lang,	
Deputy	Premier	Loughlin	and	several	other	Labor	politicians	for	failing	to	give	effect	
to	union	policy	of	improving	public	service	conditions.36	This	was	largely	a	publicity	
stunt	but	it	does	further	demonstrate	the	dilemma	of	the	Labor	politicians	who	were	
pledged	to	obey	annual	conference	and	caucus	but	then	also	faced	pressure	from	
their	own	unions	and	local	branches.		
	
Unions	also	used	their	wealth	to	influence	the	party	undemocratically.	The	bulk	of	
party	 funds	 came	 from	 the	 unions	 and	 large	 unions	 could	 threaten	 to	 withdraw	
financial	support	or	even	disaffiliate	from	the	party	if	their	wishes	were	not	met.	For	
example,	in	1928	the	AWU	told	the	ALP	federal	executive	that	unless	it	overturned	
some	NSW	central	executive	expulsions	the	party	would	not	have	AWU	assistance	at	
the	next	federal	election.37	In	1930	the	central	executive’s	failure	to	repudiate	war	
debt	resulted	in	the	Federated	Ironworkers	Union	threatening	to	disaffiliate	from	the	
party;	at	the	time	it	was	the	party’s	third	largest	union.38	This	is	another	problematic	
issue	for	party	democracy.	On	the	one	hand,	affiliated	unions	should	maintain	their	
autonomy	and	have	the	right	to	disaffiliate	from	the	party.	On	the	other	hand,	a	large	
union	 threatening	 to	 withdraw	 from	 the	 party	 over	 a	 specific	 issue	 is	 likely	 to	
disproportionately	influence	party	decisions.		
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A	final	potential	for	undemocratic	influence	existed	when	a	delegate	from	one	union	
was	employed	by	a	different	union.	S.J.	Stanbridge,	for	example,	was	president	of	the	
Typographical	Association	and	worked	on	the	AWU’s	Australian	Worker	newspaper.	
At	the	1916	Annual	Conference,	Stanbridge	claimed	that	AWU	delegate	Jack	Cullinan	
had	tried	to	intimidate	him.	Cullinan	had	said	that	if	he	was	on	the	Australian	Worker	
board	of	control	he	would	have	Stanbridge	sacked	for	the	conservative	positions	he	
had	taken	at	annual	conference.39	This	anti-democratic	behaviour	demonstrates	the	
complexity	of	party	democracy	down	to	the	individual	level,	as	we	have	already	seen	
that	Cullinan	was	a	famous	democratic	advocate	within	the	AWU	and	Labor	Party.	
	
Direct	membership	decision-making	
Direct	membership	decision	making	was	limited	within	the	NSW	Labor	Party	in	the	
interwar	period.	As	we	saw	 in	 the	discussion	of	 the	rules	 in	 the	previous	chapter,	
most	party	decisions	were	made	by	elected	delegates	several	steps	removed	from	
the	ordinary	members.	One	of	the	democratic	improvements	contained	in	the	1927	
Rules	was	the	direct	election	of	some	members	of	the	central	executive.	The	most	
significant	 site	 of	 direct	 member	 decision	 making	 was	 in	 pre-selecting	 Labor	
candidates	 to	 contest	 NSW	 Legislative	 Assembly	 seats	 and	 federal	 House	 of	
Representative	 seats	 for	 NSW.	 Several	 months	 before	 an	 election	 the	 branch	
members	and	trade	unionists	could	vote	in	the	pre-selection	ballot	for	their	preferred	
candidate	in	the	electorate	in	which	they	lived.	Given	that	the	central	executive	had	
complete	 power	 between	 annual	 conferences,	 however,	 membership	 decision-
making	power	over	pre-selections	was	never	absolute.	
	
By	 1910	 the	 party	 rules	 stated	 that	 the	 central	 executive	 could	 choose	 the	
parliamentary	 candidate	 for	 an	 electorate	 if	members	 had	 not	 chosen	 one	 three	
months	 before	 a	 general	 election	 or	 one	 month	 before	 a	 by-election.	 The	 1911	
Annual	 Conference	 changed	 the	 rule	 to	 give	 the	 central	 executive	 complete	
discretion	to	select	candidates	“in	electorates	where	the	local	branch	or	council	shall	
have	failed	to	take	the	necessary	steps,	in	the	opinion	of	the	executive,	to	select	a	
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candidate”.40	The	central	executive	could	cancel	or	overturn	pre-selection	ballots	for	
personal	 or	 factional	 advantage	 or	 because	 it	 believed	 that	members	 would	 not	
select	the	candidate	most	likely	to	win	in	a	general	election.41	
	
An	example	of	electoral	pragmatism	occurred	 in	1929	when	the	central	executive	
withdrew	the	pre-selected	Labor	candidate	for	North	Sydney	and	instructed	Labor	
voters	to	vote	for	Billy	Hughes.42	Despite	being	the	most	prominent	“Labor	rat”	 in	
history,	Hughes	had	led	a	small	section	of	Nationalist	Party	members	to	vote	down	
the	Nationalist	government’s	attempted	abolition	of	the	federal	industrial	arbitration	
system.	The	central	executive	knew	that	Labor	would	never	win	the	safe	Nationalist	
seat,	so	an	unholy	alliance	with	Hughes	was	considered	the	best	option	to	disrupt	the	
Nationalists.	
	
From	1924	Garden	and	other	Trades	Hall	Reds	began	to	argue	for	the	abolition	of	
selection	ballots	and	for	candidates	to	be	chosen	directly	by	unions	or	by	the	central	
executive.43	Their	argument	was	that	selection	ballots	had	become	so	corrupt	that	it	
was	better	to	do	away	with	them	altogether.	Ballot	corruption	was	a	huge	problem,	
as	we	will	see	in	the	next	chapter,	but	the	argument	that	selection	ballots	should	be	
eliminated	rather	than	cleaned	up	was	indicative	of	the	thinking	of	the	Trades	Hall	
Reds,	and	union	officials	more	broadly.	Union	selection	 in	most	cases	would	have	
meant	selection	by	the	top	officials	in	the	union	and	demonstrates	their	disregard	of	
the	importance	of	rank-and-file	decision-making.	The	attempts	to	abolish	selection	
ballots	were	unsuccessful	but	the	central	executive	did	impose	its	own	candidate	on	
the	members	in	an	increasing	number	of	electorates.		
	
Prior	 to	 the	 1927	 Rules,	 annual	 conference	 delegates	 were	 generally	 chosen	 by	
electorate	 councils	 which	were	 themselves	made	 up	 of	 delegates	 elected	 by	 the	
ordinary	members	 in	their	 local	 leagues.	Annual	conference	delegate	election	was	
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therefore	one	 step	 removed	 from	the	ordinary	members	 (members	à	 electorate	
council	à	annual	conference	delegates).	Yet	in	1926	the	central	executive	insisted	
that	delegates	be	elected	directly	by	 the	ordinary	members	 in	 certain	electorates	
where	 the	 electorate	 council	 was	 known	 to	 be	 controlled	 by	 opponents	 of	 the	
controlling	faction.44	The	controlling	faction	knew	it	had	a	better	chance	of	winning	
at	 least	 some	of	 the	delegate	positions	 though	 a	direct	membership	 vote.	 This	 is	
another	 example	 of	 the	 controlling	 faction	 cynically	 and	 unevenly	 improving	
democracy	to	its	own	advantage.	
	
The	central	executive’s	power	to	select	a	candidate	was	limited	in	some	electorates.	
In	1928	the	central	executive	tried	to	parachute	one	of	its	preferred	candidates	into	
the	Northern	coalfields	federal	seat	of	Hunter.	The	local	Labor	members	and	officials,	
mostly	miners,	were	not	impressed	and	insisted	that	there	would	be	a	rank-and-file	
ballot.	 The	 central	executive	quickly	 folded.45	Mining	electorates	were	among	 the	
few	electorates	 in	which	an	independent	 labour	candidate	could	defeat	an	official	
Labor	Party	candidate.		
	
The	 miners’	 strong	 occupational	 community	 and	 organisation,	 as	 well	 as	 their	
localism,	meant	that	they	would	not	accept	an	outsider	forced	on	them	by	the	central	
executive	and	would	gladly	elect	an	independent	candidate	instead,	as	had	occurred	
in	 1919	when	 Percy	 Brookfield	won	 the	 Legislative	 Assembly	 seat	 of	 Sturt	 in	 the	
Miners	Federation	stronghold	of	Broken	Hill.	In	mining	towns	almost	all	Labor	Party	
members	 were	 Miners	 Federation	 members	 so	 the	 Miners	 Federation’s	 strong	
occupational	community	also	doubled	as	a	readymade	local	party	community.	Greg	
Patmore	argued	that	in	Lithgow	support	for	independent	labour	political	candidates	
weakened	the	Labor	Party.46	But	it	arguably	strengthened	party	democracy	because	
the	competition	forced	the	Labor	Party	to	give	local	members	greater	authority.	
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Resistance	could	also	be	successful	in	non-mining	electorates	if	the	local	members	
had	 a	 strong	 party	 community.	 In	 1931,	 in	 the	 inner-western	 Sydney	 federal	
electorate	 of	 Reid,	 the	 central	 executive	 disallowed	 the	 pre-selection	 ballot	 for	
“alleged	irregularities”	and	ordered	a	new	ballot.	The	Reid	Electorate	Council,	by	54	
votes	to	19,	opposed	any	further	ballot	and	insisted	on	the	selected	candidate,	C.	A.	
Morgan,	 being	 endorsed	 by	 the	 executive.	 It	 declared	 it	 was	 insisting	 on	 the	
“principles	 of	 local	 autonomy	 in	 all	 selection	 ballots”. 47 	The	 central	 executive’s	
returning	officer	Harry	O’Regan	addressed	a	meeting	of	Reid	Electorate	Council	and	
declared	that	if	Reid	would	not	cooperate	with	the	fresh	ballot,	the	central	executive	
would	simply	appoint	their	preferred	candidate.	This	announcement	was	met	with	
boos	and	cries	of	“burglars”,	“Ned	Kellys”	and	“Rafferty’s	rules”.	Central	executive	
president	 Paddy	 Keller	 was	more	 conciliatory,	 saying	 “I	 belong	 to	 a	 union	 which	
stands	 for	 rank	and	 file	 control”	and	 that	 “the	wishes	of	 the	 rank	and	 file	will	be	
consulted”. 48 	The	 following	 month	 the	 central	 executive	 folded	 and	 endorsed	
Morgan.49	
	
The	most	famous	example	of	the	central	executive	holding	out	against	the	wishes	of	
local	members	and	officials	occurred	in	1933.	Willis	wished	to	stand	in	the	by-election	
for	the	NSW	Legislative	Assembly	seat	of	Bulli	on	the	south	coast	near	Wollongong	
but	Lang	and	his	Inner	Group	saw	Willis	as	a	potential	leadership	rival.	The	central	
executive	 claimed	 there	 was	 not	 enough	 time	 to	 hold	 a	 preselection	 ballot	 and	
instead	selected	its	preferred	candidate,	J.T.	Sweeney,	a	former	Miners	Federation	
official.	But	the	local	leagues	held	their	own	preselection	ballot	and	Willis	won.	When	
the	central	executive	refused	to	accept	the	preselection	result	the	Bulli	Electorate	
Council	and	the	southern	district	of	the	Miners	Federation	pledged	to	support	Willis	
who	said:	“when	it	became	known	that	I	was	a	candidate,	ALP	officers	including	Mr	
Keller	interfered	and	it	was	stated	that	the	controlling	authority	did	not	want	me	for	
Bulli”.50	A	 notable	 part	 of	 the	 dispute	was	 that	 Baddeley	 spoke	 for	 Sweeney	 and	
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against	Willis.	He	had	chosen	loyalty	to	Lang	over	loyalty	to	his	old	friend	and	ally	
from	the	Miners	Federation.	The	Australian	Worker	reported	that	“general	surprise	
was	expressed	on	the	coalfields	that	Mr	Baddeley	would	take	the	platform	against	
Mr	Willis”.51		
	
Despite	 strong	 local	 support	 Willis	 was	 unable	 to	 contest	 the	 seat	 as	 a	 Labor	
candidate	while	the	central	executive	opposed	him.	As	well	as	not	wanting	to	“rat”	
on	 the	 party,	 Willis	 was	 probably	 dissuaded	 from	 standing	 as	 an	 independent	
because	he	knew	his	chances	were	poor.	Unlike	on	the	Northern	coalfields,	miners	
were	a	minority	of	Labor	Party	members	in	the	southern	and	western	districts	and	
Sweeney	was	a	local	Miners	Federation	official	anyway.52	With	his	conflict	with	Lang	
now	in	the	open,	Willis	defected	to	the	federal	NSW	ALP	Branch	where	he	joined	his	
former	enemies	such	as	Jack	Bailey.	
	
Local	autonomy:	state	versus	federal	
Throughout	the	interwar	period	the	federal	ALP	bodies	increased	their	own	power	
and	reduced	the	local	autonomy	of	the	states.	This	increase	in	federal	power	within	
the	 ALP	 both	 influenced,	 and	was	 influenced	 by,	 the	 High	 Court’s	 corresponding	
constitutional	increase	in	power	of	the	Australian	federal	government	at	the	cost	of	
the	 states. 53 	Rawson	 argued	 that	 the	 NSW	 Labor	 factions’	 position	 on	 federal	
intervention	in	state	affairs	was	completely	cynical.	“The	attitude	of	the	NSW	party	
to	federal	intervention	in	domestic	disputes	was	simple”,	“those	who	controlled	the	
party	condemned	it;	those	who	were	seeking	to	control	the	party	welcomed	it”,	he	
declared.54	The	AWU	faction	resisted	federal	intervention	in	1923	then	called	for	it	
frequently	for	the	remainder	of	the	interwar	period,	while	the	militant	faction	called	
for	federal	intervention	in	1923	then	opposed	it	for	the	remainder	of	the	interwar	
period.	 In	 addition	 to	 these	more	 cynical	motivations,	 however,	 there	was	 also	 a	
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rising	sense	of	isolationism	and	independence	in	NSW	Labor	that	began	in	the	mid-
1920s	and	culminated	in	the	1931	split.	
	
Each	state	branch	of	the	ALP	received	the	same	number	of	delegates	to	the	federal	
conference	and	 federal	executive,	 similar	 to	 the	equal	 state	 representation	 in	 the	
Australian	Senate.	Prime	Minister	Paul	Keating	(1991	to	1996)	famously	disparaged	
the	Australian	Senate	as	“unrepresentative	swill”	and	the	same	argument	applies	to	
the	 federal	ALP	bodies	on	which	representation	was	clearly	disproportionate.	The	
counterargument	 is	 that	 this	 was	 simply	 a	 different	 kind	 of	 democracy,	 federal	
democracy	rather	than	unitary	democracy,	but	from	the	perspective	of	one	person,	
one	vote	it	was	undemocratic.	Federal	delegates	were	several	steps	removed	from	
the	 rank	 and	 file	 and	 because	 decisions	 were	 made	 by	 the	 combined	 votes	 of	
representatives	from	six	states,	it	was	difficult	for	the	ordinary	members	in	any	one	
state	to	influence	federal	decisions.	For	large,	federally	organised	trade	unions	like	
the	AWU,	however,	 the	 federal	ALP	bodies	were	 ideal.	Given	AWU	dominance	of	
Labor	in	Queensland,	South	Australia	and	Western	Australia,	the	AWU	maintained	a	
large	influence	on	the	federal	ALP	throughout	the	interwar	period.	
	
In	 the	 1920s	 the	 federal	 ALP	 bodies	 greatly	 increased	 their	 own	 power.	 The	 first	
federal	ALP	conference	occurred	in	1902	with	six	representatives	from	each	state.	It	
met	every	 three	years	ordinarily	but	could	have	special	meetings.	 It	was	not	until	
1915	that	federal	conference	formed	the	federal	executive	as	the	supreme	federal	
body	 between	 conferences.55	It	 consisted	 of	 two	 representatives	 elected	 by	 each	
state	 and	 the	 scope	 of	 its	 powers	 were	 vague.	 Its	 original	 rules	 stated	 that	 the	
executive	was	to	implement	the	decisions	of	federal	conferences	and	“interpret”	the	
party	constitution.56	
	
The	 scope	 of	 the	 federal	 executive’s	 power	 to	 intervene	 in	 state	 affairs	was	 first	
tested	in	the	1923	dispute	between	NSW	Labor	parliamentary	leader	James	Dooley	
and	 the	 AWU	 faction	 in	 NSW.	 The	 controlling	 AWU	 faction	 denied	 the	 federal	
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executive’s	 right	 to	 intervene	 but	 the	 federal	 executive	 intervened	 anyway	 and	
organised	the	Unity	Conference	at	which	the	AWU	faction	lost	control	of	the	party.	
Soon	afterwards	the	AWU	executive	council	sent	a	letter	to	the	ALP	federal	executive	
requesting	a	federal	inquiry	into	the	ballot	box	scandal	of	which	the	AWU	would	bear	
the	cost.	The	federal	executive	refused	the	request	and	stated	that	its	policy	was	no	
intervention	without	a	state	executive	request.	Federal	President	R.	Summer	said	“in	
state	matters	the	state	executive	must	be	supreme”.57	Both	the	AWU	and	the	federal	
ALP	 had	 switched	 their	 positions	 within	 a	matter	 of	 months,	 reflecting	 both	 the	
cynicism	of	those	involved	and	the	ambiguous	powers	of	the	federal	bodies.		
	
NSW	Labor	 attitudes	 became	 increasingly	 hostile	 to	 the	 federal	 ALP.	 By	 1926	 J.F.	
O’Reilly,	NSW	representative	on	the	federal	executive,	was	warning	that	body	against	
intervention	 in	 NSW:	 “this	 state	 has	 had	 the	 experience	 of	 the	 federal	 executive	
interfering	in	its	domestic	affairs	on	other	occasions.	We	are	not	going	to	stand	idly	
by	and	be	overridden	by	anybody	in	the	future".58	In	1928	the	federal	executive	ruled	
that	members	of	the	ALP	could	not	advocate	the	policies	of	the	CPA.	The	NSW	Branch	
replied	 with	 three	 principles	 that	 later	 became	 known	 as	 the	 “Local	 Autonomy	
Declaration”:	
1. The	executive	of	the	ALP,	state	of	NSW,	is	the	creation	of	the	rank	and	file	in	
conference	and	in	all	domestic	matters	recognises	only	the	authority	of	the	
rank	 and	 file	 of	 the	 ALP	 state	 of	 NSW	 as	 expressed	 in	 conference	 or	 by	
plebiscite.	
2. It	is	contrary	to	the	democratic	principles	of	the	Australian	trade	union	and	
Labor	Movement	and	to	the	working	class	movement	in	all	civilised	countries	
that	a	small	group	of	officials	such	as	is	comprised	by	the	federal	executive	
and	 conference	 should	 have	 the	 extraordinary	 power	 to	 override	 the	
expressed	will	 of	 the	 rank	 and	 file	 to	whom	 they	owe	 their	 existence	 and	
sustenance.	
3. Therefore	the	executive	of	 the	ALP	state	of	NSW	will	maintain	the	right	of	
autonomy	in	all	domestic	matters	which	the	rank	and	file	of	the	party	in	NSW	
in	 conjunction	 with	 the	 parties	 in	 all	 other	 states	 have	 enjoyed	 since	 the	
inception	of	 the	Australian	Labour	Parties	and	 this	executive	consequently	
will	repudiate	any	ruling	or	dictum	of	federal	officials	on	any	domestic	matter	
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which	 has	 not	 first	 received	 approval	 of	 the	 rank	 and	 file	 of	 the	 party	 in	
NSW.59	
That	same	year	the	federal	executive	instructed	the	NSW	executive	to	readmit	some	
expelled	party	members.	NSW	President	Webster	said	“the	federal	executive	has	not	
the	power	to	give	the	ruling".	“The	labour	movement	in	this	state	can	tell	them	to	go	
to	 a	much	hotter	place	 than	Bourke”,	 he	 continued,	 “if	 the	 annual	 conference	at	
Easter	decides	to	lift	the	suspensions	they	can	do	so,	but	they	are	the	only	body	who	
can	 do	 it." 60 	The	 federal	 conference	 held	 strong	 and	 in	 1931	 gave	 the	 federal	
executive	plenary	powers	over	all	matters	 in	 the	ALP	nationwide.61	In	 the	 sixteen	
years	of	its	existence	the	federal	executive	had	come	to	claim	complete	power	over	
the	state	branches.	
	
After	1928	the	NSW	Labor	Party	fought	back,	not	only	rejecting	the	federal	bodies’	
right	to	intervene	but	also	trying	to	win	control	over	the	federal	ALP	caucus.	The	NSW	
executive	began	to	threaten	federal	ALP	politicians	from	NSW	with	dis-endorsement	
or	expulsion.	In	1930,	for	example,	the	NSW	executive	instructed	federal	members	
to	oppose	any	wage	reductions	by	the	federal	government.62	The	following	year	the	
executive	 required	 all	 federal	 candidates	 to	 sign	 a	 pledge	 committing	 to	 local	
autonomy	and	the	“Lang	plan”.63	But	NSW	was	not	able	to	make	a	significant	impact	
on	federal	policy.	Ted	Theodore,	former	Queensland	Premier	and	now	federal	Labor	
Treasurer,	representative	for	the	NSW	seat	of	Dalley	and	long-time	personal	enemy	
of	Lang,	announced	that	the	government	would	"not	submit	to	non-parliamentary	
dictation	nor	allow	its	authority	to	be	usurped	by	anybody."64		
	
In	 1934	 the	 NSW	 Labor	 Party	 annual	 conference	 sent	 its	 delegates	 to	 federal	
conference	to	propose	big	reforms.	The	federal	conference’s	role	would	be	limited	
to	formulation	of	federal	policy,	the	federal	executive	would	be	eliminated	and	state	
representation	at	 federal	conference	would	be	on	“more	democratic	 lines	than	at	
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present	 exists,	 such	 representation	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 party	 membership	 in	 each	
state”.65	This	would	 have	 been	 a	 democratic	 improvement	 but	 unsurprisingly	 the	
other	states	rejected	it.	Most	NSW	Labor	Party	members	and	officials	continued	to	
support	state	autonomy	even	once	they	had	turned	against	Lang.	In	August	1938	the	
majority	of	the	anti-Lang	Industrialist	coalition	rejected	the	idea	of	asking	for	federal	
intervention	because	they	believed	it	would	reduce	their	 legitimacy	 in	the	eyes	of	
members.66	
	
Throughout	the	period	there	were	dissenting	voices	against	state	autonomy	within	
NSW,	chiefly	from	the	AWU.	Henry	Boote	wrote	in	the	Australian	Worker	that	“there	
is	only	one	way	in	which	essential	unity	can	be	secured.	That	way	is	by	submission	to	
the	majority	decisions	of	the	highest	authority	the	movement	has	created	for	its	own	
guidance	and	preservation…	what	the	[federal]	conference	decides	will	be	the	final	
word	 for	 all	 loyal	 labourites”.67	The	AWU	did	not	believe	 in	 local	 state	 autonomy	
within	its	own	organisation	nor	within	the	ALP	nor	the	government.	Its	federal	annual	
convention	and	executive	council	had	complete	power	and	it	consistently	supported	
an	expanded	federal	government	and	federal	arbitration	system.		
	
In	1931	the	lack	of	state	branch	autonomy	in	the	AWU	had	undermined	state	branch	
autonomy	in	the	ALP.	All	three	NSW	delegates	on	the	AWU	executive	council	voted	
to	support	Lang	Labor	in	its	dispute	with	the	federal	ALP	but	they	were	outvoted	by	
the	 executive	 council	 members	 from	 other	 states.	 The	 AWU	 executive	 council	
announced	that	 it	considered	“the	maintenance	of	the	federal	authority”	to	be	“a	
basic	principle	from	which	no	deviation	can	be	tolerated”.	State	branch	autonomy	
“would	 be	 fatal	 to	 the	 national	 aspirations	 of	 the	 ALP,	 and	 would	 dissolve	 our	
movement”.68	Prime	Minister	 James	Scullin,	 a	 former	AWU	organiser,	praised	 the	
decision	as	“consistent	with	the	traditions	of	the	union”.	"I	expected	that	decision”,	
he	continued,	“the	AWU	 is	an	all-Australian	organisation,	which,	 in	addition	 to	 its	
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valuable	work	in	the	industrial	field,	has	played	a	very	important	part	in	building	up	
the	political	Labor	movement	in	Australia”.69	
	
The	Miners	Federation	was	also	organised	federally	and	its	most	prominent	leader,	
Willis,	supported	a	more	powerful	national	government	in	his	union	and	in	Australia.	
In	1925	he	challenged	“anyone	to	prove	that	it	is	possible	for	the	state	government	
to	socialise	 industry.	Socialisation	 is	a	federal	matter,	and	 impossible	for	the	state	
alone.	The	first	step	to	socialisation	in	Australia,	by	constitutional	means	must	be	the	
nationalisation	of	the	banking	system,	and	control	of	the	credits	of	the	nation”.70	But	
as	 we	 saw	 in	 previous	 chapters,	 the	 Miners	 Federation	 retained	 strong	 local	
autonomy	 for	 lodges	 and	 districts,	 so	 the	 opposition	 of	 Willis	 and	 the	 Miners	
Federation	 to	 absolute	 federal	ALP	power	was	 consistent	with	 their	 own	 internal	
union	organisation.		
	
The	decline	of	local	autonomy	and	the	expansion	of	executive	power	
The	 increase	 in	 local	 autonomy	 of	 the	 NSW	 Labor	 Party	 against	 the	 federal	 ALP	
occurred	alongside	a	decline	in	local	autonomy	within	the	NSW	party.	In	the	1910s,	
despite	 the	 party’s	 centralised	 constitution,	 the	 leagues	 retained	 significant	
autonomy.	 Following	 the	 money	 is	 usually	 instructive,	 and	 of	 each	 member’s	
sixpence	 membership	 fee,	 4d	 went	 to	 the	 local	 branch	 and	 2d	 to	 the	 central	
executive.71	This	reflected	the	fact	that	election	campaigns	were	organised	largely	at	
the	 local	electorate	 level.	 In	 the	decades	 to	1939,	however,	 the	central	executive	
gradually	increased	its	own	power	at	the	expense	of	both	the	local	branches	and	the	
annual	conference.		
	
From	 the	 1890s	 onwards,	 controlling	 factions	 had	 deliberately	 failed	 to	 address	
certain	matters	at	the	annual	conference	so	that	the	central	executive	could	decide	
the	 issue	 later.72	As	we	have	 seen	above,	 from	1919	 the	 controlling	AWU	 faction	
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greatly	 expanded	 executive	 powers	 which	 culminated	 in	 1923	 when	 the	 central	
executive	 expelled	 the	 NSW	 Labor	 parliamentary	 leader,	 Dooley,	 elected	 his	
replacement	 and	 gagged	 the	 leagues	 and	 unions.	 But	 expansion	 of	 executive	
authority	did	not	end	with	the	AWU	faction’s	defeat.	
	
In	1925	the	executive	went	one	step	further	and	failed	to	hold	an	annual	conference	
at	all.	 Initially	 it	postponed	annual	conference	from	Easter	to	June	because	of	the	
1925	 NSW	 election	 and	 then	 following	 the	 election,	 the	 executive	 cancelled	 the	
annual	conference	altogether	saying	the	party	needed	to	save	its	funds	for	the	next	
federal	 election.73	The	opposing	 conservative	 faction	 argued	 that	 the	 cancellation	
occured	 because	 the	 ruling	 militant	 faction	 feared	 it	 would	 lose	 control	 of	 the	
conference	and	the	new	executive.		
	
In	 the	 executive’s	 annual	 report	 for	 1925	 it	 noted	 that	 "the	 executive	 takes	 this	
opportunity	of	refuting	the	contention	that	it	had	something	to	gain	by	not	calling	a	
conference"	but	this	was	a	weak	argument	given	that	it	had	effectively	doubled	its	
term	 from	one	 to	 two	 years.74	The	AWU	 released	 an	 official	 statement	 that	 “the	
present	NSW	Labor	executive	is	controlled	by	an	oligarchy	that	is	prepared	to	break	
the	rules	and	override	the	constitution	in	order	that	it	can	remain	in	office."75	This	
was	a	hypocritical	statement	coming	from	one	of	the	most	oligarchical	unions	in	the	
country,	 but	 it	was	 nevertheless	 true.	 The	 episode	 highlighted	 the	 tension	 in	 the	
party	 rules	which	made	the	annual	conference	supreme	but	also	gave	the	central	
executive	 plenary	 powers	 between	 annual	 conferences.	 Cancelling	 the	 annual	
conference	and	staying	in	power	indefinitely	took	the	central	executive’s	authority	
to	its	logical	extreme.	
	
From	 the	mid-1920s	 there	were	 also	 ongoing	 disputes	within	 the	 party	 over	 the	
central	 executive’s	 control	 over	 who	 leagues	 and	 unions	 could	 select	 as	 annual	
conference	 delegates.	 This	 conflict	 usually	 involved	 professed	 or	 alleged	
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Communists.	The	Russian	Revolution	had	occurred	in	1917	and	fear	of	Communism	
was	widespread	amongst	both	Labor	and	Nationalist	voters.	From	1924	the	federal	
ALP	rules	prevented	Communist	Party	members	from	joining	any	state	branch	of	the	
party.	The	NSW	Labor	Party’s	1927	Rules	then	banned	Communist	Party	members	
explicitly.76	The	Nationalist	Party	and	commercial	press	continually	tried	to	link	Labor	
with	 Communism	 and	 argue	 that	 the	 party	 was	 secretly	 “red”.	 In	 1925	 a	 SMH	
editorial	noted	that	in	the	US	there	was	a	“much	keener	appreciation”	of	the	danger	
posed	 by	 Communism	 and	 cited	 approvingly	 that	 “active	 membership	 of	
Communistic	organisations	 is	 in	California	an	offence	punishable	by	 long	 terms	of	
imprisonment”. 77 	Communism	 was	 electoral	 poison	 and	 most	 Labor	 officials	
understood	 that	 they	 needed	 to	 take	 a	 strong	 stand	 against	 it	 or	 be	 wiped	 out	
electorally.78	
	
The	Trades	Hall	Reds	protested	that	the	unions	and	leagues	were	the	foundational	
elements	of	the	party	and	that	for	the	state	bodies	to	decide	who	the	leagues	and	
unions	 could	 elect	 to	 represent	 them	 at	 annual	 conference	 or	 on	 the	 central	
executive	 amounted	 to	 turning	 the	 party’s	 democracy	 on	 its	 head.79	In	 1928,	 for	
example,	 the	 Coachmakers	 Union	 moved	 an	 unsuccessful	 resolution	 that	 “every	
union	must	have	unrestricted	right	to	select	its	own	delegate	to	conference	and	to	
the	[executive]”.80	From	the	perspective	of	a	majoritarian	view	of	democracy	there	
is	no	problem	with	a	majority	of	delegates	telling	a	minority	that	they	cannot	elect	
certain	 people	 as	 delegates.	 Such	 action	 is	more	 problematic	 from	 a	 democratic	
perspective	 that	 supports	minority-rights	 but	 even	 then,	 a	 political	 party	 barring	
members	of	rival	political	parties	from	involvement	is	the	norm.	The	real	problem	
arose	in	the	mid-1930s	when	the	Inner	Group	began	to	use	the	label	of	“Communist”	
as	an	excuse	to	marginalise	and	expel	its	enemies.	When	the	Industrialist	Party	split	
from	Lang	Labor	in	1938	its	president	Frank	O’Neill	said	that,	under	the	new	Labor	
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executive,	branches	would	be	given	“genuine	local	autonomy”	in	contrast	with	“the	
behaviour	of	the	Inner	Group	who	expelled	as	Communist	any	who	questioned	their	
dictatorship”.	O’Neill	said	that	“no	one	worried	about	being	expelled”	by	the	Inner	
Group,	in	fact,	“it	was	regarded	on	the	contrary	as	a	compliment”.81	
	
Unions	and	individual	union	leaders	who	were	either	Communist,	anti-Communist	or	
somewhere	in	between	brought	these	positions	into	the	Labor	Party.	The	Trades	Hall	
Reds	and	their	unions	initially	pushed	for	cooperation	and	even	fusion	between	Labor	
and	 the	 CPA.	On	 the	 other	 side	 unions	 like	 the	AWU	 fought	 against	 Communists	
inside	their	union	and	the	ALP.	At	the	1939	Unity	Conference,	AWU	General	Secretary	
and	President	of	the	Federal	Labor	executive,	Clarrie	Fallon,	presided	and	began	by	
ejecting	various	delegates	who	he	knew	or	suspected	to	be	Communists.82	
	
From	the	mid-1930s	the	Inner	Group	began	a	major	assault	on	local	autonomy	as	it	
clung	to	power	against	an	increasingly	influential	opposition.	A	group	of	trade	unions	
planned	to	hold	a	conference	on	1	August	1936	to	discuss	party	reform	and	Inner	
Group	domination,	but	the	central	executive	announced	that	it	prohibited	the	unions	
from	meeting.	The	union	leaders	were	bemused;	they	were	affiliated	to	the	Labor	
Party	but	they	were	independent	institutions,	so	for	a	central	executive	to	tell	them	
they	could	not	hold	a	conference	was	a	blatant	example	of	over-reach.	When	the	
unions	proceeded	with	the	conference	the	central	executive	established	a	“Special	
Investigation	Committee”	to	investigate	the	conference.	The	secret	police	overtones	
added	weight	 to	 the	 rebel	unions’	descriptions	of	 the	 Inner	Group	as	 increasingly	
“fascist”. 83 	Following	 the	 investigation	 the	 central	 executive	 expelled	 17	 union	
officials	and	four	MLAs.	Boote	wrote	 in	the	Australian	Worker	 that	the	expulsions	
were	“tyranny	utterly	devoid	of	sense	or	reason”.84	The	editorial	of	the	Barrier	Daily	
Truth	proclaimed:	“surely	a	dictatorship	that	has	found	it	necessary	to	expel	men	of	
a	 lifetime	 of	 devoted	 service	 to	 the	 party	 because	 they	 attended	 a	 trade	 union	
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conference	is	nearing	the	end	of	its	baneful	existence.	Nothing	short	of	Hitlerism	has	
got	the	movement	in	its	grip,	but	this	must	not	and	will	not	last	much	longer.”85	
	
The	Inner	Group	also	increasingly	delegated	central	executive	authority	to	sections,	
committees	and	individual	members.	The	executive’s	plenary	power	was	condensing	
into	the	hands	of	a	smaller	and	smaller	group	of	men.	For	example,	the	executive	
elected	 a	 five-person	disputes	 committee	 annually	 and	 this	 small	 group	began	 to	
wield	the	full	power	of	the	executive	in	relation	to	a	range	of	matters	that	fit	into	the	
broad	category	of	“disputes”.86		
	
The	controlling	faction	sought	to	closely	control	branch	affairs.	In	January	1931	the	
central	Bankstown	branch	met	to	resolve	a	local	factional	dispute.	Just	as	the	meeting	
opened	two	men	began	to	fight,	exchanging	blows	as	the	chairman	called	for	order.	
Amongst	the	rush	of	bodies	a	woman	added	to	the	mayhem	by	swinging	an	umbrella	
at	 one	 of	 the	 combatants.	 C.	 S.	Matthews,	 chairman	 of	 the	 disputes	 committee,	
entered	 the	 hall	 and	 adjourned	 the	 meeting	 indefinitely. 87 	Granted	 this	 was	 an	
extraordinary	meeting,	but	nevertheless	one	member	of	the	central	executive	was	
personally	wielding	the	power	of	the	full	central	executive	and	overriding	the	local	
branch’s	authority	to	run	its	own	meeting.	Matthews	had	less	luck	in	future	attempts.	
At	 a	 Glebe	 branch	meeting	 he	 was	 literally	 shoved	 out	 of	 the	 chair	 and	 left	 the	
meeting	with	 some	 60	 supporters	while	 185	members	 remained	 to	 continue	 the	
meeting	under	local	control.88	
	
In	1937	the	central	executive	delegated	the	authority	to	expel	members	and	leagues	
to	a	“Discipline	Committee”	of	three	Inner	Group	leaders:	Keller,	Graves	and	Martin.	
Jack	Hughes	of	the	Clerks	Union	complained	that	“never	previously	in	the	history	of	
the	political	Labor	movement	has	such	bureaucratic	power	been	given	to	executive	
officers.	When	three	dictators	are	set	up	in	this	way	it	indicates	that	they	fear	they	
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are	 losing	 the	 support	 of	 their	 own	 executive”. 89 	The	 Inner	 Group	 also	 began	
bypassing	the	central	executive	and	selecting	Labor	Senate	candidates	itself.90	
	
Conversely,	the	Industrialists	at	least	gave	lip	service	to	local	autonomy.	They	sold	
books	of	coupons	to	raise	funds	to	organise	against	Lang	and	the	money	went	50:50	
to	the	Industrialist	executive	and	local	branches.91	But	in	general	it	claimed	similar	
power	to	direct	members	and	branches	as	the	Inner	Group.	For	example,	it	instructed	
members	 that	 they	 “should	 not	 withdraw”	 from	 Lang	 Labor	 branches	 “until	 the	
question	 of	 the	 particular	 branch	 had	 been	 considered	 by	 the	 [Industrialist]	
executive”.92		
	
Conclusion	
Organised	opposition	is	the	inevitable	result	of	the	pursuit	of	power	and	positions	
within	ostensibly	democratic	political	parties.	This	chapter	has	examined	three	sites	
of	organised	opposition:	factionalism,	the	defence	of	membership	decision–making	
and	 the	 promotion	 of	 local	 autonomy.	 Factions	 enhanced	 party	 democracy	
throughout	the	period	by	holding	one	another	accountable,	providing	resistance	in	
elections,	and	by	motivating	membership	involvement.	Trade	unions	were	crucial	in	
forming	and	maintaining	the	factions	but	they	also	entered	the	party	as	individual	
quasi-factions	which	could	exercise	undemocratic	influence.	Throughout	the	period	
the	 central	 executive	 increased	 its	 own	 power	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 membership-
decision	making,	but	some	branch	communities	were	strong	enough	to	resist.	The	
NSW	Labor	Party	itself	was	also	strong	enough	to	successfully	resist	domination	by	
the	 undemocratic	 federal	 ALP	 conference	 and	 executive.	 The	 ruling	 NSW	 faction	
resisted	the	federal	ALP	bodies	more	out	of	self-interest	than	ideological	support	for	
local	autonomy	and	it	was	happy	to	undermine	local	branch	and	union	autonomy	to	
its	own	advantage.
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CHAPTER	IX	
A	 Lang	 dictatorship?	 Extra-parliamentary	 control,	 free	 speech,	 corruption	 and	
violence	within	the	NSW	Labor	Party	
The	image	of	“Dictator	Lang”	hung	over	the	NSW	Labor	Party	for	more	than	a	decade	
until	he	was	finally	deposed	in	1939.	This	chapter	focuses	on	four	key	pillars	of	Jack	
Lang’s	allegedly	dictatorial	rule:	extra-parliamentary	control,	the	suppression	of	free	
speech,	 corruption	 and	 violence.	 The	 NSW	 Labor	 Party	 became	 increasingly	
undemocratic	under	Lang	and	by	the	mid-1930s	it	was	a	closed	and	corrupt	oligarchy.	
Yet	 oligarchy	 was	 never	 absolute	 or	 uncontested;	 democratic	 struggles	 and	
improvements	occurred	throughout	the	period.	The	strength	and	organisation	of	the	
unions	as	independent	institutions	allowed	for	resistance	and	eventually	leadership	
renewal.	The	broader	NSW	democratic	political	system	and	society	was	also	crucial	
in	undermining	Lang	and	his	allies.	He	could	not	silence	criticism	in	the	commercial	
press	and	he	was	fatally	weakened	by	the	NSW	voters’	repeated	rejection	in	general	
elections.	
	
The	 so-called	 “Lang	 dictatorship”	 began	 in	 1926	 when	 the	 annual	 conference	
asserted	the	power	to	elect	the	parliamentary	leader.	Contrary	to	the	historiography,	
I	will	argue	 that	 this	alleged	“dictatorship”	actually	enhanced	party	democracy	by	
establishing	extra-parliamentary	control	over	the	politicians	for	the	first	time	in	the	
party’s	history.	In	1910	there	were	high	levels	of	free	speech	and	free	communication	
within	the	party	but	these	declined	greatly	to	1939.	The	first	major	assault	came	in	
1923	when	the	central	executive	expelled	the	parliamentary	leader	and	then	banned	
members	from	discussing	the	issue.	As	the	1920s	went	on	labour	newspapers	such	
as	 the	 Labor	Daily	and	Australian	Worker	were	 increasingly	 biased	 and	 closed	 to	
critical	 voices,	 becoming	 blunt	 weapons	 of	 factional	 warfare.	 By	 the	 late	 1920s	
criticism	of	Lang	and	the	party	had	become	unacceptable	and	the	leaders	increasingly	
used	accusations	of	“Communism”	to	silence	opponents.		
	
Some	degree	of	corruption	was	a	constant	feature	of	NSW	Labor	Party	politics.	It	is	
difficult	to	say	whether	corruption	increased	or	decreased	overall	between	1910	and	
1939	but	the	extent	to	which	the	spoils	of	corruption	became	concentrated	into	the	
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hands	of	one	faction	did	peak	at	two	times;	with	the	AWU	faction	in	the	early	1920s	
and	 the	 Inner	 Group	 in	 the	 mid-1930s.	 The	 Inner	 Group	 also	 used	 violence	 and	
intimidation	 on	 an	 unprecedented	 scale.	 The	 brand	 of	 corruption	 discredited	 the	
party	and	added	to	Labor’s	eventual	un-electability	under	Lang.	
	
Figure	28	Jack	Lang	addressing	a	crowd	in	Moore	Park	in	Sydney	in	1930.1	
Controlling	the	politicians	
In	theory,	the	extra-parliamentary	Labor	Party	controlled	the	politicians	who	were	
the	“servants”	of	the	movement.	All	Labor	politicians	signed	a	“pledge”	promising	to	
do	their	best	to	 implement	party	policy,	as	decided	by	the	annual	conference	and	
interpreted	by	the	central	executive,	and	to	vote	as	one	in	parliament,	 in	the	way	
that	a	majority	had	decided	in	a	caucus	meeting	beforehand.	Once	elected,	however,	
politicians	proved	difficult	to	control.	The	Australian	Constitution	gave	power	to	the	
elected	 individual	 rather	 than	 the	 party,	 so	 even	when	 the	 annual	 conference	 or	
central	executive	expelled	a	politician,	 the	 rebel	kept	his	place	 in	parliament.	The	
politicians	also	tended	to	be	more	well-known	and	charismatic	than	members	of	the	
central	executive	and	could	often	gain	 the	 support	of	 the	party	 rank	and	 file	 in	a	
dispute	with	the	party’s	extra-parliamentary	institutions.	
	
																																								 																				
1	Ted	Hood.	State	Library	of	NSW	51104.	
	
	
272	
As	we	have	seen,	from	its	election	in	1910	the	NSW	Labor	government’s	refusal	to	
follow	 party	 policy	 had	 alienated	 an	 increasing	 proportion	 of	 the	 party.	 The	 first	
major	attempt	to	assert	control	over	the	politicians	in	the	twentieth	century	was	the	
Industrial	Section	in	1915.	The	second	major	attempt	has	received	far	less	attention	
from	historians	and	occurred	in	1923	when,	for	the	first	time	in	the	history	of	the	
party,	the	central	executive	removed	the	parliamentarians’	right	to	choose	their	own	
leader.		By	convention,	the	Labor	parliamentarians	had	always	chosen	their	leader,	
yet	there	was	nothing	 in	the	party	rules	to	prevent	the	executive	from	taking	this	
power	for	itself.	The	executive	claimed	that	it	was	acting	within	the	power	granted	
to	 it	 by	 NSW	 Labor	 Party	 rule	 33,	 which	 stated	 that	 “the	 executive	 between	
conferences	has	plenary	powers	to	deal	with	all	matters	of	policy,	platform	and	rules,	
and	their	decisions	must	be	observed	by	all	members	of	the	movement”.	The	AWU	
faction	lost	control	of	the	party	at	the	1923	Annual	Conference	which	restored	the	
politicians’	right	to	choose	their	leader,	but	this	restoration	was	short-lived.2	
	
The	third	major	attempt	to	control	the	politicians,	and	by	far	the	most	successful,	
was	the	“Lang	dictatorship”.	In	November	1926	a	Special	Conference	declared	Lang	
the	leader	for	the	life	of	the	current	parliament	irrespective	of	the	wishes	of	caucus.	
This	continued	until	Lang	and	his	allies	lost	control	of	the	party	in	1939.	As	the	name	
“Lang	 dictatorship”	 implies,	 it	was	 criticised	 as	 undemocratic	 by	 the	 conservative	
wing	of	the	party	and	the	commercial	media,	but	is	this	justified?	The	motion	did	give	
Lang	something	like	dictatorial	control	over	his	fellow	politicians	in	that	it	removed	
their	right	to	replace	him	and	empowered	him	“to	do	all	 things	and	exercise	such	
powers	 as	 he	 deems	 necessary”.	 But	 Lang	 was	 still	 answerable	 to	 the	 central	
executive	and	annual	 conference.	 So	 from	1926	 to	 around	1934	a	more	accurate	
(though	less	elegant)	name	would	be	the	“annual	conference	and	central	executive	
dictatorship”,	or	simply	“extra-parliamentary	control”,	which	is	what	the	party	was	
supposed	 to	be	all	 along.	The	“Lang	dictatorship”	enhanced	 labour	democracy	by	
enabling	effective	extra-parliamentary	control	for	the	first	time	in	the	party’s	history.	
By	 the	mid-1930s,	 however,	 Lang’s	 dominance	 of	 the	 extra-parliamentary	 bodies	
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made	their	control	 illusory,	 so	 from	then	onwards	 the	 term	“Lang	dictatorship”	 is	
more	appropriate.	
	
The	party	privileged	 the	view	of	politicians	as	delegates	 rather	 than	 trustees.	As	 I	
argued	in	the	thesis	introduction,	the	delegate	view	is	more	democratic	as	it	implies	
that	the	members	have	more	direct	control	over	decisions.	Lang	was	very	popular	
with	 the	 union	 leaders	 and	 party	 members,	 but	 his	 poor	 treatment	 of	 his	
parliamentary	colleagues	had	seen	deputy	leader	Peter	Loughlin	go	within	one	vote	
of	 deposing	 him	 in	 a	 caucus	 ballot	 in	 September	 1926.	 The	 central	 executive	
responded	by	calling	a	Special	Conference	for	November	with	the	goal	of	entrenching	
Lang	as	leader.		
	
At	the	conference,	the	longstanding	hostility	of	the	extra-parliamentary	party	to	the	
Labor	politicians	was	 clear.	 John	Kilburn	 said	he	 “would	 sooner	be	 a	 captain	of	 a	
regiment	of	workers	than	a	performer	in	the	parliamentary	circus”.	“Again	and	again	
the	workers	have	been	betrayed	politically	and	 industrially”,	he	concluded.	3	Ossie	
Schreiber,	 Secretary	 of	 the	 Furnishing	 Trades	 Union,	 then	 moved	 the	 famous	
resolution:		
That	this	Conference	has	complete	confidence	in	the	leadership	of	John	T.	Lang,	
Premier	of	New	South	Wales,	and	hereby	confirms	him	in	the	leadership	of	the	
Parliamentary	 Labor	 Party	 for	 the	 period	 of	 the	 present	 parliament,	 and	
recognising	that	unity	is	essential	to	the	successful	carrying	out	of	the	platform	
and	policy	of	the	Labor	Party,	the	Premier	is	hereby	authorised	in	the	event	of	
circumstances	arising	which,	in	his	opinion	imperil	the	unity,	to	do	all	things	and	
exercise	such	powers	as	he	deems	necessary	in	the	interests	of	the	movement.	
Schreiber	said	the	party	had	“come	to	the	parting	of	the	ways”;	they	must	“decide	
whether	they	would	stand	idly	by”	and	see	the	politicians’	“treachery	and	intrigue	
get	 the	 upper	 hand”.	 Lang	 had	 “made	 the	 boldest	 possible	 bid	 to	 translate	 the	
platform	of	the	party	to	the	statute	book	of	the	state”.	Schreiber’s	motion	carried	
with	over	300	votes	for	and	only	four	against.4	
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We	 can	 safely	 assume	 that	 a	 majority	 of	 the	 politicians	 opposed	 the	 “Lang	
dictatorship”;	only	half	had	even	voted	for	Lang	in	the	recent	leadership	ballot.	But	
the	politicians	understood	Lang’s	popularity	and	felt	the	mood	in	the	party;	they	did	
not	dare	 to	protest	 for	 fear	of	expulsion	or	dis-endorsement	at	 the	next	election.	
Three	years	 later	at	the	1929	Annual	Conference	Lang	was	able	to	claim	that	“the	
parliamentary	section	is	working	in	perfect	harmony	with	the	executive,	and	perfect	
amity	 pervades	 the	 party”. 5 	Geoffrey	 Robinson	 argued	 that	 the	 second	 Lang	
government	 (1930-32)	 was	 “the	 most	 radical	 government	 in	 Australian	 history”	
because	 of	 the	 influence	 of	 “a	 group	 of	 radical	 unionists	who	 expounded	 a	 class	
struggle	 ideology”.6	This	 governance	 by	 Lang	 and	 the	 leading	 unionists	 was	 only	
possible	because	the	politicians	had	been	tamed.	
	
In	1931	the	SMH	 reported	 that	although	“there	 is	an	 influential	 section	of	caucus	
which	threatens	to	revolt”	these	members	“have	confided	in	their	friends	that	they	
will	pick	their	own	time	and	their	own	battleground”.7	By	1938	Carlo	Lazzarini,	one	
of	the	few	Labor	politicians	openly	hostile	to	Lang,	declared	that	“if	there	was	a	secret	
ballot	 for	 the	 leadership	 of	 the	 parliamentary	 party,	 and	 members	 voted	 in	
accordance	with	their	beliefs,	Mr	Lang	would	not	get	five	votes”.8	Yet	Lang	continued	
as	leader.	Extra-parliamentary	control	had	been	implemented	to	an	extent	that	was	
almost	unimaginable	in	the	early	1920s.	
	
A	common	scholarly	argument	against	intraparty	democracy,	and	one	made	regularly	
by	the	Nationalist	Party	in	this	period,	is	that	politicians	should	only	be	responsible	
to	 the	electorate,	not	 their	party.	 In	 the	1925	NSW	election,	Nationalist	Attorney	
General	Thomas	Bavin	said	“the	choice	is	not	really	between	Sir	George	Fuller	and	
Mr	Lang,	it	is	between	Sir	George	Fuller	and	a	body	of	men	outside	parliament	having	
no	responsibility	to	the	people,	whose	names	probably	they	have	never	heard,	the	
men	who	constitute	the	governing	body	of	the	ALP”.9	Today	we	would	use	the	term	
																																								 																				
5	“Mr	Lang,”	SMH	2	April	1929,	6.	
6	Geoff	Robinson,	When	the	Labor	Party	Dreams		(Australian	Scholarly	Publishing,	2008):	1.	
7	“State	politics,”	SMH	1	January	1932,	4.	
8	“Inner	Group	disruption,”	AW	27	April	1938,	7.	
9	“Appeal	to	women,”	SMH	28	May	1925,	12.	
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“faceless	men”.	From	a	broader	state-level	view	of	democracy	this	is	an	important	
question.	As	 I	 discussed	 in	 the	 thesis	 introduction,	 it	 is	 debatable	which	model	 is	
more	democratic	and	it	depends	on	an	individual’s	subjective	view	of	democracy	and,	
in	 particular,	 how	 participatory	 that	 democracy	 should	 be.	 However,	 from	 an	
intraparty	view	of	democracy,	which	is	the	focus	of	this	thesis,	the	situation	is	clear.	
Party	democracy	requires	members	to	decide	party	policy,	and	extra-parliamentary	
control	of	the	politicians	is	essential	to	ensure	that	the	politicians	follow	party	policy.	
	
Extra-parliamentary	control	 is	necessary	but	not	sufficient	to	provide	membership	
control	over	the	politicians.	The	second	essential	component	 is	 that	the	members	
control	the	extra-parliamentary	institutions.	As	we	have	seen	in	previous	chapters,	
the	NSW	Labor	Party	members	did	not	exercise	significant	control	over	the	annual	
conference	 and	 central	 executive	which	were	 instead	 controlled	 largely	 by	 union	
leaders.	Like	the	1927	Rules,	the	“Lang	dictatorship”	was	an	important	step	towards	
democracy	but	was	not	in	itself	sufficient.	
	
Free	speech	and	free	communication	
The	 first	 major	 suppression	 of	 free	 speech	 and	 communication	 within	 the	 party	
occurred	in	the	1923	dispute.	Early	that	year	the	central	executive	dubiously	expelled	
Dooley	from	the	party	and	on	9	March	ruled	that,	as	the	Dooley	matter	would	be	
resolved	at	annual	conference,	“branches,	members	and	councils	must	refrain	from	
further	 discussion	 of	 the	merits	 of	 the	 case”	 until	 then.	 AWU	 factioneer	 George	
Buckland	 explained	 that	 this	 would	 mean	 that	 conference	 delegates	 would	 be	
“untrammelled	in	any	way	by	resolutions	for	or	against”	the	executive’s	actions,	and	
would	be	“free	to	record	a	vote	in	the	way	that	they	thought	was	right	...	after	hearing	
the	evidence	from	both	sides”.10	
	
The	executive’s	ruling	was	designed	to	minimise	the	issue,	and	prevent	Dooley	and	
his	supporters	from	arguing	their	case	to	the	leagues.	When	the	majority	of	leagues	
ignored	the	executive’s	gag	order,	it	began	to	expel	them,	and	form	new	leagues	to	
																																								 																				
10	“No	Further	Expulsions,”	SMH	March	12,	1923,	9;	George	Buckland,	“The	Political	Situation,”	
Australian	Worker	21	March	1923,	17.	
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replace	them.	By	9	April,	the	executive	had	expelled	53	leagues,	11	state	Electorate	
Councils	and	3	federal	Electorate	Councils	from	the	party.11	This	tyrannical	behaviour	
alienated	 a	 significant	 section	of	 the	AWU	 faction’s	 former	 supporters	 and	 it	 lost	
control	of	the	party	at	the	1923	Annual	Conference.	
	
The	various	labour	newspapers’	Labor	Party	annual	conference	reports	were	never	
completely	objective	in	what	they	included	and	excluded	from	their	accounts.	After	
the	AWU	faction’s	defeat	in	1923,	however,	a	clear	change	in	reporting	is	evident	and	
the	Australian	Worker’s	annual	conference	reports	became	openly	biased.	In	1926,	
for	example,	Willis	unsuccessfully	presented	a	motion	to	amend	the	party	rules,	as	
was	the	right	of	any	conference	delegate.	However,	the	Australian	Worker	recorded	
it	as:	“Mr	Willis	had	to	abandon	his	attempt	to	tamper	with	the	rules”.12	
	
The	Australian	Worker’s	main	labour	newspaper	rival	was	the	Labor	Daily	which	was	
founded	as	the	official	newspaper	of	the	NSW	Labor	Party	in	1924.	The	newspaper	
was	 Willis’s	 creation	 and	 to	 do	 so	 he	 had	 converted	 the	 Miners	 Federation	
newspaper,	Common	Cause,	into	the	Labor	Daily.		The	Labor	Daily	was	governed	by	
a	board	of	management	of	six	union	officials	elected	by	shareholding	unions,	one	
vote	per	pound	invested.13	This	bestowed	power	on	the	leaders	of	several	wealthy	
unions,	especially	the	Miners	Federation.	Willis	even	bought	500	shares	personally.14	
	
The	Labor	Daily	proudly	declared	itself	“a	daring	challenge	to	capitalism	and	its	right-
wing	supporters	in	the	ALP	and	trade	unions”.15	The	first	edition	of	the	Labor	Daily	
on	 23	 January	 1924	 featured	 a	 shrine-like	 image	 of	 Willis,	 federal	 Labor	 leader	
Matthew	Charlton	and	Lang.16	The	supremacy	of	the	extra-parliamentary	party	was	
clear	in	the	positioning	of	Willis	above	Charlton	and	Lang	(figure	29).	Later	that	year	
																																								 																				
11	Henry	Boote,	“Further	Observations,”	AW	21	March	1923,	3;	“Labour	Split,”	SMH,	March	19,	1923,	
9;	“The	Trouble,”	AW	11	April	1923,	18.		
12	“Special	Conference,”	AW	17	November	1926,	15.	
13	“Labor	Daily,”	SMH	26	January	1924,	9.	
14	R.B.	Walker,	"The	Fall	of	the	Labor	Daily,"	Labour	History	38(1980):	68.	
15	“Enemy	within,”	LD	12	May	1928,	4.	
16	“Leaders,”	LD	23	January	1924,	1.	
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a	puff	piece	on	Miners	Federation	President	Baddeley	praised,	among	other	things,	
his	“splendid	physique	and	aggressive	features”.17		
	
Figure	29	The	Labor	Daily	23	January	1924.	
While	the	Labor	Daily	did	feature	articles	critical	of	factional	enemies	like	the	AWU,	
its	message	was	generally	one	of	party	peace	and	inclusion.18	In	1928	a	Labor	Daily	
editorial	deemed	it	“most	regrettable”	that	the	AWU	was	not	represented	at	that	
year’s	annual	conference,	provided	a	balanced	outline	of	the	dispute	between	the	
AWU	and	NSW	Labor	and	then	suggested	arbitration	by	an	impartial	third	party	to	
heal	the	breach.19	The	newspaper	also	published	even-handed	debates	between	the	
AWU	officials	and	former	AWU-president-turned-dissident	Arthur	Rae.20	
																																								 																				
17	“A	miners’	man,”	LD	8	December	1924,	4.	
18	“Not	capitalist,”	LD	8	December	1924,	8.	
19	“Labor	in	conference,”	LD	6	April	1928,	4.	
20	“Mr	Rae,”	LD	6	January	1925,	6.	
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Figure	30	Labor	Daily	cartoonist	Fred	Brown	called	for	NSW	Labor	Party	unity	in	
1927.21	
The	Labor	Daily	had	a	daily	column	of	short	letters	to	the	editor.	It	was	titled	“The	
Man	on	the	Street”	and	featured	an	image	of	a	man	using	a	rolled	up	Labor	Daily	
newspaper	as	a	megaphone.22	In	its	early	years	the	Labor	Daily	even	printed	several	
letters	 criticising	 Lang.	 In	 1924	 the	Goulburn	 eight	 hour	 committee	wrote	 to	 the	
Labor	Daily	 complaining	 that	 Lang	had	not	appeared	nor	 sent	a	 representative	 to	
their	march.	The	letter	condemned	“the	unpardonable	discourtesy	of	Mr	Lang”	and	
																																								 																				
21	Fred	Brown,	“Unity,”	LD,	3	June	1927,	4.	
22	“The	man	in	the	street,”	LD	5	May	1934,	4.	
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his	 “insulting	 tactlessness	 and	 neglect”. 23 	The	 following	 year	 the	 Labor	 Daily	
published	a	debate	between	Lang	and	Jock	Garden	over	a	maritime	dispute.24	Such	
criticism	of	Lang	was	unthinkable	ten	years	later.	
	
The	1920s	saw	the	rise	of	radio	in	Australia	and	labour	leaders	quickly	understood	its	
potential	 propaganda	 value.	 In	 1925	Willis	 warned	 in	 the	 Labor	 Daily	 that	 radio	
“could	be	utilised	by	capitalism	to	mislead	the	people;	and	therefore	Labor	must	get	
in	first”.25	Willis’s	private	secretary	Emil	Voigt	had	developed	a	keen	interest	in	radio	
during	his	travels	in	the	US	in	1923-24.	In	January	1925	when	he	returned	to	Australia	
he	successfully	promoted	the	idea	of	the	NSW	Labor	Council	forming	a	radio	station	
and	later	that	year	it	created	2KY.26	2KY	ran	at	a	profit	and	also	served	as	a	valuable	
labour	propaganda	tool,	taking	its	news	directly	from	the	Labor	Daily.27		
	
Lang	too	was	quick	to	appreciate	the	power	of	radio.	He	believed	that	if	the	public	
could	hear	him	directly,	rather	than	through	the	hostile	commercial	press,	he	could	
win	them	over.	Lang	had	influence	over	the	Labor	Council	and	2KY	but	he	did	not	
control	it.	He	investigated	the	possibility	of	state	radio	controlled	by	the	government.	
This	would	have	given	the	incumbent	government	a	huge	propaganda	advantage	and	
the	scheme	was	never	realised	due	to	constitutional	complications.	The	commercial	
press	had	been	quick	 to	criticise	 the	potentially	anti-democratic	effects	and	many	
within	the	labour	movement	feared	that	future	Nationalist	governments	could	use	
state	radio	to	entrench	themselves.28	Lang	had	to	settle	for	2KY	and	in	1932,	on	the	
eve	of	his	dismissal,	he	asked	2KY	to	transmit	the	entire	session	of	parliament,	a	first	
anywhere	 in	 Australia. 29 	Later	 that	 year	 Labor	 estimated	 that	 250,000	 people	
listened	to	Lang’s	election	policy	speech.30	
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By	the	late	1920s	the	Labor	Daily	had	become	closed	to	critical	voices.	This	became	
worse	 after	Willis	 lost	 control	 of	 the	newspaper	 to	 the	 Inner	Group	 in	 1932.	 The	
following	year	he	criticised	the	Labor	Daily’s	“refusal	to	print	one	word	of	criticism	or	
correction	of	 the	actions	 and	 statements	of	 its	 controlling	 authorities	 –	 the	 Inner	
Group”.31	This	intolerance	of	critical	voices	extended	throughout	the	party.	
	
Past	failures	of	loyalty	to	Lang	were	not	forgotten.	At	the	1928	Annual	Conference	
William	Davis,	Secretary	of	the	Building	Trades	Union,	was	speaking	when	Jack	Hooke	
interjected:	 “did	 you	 not	 work	 against	Mr	 Lang	 and	 support	 an	 opponent	 in	 his	
electorate	[in	a	preselection	ballot	four	years	earlier]”?	Davis	admitted	that	he	had,	
but	said	it	was	a	mistake	and	that	Lang	had	“proved	to	be	the	best	leader	NSW	has	
ever	 seen”.32	This	exchange	demonstrates	 the	extent	 to	which	opposition	 to	Lang	
had	 become	 taboo	 within	 the	 party.	 That	 year	 the	 central	 executive	 expelled	
Australian	Worker	editor	Boote	from	his	membership	of	the	Rose	Bay	Labor	branch	
over	an	article	he	had	written	criticising	the	Lang	government.33	
	
In	1930	the	central	executive	recommended	A.J.	Macpherson	be	dismissed	from	his	
position	as	organising	secretary	because	“he	had	made	disloyal	remarks	regarding	
[Lang]	 and	 had	 plotted	 to	 bring	 about	 his	 downfall	 from	 the	 position	 of	 leader”.	
Annual	 conference	voted	 to	dismiss	Macpherson.34	The	 following	year	 the	central	
executive’s	attempt	to	stop	Macpherson	from	speaking	at	Labor	Party	rallies	resulted	
in	an	almost	slapstick	chase	around	Sydney.	At	8pm	on	6	March	1931	word	reached	
party	headquarters	that	Macpherson	was	planning	to	speak	at	a	meeting	on	Edgecliff	
Road	in	East	Sydney.	Two	party	cars	sped	to	the	scene	but	were	told	they	were	too	
late,	Macpherson,	a	regular	Scarlet	Pimpernel,	had	already	spoken	and	left.	The	cars	
then	 drove	 to	 various	 local	 rallies	 but	Macpherson	managed	 to	 evade	 them	 and	
spoke	 to	 two	 more	 large	 gatherings	 that	 night. 35 	In	 1936	 the	 central	 executive	
introduced	a	bylaw	preventing	expelled	members	from	attending	branch	meetings	
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and	 arguing	 that	 they	 should	 not	 have	 been	 expelled.	 Mr	 T.	 Falkingham	 of	 the	
Boilermakers	Union	complained	 that	 the	bylaw	“amounted	 to	suppression	of	 free	
speech”	and	was	further	“evidence	of	a	fascist-like	dictatorship	in	the	movement”.36	
The	gag	order	was	similar	to	the	AWU	faction’s	suppression	of	free	speech	in	1923.	
	
Above	 I	 argued	 that	 the	 Labor	 Party’s	 bar	 on	members	 of	 other	 political	 parties,	
including	the	CPA,	was	democratic.	However,	it	became	undemocratic	and	repressive	
when	the	definition	of	“Communist”	began	to	change	from	meaning	a	member	of	
the	CPA	to	meaning	someone	with	“communist”	opinions.	In	November	1923	when	
Willis	controlled	Common	Cause	 it	editorialised	that	"any	communist	who	is	not	a	
member	of	the	Communist	Party	has	an	unquestioned	right	to	membership	of	the	
Labor	Party”.37	But	many	in	the	state	and	federal	ALP	leadership	did	not	agree	and	in	
1928	the	federal	executive	ruled	that	ALP	members	are	prohibited	from	“advocating	
the	policy	 of	 the	Communist	 Party”.38	Exactly	what	 constituted	 the	 “policy	 of	 the	
Communist	Party”	was	unclear	and	this	prohibition	gave	the	NSW	central	executive	
free	rein	to	redbait	against	opponents.	By	1938	the	Australian	Worker	claimed	that	
“opposition	 to	 the	 Lang	 dictatorship	 and	 the	 Inner	 Group	 gangsters	 is	 to	 be	
recognised	as	'doing	the	work	of	the	Communist	Party’”.39	
	
In	the	mid-1920s	the	Labor	Daily	had	a	circulation	of	around	100,000.40	By	1930	it	
had	dropped	to	around	70,000	but	 it	 reached	a	peak	of	162,000	on	14	May	1932	
following	Lang’s	dismissal	as	Premier	of	NSW.41	That	year	Lang	appointed	Norman	
McCauley,	the	brother	of	his	private	secretary,	as	editor	and	A.C.	Paddison	as	lead	
writer.	 The	 Labor	 Daily	 offices	 on	 Brisbane	 Street,	 Sydney	 became	 an	 unofficial	
headquarters	for	the	Inner	Group.42	By	the	mid-1930s	the	Labor	Daily’s	editorials	and	
Lang’s	speeches	were	indistinguishable.	On	5	September	1935,	for	example,	the	front	
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page	 showed	 Lang	 speaking	 on	 a	 podium	 draped	 in	 the	 Australian	 flag	 with	 the	
headline:	“No	war	of	plunder”.	That	edition’s	editorial	was	titled	“A	war	of	plunder”	
and	 reiterated	 Lang’s	 isolationist	 stance	 against	 Australian	 involvement	 in	 a	
European	war	against	fascist	states.43		
	
The	 Labor	 Daily	 did	 not	 have	 a	 monopoly	 on	 communication	 with	 Labor	 Party	
members	 who	 could	 get	 party	 news	 from	 rival	 labour	 newspapers,	 such	 as	 the	
Australian	Worker,	 from	 the	NSW	Labor	Council’s	 radio	 station	2KY	and	 from	 the	
commercial	media.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 Labor	 Daily	 was	 probably	 the	most	 trusted	
source	of	party	news	for	most	party	members	and	it	did	enjoy	a	monopoly	over	some	
party	 information.	For	example,	 in	1928	the	central	executive	voted	that	only	 the	
Labor	Daily	could	attend	and	report	on	central	executive	meetings.44	It	is	difficult	to	
assess	the	capacity	of	the	Labor	Daily	to	influence	party	members’	opinions,	but	the	
ferocity	 with	 which	 the	 rival	 factions	 fought	 for	 control	 of	 the	 newspaper	
demonstrates	that	they	believed	it	was	of	immense	propaganda	value.		
	
The	oral	histories	recorded	by	Martyn	Lyons	and	Lucy	Taska	added	further	weight	to	
this	position.	In	their	interviews	they	found	that	the	Labor	Daily	“had	a	unique	status	
in	working-class	circles”	in	the	inter-war	period.	Several	interviewees	independently	
referred	to	it	as	their	“Bible”.45	Railway	cleaner	John	Mongan	appreciated	that	“you	
could	read	about	what	your	life	was	really	like”	and	remembered	that	he	would	buy	
two	Labor	Dailys	each	morning	to	give	one	away	to	workmates	and	“spread	the	news	
trying	to	get	them	to	read	the	Labor	Daily”.46	A	labourer,	Albert	P.,	recalled	the	Labor	
Daily	was	“the	accepted	thing	in	most	homes	in	those	days,	wherever	you	went,	in	
the	snooker	rooms,	barber	shops,	any	sporting	venues,	the	Labor	Daily	was	always	
there”.47	This	 pervasiveness	 in	working-class	 circles	 and	 venues	 suggests	 that	 the	
Labor	Daily’s	influence	was	far	greater	than	its	circulation	of	70,000	to	100,000.	
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In	 1936	 the	 courts	 blocked	 an	 attempt	 by	 the	 Inner	 Group	 to	 dilute	 the	 unions’	
shareholdings	 in	the	Labor	Daily.48	To	cement	his	control	Lang	had	personally	 lent	
the	 Labor	 Daily	 £13,764.	 He	 attempted	 the	 same	 tactic	 with	 2KY	 by	 lending	 the	
station	£1000	but	the	Labor	Council	quashed	the	scheme.49	When	it	appeared	that	
the	 Inner	 Group	 would	 lose	 control	 of	 the	 Labor	 Daily	 to	 the	 Industrialist	 union	
coalition	in	1938,	Lang	tried	to	retain	control	by	calling	in	the	debt.	The	dispute	came	
to	a	head	at	the	shareholders’	meeting	on	2	February	1938.	The	Australian	Worker	
reported	 that	 “pandemonium	 reigned”	 as	 James	 Tyrell,	 director	 representing	 the	
unions,	blasted	Lang	for	his	“cowardly	act”	to	“grab	control	of	the	paper	from	the	
unions”	which	was	“unprecedented	in	the	history	of	the	Labor	movement”.50	Later	
that	month	the	unions	won	control	of	the	Labor	Daily	from	Lang	in	the	NSW	Equity	
Court.	The	unions	settled	Lang’s	debt	for	£23,239,	almost	£10,000	more	than	he	had	
loaned	the	newspaper.	In	its	typical	“scorched	earth”	fashion,	the	Inner	Group	did	
their	best	to	destroy	the	Labor	Daily	before	they	surrendered	control.	They	cancelled	
all	subscriptions	and	advertising	contracts	and	removed	all	records	and	paperwork.51	
The	Inner	Group	quickly	established	the	Century	as	a	pro-Lang	labour	newspaper.52	
	
Industrialist	control	did	not	mean	a	return	to	free	speech.	On	Tuesday	22	February	
1938	the	Labor	Daily’s	editorial	read:	“the	dictatorship	has	ended”.	“After	years	of	
waiting,	 after	months	 of	 interminable	 and	wasteful	 litigation	 imposed	 on	 us,	 the	
Labor	 Daily	 is	 back	 under	 the	 control	 of	 the	 directors	 and	 the	 trade	 unions”,	 it	
continued.53	But	 rather	 than	 restoring	 balance	 to	 the	 Labor	 Daily,	 and	 instituting	
some	level	of	freedom	of	speech	and	communication,	the	Industrialists	simply	used	
the	newspaper	in	the	same	blunt	manner	as	the	Inner	Group.	As	their	first	act	after	
winning	control	the	trade	union	directors	informed	the	staff	that	“no	support	for	the	
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Lang	dictatorship	would	be	 tolerated”.54	In	 their	war	 against	 the	 Inner	Group	 the	
Industrialists	had	taken	on	some	of	the	characteristics	of	their	enemy.	
	
“Ballot	fakers	and	rule	jugglers”:	corruption,	intimidation	and	violence	
It	is	safe	to	assume	that	some	level	of	rule	bending,	dirty	tricks	and	outright	ballot-
rigging	had	occurred	within	the	NSW	Labor	Party	from	the	outset.	By	its	clandestine	
nature	it	is	difficult	to	say	whether	corruption	increased	or	decreased	in	the	interwar	
period	but	it	does	appear	to	have	been	used	most	effectively	in	two	periods.	The	first	
was	from	1919	to	1923	when	the	AWU	faction	controlled	the	NSW	Labor	Party.	As	
Jim	Hagan	and	Ken	Turner	note,	in	this	four	year	period	“there	were	almost	endless	
allegations	of	forged	ballot	papers,	multiple	voting,	ballot	box	stuffing,	‘crook’	ballot	
boxes	and	 impersonation”	and	 that	 “most	of	 the	accusations	pointed	back	 to	 the	
[AWU	faction]	executive”.55	
	
Under	NSW	Labor	Party	rule	6	any	member	of	an	affiliated	trade	union	could	vote	in	
pre-selection	ballots	in	electorates	in	which	they	claimed	residence.	Time	and	again	
pre-selection	ballot	results	were	determined	by	the	hundreds	of	postal	ballots	that	
flooded	in	from	distant	workers	via	their	union’s	headquarters.	The	AWU	made	best	
use	of	this	system;	it	was	the	largest	union	in	the	state	and	printed	ballot	papers	in	
the	Australian	Worker	for	its	members	to	fill	in	and	mail.	Once	the	ballots	reached	
union	headquarters	it	would	have	been	easy	to	alter	or	replace	them,	or	to	add	ballot	
papers	supposedly	mailed	from	distant	pastoral	stations	but	actually	completed	by	
the	union	officials	in	Macdonell	House.	In	chapter	two	I	demonstrated	how	the	AWU	
leaders	used	fake	voting	slips	to	corrupt	internal	AWU	postal	ballots	and	it	appears	
that	they	simply	transposed	this	system	into	the	Labor	Party.	On	20	September	1922,	
James	Catts,	Labor	MHR	for	Cook,	launched	a	long	and	detailed	attack	in	the	House	
of	Representatives	against	the	“extensive	and	thinly	veiled	criminality”	of	Bailey	and	
his	Central	Branch	AWU	“junta”.	Originally	one	of	their	closest	allies,	Catts	had	fallen	
out	with	the	AWU	leaders	in	1920	when	the	AWU’s	Blakeley	ousted	him	as	federal	
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ALP	 Caucus	 Secretary.	 The	 AWU	 faction-controlled	 executive	 had	 subsequently	
expelled	Catts	from	the	NSW	Labor	Party	in	April	1922	for	sectarianism.56		
	
Catts	said	that	it	had	been	proved	at	the	1920	AWU	annual	convention	that	250	faked	
AWU	voting	slips	had	been	used	in	the	Labor	Party’s	1919	Namoi	pre-selection	ballot.	
Dissident	AWU	official	Jack	Cullinan	had	discovered	the	fraud.	He	recalled:	“I	had	the	
[fake]	 slips	with	me,	 and	 I	might	 tell	 you	 that	 I	 also	 had	my	 automatic	 revolver,	
because	if	some	persons	knew	that	I	had	the	slips	I	could	not	tell	what	might	happen”.	
“The	slips	were	placed	in	a	safe	in	Macdonnel	House”,	he	continued,	“but	on	the	safe	
being	opened	up	the	following	morning	these	documents	were	missing.	This	is	one	
of	the	most	damnable	things	that	has	ever	happened”.57	This	was	a	clear	case	of	AWU	
officials	corrupting	Labor	Party	pre-selection	ballots	but	it	was	never	proven	exactly	
which	officials	were	responsible.	
	
Catts	also	said	he	had	a	signed	statement	from	a	former	AWU	organiser	named	Dick	
McDonald	 that,	 in	 his	 1919	Goulburn	 pre-selection	 ballot,	 Bailey	 had	 “put	 in	 300	
crook	[postal]	votes”	and	that	W.	Minter	of	the	Clerks	Union	also	claimed	to	have	
overheard	Bailey	and	Buckland	discussing	this	scheme.	Catts	conceded	that	the	AWU	
convention	had	investigated	these	claims	and	found	them	to	be	false.	Finally,	Catts	
said	 that	an	unnamed	“member	of	 the	Municipal	Employees	Union”	had	told	him	
that	 in	 Lambert’s	West	 Sydney	 pre-selection	 ballot,	 eight	 cars	 had	 been	 used	 to	
transport	a	team	of	men	to	vote	in	multiple	booths	using	fake	union	tickets.	None	of	
these	claims	were	ever	proven.	Lambert	replied	that	Catts’	speech	had	been	a	“long	
and	dreary	compilation	of	 incorrect	allegations”	 that	 relied	on	the	“statements	of	
self-confessed	criminals”	and	“unscrupulous	persons”.58	
	
These	 accusations	 of	 AWU	 faction	 corruption	 culminated	 in	 the	 1923	 “ballot	 box	
scandal”.	In	July	1922	the	NSW	Labor	executive	loaned	several	ballot	boxes	to	the	
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Clerks	Union.	The	union	discovered	that	the	boxes	were	“crook”.	They	had	a	secret	
sliding	panel,	complete	with	dummy	nail	heads,	which	allowed	locked	boxes	to	be	
opened,	and	ballot	papers	 to	be	 removed	and	altered	or	 replaced.59	A	committee	
appointed	by	the	1923	NSW	Labor	Party	Annual	Conference	to	investigate	the	ballot	
box	 scandal,	 and	 consisting	 entirely	 of	 the	 AWU	 faction’s	 enemies,	 found	 that	
Alderman	 R.	 Bramston,	 Australian	 Railways	 Union	 NSW	 branch	 Secretary	 Arthur	
Buckley	 and	 AWU	 officials	 Gavin	 Sutherland	 and	 Bailey	 were	 responsible	 for	 the	
creation	of	 the	 fraudulent	ballot	boxes.	The	executive	 immediately	expelled	 them	
from	 the	 Labor	 Party.	 Over	 the	 following	 years	 various	 labour	 organisations	 and	
courts	 conducted	 numerous	 inquiries,	 some	 finding	 that	 Bailey	 and	 others	 were	
responsible	for	the	crook	ballot	boxes	and	some	finding	they	were	not.		
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Figure	 31	 The	 Labor	 Daily	 depicted	 a	 wolf	 named	 “Baileyism”	 in	 a	 den	 built	 of	
“intrigue”,	“corruption”,	“league	packing”,	“sliding	panels”,	“union	dictatorship”,	and	
“malice”.60	
It	 is	 certainly	 clear	 that	 there	was	widespread	 corruption	within	 the	 party	 in	 this	
period.	Many	cases	of	ballot	rigging	were	proven	but	it	was	difficult	to	show	who	was	
responsible.	In	the	case	of	the	ballot-box	scandal,	for	example,	either	someone	built	
the	boxes	to	corrupt	ballots	or	the	AWU	faction’s	enemies	built	them	to	frame	the	
AWU.	 Although	 no	 case	 against	 them	 was	 ever	 proven	 conclusively,	 given	 the	
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number	 and	 detail	 of	 the	 accusations	 against	 the	 AWU	 faction	 leaders	 most	
historians	have	been	satisfied	that	they	were	the	chief	source	of	corruption.	With	so	
much	 smoke,	 historians	 argue,	 there	must	 have	been	 fire,	 and	on	 the	balance	of	
probabilities	they	are	probably	correct.	It	is	also	damning	that	the	AWU	officials	were	
accused	of	remarkably	similar	methods	of	tampering	with	postal	ballots	within	both	
the	AWU	and	the	Labor	Party.		
	
Ousting	the	AWU	faction	from	power	in	1923	did	not	end	party	corruption	and	almost	
constant	accusations	and	counter-accusations	remained	a	permanent	feature	of	the	
party	 in	 the	 interwar	period.	A	perverse	kind	of	natural	 selection	had	occurred	 in	
which	 most	 of	 those	 who	 had	 survived	 as	 pre-selected	 candidates	 or	 central	
executive	members	had	probably	needed	to	engage	in	some	degree	of	rule	bending.	
There	were,	however,	 some	genuine	attempts	 to	clean	up	 the	party.	The	militant	
faction	tried	to	reduce	ballot	fraud	by	introducing	a	rule	that	union	members	must	
sign	a	branch	roll	book	before	voting	in	pre-selections.	But	there	were	exceptions	for	
remote	 workers	 in	 the	 AWU,	 Miners	 Federation	 and	 ARU	 and	 the	 signatures	 of	
uninterested	or	fictional	union	members	were	easily	forged.61	The	ongoing	extent	of	
the	ballot	problem	was	highlighted	in	the	absurd	cases	where	more	“votes”	were	cast	
for	a	 Labor	 candidate	 in	 the	pre-selection	ballot	 than	 in	 the	general	election	 that	
followed.62	
	
As	 the	 Inner	 Group	 lost	 support	 amongst	 the	 trade	 unions	 in	 the	 mid-1930s	 it	
increasingly	 resorted	 to	 ballot	 manipulation.	 The	 Inner	 Group	 achieved	 this	
efficiently	 through	 the	 appointment	 of	 a	 central	 returning	 officer	 who	 took	 full	
control	of	all	party	ballots.	Local	counting	was	abolished	and	all	ballot	boxes	opened	
for	 the	 first	 time	 in	 the	party	headquarters.	 The	 Inner	Group	 claimed	 the	 reform	
would	clean	up	the	ballots	but	 it	was	really	designed	to	ensure	the	Inner	Group	a	
monopoly	over	ballot	rigging.	In	a	fantastic	semantic	twist	their	choice	for	returning	
officer	was	named	Harry	O’Regan,	which	the	Inner	Group’s	opponents	delighted	in	
mispronouncing	 as	 Harry	 O’Riggin’.	 His	 team	 of	 ballot	 officials	 who	 counted	 the	
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ballots	 in	 Room	 32	 of	 the	 Trades	 Hall	 became	 known	 as	 the	 “Inner	 Group	
mathematicians”.63	
	
In	1937	Henry	Boote	wrote:	
'As	corrupt	as	an	ALP	selection	ballot',	is	a	phrase	that	has	been	coined	as	a	
result	of	the	ballot	box	scandals	in	Room	32.	Branches	and	Electorate	Councils	
are	denied	the	right	to	count	their	own	selection	ballots,	but	the	ballot	boxes	
must	be	forwarded	to	the	Trades	Hall.	Why,	if	there	is	no	reason	for	suspicion,	
as	 the	 Inner	 Group	 suggests,	 are	 not	 the	 votes	 counted	 by	 the	 local	 ALP	
officials	as	soon	as	the	poll	closes,	a	record	of	the	voting	made,	then	the	boxes	
resealed,	 signed	 and	 forwarded	 to	 the	 Trades	 Hall	 for	 checking,	 if	 this	 be	
necessary?64	
J.J.	Maloney	of	the	boot	trade	union	complained	“there	is	not	one	straight	selection	
ballot	conducted	in	NSW	today.	Months	before	even	the	nominations	are	called	the	
successful	candidate	 is	known”.65	The	 following	year	Bob	Heffron	said	“it	must	be	
apparent	to	all	that	it	is	impossible	to	win	from	within	the	party	while	these	ballot	
fakers	 and	 rule	 jugglers	 are	 in	 control”.66	In	 1936	 an	 Industrialist	 conference	 had	
passed	 a	motion	 that	 unions	 and	 leagues	 should	 count	 their	 own	 ballots	 before	
sending	them	to	party	headquarters.67	This	proposed	reform	would	have	eliminated	
the	 centralised	 ballot	 corruption	 that	 had	 occurred	 under	 the	 Inner	Group	 but	 it	
would	not	have	prevented	the	more	localised	corruption	that	had	preceded	it.	
	
Like	corruption,	some	level	of	violence	and	intimidation	had	always	been	present	in	
the	labour	movement	and	NSW	Labor	Party.	Threatened	violence	against	“scabs”	had	
always	 been	 used	 during	 strikes.	 Some	 union	 leaders	 also	 employed	 hired	 thugs	
within	their	unions;	dissident	AWU	meetings	were	often	broken	up	violently,	but	of	
course	 the	 officials	 denied	 any	 responsibility. 68 	The	 AWU	 leaders	 probably	 used	
similar	 tactics	 within	 the	 Labor	 Party.	 At	 the	 1924	 NSW	 Labor	 Party	 Annual	
Conference	a	mob	forced	their	way	in	and	began	brawling	with	delegates	and	the	
door	keepers.	Willis	later	told	conference	that	AWU	leaders	Bodkin	and	Bailey	were	
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responsible	but	they	denied	it.69	In	1931	the	NSW	Labor	Party	organising	secretary	
Plugger	Martin	led	a	push	for	Communists	to	be	banned	from	the	socialisation	units.	
Soon	 afterwards	he	was	 attacked	by	 four	 Communists	 in	 the	 corridor	 outside	his	
office	in	the	Sydney	Trades	Hall.	Beaten	into	semi-consciousness,	he	was	later	treated	
in	hospital	for	a	broken	finger,	gashed	forehead	and	extensive	bruising.70	From	then	
on	police	guards	stood	on	duty	outside	the	Trades	Hall.71	
	
Nevertheless,	the	Inner	Group’s	sustained,	organised	use	of	violence	and	thuggery	
from	 the	 mid-1930s	 was	 unprecedented. 72 	It	 used	 hired	 thugs	 for	 legitimate	
purposes	as	bouncers	and	security	and	for	illegitimate	purposes	such	as	intimidation,	
breaking	up	meetings	and	violence	against	dissidents.	B.	Toner	of	Armidale	wrote	to	
the	Cessnock	Eagle	explaining	how	“Mr	Lang	and	his	Inner	Group	[get]	what	they	say	
through	 at	 the	 Easter	 Conference	—	 that	 is	 to	 have	 his	 basher	 gang	 present	 at	
conference,	and	if	any	of	the	delegates	dare	to	open	their	mouths	against	Mr	Lang,	
then	they	are	ejected	from	the	meeting	and	given	a	bashing	which	they	don't	forget	
in	a	hurry”.73	This	was	an	oversimplification	of	Inner	Group	methods	but	it	did	contain	
some	 truth.	 One	 of	 the	more	 high-profile	 beatings	 occurred	 at	 the	 1938	 Annual	
Conference	where	Miners	Federation	delegate	W.	Crook	was	bashed	when	he	said	
he	intended	to	speak	against	Lang.	The	Inner	Group	bouncers	threw	him	down	a	flight	
of	stairs	and	then	kicked	him	repeatedly.	R.	Byers	of	the	Amalgamated	Engineering	
Union	received	a	similar	bashing.74	A	Miners	Federation	statement	lamented	that	“in	
its	whole	 content	 the	 Easter	Conference	of	 the	 Inner	Group	 revealed	 the	drift	 to	
fascist	policy	and	outlook	while	outside	the	doors	the	basher	gang	did	its	work”.	The	
SMH	was	not	surprised	by	the	bashings:	“the	dominating	idea	of	Langism	is	to	ride	
roughshod	 over	 everything	 to	 the	 galloping	 tune	 of	 ‘The	 Basher	 Gang	 and	 the	
Smasher	Lang’,	an	election	slogan	which	we	offer	free	to	the	state	ALP”.75	
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Following	the	defeat	of	Lang	and	the	Inner	Group	at	the	1939	Unity	Conference,	the	
new	Industrialist	central	executive	moved	into	the	ALP	headquarters	at	the	Sydney	
Trades	Hall	and	discovered	that	“many	important	records	and	other	property	of	the	
party	were	missing”.	The	Inner	Group	had	hidden	or	destroyed	them	and	they	were	
never	found.76	Perhaps	the	Inner	Group	was	worried	the	records	would	expose	their	
corruption	 and	 violence,	 or	 perhaps	 it	 was	 simply	 a	 “scorched	 earth”	 tactic	 to	
obstruct	the	new	executive.	Either	way	it	was	a	fittingly	shameless	final	act	for	the	
Inner	Group.	
	
Conclusion	
Was	 Lang	 the	 dictator	 of	 the	 NSW	 Labor	 Party?	 In	 the	 latter	 half	 of	 the	 1930s,	
perhaps.	He	certainly	dominated	the	party	to	an	extent	not	seen	before	or	since.	This	
chapter	 has	 focused	 on	 how	 Lang	 and	 his	 Inner	 Group	 cemented	 their	 authority	
through	extra-parliamentary	control,	the	suppression	of	free	speech	and	the	use	of	
corruption	and	violence.	I	have	argued	that	the	so-called	‘Lang	dictatorship’	initially	
enhanced	party	democracy;	it	was	only	once	the	Inner	Group	had	suppressed	free	
speech	and	resorted	to	corruption	and	violence	that	they	could	really	dictate	to	the	
party.	 Even	 then	 a	 growing	 Industrialist	 coalition	 resisted	 the	 Inner	 Group	 and	
defeated	 it	 in	 1939.	 The	 unions	 retained	 their	 independence	 and	 provided	 the	
organisation	and	impetus	to	resist	Lang	successfully.	The	Inner	Group	did	not	have	a	
monopoly	on	 information,	which	was	available	 to	members	 from	a	wide	 range	of	
sources	critical	of	Inner	Group	control.	This	free	speech	and	democracy	within	the	
wider	NSW	political	 system	further	undermined	Lang’s	position	as	 the	majority	of	
voters	rejected	him	repeatedly.
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Chapter	X:	NSW	LABOR	PARTY	CASE	STUDY	
“Labor	without	Lang”:	The	1938	New	South	Wales	election	
During	the	1938	NSW	election	campaign	opposition	leader	Jack	Lang	claimed	that	the	
government	had	“seized	the	opportunity	for	an	election	because	it	thought	there	was	
trouble	in	the	Labor	ranks,	and	was	trying	to	instil	into	the	public	mind	that	disruption	
and	confusion	existed	in	the	party”.1	Such	ideas	did	not	require	much	“instilling”	as	a	
large	 Industrialist	 section	 of	 the	 party,	 which	 included	 most	 of	 the	 trade	 union	
leaders,	was	in	open	rebellion	against	Lang	and	the	Inner	Group.	The	Industrialists	
ran	candidates	against	Lang	Labor	candidates	 in	six	seats	under	the	slogan	“Labor	
without	 Lang”.2	On	26	March	1938	 the	people	of	NSW	overwhelmingly	 re-elected	
Premier	 Bertram	 Stevens	 and	 his	 United	 Australia	 Party	 (UAP)/Country	 Party	
coalition	government.	It	was	Lang’s	third	successive	defeat	and	his	final	NSW	election	
as	Labor	leader.	
	
Historians	have	given	little	attention	to	the	1938	election,	preferring	to	group	all	of	
Lang’s	post-1930	election	defeats	 together	and	explaining	his	 lack	of	 success	as	a	
result	 of	 his	 personal	 unpopularity	 with	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 electorate,	 party	
infighting,	“red”	scare	campaigns	by	conservatives	and	general	voter	doubts	about	
Labor’s	 ability	 to	 manage	 the	 economy.	 Don	 Rawson	 does	 not	 discuss	 the	 1938	
election	 at	 all	 while	 Jim	 Hagan	 and	 Ken	 Turner	 simply	 summarise	 the	 election	
results.3	Even	Bede	Nairn,	who	provides	the	most	detailed	narrative	of	the	period,	
provides	only	a	brief	report	of	the	election	with	no	real	analysis.4	
	
The	1938	election	is	particularly	relevant	to	my	purposes	because	it	took	place	at	the	
tipping	point	for	Inner	Group	oligarchy.	It	is	also	notable	for	the	perfect	storm	of	bad	
timing	suffered	by	Lang	and	NSW	Labor.	In	the	final	month	of	the	campaign	Lang	lost	
control	 of	 the	 Labor	 Daily	 and	 a	 Royal	 Commission	 disproved	 his	 claims	 of	
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government	 corruption.	 This	 case	 study	 explores	 the	 interplay	of	 these	 factors	 in	
Labor’s	election	defeat.	
	
Lead	up	to	the	election	
In	 the	 first	 half	 of	 1937	 the	 NSW	 Labor	 Party	 central	 executive	 expelled	 leading	
Industrialist	members	of	 the	NSW	Legislative	Assembly	 (MLAs)	R.J.	 (Bob)	Heffron,	
Carlo	 Lazzarini,	Mat	Davidson	 and	 Ted	Horsington	 for	 their	 involvement	with	 the	
Industrialists.	 When	 branches	 in	 Heffron’s	 Botany	 electorate	 and	 Lazzarini’s	
Marrickville	 electorate	 refused	 to	 recognise	 the	 expulsions,	 the	 central	 executive	
expelled	the	branches	and	formed	“loyalist”	replacement	branches.5	The	Australian	
Labor	 Party	 (ALP)	 federal	 executive	 then	 ordered	 the	 NSW	 central	 executive	 to	
reinstate	 Heffron,	 Lazzarini,	 Davidson,	 Horsigton	 and	 several	 other	 expelled	
Industrialists.	
	
Among	the	reinstated	members	was	Jock	Garden.	He	was	the	sitting	member	for	the	
federal	seat	of	Cook	but	the	central	executive	had	expelled	him	and	excluded	him	
from	 the	 Cook	 pre-selection	 ballot	 which	 had	 elected	 Tom	 Sheehan.	 The	 federal	
executive	ruled	that	there	must	be	a	new	ballot	which	included	Garden.	The	debate	
at	the	federal	executive	meeting	highlighted	the	uncertainty	that	remained	over	the	
federal	ALP’s	control	of	state	branches.	Federal	leader	John	Curtin	argued	for	local	
state	 autonomy,	 saying	 that	 the	 federal	 executive	 “could	 only	 recommend	 the	
reopening	of	the	ballot”.	If	the	NSW	executive	declined	to	hold	another	ballot	it	was	
“quite	entitled	to	do	so”.6	But	Curtin	was	overruled	by	seven	votes	to	five.	
	
Nominations	for	Labor	Party	pre-selections	for	the	1938	NSW	election	closed	on	7	
October	 1937	 and	 the	 ballots	 occurred	 on	 18	 December. 7 	All	 but	 eight	 sitting	
members	were	unopposed	in	the	pre-selection	ballots.8	High-profile	Lang	supporters	
challenged	the	four	expelled	MLAs:	Alderman	Frank	Kelly	against	Heffron	in	Botany,	
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6	Ibid.	
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former	 Attorney	 General	 Joseph	 Lamaro	 against	 Lazzarini	 in	Marrickville,9	former	
President	of	the	Carpenters	Union	James	Smith	against	Davidson	in	Cobar	and	former	
Mayor	of	Broken	Hill	John	Barnes	against	Horsington	in	Sturt.10	
	
Heffron	 and	 Lazzarini	 lost	 their	 pre-selection	 ballots	 because	 the	 branches	which	
contained	their	strongest	supporters	remained	expelled.	At	Broken	Hill	the	Barrier	
District	Assembly	rejected	the	central	executive’s	instructions	to	send	the	unopened	
ballot	 boxes	 to	 Sydney	 for	 counting	 and	 declared	 Davidson	 and	 Horsington	
selected.11	The	 central	 executive	 did	 not	 press	 the	 issue.	 Broken	Hill	was	 able	 to	
assert	its	local	autonomy	because	its	local	party	community	was	so	strong	that	the	
central	executive	knew	it	could	not	overrule	it.	Both	Davidson	and	Horsington	were	
re-elected	 unopposed	 at	 the	 general	 election	 which	 highlights	 how	 important	
internal	party	processes	were	for	wider	NSW	democracy.	
	
In	September	1937,	six	months	before	the	election,	the	conservative	Sydney	Morning	
Herald	 (SMH)	 had	 begun	 its	 campaign	 against	 Labor.	 “However	 deafening	 the	
oratorical	 artillery	 from	 the	 Left”,	 it	 editorialised,	 “the	 people	 are	 unlikely	 to	 be	
rendered	 insensible	 to	 the	promptings	of	memory”.	 The	editorial	 continued,	 “the	
Scullin	[federal	1929	to	1932]	and	Lang	[NSW	1930	to	1932]	administrations,	both,	in	
a	 sense,	 victims	 of	 external	 misfortune,	 accentuated	 the	 evils	 of	 the	 recent	
depression	 by	 inopportune	 extravagance,	 crushing	 taxation,	 and	 legislative	
quackery”.12	The	Industrialists	were	also	starting	to	organise	their	election	campaign	
against	Lang	and	the	Inner	Group.	In	November	1937	the	majority	of	the	unions	in	
NSW,	including	the	AWU	and	the	Miners	Federation,	met	in	conference	and	pledged	
themselves	to	win	control	of	the	party	from	the	Inner	Group.13	They	employed	Bill	
Evans	 of	 the	Municipal	Workers	 Union	 as	 a	 full-time	 organiser	 to	 speak	 at	 local	
branch	and	union	meetings	against	the	Inner	Group.14	
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Unlike	previous	rebel	conferences,	the	central	executive	did	not	attempt	to	prevent	
the	conference	or	discipline	attendees.	The	SMH	reported	that	“the	Inner	Group	has	
suffered	 so	many	 reverses	 lately	 that	 its	 former	policy	of	 swift	 reprisals	has	been	
abandoned	in	favour	of	peace	at	all	costs”.15	This	is	an	example	of	the	complex	effects	
that	 internal	 opposition	 can	 have	 within	 a	 party,	 ranging	 from	 repression	 to	
toleration	 to	 leadership	 renewal.	 At	 first,	 the	 Inner	 Group	 responded	 to	 internal	
opposition	with	 repression.	 But	 when	 this	 was	 unsuccessful	 they	 were	 forced	 to	
tolerate,	or	at	least	ignore,	the	opposition	which	eventually	defeated	them.	
	
This	 Inner	 Group	 toleration	 for	 internal	 opposition	 still	 had	 limits,	 however.	 In	
December	 1937	 the	 Industrialists	 ran	 candidates	 against	 NSW	 Labor	 in	 the	
Paddington	municipal	elections	and	the	central	executive	summoned	the	assistant	
secretary	of	the	Clerks	Union,	Jack	Hughes,	to	attend	the	disciplinary	committee.	The	
disciplinary	committee	was	one	of	 the	ways	 that	 the	 Inner	Group	had	condensed	
central	 executive	 authority	 into	 an	 ever	 smaller	 group	 of	 its	 leading	 men.	 The	
disciplinary	 committee	 was	 President	 Paddy	 Keller,	 Secretary	 James	 Graves	 and	
Organising	Secretary	Plugger	Martin,	and	they	claimed	the	power	to	discipline	and	
expel	party	members.	Hughes	refused	to	appear	and	challenged	the	legitimacy	of	the	
“transfer	to	the	three	executive	officers	of	the	party	authority	to	suspend	or	expel	
members”.16	
	
Also	 in	 November	 1937,	 Lang	 used	 parliamentary	 privilege	 to	 make	 sensational	
corruption	charges	against	the	government.17	He	claimed	the	government	had	sold	
assets	in	state	pipe	works,	brick	works	and	metal	quarries	under	value	and	that	senior	
ministers	 and	 public	 servants	 had	 been	 paid	 hush	money	 and	 kickbacks.	 Stevens	
denied	 any	 government	 wrongdoing	 and	 appointed	 a	 Royal	 Commission	 to	
investigate.	 These	 corruption	 claims	 proved	 to	 be	 a	 central	 issue	 in	 the	 election	
campaign.	
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The	following	month	the	Industrialists	decided	to	"starve	the	Lang	faction	financially"	
and	 recommended	 that	 unions	 stop	 paying	 affiliation	 fees	 to	 the	 party.18	Unions	
provided	the	bulk	of	party	funds	and	by	threatening	to	withdraw	funds,	a	small	group	
of	top	leaders	in	a	large	union	could	wield	significant	influence	over	the	party.	These	
officials	 would	 not	 necessarily	 reflect	 the	 views	 of	 their	 members,	 let	 alone	 the	
remainder	 of	 the	 party	 rank	 and	 file,	 and	 could	 potentially	 wield	 undemocratic	
influence.	In	January	1938	the	Industrialists	met	in	conference.	About	400	delegates	
attended,	representing	46	unions	and	62	local	branches.	The	Industrialists	and	media	
reported	 that	 the	conference	“represented”	200,000	workers,	but	 in	 reality	many	
members	of	the	unions	would	have	supported	Lang.	The	conference	decided	not	to	
form	a	new	party	but	to	run	Industrialist	candidates	against	the	ALP	candidates	at	
the	election.19	
	
In	February	1938	the	Miners	Federation	central	council	stepped	up	its	campaign.	“For	
too	long	has	the	Federation	left	the	direction	of	Labor	politics	in	the	hands	of	a	coterie	
in	control”,	the	central	council	declared.20	The	Miners	Federation	Northern	district	
management	committee	followed	the	central	council’s	lead,	pledging	to	fight	Inner	
Group	control	and	calling	for	federal	ALP	intervention.	But	it	decided	to	fight	from	
within	the	party	and	continued	to	pay	affiliation	fees.	The	Miners	Federation	called	
a	meeting	of	coalfields	MLAs,	all	of	whom	attended	the	meeting	and	agreed	to	lobby	
Lang	to	withdraw	his	debenture	on	the	Labor	Daily,	once	again	showing	the	power	
of	the	Miners	Federation	over	coalfields	politicians.	But	the	MLAs	did	not	completely	
cave	to	Miners	Federation	pressure	and	they	made	it	clear	that	they	did	not	endorse	
the	union’s	opposition	to	Lang	and	the	Inner	Group.21	The	coalfields	politicians	were	
stuck	in	an	awkward	position	between	the	Miners	Federation	and	the	Inner	Group	
and	were	trying	to	appease	both	as	far	as	possible.	Many	members	of	the	Miners	
Federation	had	divided	loyalty	between	their	current	leaders	and	their	former	leader	
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Baddeley,	who	was	the	most	prominent	coalfields	MP,	deputy	parliamentary	Labor	
leader	to	Lang	and	one	of	his	closest	allies.		
	
At	the	lodge	level	the	Miners	Federation	was	deeply	divided	into	pro-Lang	and	anti-
Lang	groups.	Officials	at	several	lodges	in	the	Cessnock	area	asked	Eugene	O'Neil	to	
stand	for	Cessnock	as	an	Industrialist	candidate	against	Baddeley.	Lodge	officials	at	
Kurri	Kurri	immediately	decried	the	move	and	began	campaigning	for	Baddeley.22	In	
March	 eight	 aggregate	 meetings	 took	 place	 on	 the	 northern	 coalfields	 and	 six	
adopted	 resolutions	 critical	 of	 the	 Inner	 Group	 and	 calling	 for	 federal	 ALP	
intervention.23	Plugger	Martin	spoke	at	the	Cessnock	meeting	where	his	criticisms	of	
the	 central	 council	 caused	 “uproar”	 from	 the	 crowd	and	he	was	 interrupted	by	a	
sustained	applause	greeting	Orr’s	arrival	at	the	meeting.24	The	close-knit	miners	did	
not	appreciate	criticism	of	 their	union	 from	an	“outsider”.	A	meeting	of	Cessnock	
lodge	officers	endorsed	O’Neil	but	those	present	had	been	handpicked	Industrialist	
supporters	 and	 a	 later,	 larger	 meeting	 of	 Cessnock	 lodge	 officials	 declared	 their	
support	for	Baddeley	and	stated	that	“if	all	lodge	officers	had	been	invited”	to	the	
previous	meeting	“Mr	O'Neil	could	not	possibly	have	received	endorsement".25		
	
The	campaign	
The	policy	centrepiece	of	Labor’s	1938	election	campaign	was	a	40	hour	week	with	a	
minimum	wage	 of	 £4/2/6.	 Vague	 additional	 promises	 included	 cracking	 down	 on	
monopolies,	 fair	 rents	 and	 prices	 and	 full-time	 work	 for	 all.	 In	 rural	 NSW	 Lang	
promised	 closer	 settlement	 (breaking	 up	 large	 land	 and	 water	 holdings)	 and	
government	relief	for	small	farmers.	He	also	pledged	increased	government	spending	
on	special	maternity	hospitals,	cheaper	milk	and	reduced	railway	fares.26	There	was	
little	explanation	of	where	the	money	for	such	promises	would	come	from.	Fitting	
with	 their	 claim	to	simply	be	“Labor	without	Lang”,	 the	 Industrialists	did	not	vary	
significantly	 from	 Labor	 policy,	 promising	 slightly	 better	 pay	 and	 conditions	 for	
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workers	and	even	more	government	spending.27	The	Labor	Council	announced	that	
Lang	had	no	authority	from	the	unions	for	his	minimum	weekly	wage	of	£4/2/6	and	
that	it	should	be	£5.28	
	
A	policy	of	reduced	hours	and	increased	wages	at	the	state	level	risked	encouraging	
businesses	to	leave	NSW	for	states	with	more	employer-friendly	laws.	Queensland	
Labor	Premier	William	Forgan	Smith	had	recently	ruled	out	the	 legislated	40	hour	
week	in	Queensland	for	this	very	reason	and	said	it	must	be	introduced	at	the	federal	
level.29	Stevens	argued	that	in	reality	the	40	hour	policy	would	“reduce	the	working	
time	of	many	from	44	to	0”	hours.30	A	writer	calling	him	or	herself	“Dinkum	Labour”	
from	 Redfern	 wrote	 that	 “any	 person	 with	 even	 an	 elementary	 knowledge	 of	
economics	 and	 interstate	 trade,	must	 realise	 that	 a	40-hour	week	 to	be	effective	
must	apply	to	the	Commonwealth.	To	be	adopted	by	only	one	state	would	lead	to	
economic	chaos	and	to	the	industrial	ruin	of	that	state”.31	Lang’s	advocacy	of	policies	
better	suited	to	the	federal	level	was	not	surprising.	He	had	frequently	demonstrated	
his	willingness	to	make	unrealistic	promises	in	election	campaigns.	He	also	had	well-
known	ambitions	to	become	Prime	Minister.	These	ambitions	mixed	strangely	with	
what	Bede	Nairn	called	Lang’s	“eerie	post-1932	dream	world	of	 frustrated	states-
rightism”.32	Advocating	state	rights	suited	Lang	and	his	allies	at	the	time	because	they	
controlled	 the	NSW	 Labor	 Party,	 and	 potentially	 the	NSW	government.	 Lang	was	
above	all	an	opportunist.	
	
The	UAP/Country	Party	coalition	and	commercial	press	argued	that,	if	elected,	Labor	
would	 bring	 its	 internal	 conflict	 into	 government.	 Stevens	 said	 “two	 groups	 of	
political	opportunists	are	struggling	for	mastery	of	the	Labor	machine”	and	that	this	
“strife	means	that	the	Labor	Party	is	totally	unfitted	to	govern”.33	Conservatives	also	
linked	 lack	 of	 democracy	 in	 the	 Labor	 Party	 with	 a	 potential	 undermining	 of	
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democracy	 in	 the	 state.	 The	SMH	 editorialised	 that	 “the	 [Stevens]	 government	 is	
standing	for	our	traditional	freedom	of	democracy	against	the	particularly	rabid	form	
of	 internal	 fascism	 into	 which	 the	 state	 Labor	 Party	 has	 degenerated	 under	 the	
ruthless	rule	of	Langism”.34	These	claims	of	a	potential	descent	 into	fascism	under	
Labor	were	bolstered	by	the	context	of	European	totalitarianism.	Communists	had	
entrenched	their	 rule	 in	 the	Soviet	Union,	 fascists	were	 in	power	 in	Germany	and	
Italy	 and	 in	 Spain	war	 raged	between	 leftist	Republicans	and	 rightist	Nationalists.	
Stevens	said	“the	fact	that	the	Labor	Party	has	endured	this	man’s	dictatorship	for	
nine	years	is	a	poor	recommendation	for	its	power	to	safeguard	our	democracy”.35	
	
In	February	1938	the	Industrialists	finally	won	their	 long	 legal	battle	with	Lang	for	
control	of	the	Labor	Daily.	The	newspaper	had	been	blatantly	pro-Lang	and	in	the	
space	 of	 one	 issue	 became	 equally	 anti-Lang.	 There	 was	 no	 space	 for	 dissenting	
views.	William	Young	of	Redfern	wrote	to	the	SMH	saying	“strong	appeals	are	being	
made	 to	 the	 rank	 and	 file	 for	 support	 at	 the	 present	 juncture;	 it	 is	 only	 on	 such	
occasions	that	they	are	considered	as	of	any	importance.	Their	opinions	have	never	
been	considered	as	of	much	consequence	by	the	official	organ	of	the	Labor	Party,	
and	the	mere	rank	and	file	now	feel	obliged	to	seek	the	hospitality	of	the	‘capitalist’	
press	for	the	right	to	express	an	opinion”.36	
	
Lang’s	 desperate	 attempt	 to	maintain	 control	 of	 the	 Labor	 Daily	by	 calling	 in	 his	
personal	debt	was	politically	disastrous.	The	man	who	had	built	his	public	persona	
on	fighting	against	wealthy	elites	and	money	lenders	had	called	in	the	bailiffs	on	his	
party’s	 own	 newspaper.	 A.P.	 Macindoe	 of	 Hornsby	 observed	 that	 Lang’s	 policy	
speeches	in	the	1938	election	were	“largely	a	repetition	of	former	ones”	except	that	
“it	was	conspicuous	that	he	did	not	make	any	attack	on	the	pitiless	money-lender.	
Evidently	he	regarded	his	own	actions	to	the	Labor	Daily	as	all	too	fresh	in	the	minds	
of	the	electors	to	indulge	in	his	usual	tirade	of	abuse	of	the	ruthless	blood-sucking	
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money-bags”.37	Claude	McKay	wrote	to	the	SMH	that	“Mr	Lang	has	committed	the	
deadly	political	sin.	He	put	the	bailiffs	in!	And	where?	Into	Labor’s	own	newspaper!	
Wriggle	and	squirm	as	he	may,	that	is	his	brand	of	the	capitalist.	He	has	committed	
the	unforgivable	act	in	the	eyes	of	the	underdog”.38	
	
On	18	February	1938	the	Industrialist	leaders	held	a	rally	in	Lang’s	seat	of	Auburn.	
Their	 strong	 criticism	 of	 Lang	 drew	 a	 mix	 of	 cheers	 and	 boos	 from	 the	 crowd,	
representative	of	the	deep	divide	 in	the	 labour	movement.39	Two	victories	for	the	
Industrialists	occurred	soon	after	as,	first,	the	Australian	Broadcasting	Commission	
(ABC)	announced	that	it	would	broadcast	Heffron’s	policy	speech	in	addition	to	those	
by	the	leaders	of	Labor,	UAP	and	the	Country	Party.40	Second,	Curtin	announced	that	
he	would	not	take	any	part	in	the	NSW	election	campaign.41	This	was	a	tacit	but	clear	
censure	of	Lang.	
	
Things	got	worse	for	Lang	Labor	on	2	March	when	Justice	Halse	Rogers	delivered	his	
judgement	 in	 the	 Royal	 Commission	 into	 the	 sale	 of	 state	 assets,	 finding	 Lang’s	
charges	 completely	 disproved. 42 	Lang	 had	 appeared	 as	 a	 witness	 in	 the	 Royal	
Commission	and	had	all	but	admitted	that	he	had	no	evidence	to	support	his	claims.43	
John	Manton	of	North	Sydney	wrote	to	the	SMH	that	Lang	“must	have	been	fully	
aware	of	the	fact	that	his	reckless	charges	of	fraud	and	corruption	against	the	highest	
and	most	respected	citizens	in	this	state	could	not	be	proved.	As	one	who	has	worked	
40	years	for	a	crust,	I	can	assure	Mr	Lang	that	he	is	labouring	under	a	big	delusion	if	
he	thinks	these	tactics	are	going	to	be	tolerated	by	the	average	worker”.44	Stevens	
also	 linked	 the	episode	back	 to	 Lang’s	 contempt	 for	 democracy.	 Lang’s	 “shocking	
abuse	 of	 Parliamentary	 privilege”	 risked	 bringing	 government	 “institutions	 into	
discredit”	and	“prepares	the	way	for	a	dictatorship”.45	Lang	added	more	fuel	to	that	
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fire	 by	 persisting	with	 his	 accusations	 and	 dismissing	 the	 Royal	 Commission	 as	 a	
“whitewash”.46	This	response	demonstrated	the	pride	and	failing	political	judgement	
that	had	made	him	increasingly	unelectable.	
	
On	7	March	Heffron	delivered	 the	 Industrialists’	 policy	 speech	at	Mascot.	 Several	
Lang	supporters	repeatedly	interrupted	the	speech,	including	a	woman	who	shouted	
“rat,	rat,	rat”	at	Heffron.	Eventually	police	removed	the	interjectors.47	This	disruption	
appeared	organised	and	the	fact	that	 it	occurred	during	Heffron’s	most	 important	
campaign	 speech,	which	was	 broadcast	 on	 radio,	 and	 not	 during	 his	many	 other	
speeches,	was	presumably	planned.	Two	weeks	later	UAP	MLA	Waddell	complained	
of	“gangs	which	are	attempting	to	wreck	UAP	meetings	in	the	Waverley	electorate”.	
He	blamed	the	Inner	Group	and	said	the	tactics	were	“consistent	with	those	that	had	
disgraced	the	Labor	Party	since	Mr	Lang	became	its	leader”.48		
	
Exactly	who	planned	these	disruptions	is	impossible	to	prove	but	it	fits	neatly	within	
Inner	Group	tactics	of	disruption	and	violence	at	meetings	and	the	use	of	hired	thugs.	
In	keeping	with	the	Inner	Group’s	“scorched	earth”	approach	to	internal	opponents,	
the	 Labor	 Party	 advised	 supporters	 to	 give	 second	 preferences	 to	 a	 non-labour	
independents	 over	 Industrialists	 in	 several	 seats	 including	 Bulli.49	Conversely,	 the	
Industrialists	took	the	moral	high	ground	and	advised	voters	to	preference	the	ALP	
second	and	to	vote	for	ALP	candidates	where	an	Industrialist	was	not	running.	
	
Lang	addressed	a	crowd	of	1400	people	in	Auburn	on	9	March.	For	the	first	time	in	a	
NSW	 election	 Lang’s	 speech	 was	 broadcast	 outside	 the	 venue	 by	 “amplifiers	 of	
tremendous	 power”	 which	 the	 SMH	 described	 as	 “a	 new	 and	 terrible	 election	
weapon”	that	could	be	heard	one	mile	away.50	The	supportive	crowd	greeted	Lang	
with	shouts	of	“good	on	you	John”,	“make	them	take	it”,	“go	your	hardest”,	“we’ll	be	
																																								 																				
46	“Royal	Commission,”	SMH	9	March	1938,	14.	
47	“Elections,”	SMH	8	March	1938,	11.	
48	“Candidate	defies	gangs,”	SMH	21	March	1938,	10.	
49	“Industrialists	angry,”	SMH	25	March	1938,	19.	
50	“Basic	wage,”	SMH	9	March	1938,	17.	
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with	 you”	 and	 a	 chant	 of	 “good	 old	 Jack”.51	At	 the	 end	 of	 the	meeting	 Baddeley	
proposed	a	motion	of	“complete	confidence”	in	Lang.	One	brave	individual	dissented	
and	was	 rewarded	with	shouts	of	abuse	 from	others	 in	attendance.	On	18	March	
Lang	spoke	to	a	crowd	of	1,000	 in	Heffron’s	electorate	of	Botany	and	received	an	
equally	positive	response	as	he	had	in	Auburn.52	Lang	spent	little	time	campaigning	
in	 his	 own	 electorate,	 publicly	 dismissing	 the	 threat	 posed	 by	 his	 Industrialist	
challenger	Jack	Hooke,	and	instead	visited	almost	every	electorate	in	the	state.53	
	
In	the	closing	days	of	the	campaign	some	branches,	such	as	Randwick	in	east	Sydney,	
carried	 resolutions	 expressing	 "the	 fullest	 confidence"	 in	 Lang	 and	 the	 central	
executive.54 	Others	 such	 as	 Corrimal	 in	 northern	 Wollongong	 rejected	 Lang	 and	
reformed	as	a	branch	of	the	Industrialists.55	In	the	northern	coalfields	a	meeting	of	
Abermain	number	one	miners'	lodge	pledged	to	support	the	Industrialist	candidate	
O'Neill	 against	 Baddeley	 in	 Cessnock.	 Soon	 afterwards	 a	 subsequent	 meeting	
overturned	the	decision	and	pledged	to	support	Baddeley.56	The	rank	and	file	was	
deeply	divided.	“X”	of	North	Strathfield	summed	up	the	campaign	in	a	letter	to	the	
SMH,	asking	“could	any	man	do	more	than	(or	as	much	as)	Mr	Lang	has	to	serve	up	
the	election	on	a	plate	to	the	united	parties?”57	
	
Results	and	aftermath	
A	record	nineteen	MLAs	out	of	90	were	elected	unopposed:	ten	ALP,	six	UAP	and	
three	Country	Party.58	This	is	another	reminder	of	the	importance	of	internal	party	
politics	 as	 in	 these	 19	 seats	 party	 pre-selections	 essentially	 took	 the	place	of	 the	
general	 election.	 The	 Stevens	 UAP/Country	 Party	 government	 won	 the	 election	
easily.	Labor	received	just	35	per	cent	of	the	vote	and	28	out	of	90	seats,	only	winning	
18	 out	 of	 the	 71	 seats	 contested.	 It	 was	 Lang’s	 third	 successive	 general	 election	
																																								 																				
51	“Barrage	of	sound,”	SMH	9	March	1938,	17.	
52	“Lang	at	Mascot,”	SMH	18	March	1938,	8.	
53	“Whirlwind	tour,”	SMH	21	March	1938,	10.	
54	“Bitter	union	ballot,”	SMH	31	March	1938,	6.	
55	“Industrialists	branch,”	SMH	24	March	1938,	8.	
56	“Coalminers,”	25	March	1938,	19.	
57	“Lang	conundrum,”	SMH	11	March	1938,	8.	
58	“Election,”	SMH	5	March	1938,	1.	
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defeat	(1932,	1935,	1938)	and	NSW	Labor’s	worst	performance	since	1907.	The	ALP	
received	 570,000	 votes,	 142,000	 fewer	 votes	 than	 Labor	 in	 NSW	 in	 the	 federal	
election	six	months	earlier.59	This	means	that	20	per	cent	of	federal	Labor	voters	in	
NSW	were	unwilling	to	vote	for	Lang.	A	further	40,000	Labor	voters	(7	per	cent)	chose	
Industrialist	candidates	over	ALP	candidates,	despite	the	fact	that	they	only	ran	in	six	
seats.	
	
Lang	Labor	beat	the	Industrialists	in	four	out	of	six	seats	contested.	In	Auburn	Lang	
defeated	Hooke	with	9,380	votes	to	6,759	(58:42	per	cent).	Heffron	won	Botany	with	
12,909	to	F.D.	Kelly’s	8,616	(60:40	per	cent).	The	only	other	Industrialist	to	win	a	seat	
was	Lazzarini	in	Marrickville	who	won	6,483	votes	to	F.	Rushton	(UAP)	on	5,380	and	
L.E.	Balzen	(Lang	Labor)	with	4,229.	In	Cessnock	two	thirds	of	the	miners	remained	
loyal	to	Baddeley	who	defeated	O’Neill	with	11,222	votes	to	4,910.	In	Glebe	the	Lang	
Labor	 candidate	 W.J.	 Carlton	 narrowly	 beat	 the	 Industrialist	 H.J.	 Foley	 after	
preferences	 by	 6,573	 to	 5,617,	 with	 1,881	 votes	 going	 to	 an	 independent.	 In	
Leichhardt	 Lang	 Labor’s	 C.H.	Matthew,	 9,127,	 easily	 defeated	 the	 Industrialist	 JP	
Dunn,	3,656.60	The	 fact	 that	all	 six	 seats	went	 to	 the	 incumbent	suggests	 that	 the	
results	may	have	reflected	local	loyalty	and	familiarity	as	much	as	support	for	Lang	
over	the	Industrialists.	Other	local	factors	were	also	in	play;	for	example,	Botany	had	
a	strong	history	of	electing	independent	labour	men.61	
	
In	the	face	of	a	third	straight	defeat	Lang	and	his	supporters	remained	defiant.	At	the	
NSW	Labor	Party	annual	conference	the	month	after	the	election	Lang	was	greeted	
with	 “tumultuous	 applause”	 and	delegates	 sang	 "For	He's	 a	 Jolly	Good	 Fellow."62	
Lang	blamed	the	Industrialists	and	Communists	within	the	labour	movement	for	his	
defeat	and	called	for	“an	Australia-wide	conference	to	evolve	plans	for	eradicating	
Communists	from	the	movement”.63	Even	the	fiercely	anti-Communist	Henry	Boote	
did	not	buy	the	Communism	excuse,	writing:	“Lang	and	the	junta	that	run	him,	the	
																																								 																				
59	“Labor’s	sorry	plight,”	SMH	6	April	1938,	7.	
60	“Results,”	SMH	28	March	1938,	8.	
61	“Labour	split,”	SMH	1	November	1937,	11.	
62	“Welcome	for	Lang,”	SMH	16	April	1938,	16.	
63	“Labor	conference,”	SMH	19	April	1938,	3.	
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champion	election	losers	of	this	or	any	other	country,	trot	out	the	poor	old	battered	
Communist	bogey	to	cover	their	disgrace!”64	The	Industrialists	were	strengthened	by	
Lang’s	defeat	and	intensified	their	attacks,	saying	there	could	be	no	compromise	with	
Lang	and	the	Inner	Group.	Lazzarinni	said,	“if	I	see	a	black	snake,	I	do	not	compromise	
with	it;	I	kill	it."65	It	would	take	another	year	of	organising	before	the	Industrialists	
could	strike	the	fatal	blow.	
	
Conclusion	
Elections	 are	 complicated	affairs	decided	by	 large	numbers	of	 voters	with	 a	wide	
range	of	motivations.	It	is	unnecessary	for	my	purposes	to	try	to	rank	the	reasons	for	
Labor’s	1938	defeat.	It	is	enough	to	say	that	the	struggle	for	power	within	the	labour	
movement	was	an	important	factor	in	the	outcome	of	the	election.	The	undermining	
of	Labor	Party	democracy	by	Lang	and	the	Inner	Group	had	caused	the	Industrialists	
to	form	an	internal	opposition	which	had	divided	the	party	and	exposed	its	oligarchy	
and	internal	dysfunction	to	public	view.	The	fact	that	the	trade	unions	enjoyed	strong	
local	 autonomy	 from	 the	 party	 allowed	 union	 leaders	 to	 form	 an	 independently	
organised	 and	 well-funded	 rebel	 grouping.	 In	 turn,	 the	 strength	 of	 this	 internal	
opposition	forced	the	Inner	Group	to	tolerate	it	after	attempts	to	crush	it	had	failed.		
Ironically,	if	the	party	had	been	even	more	oligarchical	it	could	have	quickly	quashed	
the	dissent	and	may	have	fared	better	in	the	election.	
	
Despite	a	campaign	marred	by	poor	judgement	and	bad	timing,	Labor	received	35	
per	cent	of	the	primary	vote.	One	third	of	the	electorate	was	still	willing	to	vote	for	
Lang,	and	a	large	proportion	of	Labor	Party	members	still	supported	him,	probably	a	
majority.	 This	performance	highlights	 an	 important	point;	 the	party	was	never	 so	
oligarchical	that	Lang	and	the	Inner	Group	could	have	continued	without	widespread	
support	amongst	branch	and	union	members.	By	1938	this	rank-and-file	support	was	
at	a	tipping	point	and	the	party	was	deeply	divided	right	down	to	the	local	level.	
	
																																								 																				
64	“Conference	that	failed,”	AW	27	April	1938,	1.	
65	“Unity	move,”	SMH	20	April	1938,	18.	
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One	 of	 the	 UAP/Country	 Party’s	 key	 campaign	 arguments	was	 that,	 if	 Labor	was	
elected,	oligarchy	and	dictatorship	within	the	Labor	Party	would	be	translated	into	
oligarchy	and	dictatorship	in	government.	This	argument	was	made	more	plausible	
in	the	minds	of	voters	by	the	1930s	context	of	the	rise	of	totalitarianism	in	Europe.	
In	hindsight	it	is	tempting	to	dismiss	these	arguments	as	alarmist;	Lang	and	the	Inner	
Group	were	not	 fascists.	But	they	had	repeatedly	shown	contempt	for	democracy	
within	 the	 Labor	 Party.	 They	 had	 also	 demonstrated	 disregard	 for	 Australia’s	
Constitution,	courts	and	federal	government,	especially	during	the	crisis	in	1932.	The	
extent	to	which	their	attitudes	towards	party	democracy	would	have	been	reflected	
in	their	attitudes	towards	democracy	in	government	was	a	valid	concern	and	a	risk	
that	most	voters	did	not	want	to	take.
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CONCLUSION	
Oligarchy,	interconnections	and	resistance	
The	NSW	Labor	Party	and	the	Australian	Workers	Union	(AWU)	were	oligarchies	in	
the	period	from	1910	to	1939	and	both	became	more	oligarchical	over	time.	I	have	
not	attempted	to	classify	strict	“levels”	of	oligarchy	in	this	thesis,	but	it	seems	fair	to	
say	broadly	that	the	NSW	Labor	Party	went	 from	somewhat	oligarchical	 to	clearly	
oligarchical	 and	 the	 AWU	 from	 clearly	 oligarchical	 to	 highly	 oligarchical.	 Both	
organisations	 fit	 with	 the	 sociological	 consensus	 that	most	 ostensibly	 democratic	
parties	and	unions	will	be	oligarchies	and	become	more	oligarchical	over	time.	The	
pillars	 of	 Robert	 Michels’	 iron	 law	 of	 oligarchy	 were	 evident	 throughout	 with	
disempowered	and/or	uninterested	members	and	deference	to	strong	leaders	like	
Jack	Lang	in	the	Labor	Party	and	Jack	Bailey	in	the	AWU.	Yet	these	oligarchies	still	
required	certain	additional	conditions	to	thrive.	I	have	explored	these	conditions	by	
assessing	 each	 organisation’s	 community,	 rules,	 local	 autonomy,	 rank-and-file	
decision-making,	 internal	 opposition,	 free	 communication	 and	 equality	 between	
officials	and	members.	Furthermore,	oligarchy	within	both	organisations	was	widely	
resisted;	 impulses	 towards	 democracy	were	 always	 operating	 in	 some	 form	 even	
when	the	organisations	were	at	their	least	democratic.	
	
At	 the	 opposite	 end	 of	 the	 spectrum,	 the	 Miners	 Federation	 was	 a	 democratic	
exception	 to	 the	 oligarchic	 norm.	 Here	 too	 the	 conflicting	 tendencies	 towards	
oligarchy	and	democracy	played	out,	but	democracy	won	 for	various	complicated	
reasons	 centred	 on	 the	miners’	work	 and	 occupational	 communities.	 Even	 in	 the	
Miners	Federation,	however,	Michels’	observations	were	relevant	as	voting	turnout	
suggests	 that	 around	 a	 quarter	 of	 members	 were	 disengaged	 and	 there	 was	
significant	deference	to	leaders	from	Albert	Willis	to	Bill	Orr.	The	Miners	Federation	
also	 became	 less	 democratic	 over	 time,	 particularly	 under	 Orr’s	 Communist	
leadership	from	1934.		
	
The	fact	that	these	three	organisations	influenced	one	another	further	complicated	
the	 picture.	 Usually	 the	 effects	 were	 straightforward	 with	 methods	 and	 cultures	
transposed	 from	one	organisation	 to	another	but	at	other	 times	 the	effects	were	
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more	counterintuitive.	Overall,	oligarchy	prevailed	more	often	than	democracy	but	
democratic	resistance	was	always	present.	This	conclusion	draws	out	these	two	key	
threads	of	the	thesis:	interconnections	between	the	organisations	and	resistance	to	
oligarchy.	
	
Interconnections	
Organisations	within	 the	 interwar	NSW	 labour	movement	 influenced	one	another	
greatly.	Trade	unions	influenced	one	another	within	the	Labor	Party,	peak	bodies	and	
the	industrial	sphere	and	also	formed	the	most	influential	building	blocks	of	the	Labor	
Party.	 In	turn,	 the	Labor	Party	 influenced	the	unions	by	enhancing	the	power	and	
prestige	 of	 union	 officials,	 providing	 a	 forum	 for	 organised	 opposition	 to	 union	
leaderships	and	through	legislation	when	in	government.	The	NSW	labour	movement	
was	a	complicated	web	of	hundreds	of	organisations	and	thousands	of	 individuals	
influencing	one	another	in	big	and	small	ways.	One	thesis	can	only	do	so	much	and	I	
have	focused	on	three	of	the	largest	and	most	influential	organisations.	By	necessity	
this	 presents	 an	 incomplete	 picture	 but	 it	 still	 provides	 a	 range	 of	 informative	
categories	and	examples	of	influence	that	deliver	valuable	insights	into	the	overall	
web.	
	
Affiliation	 with	 the	 Labor	 Party	 increased	 the	 status	 gap	 between	members	 and	
officials	 in	 the	AWU	and	Miners	Federation	and	encouraged	officials	 to	behave	 in	
oligarchical	ways.	Union	officials	often	became	Labor	Party	officials	and/or	politicians	
which	amplified	their	power,	fame	and	status.	This,	in	turn,	made	union	officials	more	
desperate	 to	keep	 their	union	positions	and	 therefore	more	motivated	 to	behave	
undemocratically.	Political	affiliation	also	meant	that	many	union	officials	were	less	
concerned	with	winning	improvements	for	their	members	and	more	concerned	with	
maintaining	 their	 union	 as	 a	 large,	 stable	 power	 base.	 In	 the	 democratic	Miners	
Federation	 membership	 pressure	 forced	 the	 leaders	 to	 focus	 on	 wages	 and	
conditions	 in	 order	 to	 keep	 their	 union	 positions	 but	 this	 pressure	 was	 less	
pronounced	in	the	AWU.	Even	in	the	Miners	Federation,	however,	in	the	mid-1920s	
Albert	Willis	 and	 Jack	 Baddeley	 led	 the	 union	 to	 ally	 closely	 with	 Jack	 Lang	 and	
privilege	political	 action	over	 industrial	 action,	 thereby	 encouraging	more	passive	
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membership	 involvement.	 In	 this	 period	 the	 miners’	 newspaper	 Common	 Cause	
became	a	supplement	to	the	Labor	Daily	and	lost	much	of	its	role	as	a	forum	for	free	
communication	within	the	union.1	
	
Both	 the	 AWU	 and	 Miners	 Federation	 successfully	 pursued	 various	 forms	 of	
compulsory	unionism.	I	have	argued	that	this	undermined	democracy	by	creating	a	
significant	 minority	 of	 uninterested	 and	 even	 hostile	 members. 2 	Labor	 Party	
affiliation	further	exacerbated	this	problem	as	the	party	required	all	members	to	join	
their	 trade	 union.	 Neither	 the	 arbitration	 courts	 nor	 the	 Labor	 Party	 considered	
leaving	one’s	union	to	be	a	valid	expression	of	dissent,	even	when	it	was	the	only	
option	remaining	to	members	of	oligarchical	unions	like	the	AWU.3	This	was	only	one	
of	many	ways	 in	which	 arbitration	 undermined	 democracy	 in	 both	 the	AWU	and	
Miners	 Federation,	 but	 the	 effects	 were	 less	 pronounced	 in	 the	 latter,	 which	
maintained	a	more	contested	relationship	with	arbitration	and	continued	to	strike.	
	
Unions	 could	 also	 use	 their	 power	 within	 the	 Labor	 Party	 to	 attempt	 to	 silence	
dissenters.	For	example,	in	1930	the	AWU	tried	to	have	the	NSW	Labor	Party	Central	
Executive	withdraw	Arthur	Rae’s	endorsement	as	a	Senate	candidate	because	he	was	
leading	 the	dissident	Bushworkers	Propaganda	Group	 (BPG)	within	 the	AWU.	Rae	
countered	successfully	that	the	BPG	was	a	rank-and-file	reform	movement	within	the	
AWU.4	Labor	Party	affiliation	had	the	potential	either	to	provide	a	platform	for	union	
dissenters	or	to	silence	them.	
	
Labor	Party	affiliation	also	had	positive	influences	on	democracy	within	the	AWU	and	
Miners	Federation.	Most	importantly,	the	Labor	Party	acted	as	a	forum	for	criticism	
and	 opposition	 to	 sitting	 union	 leaderships.	While	 the	 AWU	 leadership	 was	 able	
largely	to	suppress	organised	opposition	within	the	union,	it	was	not	able	to	prevent	
																																								 																				
1	“Press	representatives	of	lodges,”	CC	31	January	1924,	9.	
2	Edgar	Ross,	A	History	of	the	Miners	Federation	of	Australia		(Sydney:	Australasian	Coal	and	Shale	
Employees’	Federation,	1970).	3.	
3	Clyde	Cameron	foreword	in	John	Merritt,	The	Making	of	the	A.W.U.		(Melbourne:	Oxford	University	
Press,	1986):	vi-vii.	
4	“ALP	preparing,”	SMH	5	November	1930,	13.	
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criticism	from	its	factional	opponents	within	the	Labor	Party.	The	militant	faction’s	
Labor	Daily	became	a	forum	for	critique	of	the	AWU	and,	unlike	the	AWU’s	Australian	
Worker,	it	published	critical	opinions	from	AWU	members	and	dissidents.5	Factional	
attacks	could	have	devastating	effects	for	AWU	leaders	and	the	best	example	is	the	
ballot	box	scandal	which	destroyed	NSW	AWU	leader	Jack	Bailey’s	reputation	in	the	
1920s.6	
	
At	times	the	Labor	Party	officially	supported	dissident	movements	within	the	AWU	
such	 as	 the	 Railway	Workers	 Industry	 Branch	 Rank	 and	 File	 Committee	 in	 1928.7	
Affiliation	 also	 brought	 Labor	 Party	 disputes	 into	 the	 unions,	 a	 development	 that	
encouraged	membership	involvement.	The	AWU’s	opposition	to	the	highly-popular	
Lang	caused	many	AWU	members	to	join	opposition	groupings	within	the	union	or	
rival	unions	such	as	the	United	Labourers	Union	(ULU)	or	Pastoral	Workers	Industrial	
Union	 (PWIU).8	In	 1934	 the	 controlling	 Lang	 faction	 in	 the	 Labor	 Party	 even	 ran	
candidates	in	Miners	Federation	elections	in	an	attempt	to	displace	the	Communist	
leadership.	 The	 attempt	 was	 unsuccessful	 but	 it	 still	 enhanced	 democracy	 by	
providing	 electoral	 opposition	 and	 encouraging	 membership	 interest	 and	
involvement.9	
	
Union	affiliation	also	had	mixed	effects	on	democracy	within	the	Labor	Party.	Often	
unionists	transposed	their	union’s	methods	into	the	party,	or	at	least	tried	to	do	so.	
The	Miners	Federation	especially	brought	 its	strong	democratic	 lodge	culture	 into	
Labor	 Party	 branches	 in	mining	 areas.10	Dissident	 democratic	 activists	 within	 the	
AWU	 such	 as	 Arthur	 Rae	 and	 Jack	 Cullinan	 brought	 this	 activism	 into	 the	 Labor	
Party.11	When	designing	the	1927	Rules,	Willis	brought	preferential	voting	into	the	
party	which	he	had	observed	to	be	successful	within	the	Miners	Federation.	He	also	
																																								 																				
5	“‘Bosses’	and	Alleged	‘Moderation,’”	LD,	15	July	1927,	4.	
6	Scott	Stephenson,	""Ballot-Faking	Crooks	and	a	Tyrannical	Executive":	The	Australian	Workers	
Union	Faction	and	the	1923	New	South	Wales	Labor	Party	Annual	Conference,"	Labour	History	
105(2013):	108.	
7	AWU	Annual	Convention,	AW,	23	January	1929,	17.	
8	Andrew	Moore,	"The	Pastoral	Workers’	Industrial	Union	1930-37,"	Labour	History	49(1985):	65.	
9	“The	miners,”	SMH	29	October	1934,	9.	
10	“Bulli,”	AW	24	May	1933,	18.	
11	“NSW	Labor	Conference,”	AW	27	April	1916,	17.	
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brought	with	him	his	guild	socialist	ideals	and	a	support	for	democracy	bolstered	by	
his	 repeated	personal	 success	within	 the	democratic	Miners	 Federation.12	On	 the	
other	hand,	the	AWU	leaders	transposed	their	oligarchical	methods	into	the	Labor	
Party,	 the	 most	 extreme	 example	 being	 ballot	 corruption	 using	 phoney	 postal	
ballots.13	These	are	only	a	handful	of	the	many	examples	we	have	seen	throughout	
the	thesis.	
	
Factionalism	enhanced	democracy	within	the	Labor	Party	by	providing	opposition	to	
leading	party	officials.	Unions	like	the	AWU	and	Miners	Federation	provided	the	core	
organisation	for	these	factions	and	therefore	must	receive	much	of	the	credit	for	the	
democracy-enhancing	effects	of	factionalism.	Union	independence	and	organisation	
also	allowed	for	successful	opposition	to	strongly	entrenched	party	leaderships	such	
as	 the	 Inner	Group.	However,	 the	 fact	 that	unions	came	 into	 the	party	as	 strong,	
independent	organisations	with	extensive	funds	and	full-time	salaried	officials	could	
also	undermine	democracy	by	allowing	union	leaders	to	exercise	enormous	power	
within	the	party	without	accountability	to	their	own	members	and	which	the	more	
democratically	 organised	 local	 branches	 could	 not	 match.	 Union	 strength,	 most	
obviously	the	Miners	Federation	in	the	coalfields,	also	allowed	the	party	rank	and	file	
to	 assert	 local	 autonomy	 and	 successfully	 resist	 the	 party	 executive	 in	 some	
electorates.14	
	
Each	union	entered	 the	party	 as	 a	 ready-made	quasi-faction	 and	 this	 could	 allow	
them	 great	 influence	 over	 Labor	 Party	 decisions.	 Both	 the	 AWU	 and	 Miners	
Federation	leaders	threatened	to	expel	politicians	who	were	also	members	of	those	
unions	if	they	did	not	support	union	positions.15	Both	unions	also	used	their	wealth	
to	influence	the	party.	For	example,	the	Miners	Federation	used	its	money	to	exercise	
a	large	influence	over	the	Labor	Daily	and	the	AWU	used	its	coffers	to	sponsor	loyal	
																																								 																				
12	Robin	Gollan,	The	Coal	Miners	of	New	South	Wales:	A	History	of	the	Union,	1860-1960		(Parkville:	
Melbourne	University	Press,	1963):	153.	
13	James	Catts,	Parliamentary	Debates	(House	of	Representatives),	September	20,	1922,	2467-2477.	
14	“Hunter	seat,”	SMH	4	October	1928,	13.	
15	“Labor	dispute,”	AW	16	December	1936,	18.	
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local	branch	annual	conference	delegates.16	AWU	and	Miners	Federation	affiliation	
to	the	NSW	Labor	Party	had	important	but	mixed	effects	on	democracy	in	all	three	
organisations	and	it	is	not	possible	to	conclude	that	affiliation	had	clearly	democratic	
or	oligarchical	effects	overall.	
	
Resistance	
Democratic	 impulses	 and	 countervailing	 tendencies	 against	 oligarchy	 were	
constantly	operating	to	varying	degrees	within	the	AWU,	Miners	Federation	and	NSW	
Labor	 Party	 in	 the	 interwar	 period.	 At	 its	most	 organised	 level	 this	 involved	 rival	
dissident	factions	such	as	the	BPG	in	the	AWU,	the	Communist	Minority	Movement	
(MM)	in	the	Miners	Federation	and	the	Industrialists	in	the	Labor	Party.	The	BPG	was	
a	persistent	gadfly	to	the	AWU	leadership	exposing	its	oligarchy	and	corruption,	the	
MM	 built	 up	 a	 strong	 critique	 of	 the	 Miners	 Federation	 leaders	 and	 eventually	
deposed	 them,	and	 the	 Industrialists	overthrew	 the	most	entrenched	oligarchy	 in	
NSW	Labor	Party	history,	the	Inner	Group.	
	
A	key	countervailing	tendency	is	ideological	support	for	democracy	amongst	leaders.	
This	 was	 apparent	 to	 varying	 degrees	 for	most	Miners	 Federation	 leaders,	many	
Labor	Party	 leaders	and	even	some	leaders	 in	the	AWU	like	Rae	and	Cullinan.	The	
most	 important	 countervailing	 tendency,	 however,	 is	 membership	 pressure	 from	
below.	Even	in	the	oligarchical	AWU	the	leaders	needed	to	pay	some	attention	to	
membership	 opinion.	 In	 all	 three	 organisations,	 oligarchy	 was	 weakest	 where	
ordinary	 members	 lived	 and	 worked	 in	 strong	 communities.	 	 Almost	 all	 Miners	
Federation	members	 lived	 and	worked	 in	 such	 an	 environment	 and	 this	was	 the	
primary	 reason	 for	 the	 union’s	 high	 levels	 of	 democracy.	 Members	 successfully	
resisted	leaders	on	many	issues	from	work-sharing	to	local	stoppages	to	large-scale	
strikes	 and	 lockouts. 17 	The	 miners’	 strong	 communities	 also	 enabled	 them	
successfully	to	assert	their	local	autonomy	within	the	Labor	Party.	Similar	resistance	
could	succeed	in	non-mining	electorates	only	when	the	local	members	had	behind	
them	a	strong	party	community.	In	1931,	for	example,	party	members	in	the	inner-
																																								 																				
16	“Labor	Daily,”	SMH	26	January	1924,	9;	“Labour	Party,”	SMH	19	April	1928,	12.	
17	“Minutes,”	CC	17	February	1922,	6;	“Aggregate	meeting,”	SMH	7	December	1929,	17-18.	
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western	Sydney	federal	electorate	of	Reid	successfully	asserted	their	right	to	select	
Labor’s	candidate	by	membership	ballot.18	Strong	party	community	in	inner-western	
Sydney	was	probably	based	upon	the	occupational	communities	of	the	area’s	urban	
craft	unions.19	Conversely,	most	AWU	members	were	scattered	and/or	itinerant	and	
did	not	form	strong	communities	which	meant	they	were	generally	unable	to	resist	
oligarchy.	 When	 AWU	 members	 did	 live	 and	 work	 together	 in	 permanent	
communities,	however,	they	were	able	to	resist	oligarchy	successfully.	Port	Kembla	
AWU	members	have	provided	such	a	case	study.20	
	
Resistance	to	oligarchy	could	also	come	from	outside	an	organisation.	We	have	seen	
how	the	AWU	and	its	factional	opponents	within	the	Labor	Party	persistently	sniped	
at	one	another	throughout	the	period.	Aside	from	the	Labor	Party	 itself,	the	most	
influential	organisation	in	this	regard	was	the	CPA.	It	was	instrumental	in	the	PWIU,	
which	opposed	the	AWU	leaders,	and	in	the	MM,	which	opposed	and	then	deposed	
the	Miners	Federation	leadership.	It	also	had	considerable	clandestine	involvement	
with	the	Industrialists	and	their	successful	fight	against	the	Inner	Group.	
	
Conclusion	
Oligarchy	 is	 the	 norm	 within	 ostensibly	 democratic	 organisations	 including	 trade	
unions	and	political	parties.	 It	may	not	be	quite	 the	 iron	 law	 that	Robert	Michels	
claimed,	 but	 it	 is	 certainly	 a	 strong	 tendency.	 The	 three	 NSW	 labour	 movement	
organisations	studied	in	this	thesis	add	further	support	to	this	scholarly	consensus.	
The	 tendency	 to	 oligarchy	 is	 evident	 throughout	 but	 so	 is	 the	 potential	 to	 resist	
oligarchy	 even	 within	 the	 most	 undemocratic	 organisations	 like	 the	 AWU.	 Also	
evident	 is	 the	 possibility	 for	 highly	 democratic	 organisations	 like	 the	 Miners	
Federation	to	exist,	which	in	itself	disproves	the	claim	that	oligarchy	is	an	iron	law.	
	
																																								 																				
18	“Reid’s	revolt,”	SMH	28	September	1931,	7.	
19	Michael	Hogan,	Local	Labor:	A	History	of	the	Labor	Party	in	Glebe	1891-2003		(Leichardt:	
Federation	Press,	2004):	69.	
20	Port	Kembla,	South	Coast	Times	and	Wollongong	Argus,	22	July	1927,	10;	“AWU	members	locked	
out,”	AW,	13	August	1924,	16.	
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The	effects	of	trade	union	affiliation	to	the	Labor	Party	were	important	but	mixed	for	
democracy	 in	both	the	unions	and	the	party.	This	 is	actually	a	positive	 finding	 for	
labour	parties	because	it	contradicts	the	argument	made	by	some	both	within	and	
outside	 the	 labour	 movement	 that	 union	 affiliation	 has	 inherently	 undemocratic	
effects. 21 	Furthermore,	 much	 of	 the	 anti-democratic	 influence	 of	 unions	 on	 the	
interwar	NSW	Labor	Party	came	as	a	result	of	a	lack	of	democracy	within	the	unions	
themselves	rather	than	because	of	structural	effects	of	affiliation.	Democratic	labour	
parties	 do	 not	 need	 to	 drop	 union	 affiliation	 but	 they	 must	 acknowledge	 the	
tendency	 to	 oligarchy	within	 their	 affiliated	 unions	 and	 take	 a	 greater	 interest	 in	
ensuring	 that	 their	 affiliates	meet	basic	democratic	 requirements	before	 they	are	
allowed	to	exercise	power	within	the	party.
																																								 																				
21	Mark	Aarons,	"Labor	and	Unions,"	in	Dear	Mr	Rudd,	ed.	Robert	Manne	(Melbourne:	Black	Inc,	
2008).	
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APPENDIX	1:	LIST	OF	KEY	OFFICIALS	
AWU	
John	(Jack)	Bailey:	Central	Branch	President	(1915-33).	
John	(Jack)	Barnes:	national	President	(1924-38).	
Henry	Boote:	Australian	Worker	editor	(1914-43).	
George	Buckland:	Central	Branch	Secretary	(1921-1933).	
John	(Jack)	Cullinan:	Western	Branch	Secretary	(1917-20).	
Clarence	(Clarrie)	Fallon:	Queensland	Branch	Secretary	(1933-50).	
Edward	Grayndler:	General	Secretary	(1912-41).	
William	(Bill)	Lambert:	Central	Branch	Secretary	(1915-21).	
Hector	Lamond:	Australian	Worker	editor	then	manager	(1895-1916).	
Arthur	Rae:	AWU	national	President	(1895)	and	General	Secretary	(1898-99)	then	organiser	
of	the	Bushworkers	Propaganda	Group	(1920s)	and	Pastoral	Workers	Industrial	Union	
(1930-37).	
William	Spence:	General	Secretary	(1894-98)	and	national	President	(1898-1917).	
	
MINERS	FEDERATION	
John	(Jack)	Baddeley:	national	President	(1915-21).	
Dai	Davies:	General	Secretary	(1926-31).	
Thomas	(Bondy)	Hoare:	northern	district	President	(1922-42).	
Charles	(Charlie)	Nelson:	national	President	(1934-41)	
William	(Bill)	Orr:	General	Secretary	(1934-	40).	
Daniel	Rees:	national	President	(1922-34).	
Samuel	Rosa:	Common	Cause	editor	(1923-25).	
Edgar	Ross:	Common	Cause	editor	(1935-66).	
Arthur	Teece:	General	Secretary	(1925-26	and	1931-33).	
Albert	Willis:	General	Secretary	(1915-25).	
	
NSW	LABOR	PARTY	
James	Dooley:	parliamentary	leader	(1921-23)	and	Premier	of	NSW	(1921-22).	
James	(Jim)	Graves:	General	Secretary	(1930-39).	
Robert	(Bob)	Heffron:	parliamentary	leader	of	the	anti-Lang	Industrialist	section	(1936-39)	
and	later	Premier	of	NSW	(1959-64).	
John	(Jack)	Lang:	parliamentary	leader	(1923-39)	and	Premier	of	NSW	(1925-27	and	1930-
32).	
Harold	McCauley:	NSW	Premier’s	Department	(1925-27	and	1930-32).	
Norman	McCauley:	NSW	Premier’s	Department	(1925-27	and	1930-32).	
Harry	O’Regan:	returning	officer	(1931-39).	
John	Storey:	parliamentary	leader	(1916-21)	and	Premier	of	NSW	(1920-21).	
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April	1916	
§ Personal	 files,	 being	 mainly	 correspondence	 and	 printed	
material	 arranged	 alphabetically	 by	 name.	 Correspondence	
include	T.R.	Bavin,	J.	Bailey,	G.	Cann,	J.J.	Carruthers,	G.E.	Finey,	
V.E.	Goodin,	P.F.	Loughlin,	J.J.G.	McGirr,	N.	Makin,	T.D.	Mutch,	
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R.O'Halloran,	 K.	 O'Malley,	 C.W.	 Oakes,	 J.	 Osborne,	 J.W.	
Percival,	A.B.	Piddington,	W.G.	Spence,	T.	Waddell	
§ File	 re	 John	 Thomas	 Lang	 includes	 correspondence,	 notes,	
drafts	of	articles,	cuttings	etc.,	c.1913-29	
§ 'Full	story	and	documents	with	history	of	the	Industrial	Section	
of	 the	 A.L.P.	 -	 or	 "Billy	 Hughes	 secret	 junta".	 Scrapbook	
compiled	 by	Molesworth,	 including	 his	 typescript	 history	 of	
the	Section	(later	known	as	the	Industrial	Vigilance	Council	of	
the	A.L.P.),	with	rule	books	annual	reports	and	balance	sheet	
§ Papers,	 1918-28	 including	 correspondence	 and	 cuttings,	 re	
A.C.	Willis	and	J.S.	Garden	
§ Papers,	 including	correspondence,	cuttings	and	writings	re	J.	
Dooley's	leadership	of	State	Labor	Party,1921-3	
§ Printed	political	material	1922-32	
§ Papers	1924-30	re	mining	unions,	 including	correspondence,	
cuttings	and	printed	material	re	the	Workers'	Industrial	Union	
of	Australia	(Illawarra	district)	
§ Papers	1926-7	including	correspondence	and	drafts	of	articles,	
chiefly	re	Lang's	leadership.	
o MLMSS	243	
§ News	cuttings,	other	printed	and	Mss.	 re	One	Big	Union	
movement	and	ALP	internal	crisis	1918-22;	2	Vols.	
§ Correspondence	and	printed	material	re	conscription	and	
Industrial	Vigilance	Council	1917-18;	1	Vol.	
§ Papers	 re,	 i.a.,	 ALP	 conferences	 and	 election	 materials;	
1915-31.	
§ Papers	re	political	involvement	with	ALP,	P.L.L.,	and	as	an	
MLA:	(xiv)1911-15;	(xv)	1922-30;	(xvi)	1926-28	
§ Papers	re	Political	Labor	League,	1910-15;	
§ NSW	ALP	Conference	papers	1920-21	
o MLMSS	398:	
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§ 1901-1928;	Printed	material	re	the	A.L.P.,	the	NSW	Labour	
Council	 and	 the	 Political	 Labor	 League;	 includes	 balance	
sheets,	annual	conference	papers	and	Labor	Daily	material	
(Call	No.:	MLMSS	398/1)		
§ 1905-1928;	 Printed	 material	 relating	 to	 the	 Australian	
Workers	Union,	the	Great	Strike	of	1917	and	miscellaneous	
trade	 union	 material;	 includes	 newscuttings	 and	
conference	papers.	(Call	No.:	MLMSS	398/1)		
• Waite,	George:	
o George	Waite	papers,	1885-1926	MLMSS208	0.51	metres	of	textual	
material	(3	boxes)	
	
• Mutch,	T.D.	
o See	Bibliography	of	selected	manuscripts	relating	to	Australian	politics	
since	1890	held	in	the	Mitchell	Library,	Sydney	by	Peter	Loveday	and	
Helen	Nelson	
	
• Black,	George	
o Item	2	ALP	(NSW)	Report	1918	
• Holman,	W.A		
o Uncat	MSS	Set	111	(1	box)	proposed	standing	orders	for	NSW	Labor	
Party,	 letters	 1917-19	 re	 organisation	 of	 parties	 (Federal	 national	
Party	and	LP)	
• IWW	
o Set	262,	Item	(box)	3,	AWU:	Sneaking	in	Conscription	(Sydney)	n.d.	(c.	
1914)	Dodger	
o A1333,	AWU:	Ballot	Ticket	np	1900?	
o A1334,	Miners	Federation	circular	regarding	proposed	amalgamation	
with	AWU,	4	pages,	Melbourne,	1916	
• Molesworth,	Voltaire	
o Set	71	(9	boxes)	
	
	
325	
§ Item	1:		
• Parliamentary	LP	of	NSW	minute	book	Nov	1911-Apr	
1916	
• Political	 Labor	League	Homebush	Minute	book	1924-
26	
§ Item	2:	
• Industrial	 Section	 including	 reports,	 rules	 and	
constitutions,	history	
§ Item	4:		
• WIUA	(Illawarra)	balance	sheets	1922-29	
• Union	rules	and	constitution	(n.d.)	
• Notes	re	ALP	Easter	conference	1927	
• Typescript:	 How	 “Reds”	 Captured	 the	 ALP	 Machine	
(1927)	
• LP	NSW	standing	orders	1925	
• Bailey,	 John	MLA:	 dastardly	 frame-up:	 Eden-Monaro	
charges	disproved,	Sydney,	nd,	4	pages	
• Garden	on	Willis	notes	
§ Item	6:	
• ALP	list	of	Executive	members	1919	
• Official	manifesto	by	NSW	Central	Executive	1919	
• Industrial	Section	materials	
• Ford,	 William:	 The	 “Pommie”	 Takes	 Command:	 A	
warning	to	Australian	Workers,	Sydney,	1919,	Poster	
§ Item	7:	
• Typescript:	
o Dooley-ALP	Dispute	1923	
o Some	 Aspects	 of	 Dooleyism:	 How	 the	
Movement	was	Betrayed	
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o Findings	of	the	Disputes	Committee	of	the	ALP	
regarding	the	appointment	of	JB	Suttor	to	the	
LC	
• Molesworth,	Voltaire		
o Uncatt	MSS	Set	243	
§ Item	1	
• Volume	C	
o LP	crisis	of	1919	typescript	
o ALP	NSW	Conference	1919	
o ALP	NSW	Conference	1919	
§ Executive	for	1919	
§ List	of	branch	delegates	
§ Ford,	 William.	 The	 Pommie	 Takes	
Command	
• Volume	D	
o PLL	Auburn	Branch	Constitution	
o Barrier	Industrial	Assembly	Platform	and	Rules	
o List	of	delegates	to	annual	conference	1917	
o Pamphlet:	 the	 official	 history	 of	 the	
reconstruction	of	the	LP	1916	together	with	the	
12th	 annual	 report	 of	 the	 Women’s	 Central	
Organising	Committee	Sydney	1916	
§ Item	2	
• Volume	G	
o Western	Sydney	Labor	selection	ballot	
• Volume	H	
o PLL	NSW:	 includes	regulations	adopted	by	PLL	
Executive	 for	 the	 guidance	 of	 branches	
regarding	conduct	of	selection	ballots	
§ Item	4	
• Folder	23	
	
	
327	
o Power,	JM	MLC	NSW	Labor	Mix-up	(c.	1921)	
o Report	of	Committee	appointed	to	inquire	into	
allegations	 made	 by	 Mr	 McGirr	 against	 his	
colleagues	1923	
§ Item	5	
• Letters	and	notes	regarding	Willis	and	the	LP	1928	
• ALP	selection	ballots	1919	
• Folder	9	
o Correspondence	Lang-Willis	1931-32	
o Notes	regarding	Labor	Daily	
§ Item	6	
• Many	 relevant	 NSW	 ALP	 reports,	 delegate	 and	
resolution	lists,	selection	ballots	
• ALP	 NSW	 Conference	 1926	 list	 of	 union	 delegates,	
notes	and	newscuttings	
• ALP	NSW	conference	1923	list	of	delegates	
• Molesworth,	Voltaire	
o Set	398	
§ Item	1:	
• Labor	 Council	 of	 NSW	 agendas,	 annual	 conferences	
1921,	24,	27,	28	
• Labor	Council	Railway	Strike	1917	report	and	balance	
sheet	
• To	the	members	of	the	miners	union	1928	
• Australasian	Workers	Union	
o Election	results	
o Business	sheet	for	Annual	Conference	1923	
o Notes	 taken	 by	 Jack	 Bailey	 MLA	 during	
Conference	1923	
• CPA:	The	CPA	and	the	LP	1924	(15	pages)	
§ Item	2:	
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• The	New	ALP	Rules.	Why	they	are	Red	
• AWU:	
o Grayndler	replies	to	enemies	of	the	AWU	1923	
4	pages	
o Apology	to	Buckland	1928	
o Rank	and	File	Committee	of	 the	AWU	circular	
letter	and	manifesto	1928	
o How	the	present	ALP	executive	organises	1926	
o 	
• NSW	Labor	Council:	
o The	Labor	Daily	is	Black	1925	
o The	truth	about	the	Labor	Daily	1925	
o Packing	 Conference.	 Tyrrell-Magrath	 faction	
exposed	1926	
o Report	and	balance	sheet	1909-10	
• Mutch,	TD	
o Set	426	
§ Item	8	
• PLL	 NSW:	 Resume	 of	 the	 correspondence	 and	
negotiations	in	respect	of	the	branches	in	the	Belmore	
electorate	Sydney	1915	
§ Item	45	
• South	 ward	 Municipal	 League:	 Rules	 and	 By-laws	
Randwick	nd	193?	
§ Item	50	
• Reasons	why	the	red	rules	should	not	be	adopted	
• Bailey,	John	election	dodger	1917	
§ Item	75	
• Judd,	 EE	 the	 Brisbane	 street	 whore	 (alias	 the	 Labor	
Daily)	1927	
• O’Sullivan,	TJ	
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o A2756	
§ BPG:	the	AWU	and	Faked	Ballots	1924	
§ BPG:	Report	and	Balance	sheet	1924	
§ AWU	RWIB:	to	the	rank	and	file	of	the	AWU	
§ Senator	Barnes’	sinister	ruling	1925	
• Waite,	George	
o Set	208	
§ Item	1	
• Anon:	Fourteen	points	about	Gardenism	
• Waite,	George	what’s	wrong	with	Labor	(8	pages)	1922	
• Berry,	Bailey	Lambert	and	Co	Ltd	secrets	exposed	1922	
• Majority	Australian	LP	constitution	and	rules	
• HEB,	An	alleged	Labor	Daily	for	Sydney	1924	
• W	 Blake,	 Secretary,	 Conference	 of	 the	 Left	 Wing	
movement	of	the	NSW	coalfields.	The	Miners	Money	
n.d.	
§ Item	2	
• Interpretation	of	rules,	selection	ballots	1924	4	pages	
• Statement	 of	 the	 attitude	 of	 the	 LC	 on	 the	 political	
situation	at	the	present	time	1922	
• Berry	 the	 infamous	 iron	 hand:	 Bailey’s	 stranglehold	
1921	4	pages	
§ Item	3	
• RWIB	mass	meeting	1923	
• RWIB	Organise!	Organise!	For	closer	unity	1924	
• WH	Lambert	Independent	Labor	(Sydney,	nd)	
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Newspapers:	
• Australian	Worker	(AWU	official	Sydney	newspaper)	(1910-1939,	hard	copy	
at	NBAC,	digitised	on	Trove)	
• Century	(Jack	Lang’s	Labor	newspaper)	(No.	1	(Friday,	May	27,	1938)	Ceased	
with	v.	39,	no.	4	(Jan.	30,	1976),	microfilm	NLA)	
• Common	 Cause	 (Miners’	 Federation	 official	 newspaper)	 (No.	 1	 (Mar.	 19,	
1920);	Vol.	1,	no.	1	(July	15,	1921)	-	Nov.	2,	1935;	New	Series	Vol.	1,	no.	1	
(Nov.	9,	1935)	 (as	supplement	 in	Labor	Daily	Dec.	31,	1924	-	Nov.	8,	1935,	
microfilm	NLA,	hard	copy	NBAC	(S104))	
• Communist	(Vol.	1,	no.	20	(May	6,	1921)-v.	2,	no.	20	(July	21,	1922)	;	No.	73	
(July	 28,	 1922)-no.	 117	 (June	 15,	 1923),	 microfilm	 NLA)	 (Shearers’	 Strike	
Bulletin	supplement	Aug.	25,	1922).	
• Labor	Daily	(NSW	Labor	Party	official	newspaper)	(Jan.	23,	1922	-	Dec.	1,	1938,	
microfilm	NLA)	
• Labor	Monthly	 (NSW	Labor	Council	official	newspaper)	 (1926-29,	microfilm	
NLA)	(incorporated	into	Pan-Pacific	Worker	1928-32,	microfilm	NLA)	
• Labor	 News	 (NSW	 Labor	 Party	 official	 newspaper)	 (1918-24,	 digitised	 on	
Trove)	
• Labor	Weekly	(Labor	Council	official	newspaper)	(Vol.	1,	no.	1-v.	4,	no.	4	27	
Aug.	1,	1930-Dec.	23,	1938,	microfilm	NLA)	
• Socialisation	 Call	 (NSW	 Labor	 Party	 Socialisation	 Committee’s	 official	
newspaper)	(Vol.	1,	no.	1	(Apr.	1931)-		Ceased	Apr.	1933,	microfilm	NLA)	
• Sydney	Morning	Herald	(entire	period,	digitised,	searchable)	
• Workers'	Weekly	 (Communist	 Party	 of	 Australia	 official	 newspaper)	 No.	 1	
(June	22,	1923)-no.	1032	(Aug.	29,	1939),	microfilm,	NLA)	
Monographs:	
Childe,	Vere	Gordon.	How	Labour	Governs:	A	Study	of	Workers’	Representation	 in	
Australia	(1923;	reprint,	Sydney:	Australian	Digital	Collections,	1998),	71.	
Gasteen,	Jim.	Under	the	Mulga.		St	Lucia:	University	of	Queensland	Press,	2005.	
Hogan,	Michael	ed.,	Labor	Pains	Volume	IV:	Early	Conference	Reports	of	the	Labor	
Party	of	NSW	1918-1925	(Sydney:	Sydney	University	Escholarship,	2011).	
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Lane,	Ernest.	Dawn	to	Dusk.	Brisbane:	Brooks,	1939.	
Moore,	Fred,	Paddy	Gorman,	and	Ray	Harrison,	eds.	At	the	Coalface:	An	Oral	History.	
Sydney:	CFMEU,	1998.	
Moore,	Fred,	Paddy	Gorman,	Ray	Harrison,	Alan	Murray,	and	Anne	Kruse,	eds.	Back	
at	the	Coalface:	Volume	Ii	of	the	Australian	Coal	Miners	Oral	History	Sydney:	
CFMEU,	2007.	
Palmer,	Joan	Austin.	Memories	of	a	Riverina	Childhood.		Kensington:	NSW	University	
Press,	1993.	
The	Miners	Federation	of	Australia:	50th	Anniversary.		Sydney:	ACSEF,	1965.	
Furphy,	Joseph.	Such	Is	Life.	1903.	
Lang,	John	Thomas.	I	Remember.		Sydney:	Invincible	Press,	1956.	
Smith,	George.	Once	a	Green	Jackaroo.		London:	Hale,	1975.	
	
NSW	and	 Commonwealth	 Parliamentary	 Papers	 and	Debates	 (entire	 period,	 hard	
copy	ANU	library).	
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